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IHTRODUCTIO~ ASSUKPTIOHS AND SCOPE 
This study proceeds by analysis and comparison: 
analysis 0£ the elenctic method used by the Socrates of 
Pla to 1 s early dialogues and comparison of that method with 
the one used by Euripides in creating his Medea. 
Any analysis entails assumptions. To begin with, it 
is assumed, on the basis 0£ the work. of many earlier 
scholars, that Pla to 1 s dialogues show a chronological 
progression, and that the dialogues themselves may be 
divided into categories of early, middle, and late. It is 
additionally assumed that the Socratic method 0£ the early 
dialogues shows certain characteristics which distinguish 
it from Plato 1 s later method, and that these character-
is tics justi£y the designation "Socratic ... 1 
A comparison 0£ Socratic and Euripidean method may, 
however, suggest a scope to which this study does not 
1This designation does not presume to solve the 
insoluble, the so-called "Socratic question," i.e., what is 
Socratic and what Platonic in the writings 0£ Plato. The 
reticence 0£ modern scholars in using the designation 
"Socratic," an understandable reaction to the sometimes 
reckless daring of their predecessors, seems nevertheless 
to exceed the demands 0£ prudence. While the designation 
"Socratic," as a short-hand way of distinguishing the 
method 0£ the early dialogues £rom that 0£ the later ones, 
could cautiously be defended here by an appeal to the well 
respected need £or brevity 0£ expression, I nonetheless 
maintain that the (albeit scanty) evidence on the 
historical Socrates, as well as a commonsense reading of 
the vast literature on the development 0£ Plato 1 s method, 
justify the use of this designation. Solution of the 
Socratic question is, in any event, not essential for this 
study•s argument. 
aspire. This study does not propose, 'following modern 
assumptions, to treat philosophical discourse and drama as 
two distinct modes 0£ expression, i.e., as the prosaic and 
the poetic. To do so would be anachronistic, £or the 
ancient Greeks 0£ the -firth century B. C. did not consider 
philosophical discourse and drama as so obviously distinct 
as do we 0£ modern times. Hor was the "prosaic" mode 0£ 
literary expression, new to Greek. literature in the £i£th 
century B. C., at that time so 'far removed 'from the 
standard, the poetic, mode.2 .Furthermore, the 
assumption that philosophical discourse and drama are 
distinct and diverse modes of expression suggests two 
courses £or comparison--one £utile, the other promising--
that this study does not take. It does not attempt to 
disclose Euripides' "philosophy," an attempt that has, 
despite being fraught with problems, been more than once 
made.3 Hor does it consider the dramatic elements per 
2on these points, see Martha :Nussbaum, The 
Fragility 0£ Goodness: Luck. and Ethics in Greek. Tragedy 
and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986; 
hereafter :Nussbaum, Fragility), pp. 122-123. 
3see below, Chapter Three, Part One, and Chapter 
Four, Part Two, £or attempts to assign a "philosophy" to 
Euripides. He has been termed a rationalist, 
irra tionalist, sophist, and idealist. He has been accused 
both of openly rejecting •socra tic doctrine• in his plays, 
and 0£ agreeing with it. 
There are at least two methodological errors that lead 
to such con-fusion. First, it is all too easy to extract 
sections of speeches made by characters in Euripidean plays 
in support of any or these philosophic orientations, but 
more di££icult to de£end them in light of an entire play, 
Which is, after all, the poet's statement. Consider what 
2 
se of Plato's dialogues,4 although such consideration 
is worthy of further pursuit. 
Furthermore, this study does not seek to prove what 
the progression of its chapters--from analyzing the 
Socratic method to demonstrating that method's use in 
Euripides' Kedea--may suggest: that Socrates influenced 
Euripides. Such a claim was, in fact, made by Aristophanes 
and various others, but the validity of these claims is 
assumed to be the perceived similarity of method which lies 
beneath them. Demonstrating this similarity of method and 
illustrating the method's employment by Euripides, and 
thereby of£ering a new way 0£ interpreting his work, are 
the aims 0£ this study. 
Since the study's originality lies primarily in 
illustrating Euripides' method of composition, it is upon 
this endeavor that the strictest limits have been set. 
sort of assessment we would have of Plato's philosophy if 
analysis of his dialogues were based on statements made by 
certain characters he depicts. Second, even if an entire 
play is considered as a philosophic treatise, the rigorous 
standards of vocabulary common to (at least) modern 
philosophical treatises should not be assumed to be 
operational in literary texts. On the first point, see 
below, Chapter Three, Part One; on the second, see K. J. 
O'Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Kind (Chapel 
Hill: Univ. 0£ Horth Carolina Press, 1967; herea£ter 
O'Brien, Paradoxes) pp. 50-5~ 
4-see, e.g., J. H. Randall, Jr., Plato: Dramatist 
of the Life of Reason (Hew York: Columbia Univ. Press, 
1970); cf. Charles H. Kahn, •Drama and Dialectic in Plato's 
Gorgias,• in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 1, 
ed. Julia Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983; hereafter 
Kahn, "Gorgias•), pp. 75-122. 
3 
Exposing an author•s method requires an exhaustive 
examination 0£ the literature, lest details overlooked in a 
superficial analysis provide by their omission -false 
justification for an impaired hypothesis. This study 
therefore limits its analysis to one play 0£ Euripides, 
Hedea,5 so that the integrity 0£ its hypothesis may be 
thoroughly tested. 
5Justi£ica tion £or the choice of this particular 
play may be found in Chapter Three, Part Two. 
CHAPTER ORE 
SOCRATIC ELERCHOS ARD MAIEUSIS IR PLATO'S EARLY DIALOGUES 
Part One: Pla to•s Early Dialogues 
Although the chronological progression 0£ Plato•s 
dialogues is much disputed,6 the present study demands 
only that dialogues be classi£ied as early, middle, or 
late, and does not require establishing exact dating of 
each dialogue, or even their relative chronology. I accept 
as convincing the broad characteristics of the three 
periods of Platonic dialogues, drafted and used by Richard 
Robinson.7 
6The highly favored stylometric method of dating 
the dialogues, using the Laws as the standard 0£ Plato•s 
late style (on the authority of Diogenes Laertius, 
3.37.25), has yielded accord mainly, as one would expect, 
in the later dialogues. Re la ti ve dating of the early 
dialogues (the focus of this study) is hotly debated. For 
a table comparing the chronology of the Platonic dialogues 
by five different scholars, see Sir David Ross, Plato's 
Theory of Ideas (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976; 
hereafter Ross, Plato's Theory>. p. 2. Scholars who 
concentrate on classifying dialogues into three distinct 
periods do not use the philological criteria most respected 
by those seeKing exact dating, but instead point to 
philosophical or literary criteria as a basis £or 
classi f ica ti on. 
7Richard Robinson, Pla to 1 s Earlier Dialectic, 2 
ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953; hereafter Robinson, 
PED2). My indebtedness to the worK of this outstanding 
Platonic scholar will become evident. Robinson•s criteria 
for categorization 0£ the dialogues are not based on an 
assumed development of doctrine--a method rightly 
criticized by Ross, Plato•s Theory, p. 1, as too 
subjective--but instead on evolution of method. For an 
ordering of the dialogues that agrees with Robinson•.s, see 
5 
Early dialogues.8 according to Robinson. are 
characterized by the presence of Socratic elenchos and 
Socratic definition. The predominance of elenchos itself 
is the hallmark of an early dialogue, and elenchos in these 
dialogues proceeds along systematically predictable lines: 
Gregory Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," in Oxford Studies 
in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983; hereafter Vlastos1 "Elenchus"). p. 27 n. 2. Cf. also 
Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Koral Philosopher 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press. 1991; hereafter Vlastos. 
Socrates). pp. 45-80, for descriptions of the differences 
between the "Socrateses" of the various periods of the 
dialogues. 
An overview 0£ the debate on ordering the dialogues 
and criticism of scholars who do not distinguish "Socratic" 
from "Platonic" dialogues may be found in Karl R. Popper, 
The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. 1: The Spell of 
Plato, 5 ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966), 
pp. 306-313, n. 56. I owe this reference to James G. 
Keenan. 
8protasoras. Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, 
Republic 1. Gorgias. Hippias Major. Hippias Minor. 
Crito1 Euthydemus. The dialogues are not listed in 
assumed chronological order. I follow Robinson 1 s 
Ly sis. 
Apology. 
any 
(PED2, passim) evident classification: he is 
understandably hesitant to attempt strict division in a 
corpus that forms an organic whole and was revised. 
Robinson boldly lists his middle dialogues (?Keno. 
Banquet, Phaedo1 Republic, Parmenides, TheaetetUs, and 
Cratylus) and •certain late dialogues• (Phaedrus, Sophist, 
Statesman, and Philebus) in his pre-face (PED2 p. v, 
but see p. 49 for Republic 1 as early, and pp--:-70 and 122 
-for his qualifications on designating Keno a middle 
dialogue). but nowhere gives a complete account 0£ how he 
classifies the remaining dialogues. Some dialogues clearly 
-fall for him on the cusp of his divisions. Robinson 
includes Euthydemus both in the list o-f dialogues 
consulted for a count of direct and indirect elenctic 
arguments, which suggests that he considers it an early 
dialogue, and in his chapter on "Dialectic." which suggests 
that it is a middle dialogue (PED2, pp. 241 261 74, 
87). Perhaps his discomfort in classifying the dialogue 
arises from his perception that it is "mainly devoted to 
Picturing or exaggerating the eristical temper " 
(PED2, p. 85), and, as such, it obscures the elenchos. 
6 
an interlocutor is asked to define an entity, usually 
ethical, and in subsequent cross-examination, his 
definition, as a particular instance, is shown to be 
deficient in some way when compared to an assumed "form" of 
that entity. Discussion in the early dialogues ends in 
aporia: both the interlocutor and Socrates admit that they 
are at a loss, and they depart with but one fact 
established--that they do not know. The Socratic 
character of elenchos (see below, Part Three) gives these 
dialogues their ironic, destructive, conclusively negative 
tone; the fact of definition makes their subject matter 
particular, and the particulars chosen for definition give 
the dialogues a thematic compass that is distinctively 
moral.9 
While elenchos and definition never entirely 
disappear in any period of the Platonic dialogues, those of 
the middle period10 show a gradual trend away from 
9Robinson, PED2 
-- . 
pp. 19, 61. 
10Meno, Symposium, Phaedo, Republic (except 
Republic 1), Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Cratylus will be 
considered middle dialogues. The dialogues again are not 
in an assumed chronological order, and again, following 
Robinson, PED2, p. v. He no is for Robinson a dialogue 
transitionatbetween early and middle. See PED2, p. 
122. Parmenides seems to waiver between middle and late 
for Robinson (see his chapter, "Hypothesis in the 
Parmenides," PED2, pp. 223-280) while still being a 
strange hybrid of early and middle: an examination of the 
theory of ideas via elenchos and, in its later hal£, an 
example of hypothesis, the "keyword" of the middle 
dialogues. See PED2, pp. 32 and 70. 
Gregory Vlastos, "Elench us and Ha thematics: A 
Turning-Point in Plato 1 s Philosophical Development," AJP 
7 
depicting to discussing elenchos,11 and shift the focus 
of definition from the individual universals to universals 
in general. The tone becomes constructive as the negative 
aspects of elenchos are subordinated to a new purpose: 
establishing permanent knowledge. The assumed existence of 
109 (1988; hereafter Vlastos, "Elenchus and Mathematics"), 
pp. 362-396, argues that the metaphysical outlook which 
characterizes the middle dialogues is attributable to 
Plato's pursuit of the study of mathematics. Elenchos, 
which lacks "indubitably certain termini" (p. 368), was 
shed in the middle dialogues without comment by the budding 
mathematician Plato, who indicated its shedding "by 
dramatic means, pairing Socrates with interlocutors who no 
longer give him any fight." {p. 371). Vlastos similarly 
points out (pp. 376 and 380) that the adversative role 
elenchos demands of Socrates and "the 'say only what you 
believe• rule, which forbids debating an unasserted 
premise" are impediments to investigating hypotheses. 
UBy establishing this progression as the basis 
for his theory of chronology of the Platonic dialogues, 
Robinson's criteria are distinguished from the more 
subjective criteria criticized by Ross, Pla to•s Theory, p. 
1. Any scholar working with interpretation of texts would 
do well to read Robinson's strictly formulated "canons of 
interpretation," outlined in his first chapter (PED2, 
pp. 1-5), from which he derives his operational assumption 
that "to possess a single name for an idea is a later stage 
than to be able to express it only in a sentence ... " 
{PED2 , p. 5). This assumption, which gives rise to 
the basis for Robinson's chronology, not only betrays a 
sound understanding of the evolution of thought, but has 
also been recently supported by the theoretical work of 
Eric A. Havelock on the revolution of literacy in fifth 
century Greece. For Havelock's theory on the transition 
from orality to literacy and its manifestation in forms of 
expression (showing an evolution from the concrete and 
particular to the abstract), as well as its implications 
for the origins of moral philosophy as applied to the 
Socrates of the Platonic dialogues, see his recent "The 
Orality of Socrates and the Literacy of Plato: with Some 
Reflections on the Historical origins 0£ Koral Philosophy 
in Europe," in Hew Essays on Socrates, ed. Eugene Kelly 
(Lanham, HD: University Press of America, 1984; herea£ter 
Havelock, "Orality"), pp. 67-94. 
8 
"£orms" no longer serves, as it did in the early dialogues, 
as a standard against which a particular "£orm" can be 
tested and proposed opinion negated, but instead as the 
hypothetical basis £or constructing positive doctrine. As 
discussion 0£ particulars recedes behind this larger 
program, negative elenchos is "incorporated into the larger 
whole of dialectic.•12 Method yields to science, with 
knowledge, not correct procedure, as the goal. Robinson 
neatly divides the two periods: 
... the early gives prominence to method but not to 
methodology, while the middle gives prominence to 
methodology but not to method. In other words, 
theories 0£ method are more obvious in the middle, but 
examples 0£ it are more obvious in the early ... 
elenchus changes into dialectic, the negative into the 
positive, pedagogy into discovery, morality into 
science.13 
12Robinson, PED2, p. 19. Robinson 
distinguishes between dialectic and elenchos by asserting 
that "dialectic is an art or Texv'l'l as well as a 
method" (p. 74), while elenchos is presumably a method 
only. Both art and method entail an end or purpose, but 
"method is, and art is not, a specialization 0£ the notion 
0£ .. going•. The .. method• is the description 0£ the 
temporal actions in their temporal sequence, by which the 
desired end is brought about; whereas the .. art• or 
.. science• is the recital of the facts and principles which 
prescribe those actions. ..Art• tends toward permanent 
knowledge, but .. method• towards changing .. procedure.•• (pp. 
62-63). By being "incorporated into the larger whole 0£ 
dialectic," elenchos in the middle dialogues changes £rom 
unadulterated method to art and method, and thereby gives 
up its purely negative tone: ---.tJ:t is harnessed to the car 
of construction." (p. 19). 
13Robinson, PED2 
-- . 
pp. 61 and 19. 
9 
The late dialogues14 continue the trend, and 
there emerges in them a sense 0£ discomfort with the 
question-and-answer method 0£ even the more positive 
dialectic. Late dialogues tend to become trea tises15 
as hypothesis yields to synthesis and division.16 
In short, Robinson uses evolution 0£ method as the 
criterion for classifying the chronological periods 0£ 
Platonic dialogues: early dialogues depict elenchos in 
operation; middle and late dialogues, despite their 
discussion 0£ elenchos, display affiliation with methods 
other than elenchos, i.e., dialectic on the one hand and 
synthesis and division on the other. Robinson 1 s 
classi£ications provide this study with a sure way 0£ 
discriminating between primary and secondary Platonic 
source material. For analyzing Socratic elenchos, 
14Late dialogues include Phaedrus, Sophist, 
Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus, Cri tias. See Robinson, 
PED2, p. v. Robinson does not classi£y Timaeus, 
Kenexenus, or Critias, all 0£ which are virtual monologues. 
Timaeus and Critias are deemed late by Ross, Plato 1 s 
Theory, p. 10. Heither Critias nor Kenexenus is cited by 
Robinson, presumably considered in£erior or spurious. 
Kenexenus must be either middle or late (terminus post 
quem is 390 B. C., according to Ross, Plato 1 s Theory, p. 
9). 
Robinson, PED2 
-- . 
p. 84. 
16For an examination 0£ the similarities, 
differences, merits, and limitations of "de£inition• in the 
early and "division• in the late dialogues, see George 
Hakhnikian, "Elenctic De£initions,• in The Philosophy 0£ 
Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Gregory 
Vlastos (Hotre Dame, IH: Univ. 0£ Notre Dame Press, 1980), 
pp. 125-157, esp. pp. 140-157. 
10 
Robinson's early dialogues, with their distinctive 
depiction of elenchos, will best serve as primary source 
material, while his middle and late dialogues, with their 
shift from practicing to discussing elenchos, will serve as 
secondary source material which will provide evidence for 
Plato's understanding of the method. 
11 
Part Two: The Procedure of Elenchos in Plato 1 s Dialogues 
Elenchos in the Platonic dialogues is not merely 
procedure, but instead procedure given a distinctive 
character by its practitioner, Socrates. Although 
separating the method 1 s essence from its character is not 
entirely possible, analysis of elenchos will begin here 
with a description of the method itself, primarily as it is 
depicted in the early Platonic dialogues. Part Three will 
proceed with an examination of the method 1 s Socratic 
character, £or which Pla to 1 s discussions of elenchos in the 
middle and late dialogues give principal testament. Part 
Four will consider the tragic dimensions 0£ Socratic 
elenchos as it is depicted by Plato in the early 
dialogues. 
The verb E:>.eyxw,17 used by Plato to 
describe Socrates 1 procedure in the dialogues,18 gives 
a picture of the method in broad outline. In the fifth and 
fourth centuries B. c.,19 the uses 0£ the verb 
> , 
e>.eyxelv point to a procedure, to "question," 
17And 
> , 
£~£>.eyxw, 
words sharing its 
> , 
ave>.eyTos, and 
root 
the 
> , 
(e~e>.eyTeos. 
like). 
18The word and its root occur most frequently in 
the middle and late dialogues. Robinson cites Gorgias as a 
dialogue with a high occurrence 0£ the root E:>.eyx-: 
"over fifty times in its eighty pages" {Robinson, 
PED2, p. 15). 
19 >E>.Eyxw is a word whose definition shows 
marked differences in Epic and post-Epic periods. 
1.2 
•cross-examine," and imply its two possible goals, to 
•prove" (a positive outcome), or to "refute" (a negative 
2.0 outcome). The dictionary definitions serve to limit 
expectations but do not answer all questions: we know to 
expect a procedure of questioning and cross-examining and a 
goal of proof or refutation, but we do not know the intent 
of the questioning,21 the form it will take, or how 
that form ef£ects either 0£ the procedure's goals: proof 
or refutation. Plato•s early dialogues, with their 
depiction of elenchos, provide answers not obtained from 
the dictionary definitions. 
The procedure of elenchos in the early dialogues is 
largely informed by the intent of Socrates• questioning, 
which is to establish the definition of a universa1.22 
This intent expresses itself either obviously, in explicit 
primary questions, or more subtly, in a persistent emphasis 
on definition throughout the course of a dialogue. Primary 
20Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-
English Lexicon, 9 ed., ed. H. G. L. Hammond and H. H. 
Scullard, revised and augmented by Sir Henry Stuart Jones, 
Roderick McKenzie, et al., with a supplement ed. E. A. 
Barber, et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968; hereafter 
LSJ9), p. 531. 
21Properly speaking, the intent of the questioning 
falls under the method •s Socratic character, but is 
inseparable from the form, which is truly the method •s 
essence. 
22The importance of this aspect of Socrates• 
method is considered by Hugh Benson, "The Priority of 
Definition and the Socratic Elenchus," in Oxford Stud,ies in 
Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 8, ed. Julia Annas (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 19-65. 
13 
questions are expressed in one 0£ two £or ms: "What is X?" 
or "Is x Y?".23 The dialogues with primary questions 
impress the reader both as more clearly intent on 
definition, since the focus 0£ definition is maintained 
thoughout and the progression of the questioning is 
obvious, and as somewhat more artificially arranged, since 
under the £irm control 0£ Socrates 1 questioning the topic 
does not range widely as ordinary conversation is wont to 
do. Dialogues without primary questions, by contrast, 
lack the £ocus and clear progressional form 0£ those with 
primary questions, but strike the reader as more nearly 
approximating true conversational form. Thus, although the 
intent to de£ine may be observed in all 0£ the early 
dialogues, the progression 0£ the questioning is more 
easily seen in dialogues that have a primary 
question.24 
The general form 0£ the questioning in dialogues with 
a primary question follows a predictable procedure. A£ter 
eliciting an answer to his primary question, Socrates o£ten 
23see Robinson 1 s chapter, "Socratic Definition" 
(PED2, pp. 49-60). Robinson identifies Euthyphro, 
Laches, Charmides, and Hippias Major as dialogues dominated 
by the "What is X?" question, while in Gorgias, Meno, and 
Republic 1 the "Is X Y?" question predominates. Dialogues 
lacking primary questions are, according to him, Ion, 
Hippias Minor, Apology, Crito, and Protagoras. --
24Both using a dialogue that has a primary 
question, and extracting the method from that dialogue are 
£or the sake 0£ clarifying the procedure 1 s form. This 
artificially created clarity should not be construed as 
integral to the method 1 s employ. 
14 
allows the answerer to elaborate and then expresses 
dissatis£action with the answer, not by claiming that the 
answer is £alse, but that the question was misunderstood. 
He has been given a particular example 0£ practice, he 
maintains, when what he wanted was a universal 'form 
<e'l'oos>. essence > I (oua1.a), or aspect 
> ( I. 6 
I 
€ 
a ) 
A summary 0£ Euthyphro will serve to illustrate the 
procedure. A£ter an introductory prologue, in which 
Euthyphro explains his present circumstance and agrees to 
the existence 0£ the 
> I 1.oea 0£ •holiness• (To 
~01.ov)--that it is always the same regardless 0£ action 
and that holiness and unholiness are opposites (5d.1-5), 
Socrates asks Euthyphro to tell him what he considers 
•holiness and unholiness.• To this Eu thyphro replies, 
•. . . holiness is the very thing I am doing now " 
Cl (ovep > • eyw v \) v ..... 1f01.W, 5d.8-9).25 
Euthyphro elaborates brie£ly by way 0£ proo£, drawing a 
parallel between his actions and those which men 
believe26 Zeus committed against his £a ther (5e.2-
25The text used £or all Platonic dialogues is the 
'five volume Ox£ord Plato: Platonis, Opera, vols. 1-5, ed. 
by J. Burnet (Ox£ord: Clarendon Press, 1900-1907). 
26Euthyphro cites as proo£ the belie-fs o-f his 
contemporaries, but Socrates, in his customary way, makes 
Euthyphro pro£ess these belie-fs as his own (6b.3-6) be-fore 
he will continue his questioning. Euthyphro must thus be 
understood as both a 'fictional character in a dialogue and 
an "everyman" contemporary 0£ Socrates. See Robinson, 
m 2 • p. 26. See below, Part Three, £or a discussion 
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6a). But Socrates complains that the answer is 
insufficient, being grounded in happenstance (6d.l-4). He 
reminds Euthyphro of his former agreement to the 
proposition that holiness and unholiness are consistent and 
opposite regardless of particular action (5d.l-6), and 
requests that Eu thyphro now give him not examples from the 
many holy things, but instead "that form itself, by which 
things are deemed holy" li ,... > ' (E:KE:lVO auTo all holy 
' TO .) or the "aspect" (T.fiv 
, . 
lc5eav, 
6d.10-e.3). 
Astutely and definitely, Socrates steers the focus of 
definition away from reference to accepted practice and 
popular belief to the more rigorous definition of 
uni versals.27 Throughout the early Platonic dialogues 
Socrates does not allow particular action, described 
through the use of adjectives or verbs related to the 
concept, to serve as definition for the concept itself, for 
which he regularly uses an articular adjective. Hor does 
he take elaborated belief at face value, but often 
discreetly examines its logical consequences. Eu thyphro 
of Plato"s (or Socrates') intent in using this "personal 
aspect" of elenchos, and below, Chapter Four, Part Four, 
for Euripides" similar practice in creating mythic personae 
who exhibit fifth-century B. C. Athenian characteristics. 
2 7The subtle but continual collocation of these 
two realms of definition (accepted practice and popular 
belief on the one hand, and uni versa ls on the other) is the 
crux, I am convinced, of elenchos, and in and of itself 
goes a long way towards explaining how Socrates is able to 
bring about refutation, yet cannot but suggest proof. 
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agrees to the rules set by Socrates, and proposes a revised 
de£ini tion 0£ the universal: "What is dear to the gods is 
holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy." (6e.10-
7a.1). 
The procedure continues with Socrates asking 
questions whose answers seem obvious; in effect he is 
eliciting agreement to a number of secondary premises, 
based both on information provided as proof by the 
interlocutor in the elaboration of his original 
de£inition, and on logical, commonsense interpretations of 
seemingly analogous everyday occurrences.28 These 
secondary premises, which sometimes at first blush seem to 
have little to do with the universal proposed for 
28As Robinson notes, "These secondary questions 
differ from the primary one in that, whereas that was a 
matter of real doubt and di£ficulty, the answers to all 
these seem obvious and inescapable. Socrates usually 
phrases them so that the natural answer is yes; and i£ you 
say anything else you are likely to seem irrational or at 
least queer." (PED2, p. 7; italics added). The 
italicized sections explain why it is that these secondary 
premises are derived from situations which are only 
seemingly analogous. The realm of belief and that of 
logic, or enlightened self-interest which informs true 
practicality and utility (from which Socrates 1 analogies 
are inevitably drawn) are rarely synonymous. 
Nietzsche boast£ully exposes the naivete with which we 
an approach explanation of belief: "Would anyone like to 
take a look into the secret of how ideals are made on 
earth? Who has the courage?--Very well! Here is a point 
we can see through into this dark work.shop. But wait a 
moment or two, Hr. Rash and Curious: your eyes must first 
get used to this false iridescent light.--All right! How 
speak.! What is going on down there? Say what you see, man 
of the most perilous kind of inquisi ti veness--now I am the 
one Who is listening." F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of 
Morals, in The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, transl. and ed. 
W. Kaufmann (Hew York: Random House, 1968), p. 482. 
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de£inition,29 inevitably show a de£iciency in the 
revised de£inition, which is consequently emended. In 
guthYPhro, this part 0£ the procedure begins at 8a and 
continues through the dialogue until near its end, at 
l5b.7. Socrates £irst easily obtains Euthyphro•s 
agreement to his own previously alleged statement 0£ 
29Robinson distinguishes three -forms 0£ Socrates• 
argumentation within elenchos, which depend on the attitude 
o£ the interlocutor. Socrates will merely restate a 
position with which the interlocutor is in agreement, and 
the interlocutor does not argue at all. I£ it is perceived 
as likely that the interlocutor will not agree with a 
statement, Socrates• mode 0£ argumentation is adjusted to 
how willing he thinks the interlocutor may be to concede 
the destruction 0£ a thesis. Hore or less deception is 
used in response to the interlocutor•s perceived 
willingness: some £ew arguments in de£inition are £airly 
direct, and labelled "epagoge" {synonymous with induction) 
by Robinson; more are indirect, and called by Robinson 
•syllogism." {For his definition of these terms, see 
PED2, pp. 33 and 21 respectively.) Robinson•s 
conclusions about the occurrence of various £orms of 
argumentation are as £ollows: "The Socratic elenchus is 
nearly always a syllogism. Hore in detail, the simple 
refutations are nearly always syllogisms; and in the 
complex re£utations the last and main step is nearly 
always a syllogism. The probable cause of this is that an 
answerer is very unlikely to grant premisses £rom which the 
contradictory 0£ his thesis could be obtained by epagoge. 
In epagoge the premisses even when taken separately are so 
closely allied to the conclusion that we can hardly help 
seeing that they go together .... It thus appears that 
practically the only £unction of epagoge in the elenchus is 
to provide some 0£ the premisses for a -final syllogism. 
When an elench us is complex, as it usually is, the main 
step is always a syllogism; and of the premisses for these 
main steps some are admitted at once by the answerer, some 
~ syllogized, and spme are obtained~ epagoge .... 
Probably the commonest structure £or a Socratic elenchus to 
have is a syllogism from two premisses one of which is 
granted immediately while the other is induced. Very 
common variations on this scheme are £or the uninduced 
Premiss to be briefly syllogized, or for there to be three 
Premisses instead of two." Robinson, PED2, pp. 38-40 
(italics added). 
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common belief (5e.5-6c. 7) that the gods quarrel among 
themselves. Then, by analogy to disagreements among men, 
Socrates inductively attempts to get Euthyphro to agree 
that the gods would not quarrel over anything easily proven 
(like mathematics, measures and weigh ts), but instead about 
ethical concepts, "justice and injustice, nobility and 
shamefulness, good and bad" {7d.1-2). This inductive 
argument points obviously to the refutation of Euthyphro 1 s 
revised definition, since the gods do not agree among 
themselves about ethical concepts, one of which is 
holiness. Euthyphro, however, is as yet reluctant to 
abandon his thesis, and argues that the gods really do not 
so disagree, whereby Socrates resorts again to inductive 
analogy to prove his point about disagreements among men, 
whose more observable practice in the law courts he uses to 
show that men there do not disagree about punishment per 
se, but instead about whether or not a particular act is 
wrong or right. At this point Euthyphro, who undoubtedly 
has witnessed such practices himself, must agree to emend 
the revised primary definition, so that unholiness now is 
defined as "whatever all the gods hate, and holiness is 
what they all love• {9d.1-3). But by analogy again, this 
time through syllogism, to passive states and their 
corresponding actions {being carried and carrying, and the 
like, 10a.5 ff.), Socrates proves the emended definition 
deficient, since the essence > , (OUOla) of holiness 
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:nas not been described, but instead something which happens 
to it, i.e., that it is loved by all the gods (Ha.6 ££.). 
There follows an interlude on Euthyphro•s 
consternation (see below, Part Three). Socrates then 
suggests the definition that all that is holy is just, to 
which Euthyphro agrees. But is all that is just also holy 
(in Robinson's terminology, •Is X Y?>? Led by Socrates 
through another analogy (this time on £ear and reverence), 
Euthyphro admits that while all that is holy is just, all 
that is just is not holy, since justice, like £ear, covers 
a range 0£ which holiness is only a part. Euthyphro 
proposes the definition that holiness is the part of 
justice which attends to the gods (12.e.5-8). By 
syllogistic analogy to other arts of at tending 
(horsemanship, h un tsmanship, etc.), Eu thyphro is made to 
admit that attending aims at some good or benefit to the 
thing attended, which is clearly preposterous to Euthyphro 
when applied to the gods (13a-d.4). Euthyphro then 
proposes that the attention that is holiness is analogous 
to the service rendered by slaves to masters. But by 
inductive analogy to other services, Eu thyphro is 
encouraged to define the result of this service which, 
according to him, is salvation to families and states who 
have prayed and sacrificed in a way that pleases the gods. 
Socrates deduces £rom this that holiness is then a science 
Of asking and giving, which implies, as Euthyphro agrees, 
2.0 
asking £or and giving what is needed. But what do the gods 
need? Euthyphro asserts that we give them honor and that 
which pleases them but is not beneficial. 
At this point Socrates ends the questioning and 
begins a syllogistical tabulation of the agreed upon 
secondary premises. It is discovered that together they 
entail the re£u ta tion of the answerer 1 s la test definition: 
for Euthyphro this means admitting that he has come full 
circle to a definition which has previously been recognized 
as deficient. The essence of holiness has eluded him 
because he is confronted again and again with deficiencies 
in his definition which require him to abandon one of the 
following: 1) commonsense interpretation derived from his 
everyday experience; 2) beliefs he holds concerning the 
gods (myths about their quarrelling, the belief that Zeus 
is "the best and most just," the belie£ that gods are self-
suf£icient and yet anthropomorphically analogous to humans 
in at least some instances); or 3) the en tire conversation 
and its discom£orting implication that his belie£s, which 
he has used as justification £or his present practice, are 
not in accord with what he clearly agrees is sensible. 
Euthyphro, like every other exasperated interlocutor, 
chooses the third option. He rushes 0££ to his now 
clearly suspect prosecution 0£ his £a ther. 
Euthyphro ends with the interlocutor 1 s admission 0£ 
ignorance, yet unwillingness to continue the procedure as 
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Socrates requests. Every definition Euthyphro proposed was 
eventually acknowledged by him to be deficient or impaired. 
Both Socrates and his interlocutor depart in seeming 
ignorance. Eu thyphro•s earlier self-assurance and 
eagerness t.o display his knowledge have been replaced by an 
urge t.o escape. He has not. only been refu t.ed, he has been 
made uncomfort.able.30 
But. how exactly has Eut.hyphro been refuted, and in 
what arena? Definition, with which our description of the 
method began and which, as was asserted, informs the 
procedure, points not only t.o the way in which the goal of 
the method, refutation, is accomplished, but also to a more 
exact description of the method itself. Consider how it is 
that a definition may be refuted: "The most obvious way to 
refute a definition is to produce a case that falls under 
the definition but not under the definiend, or 
contrariwise.1131 This suggests a neatly logical 
overthrow, which is but one small part of Socrates• art of 
refutation, and the least subtle part of it at that. We 
know already the genus of the definiend, for Socrates is 
30This unwillingness is a commonplace in the early 
dialogues. How are we to interpret this unwillingness of 
the interlocutor when put again and again beside Socrates• 
enthusiastic avowal that they must continue, if we do not 
say that the interlocutor has been made to feel enough 
discomfort that the process has become unpleasant? For 
Plato's evidence on the effect of elenchos on the 
interlocutor, see below, Part Three. 
31 Robinson, PED2 
-- . 
p. 24. 
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care:ful to di:f:ferentiate it :from any haphazard offering of 
bis interlocutor: the definiend is a universal. In 
gutbyphro, this means an entity that is unchanging 
regardless of circumstance, and, given the insistence in 
argumentation on logical cohesiveness, rational. Producing 
a case which "£alls under the definition but not under the 
definiend" can mean, strictly speaking, any case which in 
and of itsel£ does not fit the designation of "universal" 
as Socrates and his interlocutor have agreed. This is 
"refutation by citing the rules of de:finition," that aspect 
0£ elenchos which requires the least subtlety and artistry. 
The method of defining uni versa ls by. inductive 
analogy is open to disruption by Socrates because of the 
very nature of the universals as defined by him. 
Definition of universals through induction implies that one 
can 
establish, from a number 0£ observed instances, a 
general characteristic 0£ a whole class. . . . 
Induction leads to de£inition because a de£inition 
consists of a collection 0£ these general 
characteristics, selected with certain requirements in 
mind: (a) They must be essential to membership of the 
class, not accidental attributes of certain 
individuals within it .... (b) They must be 
collectively sufficient to mark. off the class of 
objects to be defined 'from all other classes of 
objects whatsoever.32 
Socrates has access, then, in his refutation 0£ an 
interlocutor's definition, to a set of agreed-upon rules 
32w. K. c. Guthrie, Socrates (Hew York.: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1977; hereafter Guthrie, Socrates), p. 109. 
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•hiCh can immediately disquali£y a speci£ic example as "not 
'falling under the de£iniend," i.e., not quali£ying as a 
universal. In Euthyphro, this tactic is used at Ua.6-b.6, 
and then recalled in the dialogue's syllogistic 'final 
re£u ta tion, at 15c.1-2.. 
Re£utation 0£ de£inition, however, also allows 
producing a case that falls under the definiend, but not 
under the de£inition. The distinction between de£inition 
and de£iniend, inferred from Robinson's statement, is 
everywhere applicable to the early dialogues where 
refutation of definition is the norm. The mere £act of 
this distinction indicates a sharp dichotomy33 between 
definition and definiend in these dialogues which, when 
explored, points to an arena of refu ta ti on beyond the 
strictly logical sphere suggested by Robinson's rule for 
re£u ting a de£ini tion. What, then, are the "definitions" 
33This long unrecognized dichotomy is, I believe, 
the point behind Vlastos's disagreement ("Elenchus," 
especially pp. 2.9-30) with what he terms Robinson's 
"invention": that "the consequence which contradicts the 
thesis is drawn £rom that thesis, that is, deduced from 
it.• Vlastos instead argues, "What Socrates in fact does 
in any given elenchus is convict E not 0£ falsehood but 0£ 
being a member 0£ an inconsistent premiss-set; and to do 
this is not to show that p is -false, but only that either p 
is 'false or that some or all 0£ the premisses are -false." -
Vlastos continues by noting that Socrates never undertakes 
to prove the truth of the premises: " ... they have 
entered the argument simply as propositions on which he and 
the interlocutor are agreed." (p. 30). Vlastos seems to 
have misunderstood Robinson, whose designation 0£ 
"indirect" re£utation, the pre£erred form, does not allow 
for the deduction to which Vlastos protests. See Robinson, 
~2• pp. 23 ££. 
2.4 
1'hiCh are repeatedly found deficient under the agreed-upon 
rules £or defining a universal? 
Looking again to Eutbyphro, we £ind that the 
definitions proposed by Eu thyphro take two forms: the 
obvious expression 0£ practice justified by belie£, and the 
less obvious, but nonetheless insistent, reliance upon that 
same justifying system 0£ beliefs. Eu thyphro•s 'first 
attempt at definition is perhaps most revealing, £or the 
conflict between definiend and definition has as yet not 
been forced below the surface by Socrates• insistence on 
certain rules 0£ definition: Euthyphro at 'first cites as 
definition an actual practice that he has undertaken, 
justified on the basis of popular beliefs he maintains he 
also bolds. All 0£ his subsequent allegations do not, at 
least on their £ace, challenge that justifying system 0£ 
beliefs. In fact, when any facet 0£ that system of 
beliefs is offered up by Socrates as a minor premise, 
Euthyphro readily agrees to the premise and re-fuses to 
abandon it, even at the eventual expense of his revised 
definition. Euthyphro•s operational belie£s are thus 
integral not only to the primary definition he offers; they 
also form the basis of several of the premises which lead 
to the overthrow 0£ his revised de£initions. And, although 
Socrates never openly at tacks Eu thyphro•s beliefs, it is 
Precisely those beliefs which are overthrown by Socrates• 
seeming assumption and then collocation 0£ them with 
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another set of operational beliefs, subtly suggested in his 
choice of analogous situations. This system of beliefs is 
clearly more logical, more consistent with enlightened 
seH-interest, and yet totally foreign to Euthyphro and the 
other fifth-century B. C. Greeks with whom Socrates 
conversed. 
rt is, then, through judicious choice of the 
secondary premises that Socrates is able to refute 
definitions in the second way, by producing cases which 
fall under the definiend, but not under the definition. If 
the definition is in essence the interlocutor•s set 0£ 
operational beliefs, and the uni versa! is some as yet 
unknown which must fulfill only certain rules in its 
definition, the search for the definiend quickly centers on 
the need £or consistency and exclusivity in definition. 
The interlocutor, perhaps seduced by the need to produce 
appropriately analogous cases which do not of£end the 
rules of definition, is easily led a way £rom the as yet 
unstated but soon-to-become manifest inconsistencies in his 
system of beliefs. The analogous cases he is inductively 
led to affirm form a belief system that is clearly more 
logical and consistent, albeit unwitnessed. The secondary 
Premises, then, so willingly conceded by the interlocutor, 
are in fact often cases which would, upon reflection, 
clearly be rejected in practice based on the belief system 
Of the interlocutor (the definition), but acceptable as 
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universals (the definiend), given the rigorous rules agreed 
upon bY Socrates and the interlocutor for defining 
universals. 34 
This establishment of certain of the secondary 
premises, whereby one "reaches the demonstrand without at 
any time or in any way assuming the contradictory of the 
demonstrand" is what Robinson terms "direct 
establishment," and is a crucial counterpoint to what he 
claims is the preferred method of refutation, the indirect 
method, i.e., showing that "· . . the thesis entails a 
consequence which is so repugnant to you that you would 
rather abandon the thesis than keep it and the consequence 
along with it."35 For if, as according to the 
dictionary definition of eAf:yxw, the method is 
equally capable of proof as it is of refutation, it should 
be asked not only what is refuted by Socrates, but whether 
anything has withstood this process of cross-examination. 
The emotional response to this preferred method of 
argumentation, apparent in Robinson 1 s use of "repugnant" in 
the above quotation, supports the contention that the 
341t is here that the reader familiar with the 
Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues will begin to 
sense the presence of the well-known "Socratic paradoxes." 
See the discussion below, Part Three. 
35Robinson, PED2, p. 23, i ta lies added. This 
"indirect argument," by Robinson 1 s count, accounts for 
approximately three-quarters of the arguments in nine of 
the early dialogues (both refutations and establishments 0£ 
Premises). 
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SF.· 
refutation involves more than simple logical overthrow of a 
proposed definition, which clearly would not elicit such a 
strong emotional response.36 The conversation becomes 
36James Haden, •socra tic Ignorance,• in Hew Essays 
on Socrates, ed. Eugene Kelly (Lantham, HD: University 
Press of America, 1984; hereafter Haden, "Socratic 
Ignorance"). pp. 17-28, sees the process 0£ inquiry as the 
goal of elenchos, a process • . . . in which prior 
assumptions and especially feelings related to those 
assumptions are brought into the open and tested • 
Movement is toward "the integration 0£ 'feeling and 
thought,• not 'final definition (p. 27). Socrates• 
ignorance, according to Haden, is in how to effect such an 
integration. Michael Soupios• response to Haden in the 
same publication, "Reason and Feeling in Pia to,• pp. 137-
141. does not. to my mind at least. argue persuasively 
against Haden•s thesis. Soupios accuses Haden of taking an 
existentialist perspective on feeling among the Greeks, and 
cites two texts as evidence that the Greeks (even Socrates) 
thought that 'feeling must be subordinated to reason: 1) 
the Republic's theory of the tripartite soul, and 2) 
Diotima•s encouragement in the Symposium to purify •crude 
eroticism• (p. 140). Soupios likewise cites Aristotle's 
Politics as evidence that the Greeks believed that "[Horal 
feeling] took shape only when raw human sentiment was 
ordered and disciplined by reason . . . .• Soupios seems 
to be confusing Socrates• early inquiries and honest 
confusion about the relationship between thought and 
feeling with the later solutions of Plato and Aristotle. 
The failure to take account of elenchos• emotional 
component is an oversight in Vlastos• fine interpretation 
of elenchos. Vlastos thus must posit a •super Socrates• 
whose self-confidence comes from an assurance that he can 
logically overthrow any shift in argumentation the 
interlocutor may make ("Elenchus,• p. 50). See also pp. 40 
and 49, where Vlastos• oversight may be the source of his 
perplexity at the conviction allotted to premises that are 
•1ogically unsecured,• and p. 48, where he argues that the 
only means to "'compel' [an] adversary to affirm what he 
denies• are "logical." Thomas c. Brick.house and Nicholas 
D. Smith, "Vlastos on the Elenchus,• in Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy, vol. 2. ed. Julia Annas (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 191, argue against Vlastos but 
Preserve his oversight. They do argue that elench tic 
refutation sometimes requires that •true non-moral beliefs• 
be brought into conjunction with •true moral beliefs•; this 
~uggests, but does not make explicit, the attempt to 
integrate feeling (moral beliefs) and thought (non-moral 
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repugnant to Euthyphro because Socrates 1 art in elenchos is 
the astute collocation 0£ two separate worlds, the world 0£ 
the interlocutor's practice and belie£, one in which the 
interlocutor has an emotional investment, with the world 
£rom socrates 1 analogies, a world where consistency, logic, 
and enlightened self-interest prevail. The collocation is 
astute precisely because it is never made clear until the 
£inal moments: the world of Eu thyphro 1 s practice and 
belief is assumed in the indirect refutation, and yet never 
openly contradicted in either the direct or the indirect 
beliefs). Nonetheless Brick.house and Smith cannot imagine 
on the basis of what Vlastos 1 Socrates came to believe that 
his own moral views were consistent (p. 193), since no 
logic can argue for their consistency. 
The oversight continues in Richard Kraut, •comments on 
Gregory Vlastos, 'The Socratic Elench us,... in Ox£ord 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. Julia Annas 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983; hereafter X:ra u t, 
•comments"), pp. 62-67. Al though X:ra u t argues that not 
being able to give a reason for everything one believes 
does not deprive one of proo£ (p. 62) and describes 
Socrates as using premises that are •psychologically 
compelling• (p. 66) and as assuming that interlocutors have 
•a certain amount of psychological and moral fixity• (p. 
67), he nonetheless does not make the leap to describing 
the interlocutor 1 s dilemma as partly emotional. See, 
however, as an example of someone who does make this leap, 
l'.:ahn, "Gorgias, • p. 106, who describes Callicles 1 defeat as 
in part due to •moral emotion•: "Why cannot Callicles be a 
consistent hedonist? First of all, because of his 
aristocratic pride and his moral contempt for actions and 
persons that he regards as vulgar, disgusting, and 
unmanly.• 
Vlastos 1 response to Kraut, "A£terthoughts on the 
Socratic Elenchus,• in Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. Julia Annas (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1983), p. 73, does begin to speak. of premises that 
for interlocutors are •well-entrenched" in their systems of 
beliefs, and Socrates as having "moral intuitions." 
Vlastos does not, however, seem to sense the emotional 
subtext of his own use of •entrenchment" and "intuition.• 
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establishment of the secondary premises. 
Plato indicates his awareness of the potency of this 
collocation in a late dialogue, Sophist. By way of 
differentiating elenchos from another type of education, 
Plato has a "stranger" explain elenchos in broad outline: 
. . . some men appear to have reached the conclusion 
that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one 
will ever learn anything if he thinks he is already a 
wise man in that respect, and that the admonitory form 
of education involves great labour and achieves little 
result. . . . So they aim at the removal of this 
opinion by another means. . . . They question a man on 
those matters where he thinks he is saying something 
although he is really saying nothing. And as he is 
confused they easily convict his opinions,~ 
bringing them together and putting them side by side 
[auvayoVTES 6~ T075 AoyOlS E~S Ta~TOV 
. , . 
Tl0£aal 11ap> aAA'l')AasJ, and thus showing that 
they are contrary to each other at the same time in 
the same respect about the same things. {Sophist 
230a.5-b.8)37 
The effect of this refutation by collocation is 
betrayed in the Epic definition of ) . EAEYXElV, to 
"disgrace," "put to shame." Socratic elenchos derives the 
potency of its refutation from the fact that it confronts 
not only the logical basis of beliefs, but the believer1 s 
emotional investment as well. There is disgrace in 
publicly abandoning the system of beliefs that has guided 
one 1 s actions, in admit ting that one 1 s en tire basis for 
decision-making has been faulty--which would of course 
necessitate a drastic change in the conduct of one 1 s 
37The translation is Robinson 1 s, 
The italics and Greek. are added. 
PED2 
-- ' 
p. 12. 
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life,38 but who would choose instead to deny that which 
is clearly sensible? Who wants to appear "irrational or at 
least queer"? Who but Socrates could consistently apply to 
his own life the rigorous moral standards implicit in the 
proposed analogies? For it is these standards that alone 
survive, and they survive the rules 0£ de£inition, the 
reluctance 0£ the interlocutor, and the relentless scrutiny 
o£ socra tes. The only thing they do not survive is 
translation into the world 0£ men, where consistency and 
enlightened self-interest are not the sole informers of 
action. 
38Tolstoy perhaps best indicates the reason for 
the reluctance to abandon a belief: "I know that most men, 
including those at ease with problems of the greatest 
complexity, can seldom accept even the simplest and most 
obvious truth if it be such as would oblige them to admit 
the falsity o"f the conclusions which they have delighted in 
explaining to colleagues, which they have proudly taught to 
others, and which they have woven, thread by thread, in to 
the fabric of their lives.• Quoted by the physicist Joseph 
Ford, in James Gleick, Chaos (Kew York: Penguin Books, 
1987), p. 38. 
Ernest Becker, following Otto Rank, describes the 
defeat of beliefs as a sort 0£ death. "'Every conflict 
over truth is in the last analysis just the same old 
struggle over . . . immortality." If anyone doubts this. 
let him try to explain in any other way the life-and-death 
viciousness of all ideological disputes. Each person 
nourishes his immortality in the ideology of self-
perpetuation to which he gives his allegiance; this gives 
his life the only abiding significance it can have. Ho 
wonder men go into a rage over fine points of belie£: if 
your adversary wins the argument about truth. you die. 
Your immortality system has been shown to be 'fallible, your 
life becomes fallible." Ernest Becker, Escape from Evil 
(Hew York: Macmillan, 1975), p. 64, quoting Otto Rank, 
Psychology and the Soul (Hew York: Perpetua Books edition, 
1961), p. 87. 
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In summary, then, the procedure 0£ elenchos in the 
earlY Platonic dialogues consists 0£ these essentials: 1) 
the intent to define, whether expressed through explicit 
primary questions or a persistent emphasis on definition; 
2) establishing the rules of definition: differentiating 
between a universal, an entity that is consistent and never 
changing, and a mere list 0£ particular instances; 3) a 
primary attempt to de£ine by explicit citation 0£ 
particular instance 0£ common practice o£ten justi£ied by 
personal and popular belief; 4) rejection of the primary 
definition by reference to the agreed upon rules of 
definition; 5) subsequent attempts to define which, 
al though they do not explicitly cite particular instances, 
revea139 the interlocu tor"s reliance on the system 0£ 
beliefs used to justi£y the primary definition; 6) 
argumentation, whose essence is the subtle collocation 0£ 
the interlocutor•s persevering belie£ system with another 
system 0£ belie£s, consistent and rational, with which the 
interlocutor agrees because establishment is accomplished 
either by re£erence to particular instances which are 
seemingly analogous and appeal to what could be termed 
39This revelation is apparent 1) in the 
interlocutor's persistent willingness to acknowledge 
certain statements assumed by Socrates in his argumentation 
and 2) in the interlocutor"s unwillingness to abandon 
certain unstated but manifest beliefs regardless of the 
consequence of their espousal to his proposed de£inition. 
?n "overt/explicit" vs. •covert/tacit" belie£s 0£ the 
interlocutor, see Vlastos, "Elenchus," p. 51. 
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•common sense,• or by eliciting agreement to positions 
which appear unrelated to the interlocutor's tenets 0£ 
belie£; 7) £inal re£utation: the synthetic breakdown 0£ 
the interlocutor's position achieved by Socrates• 
syUogistically re-evoking the two systems 0£ belie£s 
embodied in the interlocutor•s ready assumptions on the one 
hand, and the premises painstakingly established in 
argumentation on the other; 8) agreement by both parties 
that they are at a loss and need to start all over again; 
9) reluctance 0£ the interlocutor to continue elenchos, a 
reluctance perhaps attributable to the shame he £eels at a) 
his original profession 0£ knowledge become mani£est 
ignorance and b) the dawning recognition that there exists 
a system 0£ belie£s which, al though it has not been re£u ted 
and is clearly pre£erable to his own, would require that 
the interlocutor change his whole operational belie£ 
system, and thus his way 0£ li£e; 10) continuation 0£ the 
status quo, with the interlocutor returning to life as he 
has always conducted it, albeit with a new sense 0£ 
uneasiness. 
The procedure may be broadly described, then, as 
indirect re£utation of definition become blatant 
refutation 0£ the interlocutor's belief system, and 
establishment 0£ premises become intimation of a system of 
beliefs which would withstand another round of elenchos. 
The terminus of elenchos, refutation combined with implied 
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proof, simultaneous blatant overthrow of one belief system 
and implied establishment of another, perhaps suggests a 
method whose aspirations do not extend beyond the narrow 
boundaries 0£ winning. Nevertheless, this impression of 
elenchos 1 aim is one which Plato was careful to 
dispel,40 for it seems he was aware of the potential 
for misinterpreting the aim of elenchos, especially given 
the distinctive character it acquired from its 
practitioner, Socrates. 
40Plato designated to eristic, rather than to 
elenchos or to his own dialectic, the aim of winning. See 
Sophist 225 and Robinson 1 s discussion of Pla to 1 s seeming 
defensiveness about the distinction between dialectic, 
eristic, and antilogic (PED2, pp. 84-88). On the 
distinction, see also G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Hovemen t 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981; herea£ter 
Kerferd, Sophistic Movement), pp. 59-67. 
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!l'F 
Part Three: The Socratic Character of Elenchos 
Analysis 0£ the Socratic character 0£ elenchos 
requires a definition of its preliminary aims (reversal, 
recognition, and ka tharsis) and description of their 
effects as well as a consideration of its tone in relation 
to its distinctive subject matter. Plato's discussions 0£ 
the method in the middle and late dialogues will serve not 
only to complete the description of elenchos in the early 
dialogues, but also to in£orm a final consider a ti on of 
elenchos in Part Four, o:f its ultimate aim of moral 
improvement and the sense o:f tragedy produced by its lack 
of success in achieving this aim. 
Elenchos' Preliminary Aims and Their E££ects 
Plato sees elenchos" ultimate aim as the moral 
improvement o:f the soul which is realized through a series 
of preliminary steps: 1) the interlocutor must undergo a 
reversal, which is usually termed by the interlocutor 
aporia, con:fusion; 2) he must recognize his ignorance; 3) 
he will have one or more reactions to this recogni tion--he 
Will feel either shame or wonder; 4) he must be "purged" o:f 
his former opinions; and 5) the truth must be brought to 
birth.41 At this point the ultimate aim of elenchos, 
4 1Ky use 0£ certain English words {e.g., 
"reversal" and "recognition"), suggestive o:f Aristotelian 
terms 'from the Poetics, were, in an earlier version 0£ this 
study, justified not only on the basis of a commonsense 
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the moral improvement 0£ the soul, -finally becomes 
possible. 
It is the re£utation 0£ the interlocutor•s 
de£initions (and thus his belief system) that serves to 
e££ect the -first two aims 0£ elenchos: the interlocutor 
goes £rom being one who claims to know something to one who 
cannot help but admit that he does not know. Euthyphro, 
for example, begins his discussion with Socrates with the 
boast that he has exact knowledge about holiness (5a.1-2), 
but is so "reversed" by the dialogue•s close that he can do 
no more than -feebly agree with Socrates" allegation that 
interpretation 0£ the text 0£ Plato, but also by a 
comparison 0£ that interpretation with the words peripeteia 
and anagnorisis as they are used in Aristotle. Robinson, 
who uses the words as well but nowhere connects them to 
Aristot1e•s terminology, serves as an observer 0£ the 
method whose interpretations cannot be said to be 
conveniently prejudicial to terms £rom the text of 
Aristotle. Robinson's one word descriptions 0£ a process 
are presumably Justi£ied on the basis 0£ one 0£ his study•s 
assumptions, i.e., that "the history of human thought is 
'evolutionist/" and that that evolution is detected in 
part £rom the £act that "to possess a single name £or an 
idea is a later stage than to be able to express it only in 
a sentence" (Robinson, PED2, pp. vi and 5). Havelock 
supports such assumptionsas these in his writings on the 
effects of the advent of literacy, whereby narrative 
description 0£ agents acting is replaced by the use of 
impersonals £or the agents, and only later becomes 
analytic, i.e., more abstract. See Havelock, "Orality," 
pp, 72-75. The £act that we do have in Plato one of the 
Aristotelian terms, namely katharsis, should not 
nevertheless lead us a way £rom a careful analysis 0£ the 
term in both texts, which is the only way that a credible 
claim of comparable usage can be made. The dangers of 
declaring the correlation 0£ ideas solely on the basis of a 
linguistic observation that the same words recur in two 
texts are clearly outlined by o•Brien, Paradoxes, pp. 39-53 
:e_assim. 
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tbeY were either wrong in their -former argumentation or are 
•rong now. In either case, they must begin again (15c.8-
12). And while Euthyphro is pondering the implications 0£ 
being wrong in their 'former argumentation where some things 
he took. as givens without argumentation (his own belie£ 
system) and other things he agreed to a£ter having been led 
through argumentation to logical conclusions he cannot now 
easily disavow, Socrates indulges in what has been called 
irony.42 He recalls Euthyphro 1 s earlier confidence in 
his k.nowledge, alludes to the consequences this confidence 
has on Euthyphro1 s current lawsuit, and begs Euthyphro, 
who Socrates assumes is still every bit as knowledgeable, 
to continue their conversation. This wrenching 
counterpoint to his dawning realization 0£ how untenable 
are his positions is too much £or poor Euthyphro: not only 
has he been thoroughly trounced, but Socrates 1 con£idence 
in the "all-knowing" Euthyphro mak.es the Euthyphro, who now 
obviously does not k.now, £eel shame that he was first 
"drawn into a parade 0£ knowledge," and then su££ered a 
"violent reversal 0£ the situation. 11 43 He escapes, 
claiming the press of unspecified commitments > (£t.S 
, 
TOt.VUV, V\1V ' yap o1teuch> 
'll'Ot., 
, 
Kat. 1-L Ot. 
Cl 
wpa 
> , 
a 11't.£vat., Euthyphro 15e.2-3). 
42r do not agree with Robinson and many others 
that Socrates• "irony" is a sham. See the discussion 
below, Part Three, second section. 
43 Robinson, PED2 
-- , 
p. 18. 
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This interlocutor's sudden eager desire to escape, 
accompanied as it is by excuses which are vague and thus 
suspicious-sounding, can perhaps alone be used to defend 
Robinson's description of such an experience as a •violent 
reversal,• although Plato himself nowhere describes it so 
succinctly· In Plato's text, interlocutors describe their 
own experience and term it aporia. Can their subjective 
perception be brought into consonance with Robinson's more 
objective perspective on their experience, which leads him 
to designate it a •reversal•? Plato's text suggests the 
validity o:f this interpretation, for even as the 
interlocutors proclaim their confusion,44 they profess 
the sudden and total reversal of their circumstances. 
The reversal is apparent when one contrasts, for 
example, Heno•s initial bravado--his incredulity that 
Socrates does not know what arete is (Meno 71b.8-c.1) and 
his claim that, for him, defining arete is no problem 
(a A A' > OU xaAevov, > "' eL'lfeLV, 
Meno 71e.1)--with his later report of the •1oss of way• he 
is experiencing and how he describes it: 
4
'lHenry Teloh, •The Importance of the 
Interlocutors• Characters in Plato•s Early Dialogues,• in 
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient 
Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. John J. Cleary (Lanham, HD: 
University Press of America, Inc., 1987; hereafter Teloh, 
•Interlocutors• Characters•>. p. 32, argues that the 
confusion visited upon Euthyphro is evidence of Socrates• 
use of ad hominem arguments in elenchos: •Eu thyphro .is a 
dogmatist, and it makes good educational sense to confuse a 
dogmatist.• 
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,, 
Socrates, I heard before I met you that you never do 
anyt~ing but puz~le yol1rself a!ld oth~rs to~ 
(<XU!OS. > TE:,.. alfopE:lS KQl TOUS a).).ous 
11'0L£L5. avop£Lv]; and now it seems to me that 
you are bewitching and drugging and completely 
spellbinding me, ;:o that I hay-e be~ome ,saturated with 
puzzlement [WOT£ µ.eoTov avopLas 
yeyovE:val]. In fact, if I may make a little joke, 
you are absolutely like the broad electric ray of the 
sea, both in appearance and otherwise. That fish 
benumbs anyone who comes near and touches it, and that 
is what you seem to have done to me now; for really I 
am numb in mind and mouth, and I do not know how to 
, ~ ...---
answer you [ouK exw oTL alfoKpLvwµ.aL 
om]. Yet I have discoursed on virtue thousands of 
times and to many people; and done it well too, as I 
thought at t1!e time._ But now I cannot even~ what 
it is [vuv 6e ou6> OTL eoTL v To 
~ , " 
vapavav exw t:l1f£LV]. (Meno 79e.7-
80b.4) 45 
A man who has travelled the humbling road 'from confident 
self-assurance to the doubt and insecurity expressed here 
may perhaps be excused for attributing his condition to 
magical expertise practiced against him, or to the narcotic 
e'ffect of some aquatic creature he has haplessly 
encountered; but the vividness of the similes that express 
the profundity of his confusion suggests not merely that 
source which is common to all confusion--disloca tion (which 
even his use of the term aporia concedes). Meno has not 
only "lost his way"; he feels bewitched and benumbed 
because, like the sleeper who suffers a similar depth of 
confusion upon finding darkness when expecting light or 
vice versa, Meno finds himself in a place where before he 
45Guoted and translated by Robinson, PED2, pp. 
9-10. The italics and Greek. are added. 
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adamantly was not.46 And since his former location is 
the exact opposite of his previous one, may we not say, 
along with Robinson. that he has undergone "violent 
reversal"? 
Socrates affirms this interpretation. In response to 
Meno•s comparison of him to the electric ray, Socrates 
continues the simile and clari£ies its implications for 
Meno•s present state: Meno has, indeed, lost his way to a 
pro-found degree. He is in £act now in the position 0£ 
Socrates, a position so recently the subject 0£ Heno•s own 
incredulity: Meno, who previously knew, now knows not. As 
Socrates describes it, Meno has su£fered what is tantamount 
to total reversa~ 
As £or me, if the electric ray is itself benumbed and 
thus also numbs others, I am like it, but not 
otherwise. For it is not that I, who know the way, 
> ' > '""' ca use others to become lost (ou yap e:u11opwv 
> ' ' ,, > "' aUTOS TOUS a>.>.ous 1f0l.W avop£l.V), but 
rather that I am more at a loss than anyone, and in 
> ' this way also cause others to be lost (a>.>.a 
ll'aVTOS µ.a>.>.ov a~TOS a1fopwv OUTWS KaL 
' ,, ...... > ...... Tous a>.>.ous vo1.w avope:1.v). Even now I 
myself do not know what arete is; whereas you, who 
perhaps (Laws) knew be-fore you came in con tact 
with me, now however likewise do not know. (Meno 
80c.6-d.3) 
46Jacqueline de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric in 
Ancient Greece (Cambridge, HA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1975; 
hereafter de Romilly, Hagie), pp. 36-37, asserts that 
"[Interlocutors] do not understand what happens to them, 
but we do: they are just con£ron ted with unyielding logic. 
· · . Socrates" magic rests on the obstinate destruction 0£ 
au illusions. It is the magic of implacable truth; and 
certainly it is not just by chance that those who describe 
that magic spell 0£ Socrates are young men or laymen,. not 
used to thorough reasoning, men such as Meno and 
Alcibiades." 
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socra tes hedges here on Keno 1 s knowledge prior to 
~enchos (he "perhaps knew before"), but later deems the 
condition of the interlocutor prior to elenchos more 
e:x:plici Uy ignorance in reference to the boy who is 
subsequently examined. The simile of the electric ray is 
continued by Socrates, who describes the boy1 s progress 
after reversal as a kind of recognition: 
At 'first he 'falsely thought he knew ... and 
answered confidently as if he knew, and did not feel 
at a loss; whereas now, though he knows no more than 
he did before, he does at least £eel at a loss, and no 
longer thinks he knows. . . . Then did we do him any 
harm in puzzling him and numbing him like the electric 
ray? --I think not. --At least it seems that we have 
made him more likely to £ind out the truth. For now 
he will be glad to search £or it because he knows he 
does not know it, whereas formerly he might easily 
have supposed on many occasions that he was talking 
sense . . . . And do you think he would ever have 
tried to discover the truth, or to learn what he 
thought he knew though he did not, i£ he had not 
'fallen into puzzlement and come to believe that he did 
not know and desired to know? --I do not think so, 
Socrates. --Then he was benefited by being numbed? 
--I think so. (Meno 84-a.3-c.9)47 
This lengthy text has been quoted not only be ca use it 
again illustrates the first aim of the method, the reversal 
caused by elenchos, in combination with the second aim, a 
recognition of ignorance, but likewise because it is an 
important witness to the fourth aim, the birth of the 
truth. After considering this passage, Robinson concludes, 
u. 
The elenchus changes ignorant men from the state of 
falsely supposing that they know to the state of 
recognizing that they do not know; and this is an 
47 Quoted and translated by Robinson, PE!D2, p. 
The i ta lies are added. 
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important step along the road to knowledge, because 
the recognition that we do not know at once arouses 
the" desire to know, and thus supplies the motive that 
was lacking before. Philosophy begins in wonder, and 
the assertion here made is that elenchus supplies the 
wonder .... Elenchus is thus a method of teaching, 
of instilling intellectual knowledge in other 
persons·. It does not, however, actually increase 
knowledge, but only prepares the ground for it.'l-8 
Plato could, according to Robinson,49 justify the 
•violent reversal• caused by elenchos because the 
recognition resulting from it is a necessary precursor to 
attaining knowledge. 
Refutation does not, however, extend its effect in an 
uninterrupted line through reversal and recognition to 
katharsis and the birth of truth. At the point of 
recognition there is a pa use for reflection and the 
interlocutor responds in one of two ways--he either 
experiences a sense 0£ wonder or he £eels shame. 
Robinson's above assertion that •philosophy begins in 
wonder• is a translation from Theaetet us, where Socrates 
declares that Theaetet us 1 wonder at the topic under 
discussion is evidence of his nature--Theaetetus, according 
to Socrates, is a true philosopher: 
By the Gods, Socrates, I am in wonder (8auµ.atw) 
about what these things are, and sometimes when I 
consider them I truly feel dizzy (aKo'TocSlVlW). 
--It appears, my friend, that Theodoros rightly 
divined your nature. For this experience of wonder 
('To aauµ.atelv) is truly that 0£ the 
Philosopher. There is not any other beginning 0£ 
'l- 8 Robinson, 
4 9Robinson, 
PED2 
-- . 
PED2 
-- . 
pp. 11-12, italics added. 
p. 18. 
'l-2 
philosophy than this . . . (Theaetetus 155c.8-d.4) 
Theaetetus 1 sense 0£ wonder, an expression 0£ doubt, 
Dlar:K.s him as Socrates 1 spiritual twin as surely as his snub 
nose and protruding eyes (Theaetetus 143e) mark his 
physical resemblance to the man. Socrates, Pla to 1 s 
paradigm 0£ the true philosopher, is shown both expressing 
and engendering doubt, wonder, and amazement throughout the 
dialogues. The allegations 0£ his interlocutors cause 
Socrates to wonder: What is a sophist? Can virtue be 
taught? Are all the virtues part 0£ a whole or separate 
entities? (Protagoras 312c; 326e; 329c); Why would Gorgias 
pride himsel£ in teaching persuasion when clearly the 
persuasive are the more ignorant? (Gorgias 458e); Can 
injustice really be in the same class as virtue and 
wisdom? (Republic 1.348e); Is there no such thing as a 
£alsehood? (Eu thydemus 286b-c); Why would Protagoras 
allege that "man is the measure 0£ all things"? (Theaeteus 
161b-c). Socrates likewise £inds his interlocutors 
•amazing": Polus and Callicles are causes 0£ wonder to him 
(Gorgias 470a; 489d), as are the sophists and their bread th 
of knowledge {Eu thydemus 2.71c and 2.88b), or even 
Thrasymachus as he perspires pro£usely upon agreeing with 
Socrates 1 argumentation (Republic 1. 350d). Socrates 1 art 
Of elenchos is likewise a cause 0£ wonder, not only to 
himself {Gorgias 496a-b and Theaetetus 150d), but to 
others (Theaetetus at Theaetetus 157d and 193d; 
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'l'hrasymach us at Republic 1.337 c; his prosecutors at 
Apology t7a; Cebes at Phaedo 95a; Euthyphro, who should 
-
ratner wonder at his own abilities to "make arguments walk. 
aboU t," at Eu thyphro 15b; Alcibiades, who compares his 
abilities with words to the wonders 0£ £lute players like 
Karsyas at Symposium 215b). Finally, Socrates himseH is 
wondrous: to Cri to, who is amazed at his peace£ul slumber 
(Cri to 43b); to Alcibiades, who is in a we 0£ his true inner 
beauty and abilities to endure cold and strong drink. and 
who calls him a "marvellous wonder" (Symposium 217a, 220a, 
and 219b-c); to those who witnessed him lost in thought 
£rom dusk. until dawn (Symposium 220b).50 
50citations 0£ words with the root 9auµa- in 
the Platonic corpus, £rom which all 0£ the above testimonia 
are drawn, provide by their sheer number a vertigo-
producing experience £or one attempting to categorize the 
evidence they a££ord. I count over two hundred and £i£ty 
citations, £or which see Friederich Ast, Lexicon Platonicum 
sive Vocum Platonicarum Index, vol. 2 (Bonn: Rudol£ 
Habelt, 1956), under eauµa, eauµatw. eauµaal05, 
8auµaaT05, 8auµaTo11'o&.La, 8auµaT011'0&.&.Ko5, 
8auµaTovo1.os, eauµaToupy~a. and aauµaToupyw. I 
am indepted to Stephen Halliwell's discussion 0£ wonder in 
his Aristotle 1 s Poetics (Chapel Hill: Univ. 0£ Horth 
Carolina Press, 1986; herea£ter Halliwell, Poetics), pp. 
74-76, £or the impetus 0£ this discussion, but cannot here 
undertake the closer study he rightly suggests this topic 
in Aristotle and Plato deserves. A preliminary examination 
0£ evidence £rom the early and middle dialogues indicates 
that Socrates, not surprisingly, more consistently than his 
interlocutors expresses wonder, while his interlocutors see 
him as o£ten as his statements or the progression 0£ the 
discussion as a cause 0£ wonder. It is not uncommon £or 
interlocutors to attribute the several ef£ects 0£ elenchos 
to the person 0£ Socrates rather than to his method. 
The inability to separate the speak.er £rom what is 
spoken is, according to Havelock., "Orality," p. 76, a 
h~llmark. of the preliterate. For the allegation that a 
kinship between knower and object known is an essential 
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wonder, -ro aau1-Latetv, in the sense 0£ doubt, 
felt so consistently by Socrates, by his spiritual twin 
'l'heaetetus, and sometimes by other interlocutors, is in 
thiS sense the -first positive step beyond the loss-0£-way, 
the aporia regularly experienced by Socrates' respondents 
in the early dialogues. Protagoras, at Protagoras 326e, 
nearly equates the two experiences when he asks "· .. do 
you wonder, Socrates, and are you at a loss {9au1.1atets. 
. , ,.. 
ii::at a1fOP€l5.) whether virtue can be taught?" 
'l'o aau1-Latetv in its sense as doubt, the doubt 0£ 
the true philosophers, Socrates and Theaetetus, however, 
has in it a willingness to go 'forward with elenchos, 
whereas, as has been shown, the recognition of ignorance 
termed aporia by the interlocutors in the early dialogues 
regularly produces in them a desire to escape rather than 
to continue. How are we to account £or this unwillingness 
to continue elenchos? 
Thea tet us' sense 0£ vertigo, which he proclaims 
accompanies his wonder, provides a clue. Vertigo is 
produced when one sees things move that normally one 
perceives to be stationary. As every child who has turned 
round and round to experience dizziness knows, such a 
sensation can be invigorating to one who enjoys it. 
Prerequisite £or the success of elenchos, 
Seeskin, Dialogue and Discovery {Albany: 
:ew York. Press, 1987; herea£ter Seeskin, 
'f. and passim. 
see Kenneth 
State Univ. 0£ 
Dialogue), pp. 41 
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'fheaetetus, who has experienced the movement caused by the 
progression of elenchos, the necessity of discarding 
assumptions he formerly perceived as fixed, is so 
tnvigora ted. He, like the child who no sooner recovers 
stasis than he turns himself round and round again, wants 
to continue. 
vertigo, however, is not so pleasant for one who is 
discomfited by movement. In elenchos, this means one who 
is unwilling to discard his assumptions because of his 
investment in them as validators of his actions. Such a 
man is Eu thyphro. 51 Eu thyphro senses the movement of 
the argument: • . somehow our propositions walk about; 
no matter where we put them they do not want to stay." 
(Euthyphro Ub.7-8). Euthyphro is eager to assign 
responsibility for this movement to Socrates, or rather to 
some magical ability he imagines Socrates possesses. 
Thrice Socrates denies the comparison of himself to 
Daedalus, who could make seemingly fixed objects, statues, 
move about (twice at Euthyphro Ub.9-e.1; once again at the 
dialogue' s closing, 15b. 7-c.3). It is not himself, 
Socrates undauntedly claims, but Euthyphro who is the 
Daedalus, for the propositions are not Socrates' 
inventions, but Euthyphro's. And like Proteus, the master 
51And the vast 
according to Vlastos 
. . . 
carried . . . kicking 
that contradicts the 
majority of interlocutors who, 
"Elench us,• p. 29, have to be 
and screaming• to the conseqence 
thesis. 
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quick-change artist, Euthyphro must be detained until he, 
who knows the truth, will tell (Euthyphro 15d.1-4). 
charges, like Eu thyphro's, that Socrates makes use 0£ 
some sort 0£ magical ability are not hard to £ind in the 
dialogues.52 It will be remembered that Meno similarly 
accused the man: "you bewitch and drug and absolutely 
. . 
spellbind me" (YO'fJT€U£LS KQL KQL 
aTt:XVWS Meno 80a.2-3). Likewise, 
Alcibiades in Symposium (215a.4 ££.) attributes to Socrates 
a quasi-magical ability. Socrates' words, Alcibiades 
claims, are more the cause 0£ wonder than the £lute-playing 
of Marsyas, and like the Sirens, Socrates could have 
transfixed Alcibiades at his -feet, had Alcibiades not £led. 
Alcibiades then gives a first-person account 0£ one who, 
like Euthyphro, has fled. In this account he reveals why 
interlocutors like Euthyphro, intolerant of the movement 
they perceive occurring in elenchos, choose first to accuse 
52p1a to is care£ul to distinguish Socrates' 
wondrous abilities from those 0£ the average enchanter. 
The sophist is a "wonder-worker" (8au11aT01foLLKOS, see 
Sophist 224a and 268d; c£. 9au11aT01fOLWS at 235b), and 
the tragic poet is "wondrous" (9aup.aaTit, Gorgias 
502b), but the e££ect 0£ their word-juggling ends with the 
mere production 0£ amazement and pleasure respectively. 
Socrates' wondrous ability with words, on the other hand, 
is ostensibly able to lead the interlocutor, by the agency 
0 £ shame, through katharsis to the birth 0£ truth and, 
Ultimately, to moral improvement. For Socrates as the 
•counter-magician" and physician, who uses both the 
emotions and puri£ying powers 0£ elenchos to ef£ect his 
Positive aims, see Elizabeth Bel£iore, "Elenchus, Epode, 
and Magic: Socrates as Silenus," Phoenix 34 (1980), pp. 
128-137. 
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socrates of bewitchment and then to flee. 
The testimony of Alcibiades in Symposium supports the 
claim that a sense of shame in the interlocutor, derived 
from an unwillingness to alter the beliefs he holds as 
verifiers o:f his actions, causes his accusations of 
bewitchment, which now begin to ring false, and then his 
flight. After his description of the magical abilities of 
socra tes, Alcibiades describes his own sense of shame, 
which he claims comes upon him when he is faced with things 
to which he has formerly agreed: 
I have experienced at the hands 0£ this man alone 
that of which no one would imagine me capable--being 
o > I 
shamed (To at.axuvea9at.) by anyone; I :feel 
> I 
shame (at.axuvoµ.at.) before him alone. For I 
know well that I am not able to answer his arguments 
that I, who whenever I depart am seduced by the esteem 
of the masses, must do as he bids. So I skulk away 
like a runaway slave and £lee him, and then when I see 
him, I :feel shame at the agreements to which we'd 
, , ' c , 
come (at.axuvoµ.at. Ta wµ.oAoy'f)µ.eva). 
(Symposium 216a.8-b.6) 
The shame that Alcibiades £eels results from being 
confronted with the disparity between beliefs whose 
validity he has a vowed (Ta C I wµ.oAoy'f)µ.eva) in 
conversation with Socrates on the one hand, and the acts he 
nonetheless continues to perform on the other.53 He 
attributes his desire to £lee the presence of Socrates to 
this shame. We can now with more assurance assert that 
53see Teloh, "Interlocutors' Characters," p. 34: 
•shame occurs when an interlocutor admits that he is wrong, 
~r When he concedes some element 0£ morality. I£ an 
h~terlocutor cannot be shamed, then Socrates cannot refute im." 
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guthYPhro•s £light is motivated by a similar sense 0£ 
shame. Eu thyphro hesitates to express his shame, £or he, 
unlike Alcibiades, is neither drunk nor in the sympathetic 
company 0£ those who have su££ered similarly at the hands 
of socra tes (Symposium 217 e.1-218b. 7). 
For Euthyphro, then, it is £air to assume that it is 
less shame£ul £or him to say "I am lost• than to admit "I 
am totally wrong, whereas I previously thought I was right. 
Hy actions are based on belie£s which I now see are 
contradictory." This interpretation seems especially valid 
when one recalls how, just be£ ore Eu thyphro £lees, Socrates 
reminds him in no uncertain terms of the connection bet ween 
his knowledge and his actions: 
1£ you had not clearly known what holiness and 
unholiness were, surely you would not have ventured 
£or the sake 0£ a servant to prosecute your aged 
£ather £or murder. You would have feared to risk 
angering the gods, lest you were acting incorrectly, , , 
and you would have felt shame (!IOXuv9"1S) 
be£ore men. (Euthyphro 15d.4-8) 
It seems clear that Socrates here pinpoints the source 0£ 
the shame that makes Euthyphro, who now realizes he in £act 
does not know, suddenly remember some urgent, unspecified 
commitment. Better to leave than to stay and witness the 
complete demise of his validating system of beliefs. 
According to Plato, however, the shame is necessary, 
for it is shame, combined with refutation, that will ef£ect 
katharsis 0£ opinions which are the reluctant soul's 
impediment to £uture learning. Robinson cites a large 
49 
section 0£ the late Sophist, where elenchos is -first 
described in broad outline and then compared to medical 
purging: 
For just as the physicians 0£ the body believe that 
the body cannot bene£it £rom the nourishment it 
receives until the internal hindrances are removed, so 
do those who perform this puri£ication believe about 
the soul. She cannot pro£it £rom the knowledge 
of£ered her, until the elenchus is applied and the man 
is refuted and brought to shame ['ll'PLV av 
~AE:yxwv 1'l5. 1'0V ~Aeyxoµ.EVOV ds. 
aioxuv•riv Ka1'ao1'.ftoas.J, thus puri£ying him from 
opi~ions that, hinger learJ?ing [1'a,s. ,.~»l's. 
µ.a9'fllJ.aOlV €1J.1l'Ochous. doi;aS. Ei;£Awv, 
Ka9apOV Q1fOcpTJV~] and causing him to think. he 
knows only what he does know and not more. . . . For 
all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must say that 
elenchus is the greatest and most sovereign of the 
puri£ications [Ka9apoewv]; and the man who has 
not been subjected to it . . . must be regarded by us 
as su£fering £rom the greatest impurities 
, , >I [aKa9ap1'ov ov1'a], and as uneducated and base 
> I I ' > [a1fal6Eu1'ov 1'E Kal aloxpov] in the 
respects in which the truly happy man ought to be 
purest and noblest [Ka9apwTa1'ov K«L 
KCcAAlo1'ov]. (Sophist 230c.4-e.3)54-
But katharsis, the result of shame caused by the 
recognition of the reversal of refutation, is still not, 
according to Plato, the ultimate aim of elenchos. 
E:atharsis is conducted for a purpose: so that the soul can 
•profit from the knowledge offered her"; the newly learned 
5 4-Robinson, PED2, pp. 12-13. The transl a ti on 
is Robinson's, italics and Greek. are added. For the base 
meaning 0£ katharsis as "clari£ication" (from which the 
religious "puri£ication" and the medical "purgation" are 
derived) in Aristotle's Poetics, see Leon Golden, 
•catharsis," TAPA 93 (1962), pp. 51-60; "The Clari£ication 
Theory 0£ Ka tharsis," Hermes 104 (1976), pp. 4-37-4-52; 
•x:atharsis as Clari£ication: An Objection Answered,". CQ 23 
~973), pp. 4-5-4-6. Golden's theory is criticized by 
aUiweu, Poetics, pp. 354-355. 
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Dian iS ostensibly transformed from being "uneducated and 
}>ase• to •purest and noblest." A-fter citing Apology for 
evidence concerning the method's ultimate aim of moral 
181provement, where Socrates proclaims the method's purpose 
is, •to shame55 people into putting first things first, 
and that the first thing is the virtue of the soul" and 
• ... to put men to shame for living wrongly" {29d-30b 
2 assim), Robinson concludes: 
The Apology, like the Meno and the Sophist, regards 
elenchus as a way of convincing men that they are 
ignorant of things they thought they knew; but it 
places this procedure in a strongly moral and 
religious setting of which the other two works show 
little trace. It tells us that the elenchus arose out 
of a divine oracle, and that Socrates continued it 
because he felt divinely commanded to do so. It 
represents the ultimate aim of the elenchus not as 
intellectual education but as moral improvement. Its 
purpose is, as it is expressed at the end of the 
Apology, to make men better men, to give them more of 
the highest virtue of a man; and in practising it 
Socrates is a moral reformer.56 
At this point Robinson raises the hypothetical doubt 
of "many persons" about the suitability of Socratic 
elenchos, with its apparent "logic-chopping" and 
•paradoxical intellectualism," as an instrument for moral 
education.57 Can this instrument influence character? 
55socra tes claims that 
Athenian citizens "Aren't > , • 
aioxuv'tl) to care more for 
repu ta ti on and honor . . . 
56Robinson, PED2 
-- . 
he customarily asks the 
> you ashamed {ou1e. 
acquiring wealth and 
?" {Apology 29d.8-e.1). 
pp. 13-14. 
57Robinson is convinced, like his own discomfited 
Plato, 0£ the purely destructive potential 0£ elenchos, and 
thus dismisses or rather gives short shrift to that part of 
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80.., can Socrates proclaim that he proposes to make men 
better, virtue being knowledge, i£ he does nothing other 
than, through reversal, recognition, and shame, to remove 
ignorance? 58 
The answer to these questions lies in a££irming that 
elenchos as it is depicted by Plato shows evidence 0£ a 
second possible terminus beyond re£u ta tion, the proo£. 
Although proo£ is never admitted in the early dialogues, 
which end in a vowed aporia, Plato nonetheless at tests to 
this positive aspect 0£ elenchos. A second passage on 
katharsis, which Robinson does not cite, gives important 
evidence on the transition from the emotional investment of 
the interlocutor in his belie£s, which causes him to 
choose flight over endurance 0£ another round of elenchos, 
elenchos which establishes premises and effects proo£ or at 
least suggests a way out of aporia. This interpretation 0£ 
the method seems to belie Robinson's own assumed "evolution 
of thought," unless he perhaps thinks that Plato•s original 
contribution to philosophy, the theory 0£ forms, was 
£abricated out 0£ whole cloth instead 0£ synthesized from 
the work 0£ Socrates. Robinson is at times forced by his 
interpretation to represent a Plato whose depiction 0£ 
Socrates is in part dictated by a desire to accommodate his 
problematic mentor to his own greater philosophic 
sophistication. If this is so, Plato's accuracy as a 
witness to even the destructive aspect 0£ elenchos is 
called in to question. 
58The primacy to Socrates• mission of examining 
men•s lives (not merely propositions) is rightly argued by 
Thomas C. Brickhouse and Hicholas D. Smith, "Socrates• 
Rlenctic Mission,• in Ox£ord Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 
Vol. 9, ed. Julia Annas (Ox£ord: Clarendon Press, 1991), 
PP. 131-159. Brickhouse and Smith show how elenchos can be 
a reliable vehicle for moral improvement, both for Socrates 
and his interlocutors. 
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to the truth that awaits him i£ only he would not £lee. 
~aedo 67-69, Socrates and Simmias discuss the true 
philosopher and his attainment 0£ virtue. It is agreed 
that the only road to virtue and wisdom lies in the 
puri£ication 0£ the soul from the body and its emotional 
impediments to truth (67a-b). So-called virtuous men 
dif£er from the truly virtuous in that they, lacking 
wisdom, exchange one emotional investment for another, 
while the true philosopher, puri£ied like the initiated 
mystic, Knows that the only coin that can buy true virtue 
is wisdom: 
. . . [T]ruth is in fact a sort of a purification 
. . (Ka9apoLs. TLS.) from all these things [i.e., 
At 
the emotional investments), and moderation and justice 
and courage and wisdom itsel£ are a kind of 
purif ica ti on (ica9apµ.os. TLS.). [T]he mystics 
. . . are, in my opinion, none other than those who 
have truly engaged in philosophy (oL 
. , ,.. 
11'EcpL.>.ooocp'l'IKOTES. op9ws.). (Phaedo 69b.8-d.2) 
Elenchos' purgative powers, then, lie in its ability 
to separate the interlocutor from the emotions which impede 
him so that he can reach the truth, which in and of itsel£ 
renders him pure and receptive to moral improvement. It is 
here that the role of shame in katharsis becomes manifest. 
In elenchos, the belie£s 0£ the interlocutor become as 
PUblic as his actions which they have previously only 
Silently informed. By publicly showing the interlocutor's 
beliefs to be sel£-contradictory, Socrates can counter the 
interlocutor's emotional investment in his false opinions 
With the most powerful instrument 0£ social control Known 
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to the ancient Greeks, the feeling 0£ shame. Socrates thus 
uses one emotion, shame, homeopa thically against those 
which tie the interlocutor to his false opinions, and 
effectively clears the emotional field for the attainment 
of truth, which is a necessary precursor to the ultimate 
aim of moral improvement. 
Plato represents Socrates metaphorically discussing 
the next step in elenchos• aims, the attainment 0£ truth, 
in one dialogue of the middle period, Theaetetus.59 
There (148e.6-151d.3) Socrates likens his own techne to the 
art of the midwife Phaenarete, his mother.60 Like the 
59Robinson doubts the historical validity of the 
midwife (whether metaphor only or metaphor based on 
mother), and claims that it is "a purely Platonic 
invention, made long after Socrates• death; and it serves 
the unconscious purpose 0£ enabling the elenchus to 
preserve a good standing in an otherwise very un-Socratic 
mind" (PED2 p. 84). For the avowal that the 
similarities between Socrates• usual pose of ignorance and 
the barrenness 0£ the midwi£e support the contention that 
the midwi£e -figure belongs to the historical Socrates, see 
Guthrie, Socrates, p. 77 n. 1. Guthrie likewise sees 
reference to the midwifery of Socrates in Diotima•s 
discussion of "the notion of the union of minds, resulting 
in pregnancy and parturition in the realm of ideas," which 
she claims even Socrates could understand, at Symposium 
206b. 7-209e. 
6 0Gu thrie, Socrates, p. 58 n. 1, speculates on the 
veracity of the name Socrates attributes to his mother, 
Which means "she who brings virtue to light," and 
concludes, on the basis of Theaetetus• recognition of it 
here, its recurrence at First Alcibiades 131e where the 
mention of the name has no special point, and its extra-
Pla tonic existence as an At tic name, that it is an at least 
Plausible, if fortuitously meaningful, name for Socrates• 
mother. 
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JDidwi£e, he is past the age 0£ bearing himself,61 can 
discern who is pregnant and who is not, is a cunning 
111atchmaker who cari tell which unions will have the 
strongest issue,62 and is able to arouse and allay the 
pangs 0£ childbirth. His art differs from midwifery in 
that he treats men, not women, and attends souls, not 
bodies, in labor. And while the midwife•s triumph is her 
ability as matchmaker, Socrates feels his is the ability 
to test thoroughly whether the thought 0£ a young man 
has given birth to a phantom and false idea or to one 
that is viable and true (paoavtr;£lV ll'aVTl 
Tpo'ltct> 1tOT£pov t:'rowAov Kai yt:uoos 
> I '°' I C I ~ 
a1tOTlKT£l TOU V£0U "' OlQVOla "' 
, , ' , , yovq1ov T£ Kat. aA"19£S.) (Theaetetus 
150c.1-3). 
If we are to give credence to this last statement, 
which implies at least the possibility of "viable and true" 
ideas surviving the touchstone of Socrates• examination, we 
must first ask why it is that interlocutors in the early 
dialogues ever recognize only the miscarriage of a sorry 
61Teloh, "Interlocutors• Characters," p. 26, 
avoids problems in the midwife metaphor by describing 
Socrates• practice of dialectic as having two aspects: 
"· .. elenchus and psychagogia. In the former Socrates 
refutes the accounts of others, in the latter he leads the 
psyche to some view without directly saying what it is." 
As the quote illustrates, Teloh•s depiction 0£ Socratic 
psychagogia implies that Socrates• profession of ignorance, 
supported by the midwife•s barrenness in the metaphor, is 
feigned. 
6 2He claims to have sent many "who seemed not yet 
Pregnant• to Prodicus •and other wise and inspired men,• 
ostensibly for impregnation. Prodicus, it is assumed, was 
the man 0£ choice because he could instruct them in the art 
of de'fini tion. 
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es:cuse £or the truth, a stillborn idea which Socrates, like 
the 1<.nowledgeable midwi£e, has been able to recognize as 
dead while it was yet in the womb, and merely at tended to 
the necessary abortive procedure (149d.3). Socrates 
suggests the answer: the compelling nature 0£ the pangs 0£ 
a soul in delivery 0£ an idea. 
Socrates introduces the midwife metaphor by claiming 
that his practice of this art is unrecognized by others; 
they merely say that he is "really strange/paradoxical" 
(ln·o'll'wTaTos) and he makes men "be at a loss" 
(a'll'OPElV, 149a.9). Yet this state 0£ aporia, the 
description men tender 0£ his art, is merely the birth 
travail 0£ the souls his midwi£ery attends, not the art 
itself: "They labor and day and night are £ull 0£ 
perplexity, much more than women in childbirth." 
' ' 
> , (W6lVOUOl yap Ka l > , a11'optas > , eµ.1rtµ.1l'AavTat 
. . . . 151a.6-8). Men, a ft er deli very, it seems, remember 
only the pain 0£ aporia, and cite it as the total procedure 
of Socrates. Nonetheless, many have in £act given birth 
out 0£ their confusion to children of truth, but have 
deserted Socrates. Why? They, in their ignorance of his 
part in their delivery, either credit themselves and are 
disdainful 0£ him > , (ayVO'l'IOOVTES ' KOl < ' eaUTOUS 
> , OlTtaaaµ.evot, > eµ.ou Ka Ta• p ov"1aa v Tes), or 
are wooed away by the persuasion of others (150e.1-3). 
Both groups are accused 0£ esteeming falsehoods and 
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phantoms 
1f}.£LOVOS 
more than 
, 
11'0L"'l<JQµ.£VOL 
.... 
"l'OU 
. . 
KQL 11'£pl 
, .... 
a>.'1')9ous, 150e.6-7). 
The truth-children delivered by Socrates are lost to poor 
nurturance, and all promise of future viable birth is 
aborted unless men are willing to submit again to 
socra tes 1 maieu tic art. 
It is dif-ficult to continue to maintain that this 
metaphor of the midwife is merely "a curious example . 
of the subter£uges adopted by the notion of elench us to 
maintain its home in Plato 1 s alien mind"; that elenchos is, 
after all, a "purely destructive instrument" capable of 
producing only "wind-eggs,•63 unless one £eels no 
discomfort at discrediting our primary "philosophically" 
inclined ancient evaluator of Socrates 1 method, 
Plato.64 Perhaps Robinson, in his otherwise astute 
analysis 0£ Socra tes 1 elenctic refutation, has, as a close 
witness like so many other 0£ Socra tes 1 attendees to the 
63Robinson, PED2 
-- . 
pp. 83-84. 
6 4xenophon 1 s portrait of Socrates, the product of 
a "prosaic commonsense" need not be discredited or 
dismissed when compared to Pla to 1 s testimonia, according to 
Guthrie, Socrates, pp. 15-17: "When ... we find in the 
Socrates of Plato something far less commonplace, far more 
paradox, humour and irony and above all a greater 
Profundity of thought, it would be wrong to suppose that 
these were foreign to Socrates simply because they do not 
~PPear in Xenophon 1 s portrait." In fact, as Guthrie 
illustrates by citing the text of Xenophon, even this 
Prosaic observer gives us "the Socratic method in a 
nutshell, question and answer, 'mental midwifery 1 and all." 
Likewise, see Aristotle's claim that the two innovations 
ascribable to Socrates are "inductive reasoning and general 
definition" (Metaphysics 1078b). 
57 
force of the labor pains, forgot ten that a child of truth 
~ay bave issued forth as a tiny second twin to the 
ponderous child of aporia, the wind-egg, whose arrival is 
announced and acknowledged all round. Yet even if, as 
Robinson contends, the midwi£e metaphor is a Platonic 
invention,65 we must at least afford Plato the respect 
be deserves as an observer 0£ Socratic method, and ask. on 
what basis Plato perceived the metaphor to be accurate. 
The answer lies in the arena of the premises established by 
Socrates and admitted by the interlocutors during the 
course of the elenchos. 
Treatment of Socra tes 1 secondary premises by Platonic 
scholars is the touchstone whereby one can determine the 
orientation of a particular critic. Those who are more 
philosophically oriented tend to view the secondary 
premises as a system whose latent logical cogency only 
needs be discovered to reveal a consistent philosophic 
doctrine. The critics who take a more literary approach 
tend to stress the importance 0£ analysis 0£ 
characterization and the like in rendering the dialogues 
meaningful, sometimes at the expense of their philosophic 
65Robinson 1 s position is advocated by M. F. 
Burnyeat, "Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration," BICS 
24 (1977; hereafter Burnyeat, "Midwifery"), pp. 7-16, who 
differs from Robinson in his defense of elenchos 1 positive 
Potential. Vide contra Julius Tomin, "Socratic Midwifery," 
CQ 37 (1987), pp. 97-102, who argues that the midwife 
metaphor belongs to the historical Socrates. 
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content.66 Seeskin, in his book Dialogue and 
filscovery, makes an admirable attempt to present an 
interpretation 0£ the early dialogues that takes both their 
philosophic and literary aspects into account, but he 
nonetheless at times takes on the somewhat reactionary 
stance 0£ the literary critic. Sees kin argues against the 
tnterlocutor1 s and reader1 s optimistic impression that "he 
has only to fiddle with the premises 0£ the argument to see 
what Plato is trying to say"; that there is nothing wrong 
with the subject matter, but instead that "· .. once the 
£og clears, all the pieces will £it together like a 
puzzle." By appealing to the "centuries 0£ Platonic 
scholarship," where Grote 1 s interpreters vainly "si£t with 
microscopic accuracy the negative dialogues 0£ 
Plato,"67 and to "the £act that Socrates never claimed 
to have cleared up all the 'antecedent 
66see, £or example, the near apology 0£ Teloh, 
•1nterlocutors 1 Characters," p. 25, £or his literary 
approach. Aryeh Kosman, "Commentary on Teloh," in 
Proceedings 0£ the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient 
Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. John J. Cleary (Lanham, HD: 
University Press 0£ America, 1987), pp. 40-41, criticizes 
Teloh £or placing the "drama 0£ re£utation and psychogogy, 
a represented process 0£ philosophical therapy and 
enlightenment" above philosophical issues and questions. 
Teloh 1 s view 0£ the early dialogues is, according to 
Kosman, "radically Socratic" in that it ignores Pla to 1 s 
intent in writing these dialogues £or readers. 
67 G. Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions 0£ 
Socrates, Vols. 1 and 3, 3 ed. (London: John Hurray, 
1875), pp. 291-292. Quoted by Seesk.in, Dialogue, p. 12. 
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r 
i· 
difficul ties/"68 See skin denies the validity 0£ claims 
aaade by such as Koyre, who alleges, "one must conclude 
that every dialogue carries with it a conclusion. 
. . . 
certainly not a conclusion -formulated by Socrates; but one 
that the reader-auditor is in duty bound and is in a 
position to £ormulate."69 
The strong words, "duty bound," applied to the 
reader-auditor who "is in a position to -formulate" ICoyre"s 
alleged conclusions, are suggestive 0£ something which 
eludes the £ear£ul interlocutors, who :flee in horror :from 
the pain 0£ delivery and the stillborn it has produced, who 
refuse to do Socrates" bidding, namely, to look at the 
whole question again £rom the beginning > > (E~ apX'l'IS 
,, 
apa 
c ,.. 
'11 JJ.L v 
I 
O"KE1fTEOV, Euthyphro 15c.11), 
assuming that either they were wrong before, or are wrong 
now. This duty--to take up whence the interlocutor has 
68seesk.in, Dialogue, pp. 11-12. Seeskin believes 
that elenchos does have a positive aspect, in that it 
transforms several interlocutors. It is here that we may 
see the method•s salutary, i£ nonetheless temporary, effect 
(p. 127). His allegation, based partly on Pla to"s Seven th 
Epistle (344b, "ICnowledge never takes root in an alien 
nature."), that there must be a kinship between the knower 
and the object known, goes a long wa·y towards explaining 
the theory 0£ knowledge as recollection as well as the 
mixed success Socrates has in the early dialogues with 
interlocutors whose "arrogance, vanity, and cowardice" 
impede the progress of elenchos, which demands "honesty, 
reasonableness, and courage ... : the honesty to say 
What one really thinks, the reasonableness to admit what 
one does not know, and the courage to continue the 
investigation." (pp. 41 and 3). 
6 9 Alexandre Koyre, Discovering Plato (Hew York: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1960), p. 6. 
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fled and look at the whole question again--is accurately 
assigned by Koyre to the reader-auditor, £or we are indeed 
•in a position• to formulate the conclusion. How so? 
First, because it is not our reputations or our lifestyles 
that are publicly on the line, which £act a££ords us a 
greater degree 0£ emotional detachment than that allowed 
hapless interlocutors. We can perhaps forgo the shame 
which presses so many interlocutors to £lee.70 And, 
second, because in this state 0£ less emotional 
involvement, we are perhaps able to see more clearly the 
forest £or the trees that have been 'felled, to discriminate 
between the unexamined assumptions 0£ the interloeutor and 
those premises which have been examined and proven to the 
satisfaction 0£ both interlocutor and Socrates. And it is 
in this forest that we may £ind the children 0£ truth whose 
birth Plato witnessed and £elt_ c.ompelled to proclaim by 
means 0£ the drama tic dialogue: 
Pia to could teach by suggestion and by silence. . . . 
instead 0£ advancing the argument to the limits 0£ his 
understanding 0£ it, [Plato] was content to play the 
dramatist and lead his characters into conflict 
without result. This appears to be an adaptation 0£ 
the Socratic method to the written word. The reader 
cannot be questioned like the slave in the Meno, but 
he can be asked to watch a discussion in which lines 
0£ inquiry are opened and not exhausted. The alert 
student is expected to pursue the inquiry further. 
. . . This method, by which Pia to, as it were, 
pretends ignorance in order to a waken the mind 0£ the 
reader, is his own version 0£ Socratic irony.71 
70see, however, below 
admitted emotional investment 
necessity to arriving at the 
Paradoxes, 
(next section), £or the 
0£ the reader-auditor and its 
ultimate aim 0£ elenchos. 
pp. 108-109. 
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The above quotation, like 1Coyre 1 s allegations on the 
role of the reader-auditor, points beyond Socratic method 
se to the problem of Pia to 1 s in terpreta ti ve per 
intervention in the method, by indicating as it does a 
shift away from depiction 0£ the method to the ultimate 
intentions 0£ the depictor. Regardless 0£ whether it can 
:t>e proven that Plato was the creator 0£ the midwi£e 
metaphor, it must nonetheless be admitted that the 
metaphor 1 s sole occurrence in the middle dialogue, 
Theaetetus, is nowhere matched in the early dialogues by 
occurrence 0£ its re£erent, a proclaimed birth 0£ truth. 
Likewise, the necessary katharsis which precedes it, 
discussed in explicit re£erence to elenchos only in the 
late Sophist, is also unwitnessed in Plato 1 s depictions 0£ 
the method in the early dialogues.72. And, although it 
has been and will continue to be argued that Plato 1 s 
understanding 0£ the method is not alien to its more subtle 
aspects, we must nonetheless distinguish between the aims 
and their effects which are accomplished between Socrates 
and his interlocutors (reversal, recognition, and shame) 
and the aims which Plato leaves to be completed by his 
7 2.seeskin argues persuasively that elenchos does 
have a salutary effect, albeit temporary, on the titl_e __ 
characters 0£ the Meno, Cri to, and Theaetet us, as well as 
Thrasymachus in Rep:ui)lic 1. Put, however, in the context 
Of what the reader knows about the subsequent career 0£ 
someone like Meno, this momentary transformation serves 
only to heighten the tragic e££ect of elenchos 1 potential. 
S~e See skin, Dialogue, pp. 12.5-12.7, 14, and 130, and the 
discussion (below, Part Four) o:f tragedy in the dialogues. 
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audience of reader-auditors (ka tharsis, the birth of truth, 
d ultimately, moral improvement). an , But before 
recognizing the role of Plato as creator of drama tic 
dialogues, and proclaiming the tragic force with which he 
depicts elenchos 1 lack of success in attaining its ultimate 
goal of moral improvement, it is essential to discuss at 
some length the tone and distinctive subject matter of the 
early dialogues, both of which give indication why Socrates 
found it so difficult to purge his interlocutors of their 
false opinions, to bring the truth to birth, and, 
ultimately, to achieve in his interlocutors the moral 
improvement requisite for 1i ving well. 
Socratic Character 0£ Elenchos: Its Tone Considered in 
Relation to Its Distinctive Subject Matter 
There is evidence in the dialogues themselves that 
either Plato or Socrates himself was aware of the 
potential £or misunderstanding that the interlocutor 1 s 
emotional investment might produce, and took steps to 
remedy the impediment created by the negative reaction of 
flight in response to the shame 'felt a£ter reversal and 
recognition. The evidence is to be 'found in two peculiar 
attitudes 0£ Socrates towards the elenctic process: in the 
interplay between what Robinson designates the "personal 
Character" 0£ el enc hos and the much discussed Socratic 
"irony.• 
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socra tes in the early dialogues will not accept £rom 
biS interlocutors a statement 0£ hypotheticals to be used 
in argumentation. The classic example 0£ this is at 
f_rotasoras 331c, where Socrates re£uses to discuss 
protagoras 1 proposed hypothesis that justice is holiness. 
BY this insistence on discussing only what the interlocutor 
bimsel£ believes, Socrates sets up a situation wherein the 
inter1ocutor 1 s emotional investment is assured: "At stake 
are the moral intuitions which underlie everything one 
stands £or.•73 The emotional investment 0£ the 
interlocutor is that aspect 0£ elenchos which Robinson 
deems its "personal character," and it is this investment 
that he acknowledges as essential to the method's 'first two 
aims: reversal and recognition. For i£ the interlocutor 
either does not believe his primary statement, or remains 
unconvinced by the argumentation, or does not accept the 
premises, "the re£utation ... will not convict him 0£ 
thinking he k.new when he did not."7 4 
The personal character 0£ elenchos is a de£ect, 
according to Robinson, because it thereby "takes on 
particularity and accidentalness," aspects which make it 
73seeskin 
• 
Dialogue, p . 2. 
•E 74Robinson, PED2. p. 15. Cf. Vlastos, 
lench us," pp. 36-37. who argues that Socrates serves 
three objectives in not allowing hypothetical argument: 1) 
to test honesty in argument; 2) to test seriousness in the 
P~rsuit of truth; 3) to accomplish elenchos• therapeutic 
aim of changing lives to accord with the truth. 
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"in£erior to75 the impersonal and universal and 
rational march 0£ science axiomatized according to 
Aristotle's prescription."76 This "particularity and 
accidentalness" renders elenchos closer to the realm 0£ 
myth, perhaps, than to the realm 0£ "treatise philosophy," 
with its axioms, its prescriptions, and its inevitable 
tramp towards the conceit 0£ modern "science.• And, given 
that this aspect 0£ elenchos is more mythic than 
scienti£ic, we might with more assurance assign it to 
Socrates himsel£ than to the artistic intervention 0£ 
Plato. The -fallacy in Robinson's "pre£erence £or the 
impersonal march 0£ science" when applied to Socratic 
philosophy is brought out by Seeskin, who counters: 
The £irst line 0£ response to Robinson is to point out 
that the subject matter 0£ Socratic philosophy does 
not lend itsel£ to axiomatization. To put it bluntly, 
Socratic philosophy tries to reason to axioms rather 
than £rom them. The -fundamental quest 0£ Socratic 
751 pre£er to think that Robinson's value judgment 
is su££iciently quali£ied here by the latter part 0£ his 
sentence. Nonetheless, the statement begs the 
clari£ication be made that particularity and accidentalness 
are not perceived as in£erior modes 0£ "philosophic" 
expression until a£ter the time 0£ Aristotle. See the 
discussion 0£ Nussbaum which addresses i tsel£ to "our 
conventional grouping 0£ texts" which "[takes] the 
distinction between philosophy and literature £or granted" 
and contrasts this with the views 0£ the ancient Greeks: 
"epic and tragic poets were widely assumed to be the 
central ethical thinkers and teachers of Greece; nobody 
thought 0£ their work as less serious, less aimed at truth, 
than the speculative prose treatises 0£ historians and 
Philosophers. Plato regards the poets not as colleagues in 
another department, pursuing di££erent aims, but as 
dangerous rivals." {Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 12) 
76Robinson, PED2 
-- . 
p. 16. 
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philosophy is to answer the question "What is it?" 
... If we were to compare •a Socratic dialogue with 
an axiomatized science, we would find more than a 
difference in presentation .... [T]he point of 
Socrates asking his "What is it?" question in the way 
he does [is] to bring about serious revision .... 
Socrates neither was nor claimed to be a scientist. 
His overriding concern was practicai.77 
Robinson, however, also recognizes what might be 
called a totally "impersonal aspect• of elenchos, that is, 
socra tes 1 insistence that neither he, nor the 
interlocutor, has anything whatsoever to do with the 
refutation which occurs: 
And we must now observe some other curious 
disclaimers. Hot merely does Socrates sometimes deny 
by implication that it is the answerer who is refuted 
('It is the logos that I chiefly examine1 , he says, 
Prt. 333c); at other times he even denies that it is 
Socrates who is doing the refuting. He speaks as if 
the logos were what was doing the refuting. and as if 
the logos were a person over whom he had no control, 
refuting not merely the answerer and himself but even 
the whole company with equal impartiality and 
inexorability. He denies that he resembles Daedalus, 
who made statues move; for the logoi run away without 
his agency, and he would rather they remained 
(Euthyph. Ud). His language implies that he himself 
did not foresee the course the argument has taken, but 
was led along by it blindfold; and that for all he 
knew the argument might have turned out a proof 
instead of a disproof of the original thesis. He even 
implies at times that there is no refutation at all, 
of anybody or by anybody or anything. There is only a 
company of persons engaged in determining the truth-
val ue of a proposition, engaged in an impersonal 
elenchus in the wider sense.78 
77 Seeskin, Dialogue, pp. 145, 26, and 43. For 
Seeskin1 s insistence that Robinson1 s lack of appreciation 
of the personal aspect of elenchos renders the paradoxical 
connection between virtue and knowledge unnecessarily 
ludicrous, see his pp. 145-146. ~ Vlastos, "Elenchus and 
Mathematics,• p. 380, points out ··that elenchos 1 personal 
aspect forbids what investigating scientific hypotheses 
requires: "debating an unasserted premise.• · 
78Robinson, PED2 
-- . 
p. 8. 
66 
Robinson's apparent incredulity arises from his belief 
that Socrates• "curious disclaimers• are not a sincere 
attempt to represent a perceived reality, but instead 
evidence 0£ "Socratic irony or slyness.•79 Socrates• 
disclaimer may at £irst seem to hinge on the meaning 0£ 
one word, logos,80 but given that any meaning we 
assign to the word can never be conclusively ascertained to 
be the one that Plato or Socrates in these instances had in 
mind, another tack may prove more e££icacious. 
Taking as our clue the £act that Robinson describes 
Socratic "irony" as the removal 0£ all personalities £rom 
the method, and that he designates the apparent opposite 0£ 
79Robinson, PED2, pp. 8-9. That Socrates• 
"irony" is thinly veiled lying is taken as a commonplace by 
many scholars. See, e.g., Peter Smith, Nursling 0£ 
Mortality: A Study of the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite 
(Frank£urt am Hain: Peter D. Lang, 1981), p. 49: "the 
Greek sense of fairness did not require one always to tell 
the whole or literal truth. Odysseus lied, Apollo 
equivocated, Socrates pretended an ignorance never quite 
real " 
Gregory Vlastos, "Socratic Irony," CQ 37 (1987; 
herea£ter Vlastos, "Irony"), pp. 79-96, argues that 
Socrates• irony does not admit 0£ any intent to deceive and 
is "complex," i.e., Socrates "both does and does not mean 
what he says." Socrates has, in short, no certainty in the 
domain 0£ morals, but does have true belie£ justi£ied by 
elenchos (p. 86). 
Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, "Irony, 
Arrogance, and Sincerity in Plato's Apology," in Hew Essays 
on Socrates, ed. Eugene Kelly (Lanham, HD: University 
~ress 0£ America, Inc., 1984), pp. 29-46, claim that 
interpreting Socrates• remarks in the Apology as ironic 
requires one to doubt the sincerity 0£ Socrates• moral 
commitments. Perhaps this doubt is understandable, given 
the paradoxical nature 0£ these commitments. 
s.v. 
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tbiS, tbe •personal" aspect 0£ elenchos, as responsible £or 
method's "particularity and acciden talness,•81 we 
might, on the one hand, profitably consider Socrates' 
disclaimers as his, or Plato's, at tempt to "depersonalize" 
the method and thus bypass both the interlocutor's first 
attempts to deny recognition (his attempt to blame Socrates 
personally £or the confusion that abounds), and the 
personal investment of the interlocutor assured by 
elenchos' "personal aspect.• 
on the other hand, by removing both himself and the 
interlocutor from the procedure, Socrates likewise propels 
the discussion out 0£ the domain 0£ the particular and 
accidental (the interlocutor's old refrain, his definition) 
and thereby nearer the domain of the universal and constant 
(the "definiend").82 By his insistence on the primacy 
of the process, not personalities, Socrates simultaneously 
moves his interlocutors one step a way from the emotional 
involvement that inevitably impedes them, and one step 
81Robinson, PED2, p. 16. Robinson likewise 
credits irony with causing "the bewilderment of the 
answerer" (PED2, p. 9). Vlastos, "Irony," p. 93, 
argues that the irony merely allows the interlocutor to 
deceive himself, i.e., to believe what he wants to believe. 
8 2Robinson imagines that "Plato might urge . 
that elenchus is the means by which the irrational and 
accidental individual is brought to the appreciation of 
Universal science, brought out of his individual 
arbitrariness into the common world of reason" (PED2, 
p. 16), but he nowhere attributes this accomplishment to 
the "irony,• which he in £act finds di£ficult to de£end and 
Whose sincerity he doubts. 
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away £rom the particular and accidental ideas that cannot 
withstand the rigorous rules £or defining universals. The 
interlocutors are likewise moved nearer to an objectivity 
that makes it possible £or them to accept the established 
premises, which are a hair 1 s breadth away from the 
definition of universals, those viable truths whose birth 
e1enchos 1 re£u ta tion portends. Whether or not Socratic 
"irony" is an intentional ruse, and whether or not it is a 
Platonic invention, it can nonetheless be defended as 
requisite for the method 1 s penultimate aim: the 
acquisition 0£ truth. 
Even i£ the "irony" is assumed to be a Platonic 
fabrication, one must admit that it serves the reader-
auditor just as well as it was perhaps intended to serve 
the interlocutor within the dialogue. Plato•s reader-
auditor, £or whom above was posited a greater emotional 
distance than that afforded the interlocutor, would 
nevertheless also have need of a device that would increase 
objectivity both in thought and feeling, a device like the 
"irony" described above. Why is this so? Because 
repeatedly in the early dialogues the in terlocu tor 1 s 
position is claimed to be one which "anyone" would 
share.83 Plato 1 s reader-auditor, then, would likely 
8 3 As Callicles, for example, claims at Gorgias 
48tc that the position 0£ Socrates is one which would "turn 
the whole of human life upside down," and at 513c cites his 
consonance with the "experience of the many" as reason for 
his inability to agree with Socrates 1 argumentation. Polus 
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identi£Y with the belie£s the interlocutor espouses, 
undergo a vicarious reversal and recognition, and £eel a 
shame similar to, but perhaps less than, the 
interlocutor's. Seeskin asserts that shame is a natural 
by-product £or any reader, even a modern one, 0£ Plato's 
dialogues: 
It is impossible £or the reader not to be aroused by 
the optimism generated by the inquisitive process but 
simultaneously to be dismayed by the realization that 
like so many others, she will resist the conclusions 
to which it leads her. We saw be£ore that the 
knowledge already present in the soul requires courage 
to recover. To the extent that we do not recover it, 
we, too, are made to £eel shame.84 
The "irony"--able as it is to di£fuse the emotional 
response 0£ shame which leads to flight, and likewise 
serving to "depersonalize" the reversal and encourage the 
objectivity required for sorting the surviving secondary 
premises from the interlocutor's proposed de£initions--is 
an absolute necessity for Plato's reader-auditor, in whom 
alone 0£ the witnesses to the early dialogues the elenchos 
can realize its goal 0£ tru th-aquisi tion. 
Socrates') use 0£ "irony" is defensible, astute, and to the 
point. 
had earlier confidently appealed to any of those present 
£or verification of his own position, and claimed that his 
were views shared by "any other man" (473e and 474b). 
Crito likewise argues the "opinion of the many" against 
Socrates• position (Crito 44 ££.). These are but a few 
'from many examples. Socrates' position, when compared with 
that 0£ his interlocutors, strikes even the modern reader 
as something unwitnessed and strange. 
84seeskin, Dialogue, p. 16. 
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It is also comic. One suspects that there is not a 
single reader of the dialogues not guilty of sniggering at 
what appear to be Socrates' shenanigans and his inter-
locutors' squirmings. Vlastos notes that humor is one of 
the purposes to which irony can be put, but he assigns to 
socra tes' irony instead the purpose of riddling and 
dismisses its apparent humor.85 Eager to defend 
Socrates against the charge of making butts of his 
interlocutors, Vlastos fails to note that humor is 
regularly effected by objectification,86 and that 
thinking objectively is a sine qua non 0£ thinking 
philosophically.87 Socrates, it has been argued, by 
his use of irony, urges his interlocutors to philosophic 
objectivity. Irony, then, even if its purpose is humor, is 
natural for Socrates the philosopher. But one suspects 
that the humorous aspects 0£ Socratic irony were lost on 
the hapless interlocutor, and perhaps reserved £or the 
reader-auditors of Plato's dialogues. Was irony, then, a 
Platonic rather than a Socratic invention? 
It is hard to believe that Robinson's Plato, not 
above fabricating the midwi£e metaphor to assuage his 
85v1astos 
• 
•irony,• p . 79. 
86see the discussion 0£ comedy's use of 
Objectification, below, Chapter Two, Part One. 
87Michel Despland, The Education of Desire: Plato 
and the Philosophy of Religion (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto 
Press, 1985; hereafter Despland, Education), p. 241. 
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guiltY attachment to what he felt was a profoundly 
destructive method, would hesitate to eradicate the 
obviously problematic posture 0£ irony, unless 0£ course 
that posture was so historically verifiable that he felt it 
,,.ain to attempt its censure. 1£, then, the irony can be 
defended as historical £act, and yet Socrates is considered 
insincere in his disclaimers, we must then accuse him 0£ 
regularly perpetrating a knowing untruth, and this in the 
,,.ery man whom Plato depicts as primarily concerned with 
truth's acquisition.88 Although these disclaimers may 
be di££icul t to explain, they nonetheless may well be 
Socrates• honest evaluation 0£ a perceived reality. Taken 
as sincere, they can inform our understanding both 0£ 
Socrates• place in the development 0£ philosophic thought 
and 0£ the subject matter distinctive to elenchos. 
To go a step further: i£ we take Socrates• 
disclaimers as a sincere attempt to represent a perceived 
reality, we must answer why it is that Socrates finds this 
method he wields with such apparent de£tness89 to be 
88v1astos, Socrates, pp. 132-156, similarly argues 
that Socrates• divinely commanded mission to seek the right 
way to live precludes his "cheating" in elenctic 
argumentation. It does not preclude, as Vlastos notes, 
Socrates• leaving his befuddled interlocutors to the 
discomfort of their ignorance. 
89socra tes• deftness, as well as the homogeneity 
Of focus found in certain dialogues {which would seem 
Peculiar if encountered in extemporaneous conversation), 
are likely the result 0£ Pla to•s artistic organization of a 
Procedure which was much less structured in real life. For 
Havelock.'s assertion that the exposition of even early 
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solDething which seems sel£-propelled, as i£ its outcome 
,,ere as hidden £rom him as 'from the interlocutor who 
su'ffers reversal. The answer is to be 'found in the subject 
1Datter distinctive to the elenchos 0£ the early Platonic 
dialogues--the Socratic ethical "doctrine," or rather in 
the nature 0£ that doctrine: both in the manner in which 
the doctrine is expressed and in the content 0£ the 
doctrine and its e££ect on the interlocutor. It will be 
shown £irst that the historical position 0£ Socrates in the 
development 0£ philosophic thought and the form in which 
his "doctrine" is expressed in the dialogues support the 
hypothesis that his "irony" was an honest expression 0£ his 
perception 0£ his own ignorance when £aced with the 
prospect of defining a universal or abstraction, something 
consistent and bearing no relation to particular action. 
Second, it will be shown that the substance 0£ Socrates' 
ethical "doctrine," when set side-by-side with the 
interlocutor's {and the interlocutor's contemporaries') 
system 0£ belie'fs, creates a state 0£ paradox that not only 
succinctly restates the historical position 0£ Socrates in 
the development 0£ philosophic thought, but also produces 
in the interlocutor the two opposing reactions common to 
an states 0£ paradox: at traction and repulsion. 
"Socratic" dialogues betrays "a manner thoroughly 
characteristic 0£ the way language is managed when it. is 
documented" which the "orality" 0£ Socrates could never 
Produce, see Havelock., "Orality," p. 87. 
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The historical position of Socrates in the 
de"Yelopment of philosophic thought is first discussed by 
Aristotle, who claims that while Socrates sought after the 
definition of moral virtues and inquired into the essence 
of things, it was Plato and "the idealists" who first 
sought to define that which is not in the realm of the 
•sensible," who first separated universals from particulars 
(Metaphysics 987b, 1078b, and 1086a-b). It has long been 
accepted that Plato's contribution to the development of 
philosophy was the theory of "forms," and yet only 
recently has the ability of Plato to mak.e such a 
contribution to his mentor's legacy been studied as a 
£unction of the development of language, and, in 
particular, of that development as it was influenced by the 
advent of literacy. 
Eric A. Havelock.•s many inquiries90 into this 
90By far the most controversial of Havelock's 
work.s is his earliest, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, KA: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1963). The Literate Revolution in 
Greece and Its Cultural Consequences (Princeton, HJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1982) is a collection of essays 
reprinted from other sources, including what I found to be 
a largely disappointing piece, "The Oral Composition of 
Greek. Drama," pp. 261-313. Havelock's final book., The Huse 
Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy £rom 
Antiquity to the Present (Hew Haven and London: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1986; hereafter Havelock, Huse) is a generalist's 
overview 0£ orality· and literacy, with little new to offer 
besides bibliographical citations. The most useful, for 
the Purposes of this study, is the 1984 "Orality," cited 
above and extensively below; but see also "The Socratic 
Problem: Some Second Thoughts," in Essays in Ancient Greek 
Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. John P. Anton and Anthony Preus 
(Albany: State Univ. of Hew York Press, 1983; hereafter 
Havelock., "Socratic Problem•), pp. 147-173. 
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Ct of the evolution of thought have led to a greater aspe 
understanding of the ef£ect 0£ the transition £rom orality 
to literacy on the development 0£ moral philosophy.91 
In one o-f his most recent articles, Havelock. proposes that 
... moral philosophy. . . is a creation 0£ 
alphabetic literacy ... [which came] into existence 
in the last hal£ of the £ifth century and the £irst 
half of the £ourth century B. C., in the city 0£ 
Athens. . . . [T]he effectiveness o-f . . . the mental 
process we identi£y as £orming a moral judgement . 
depended upon a prior ability 0£ the human mind to 
conceptualize the rules of behaviour as moral 
universals, an ability which emerged at that time and 
place. Such mental ability depended in turn upon a 
linguistic ability to devise a suitable language £or 
the expression 0£ such universals.92 
In tracing the development 0£ the language 0£ moral 
thought through the transition -from orality to literacy, 
Havelock. marks, among other things, the progression -from 1) 
narrative in which agents are described performing action 
91For re£erences and criticism 0£ theories on the 
effects of literacy, see Rosalind Thomas, Oral Tradition 
and Written Record in Classical Athens (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989; herea£ter Thomas, Oral 
Tradition), pp. 24-28. C£. also William V. Harris, Ancient 
Literacy (Cambridge, KA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1989; 
hereafter Harris, Ancient Literacy), pp. 40-42. While 
Thomas 1 criticisms are though t-provok.ing, Harris 1 are 
openly hostile and dismissive. Thomas argues mainly 
a1ainst Goody, while Harris 1 target is Havelock.. Heither 
cites in their bibliography A. R. Luria, Cognitive 
Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations, trans. 
Hartin Lopez Korillas and Lynn Solotaro££, ed. Michael Cole 
(Cambridge, KA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1976; hereafter 
Luria, Cognitive Development), though both have seen Walter 
J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing 0£ the 
!!>r,J! (London and Hew York.: Methuen, 1982; hereafter Ong, 
ralit.z), Which makes extensive use 0£ Luria 1 s study on pp. 
9-57. 
92 Ha velock., •orality,• pp. 68-69. 
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to e) •states 0£ being• or names 0£ •impersona1s• replacing 
uie agents in the descriptive narrative to 3) the 
discussion 0£ •states 0£ being" or •impersonals" as 
abstract en ti ties removed from the action.93 
Havelock is likewise care£ul to distinguish between 
the moral thought 0£ preliterate and literate societies. 
Before the advent of literacy, he maintains, criteria for 
governing and judging behavior were 
. . . settled by custom and habit. The wrong thing to 
do was not the immoral thing, but the non-customary 
thing; actions were judged by their propriety, which 
within certain limits could £luctuate. The canons of 
law and right were therefore identical with what the 
structure 0£ any given society could accept.94 
A£ter the revolution 0£ literacy, however, which made 
possible the abstraction of thought, Havelock proclaims: 
The rules of human behavior are no longer proverbial 
or particular or pragmatic and flexible, no longer 
suggested by examples of behavior. Previously 
expressed only in specifics, they are now stated as 
universals. Ceasing to be customs, which are acted 
out, they become absolutes by which an custom is 
judged and categorized as either good or bad, right or 
wrong.95 
Havelock, then, holds that the transition £rom 
oralism to literacy is witnessed in language as a 
progression away £rom speci£ics towards universals, and in 
moral thought as a development away £rom the hegemony of 
9 3Havelock, •orality," pp. 71-79; cf. also Huse, 
pp, 101-106. 
9 4 Ha velock, •orali ty ,• 
95Ha velock, "Orali t y." 
p. 69. 
p. 91. 
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custom to that of absolutes. He locates the historical 
Socrates on the cusp of the transformation which was 
occurring in his lifetime: " . . . he was and remained an 
oralist, yet paradoxically [he was] involved in a 
transition from orality to literacy.•96 
we can perhaps never know for certain to what extent 
Socrates was literate.97 We have, to be sure, no 
writings of his and little evidence that he could 
write,98 but absence of evidence is not proof of 
absence. In any case, inability to write does not preclude 
the ability to read, and both Plato and Xenophon seem to 
depict Socrates as able to read. Plato has Socrates 
describe himself as seizing upon the books of Anaxagoras 
and reading them as fast as he could (Phaedo 98b); 
Xenophon's Socrates speaks of perusing writ ten works of 
ancient sages together with friends (Kai . TOUS 
8"1aaupous ...... TWV > ...... av6pwv, 
> £K£l VOl > £V 
I ypayavT£5, 
> I 
av£AlTTWV KOlV!) 
. 
(J \) v 
...... 
TOlS dlEpxoµ.al) 
96Ha velock, "Orality," p. 85. 
97Thomas, Oral Tradition, pp. 17-19, has an 
excellent discussion of the difficulties of defining 
literacy in general. 
98xenophon, Memorabilia 4.2.13, describes Socrates 
W:riting the letters alpha and delta as headings under which 
~e and his interlocutor place various actions they deem 
Just or unjust. 
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and extracting whatever is good (Memorabilia 1.6.14).99 
'l'hiS activity does not require that Socrates himself read, 
for his :friends could have read passages aloud to him, a 
common practice of the time.100 Yet these bits of 
evidence are tantalizing, :for i:f Socrates had in fact been 
introduced to writing or reading, part of his difficulties 
with his interlocutors--and even his difficulties in 
arriving at universals--may in this fact :find explanation. 
The e:f:fects on cognition o:f even a moderate degree o:f 
literacy are, according to the work. of A. R. Luria, 
profound. When testing a wide range of subjects, :from the 
illiterate to the newly and minimally literate to the fully 
literate, Luria found that illiterate subjects showed a 
remark.able inability to make generalizations, arrive at 
abstractions, and use deduction and inference in solving 
syllogisms. Instead, these subjects consistently reverted 
to practical, particular, situational thinking and did not 
seem able to understand syllogisms. In addition, the 
illiterate subjects :found many o:f the tasks imposed upon 
them to be either perplexing, mildly annoying, ridiculous, 
or completely uninteresting. At times they seemed to 
consider their interviewers peculiar for posing such 
99 Ancient sources :for Socrates writing and reading 
are cited by Harris, Ancient Literacy, pp. 85 n. 95 and 91 
n. 124. I owe this reference to James G. Keenan. 
100see Thomas, Oral Tradition, pp. 20-21, for. a 
discussion 0£ the extent to which the Athenians conducted 
ed uca ti on, literary critic ism, and politics orally. 
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. ns 101 questio · 
When one looks at even a £ew of the many examples 
Luria gives, the parallels--between Luria's interviewers 
and their subjects on the one hand, and Socrates and his 
interlocutors on the other hand--are astounding. In the 
following interview, for example, one can almost hear 
socra tes trying--unsuccessfully--to wrest from an 
interlocutor the definition of a universal: 
--Try to explain to me what a tree is. --Why 
should I? Everyone knows what a tree is, they don •t 
need me telling them. --Still, try and ex plain 
it. --There are trees here everywhere; you won•t 
find a place that doesn't have trees. So what's the 
point of my explaining? --But some people have 
never seen trees, so you might have to explain. 
--Okay. You say there are no trees where these people 
come from. So I'll tell them how we plant beet roots 
by using seeds, how the root goes into the earth and 
the leaves come out on top. That•s the way we plant a 
tree, the roots go down . . . --How would you 
define a tree in two words? --In two words? Apple 
tree, elm, poplar.102 
Incredulous though he is at being asked a question he 
believes anyone can answer, this subject finally makes an 
honest effort to define "tree." In his responses, £rom his 
initial wariness-cum-self-assurance to his {to our ears) 
naively particular and experiential answers, one can 
recognize Euthyphro's initial bravado at knowing exactly 
101Luria, Cognitive Development, passim, esp. pp. 
48-99. See also Havelock, "Socratic Question," p. 167, who 
suggests that Socrates' distinctively oral technique of 
asking "interrupting" or "disruptive" questions was his 
contribution to the 'formulation of "a vocabulary and syntax 
for conceptual discourse." 
i02Luria, Cognitive Development, pp. 86-87. 
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,,hat holiness is (5a.1-2) and first attempt at definition: 
. . . . holiness is the very thing I am doing now . 
(Sd.7-9). And yet Euthyphro never does arrive at a 
satisfactory definition; he thinks, essentially, like a 
" 
preliterate. He, like Luria 1 s illiterate subjects, is the 
product of an essentially oral culture, and, as Walter J. 
ong asserts, 
an oral culture simply does not deal in such items as 
geometrical figures, abstract categorization, formally 
logical reasoning processes, definitions, or even 
comprehensive descriptions, or articulated self-
analysis, all of which derive not simply from thought 
itself but from text-formed though t.103 
Luria 1 s subjects had similar difficulties 
comprehending syllogisms. Recall that Socra tes 1 
syllogistic adding together of the secondary premises is 
what led to the interlocutor 1 s realization that the 
secondary premises together entailed the refutation of his 
thesis. 1£ we can theorize that Socrates was more literate 
than his interlocutors, and there-fore able to syllogize 
While his interlocutors were at best inept at it, we can go 
a long way toward explaining why the interlocutors seem so 
dense and gullible in the face of what seem to us such 
obvious logistic traps. Luria 1 s interviewers indeed faced 
illiterate subjects who, when confronted with a syllogism, 
could only resort to their own particular experience. The 
syllogism made no sense to them: 
103ong, Orality, p. 55. 
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--In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears 
are white. Novaya Ze.mlya is in the Far North and 
there is always snow there. 'What color are the bears 
there? --There are di££erent sorts 0£ bears. [The 
syllogism is repeated.] --I don't know; I've seen a 
black bear, I've never seen any others . . . Each 
locality has its own animals: i£ it's white, they 
will be white; i£ it's yellow, they will be yellow. 
--But what kind of bears are there in Novaya 
zemlya? --We always speak only 0£ what we see; we 
don't talk about what we haven't seen.104 
ong, in discussing Luria's illiterate subjects' 
responses to syllogisms and requests £or de£ini tion, 
argues that a person £rom an oral or residually oral 
culture would react to such queries ". . . not by 
answering the seemingly mindless question itsel£ but by 
trying to assess the total puzzling con text " Ong 
goes on to imagine the con£usion under which such subjects 
are obviously laboring: 
You £ind what color bears are by looking at them. 
Who ever heard 0£ reasoning out in practical li£e the 
color 0£ a bear? . . . What is he asking me this 
stupid question £or? What is he trying to do? 'What 
is a tree?' Does he really expect me to respond to 
that when he and everyone else has seen thousands 0£ 
trees7105 
That such an attitude echoes that 0£ Socrates' 
interlocutors is obvious. From such a perspective, the 
only reasonable explanation is that the questioner is 
really odd, which is exactly what Socrates' interlocutors 
thought 0£ him. 
In short, there is evidence that the Socrates 0£ the 
104Luria, Cognitive Development, pp. 108-109. 
105ong, Orality, pp. 53 and 56. 
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ly dialogues lived at the time in the evolution of ear 
thought when the cognitive e££ects 0£ literacy were just 
1>eginning to be felt. We can see the conflict brought upon 
l>Y these e£fects in the problems Socrates has communicating 
with his interlocutors, £or Socrates shows the signs of one 
who has at least been introduced to literacy. Havelock 
maintains, however, that • ... [Socrates] was and 
remained an oralist, yet paradoxically [he was] involved in 
a transition from oralism to literacy.•106 
But what evidence is there that Socrates himself was 
stuck in oralism? The £orm the Socratic ethical 
•doctrine• takes in the early dialogues. For we nowhere 
find a Socrates who is able to o£fer up to his 
interlocutors anything that even approximates an 
abstraction which would survive the rules of definition 
agreed upon by both parties. Instead, the secondary 
premises, the only things to survive the rigors of 
de£ini ti on and the touchstone of elenchos, impress the 
reader as being logically cons is tent but no 'further removed 
from the particular than any definition offered up by the 
interlocutor a£ter his abortive initial attempt. It will 
be remembered that the secondary premises most o£ten take 
the 'form 0£ analogies, wherein a particular action is 
described and its logical or sensible cogency is assessed. 
In Euthyphro, £or example, Socrates examines one 
106Ha velock 
• 
•orality,• p . 85. 
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definition proposed by Euthyphro by drawing an analogy 
between attending to the gods and other arts of attending. 
SY calling Eu thyphro's attention to the particular art 0£ 
attending horses, he elicits his eventual agreement to the 
premise that attention always aims to accomplish bene£it 
(EU thyphro 12e-13c). 
In short, Socrates himsel£ displays at least some 0£ 
the di££iculties experienced by the preliterate: he can 
begin to define, but he cannot arrive at true abstraction. 
Socrates is able to of£er something which can withstand the 
logical rigors of elenchos, but nonetheless cannot serve as 
the de£inition 0£ a universal. His premises instead merely 
aim at an elastic approximation of the definiend by 
supplying seemingly analogous instances,107 but they 
107His establishment of premises is thus similar 
to the modern-day lawyer's attempt to establish precedents 
by discovering analogies between cases. The comparison 
between legal reasoning and Socrates' establishment 0£ 
precedents is especially informing when one considers the 
arena from which Socrates regularly draws his precedent 
cases: the arena of technai. Edward H. Levi, in his An 
Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: Univ. 0£ Chicago 
Press, 1949), defines legal reasoning and indicates the 
influence 0£ precedent cases on establishment of law: "The 
basic pat tern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. 
It is reasoning £rom case to case. It is a three-step 
Process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a 
Proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a 
rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation. 
The steps are these: similarity is seen between cases; 
next the rule of law inherent in the 'first case is 
announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the 
second case. This is a method of reasoning necessary for 
the law, but it has characteristics which under other 
Circumstances might be considered imperfections. . . . 
[C]ase-law reasoning ... is not truly inductive, but the 
direction appears to be from particular to general. It has 
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cannot and do not serve as the de£iniend i tsel£. 
The dialogues end in actual ignorance £or both 
Socrates and the interlocutor, and the "irony" Socrates 
practices is best understood as his perception that the 
proclaimed goal 0£ de£ini tion has not been reached. In 
arguing against interpretations, like that 0£ Robinson, 0£ 
socra tic irony as a ruse, Seeskin states: 
[W]e [should not] be misled into thinking that 
Socrates has the necessary information but has 
decided to :keep it to himself. The Socratic 
dialogues are spurs to inquiry in the sense that they 
engage the reader and encourage her to think £or 
herself. But they are not like mystery novels where 
the author leaves a trail 0£ clues pointing to a 
single conclusion. "What is justice?" cannot be 
answered in the way we answer "Who :killed the butler?" 
We have the entire text 0£ the Republic as proof. So 
there is nothing insincere in Socrates• professing 
ignorance even though he has spent a lifetime 
examining the relation between virtue and :knowledge. 
To complete his search, he would need logical, 
psychological, and metaphysical insights 
unav[a]ilable to any person in the £i£th 
century.108 
Havelock would probably argue that such insights were 
unavailable to persons in the £i£th century because they 
had not yet experienced the transition to full literacy. 
Such insights would have to await the fourth century and 
Plato. 
been pointed out that the general finds its meaning in the 
relationship between the particulars. Yet it has the 
capacity to suggest by the implication 0£ hypothetical 
cases Which it carries and even by its ability to suggest 
~ther categories which sound the same." (pp. 1-2 and 27, 
i.talics added. I owe this reference to James G. Keenan.) 
108seeskin, Dialogue, p. 45. 
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Socrates nonetheless continually displays a sense or 
sel:f-assurance about his ability eventually to arrive at 
knowledge o:f a universal. This seH:-assurance, which seems 
to suggest the interpretation of the •irony• as a 
ruse,109 may in -fact come -from Socrates• willingness to 
submit to yet another round or elenchos, for he does not 
experience the shame common to the -fleeing interlocutors. 
WbY? Because, his life was led, as far as our evidence 
gives witness, in consonance with the •doctrine• 
extractable from the analogies he proposes in the 
secondary premises.110 And yet, there is a sense in 
which Socrates, as will be shown, is a tragic hero. The 
tragedy belongs, however, not solely to him, but also to 
the interlocutors, and vicariously, to the reader-
auditor.111 
Removing ethical principles from the context in which 
Socrates gives them tends to create an artificial sense of 
•doctrine,• whose concreteness belies both the residual 
109This in terpreta ti on would doubtlessly be less 
formidable in its appeal if we had access to transcripts or 
elenchos as Socrates actually conducted it on the streets 
of Athens, stripped of the artistic arrangement and 
synthetic focus Plato has given it. 
UOFor full discussion of this point, see Thomas 
C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, •what Hakes Socrates a 
Good Han?," Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1990), 
pp. 169-179. 
111For the contrast between Socrates and the old 
tragic heroes, see Seesk.in, Dialogue, pp. 78 and 91, and 
the discussion below, Part Four. 
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orali ty 0£ Socrates defended above as well as the very 
particularity of the context. Nonetheless, even as we 
create a doctrine by extracting and perhaps concentrating 
concepts described at length in narrative form, the 
commonplaces of Socratic ethical doctrine loudly declare 
their position in the development of philosophic thought by 
attesting the foundation 0£ their substance in the 
description 0£ action. 
The "commonplaces" form a group whose interrelation is 
grounded in the correlation between knowledge and action: 
1) virtue is knowledge; 2) all wrongdoing is involuntary in 
as much as it results from ignorance; 3) the care 0£ the 
soul is requisite for living well. These doctrines have 
been deemed "paradoxes," primarily because their 
translation into the real world seems to £ly in the £ace of 
experience. Even Aristotle was troubled by their apparent 
inconsistency with the facts of human existence: "The 
effect of his [sc. Socrates 1 s] making the virtues into 
branches 0£ knowledge was to eliminate the irrational part 
of the soul, and with it emotion and moral character 
' KQl 'R'aaos ' KQl ,, £805]." (Magna 
Koralia lt82a.20).112 
In his analysis of the Socratic paradoxes, H. J. 
112Quoted and translated by Guthrie, Socrates, p. 
131 (Greek added), who avows that he is sparing in his 
quotations from this text "owing to the widespread view 
that it is a product 0£ the Peripatos after Aristotle's 
death" (p. 130 n. 3). 
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O'Brien recognizes in their phrasing both the capacity to 
•surprise and shock Greek common sense" as well as their 
latent appeal, given the origins he proposes for them: 1) 
the ancient ethic of self-interest, 2) the fifth-century 
conception of politics and virtue as an art, and 3) the 
Delphic maxim {"with the irony that is its formal 
expression"), "Know thyself ... 113 Socrates' constant 
questioning is unpleasant in that it is "an at tack on the 
pretensions of Kan the Artisan," the fifth-century 
assurance that humans could control their destinies, and 
yet it appeals, through the paradox that virtue is 
knowledge, to the very pretensions it attacks: "[T]he 
Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge . is a 
fusion of opposites. It unites the passion for intelligent 
control of human life with the belief that man's 
intelligence is weak and puny compared to the 
God's."114 
O'Brien's hypothesis of the latent appeal of the 
Socratic paradoxes is supported by the text of Plato, for 
only the brash Callicles of the Gorgias even comes close to 
accusing Socrates openly of complete denial of reality. 
This is not because, as Callicles on the one hand suggests, 
interlocutors are {like Polus) too modest to proclaim aloud 
their "natural" inclinations when con-fronted with the 
113o'Brien, Paradoxes, pp. 56 and 82. 
114-o'Brien, Paradoxes, pp. 80-81. 
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dictates of "tradition," but instead, as he likewise 
ilDPlies, because they are not sharp enough to follow the 
penduluJD of' Socrates 1 argumentation as it swings from one 
to another.115 Callicles at one point comes arena 
close to pinpointing how it is that Socrates is able to 
sliP undetected from one arena to another, when he 
coJDplains that Socrates is always "inappropriately talking 
about cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if our 
discussion had anything to do with these things." (Gorgias 
491a.1-3). The secondary premises do, in £act, quite 
regularly involve description from the arena of various 
technai, in which arena, it must be noted, equation 0£ the 
good and the useful seems obvious, given the fact that the 
object of such technai is clear and unimpeded by the 
conflicting desires which regularly visit human beings in 
all situations where moral choice is required. Socrates 1 
analogies from human practice of crafts, skills, and arts 
are not strictly analogous, then, for human beings making 
moral decisions, or at least for human beings unlike 
himself who do not live solely on the basis of enlightened 
self-interest. This is precisely why Socrates is able to 
"surprise and shock" his interlocutors with his paradoxical 
115Callicles thinks he detects the rapid transport 
of Socrates 1 argumentation between the realms guided by 
"nature" and "tradition," wherein Socrates attacks from 
Whichever position is the opposite of his opponent 1 s. 
CaUicles 1 assessment is colored by his own division of 
reality into these two rather narrow positions, as the 
dialogue 1 s subsequent progression shows. 
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t . 116 allega ions. 
Yet most interlocutors do not openly accuse Socrates 
of denying reality, as Callicles so boldly does. Why not? 
Because "[w]hat separates the paradoxes from nonsense is 
that, instead 0£ denying common human experience, they 
simply re£ormula te i t."117 By his analogies from 
116An in-depth consideration 0£ the problems 
inherent in the era-ft analogies used by Socrates may be 
found in Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory: The Early 
and Middle Dialogues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977; 
hereafter Irwin, Moral Theory), pp. 37-101. Irwin locates 
the source 0£ tension in elenchos in two unexamined 
assumptions: 1) that virtue must always be beneficial (p. 
39), and 2) that virtue "prescribes instrumental means or 
components" to the determinate end 0£ happiness (p. 84). 
These assumptions guide the elenchos and determine its 
paradoxical issue. 
Edward Warren, "The Craft Argument: An Analogy?" in 
Essays in Greek Philosophy, Vol. 3: Plato, ed. John P. 
Anton and Anthony Preus (Albany: State Univ. 0£ Hew York 
Press, 1989; hereafter Warren, "Craft Argument"), pp. 101-
115, likewise sees the era-ft argument, which fails as an 
analogy, as a statement 0£ the paradox that knowledge is 
virtue. 
117o•Brien, Paradoxes, p. 92. C£. Kraut, 
"Comments," p. 63, who criticizes Vlastos• "Elenchus• £or 
its "a priori assertion that a surprising and unorthodox 
conclusion cannot be derived -from a premiss-set that 
consists 0£ nothing but humdrum, orthodox truths.• 
Another way 0£ looking at the paradoxical issue 0£ 
elenchos is to consider it the natural product 0£ the 
tension in human psyche, which has opposing and mutually 
exclusive aims. Maynard Mack, "The Jacobean Shakespeare," 
quoted in Howard W. Clarke, The Art 0£ the Odyssey 
(Englewood Cli££s, HJ: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 62, 
describes this tension as •a confrontation 0£ two 0£ our 
most cherished instincts, the instinct to be resolute, 
autonomous, free, and the instinct to be 'realistic,• 
adaptable, secure." C£. Haden, "Socratic Ignorance," p. 
25, Who similarly claims • ... £or human beings there are 
two equally fundamental but radically di££erent life 
factors: intelligence and the sense 0£ group solidarity.• 
The ancient Greek manifestation 0£ this tension can be 
seen, according to A. w. H. Adkins, Merit and 
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benefit in technai to benefit :for humans making moral 
decisions, Socrates discreetly "reformulates" the process 
of making moral decisions so as to incorporate into it a 
doctrine 0£ bene£it that looks to the end, not the 
Dleans.118 The potentially virtuous individual, like 
the artisan practicing his techne, must now look. beyond the 
particularity 0£ each action to the -finished product 
ahead. By his analogies to technai, then, Socrates sets up 
a situation in which virtue, the definiend, is designated 
as a desired goal. The paradox that "no one does wrong 
voluntarily" becomes in this context the statement o:f an 
obvious truth, in that only a :fool would admit to doing 
soDlething voluntarily against his own desires. This 
Responsibility: A Study in Greek. Values (Clarendon: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1960; reprint ed., Chicago and London: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1975; herea£ter Adkins, Merit), 
esp. pp. 30-60, in the conflict bet ween competitive and 
cooperative virtues, which Irwin, Koral Theory, pp. 15-18, 
terms respectively the "Homeric" virtues and the •post-
Homeric law-conception.• 
Elenchos covertly supports community claims over those 
of the individual, and this is why, as notes Warren, "Craft 
Argument," p. 108, the cra£t analogy does not apply to 
competitive skills such as warcraft and boxing: it assumes 
Without ever making explicit benefit of community. 
The presupposed existence of this tension perhaps 
explains, better than anything else does, why interlocutors 
feel shame: they are confronted in elenchos with their 
cherished beliefs in community benefit which, i:f indulged, 
would overthrow pursuit o:f sel£-interest. See Kahn, 
"Gorgias," p. 115, who claims that the interlocutor's sense 
Of shame can be attributed to Socrates' bringing "moral 
concerns" into play, which support claims of the community 
over those o:f the individual. 
118on benefit and teleology, see Irwin, Koral 
Theorx, pp. 39 and 76. 
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•desire," variously denoted in Plato's text by the verbs 
" 
> 
pou>.eoOaL, cpLA£LV 1 or epav and their 
cognates, 119 is at the very heart of Socrates' 
paradoxes, for it succinctly describes the precarious 
position of the interlocutor who is confronted by the 
choice between the actual and now obvious (his current 
belie£ system) and the possible but still unknown {a belie£ 
system based in enlightened sel-f-interest, suggested by 
analogy to various technai). By set ting up a comparison 
between two things which are simultaneously di££erent and 
yet somehow similar, Socrates as he "reformulates" creates 
metaphor, which invites the de-finition of the coincidence 
and, ultimately, demarcation o-f the system o-f beliefs which 
silently informs each action. 
Anne Carson, in her book Eros the Bittersweet: An 
Essay, quotes and translates Aristotle's de-finition o-f 
metaphor a -from Rhetoric 1405a.34: "To give names to 
nameless things by transference [metaphora] -from things 
kindred or similar in appearance."120 The "nameless 
things," whose name Socrates• metaphor urges but never 
accomplishes, are of course the universals, the belief 
119o•Brien, Paradoxes, pp. 90 and 225-227. 
O'Brien sees Plato's choice o-f terminology as dictated by 
". · . the associations he wants to create, the -field of 
experience he wishes to include, the intensity of emotion 
he hopes to suggest." (p. 226). 
120Anne Carson, Eros the Bittersweet: An Essay {Princeton, HJ: Prince;.;..t-'o'--n~-U-n_i_· v-. -P"""r_e_s_s"""",~1-9_8_6_; _h_e_r_e_a_f_t_e_r ...... 
Carson, Eros), p. 73. 
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systems which, at his time of history, silently informed 
action and were described only by reference to the action 
theY informed. 
The crux of elenctic procedure, the collocation of the 
action derived from analogy to technai with the action of 
the interlocutor, sets up a situation in which the 
interlocutor is made simultaneously to view his actual 
practice and the theoretical or possible practice {which he 
has agreed is both beneficial to the proposed end as well 
as logically consistent). Since the two are contradictory, 
the interlocutor is faced with the excruciating choice of 
denying the validity of his actual practice or of denying 
that of enlightened self-interest, whose desirability and 
logical consistency he has already affirmed. The moment is 
charged with a tension that is almost unbearable as the 
interlocutor stands face to face with the choice between 
what he does and what he has proclaimed is desirable and 
logically consistent. He is confronted with the essence of 
true paradox: •what is a paradox? A paradox is a kind of 
thinking that reaches out but never arrives at the end 0£ 
its thought. Each time it reaches out, there is a shift 
of distance in mid-reasoning that prevents the answer from 
being grasped.•121 
Socrates' habitual construction of paradoxical mental 
situations, in which the goal of definition seems just 
121carson, Eros, p. 81. 
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1'itllin reach but is never attained, caused those with whom 
}le conversed to £eel simultaneously attracted to him and 
repelled. As is the usual practice 0£ the pre-literate, 
Socrates' interlocutors cannot separate the agent -from the 
action, Socrates -from the procedure he practiced, elenchos. 
As a result, the con£licting emotions aroused by the 
paradoxical nature 0£ the situations elenchos creates are 
said to be ca used by Socrates the person, not his 
procedure. Alcibiades' wrenching delineation 0£ the 
extreme measures to which he -felt drawn in a vain attempt 
to £ind consummation 0£ his erotic at traction to Socrates 
is so well known that it needs no -further description here. 
But witness, in addition to this, his statement of a 
simultaneous yet opposing passion, repulsion, which 
Socrates evoked in him in similar excess: "Many are the 
times I would gladly £ind him no longer among men on earth, 
but if this were in £act to happen, I k.now that I would 
suffer greater distress than ever; the result is that I 
have no idea what to do with this man at all." (Symposium 
216c.l-3) 
Since the Alcibiades who is attracted to Socrates 
cannot tolerate the thought of a Socrates "no longer among 
men on earth" and yet cannot abide being in his presence, 
he chooses -finally to £lee. A similar expression 0£ 
repulsion is to be £ound in every interlocutor who £lees 
Socrates and his request to continue elenchos. Yet the 
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1. re at least £or Alcibiades, remains. What ca uses it? deS ' 
Socrates• practice 0£ elenchos is essentially 
. .122 
•erot1c. By using analogy, metaphor, paradox, and 
l>Y engaging in the quest £or knowledge, Socrates creates 
nearly every £orm 0£ •erotic• situation Carson describes in 
k 123 her boo . In his attempt, nowhere in the early 
dialogues accomplished, to de£ine universals, Socrates 
engages his interlocutors in •an action 0£ reaching out 
toward a meaning not yet K.nown. • By using analogy to 
technai to make the attainment 0£ virtue a desired goal, 
socra tes encourages the •reaching out £rom what is known 
and present to something else, something di££erent, 
something desired.• Through metaphor, benefit in technai 
is made to suggest but never specifically to name the 
•nameless• uni versa ls which are the true informers of 
virtuous action for those whose practice is informed by 
enlightened self-interest. By constructing paradox which 
is never resolved, Socrates places his interlocutors at one 
of the points in what Carson calls the •three point 
circuit• requisite £or eros, wherein may be communicated 
•the di££erence between what is present/actual/known and 
i22For a discussion 0£ Socratic, as opposed to 
Platonic eros, see Vlastos, •Irony,• pp. 90-92. It should 
be noted that the current discussion is about neither of 
these, but instead about elenctic eros. 
123carson hersel£ identifies Socrates• eroticism 
as evidenced by his quest £or K.nowledge, but designates 
analogy, metaphor, and paradox •erotic• in respect to other 
texts. 
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,,nat is lacking/possible/unknown 11124 
Alcibiades• at traction and repulsion now become more 
understandable. For interlocutors like him the pull 
between the actual and the possible is too excruciating. 
for although the possible has been made desirable, it will 
never win out in the end. Alcibiades shows his preference 
for the actual by his return to the adulation of the crowd, 
just as Eut.hyphro betrays a similar preference by choosing 
to return to the prosecution 0£ his -father that he can no 
longer justi£y. Alcibiades and interlocutors like him 
resist the "kinetic . . . action of eros" and choose 
instead action of another sort: flight that is mo ti va ted 
by shame. Alcibiades• sense of shame betrays his 
preference for the actual, for. according to Carson. " 
the static electricity 0£ erotic 'shame• is a very discreet 
way of marking that two are not one."125 
124carson, Eros. pp. 166, 86, 73, and 169. 
125carson. Eros. pp. 97 and 211 italics added. 
Carson•s dif£erentiation between the kinetic engagement in 
~ and the static refusal to participate is reminiscent 
of the above discussion of Theaetet us• sense of vertigo as 
he undergoes elenchos. and Eu thyphro•s sensation of 
movement which he -finds so unpleasant as to require escape. 
The discussion of static and kinetic emotions in James 
Joyce•s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, in The 
Portable James Joyce (Hew York: Viking Press, 1946 and 
1947) p. 471, is an instructive parallel to Aristotle's 
designation of the role of emotions in tragedy: "Pity is 
the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of 
Whatsoever is grave and constant in human sufferings and 
unites it with the human sufferer. Terror is the feeling 
Which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is 
grave and constant in human sufferings and unites it with 
the secret cause. . . . The tragic emotion, in £act, is a 
95 
For others, however, like Theaetetus, this •. . . 
kinetic, triangular, delightful and disturbing action o-f 
eros•126 is an exhilarating experience. Theaetet us is 
not discomfited by the movement of elenchos into the 
unknown, and, like Socrates, is a true lover of wisdom, a 
true philosopher. Carson cites Socrates• double 
proclamation {Symposium 177d; Theaetetus 128b) that •his 
knowledge, such as it is, is nothing but a knowledge of 
'erotic things• (ta erotika),• and explains what he means 
by deduction from the facts of his life: 
He loved to ask questions. He loved to hear answers, 
construct arguments, test definitions, uncover riddles 
and watch them unfold out of one another in a 
structure opening down through the logos like a 
spiralling road {Phdr. 274-a; cf. 272c) or a vertigo 
{Soph. 264-c). He loved, that is, the process of 
coming to know.127 
Pla to•s depiction of a Socrates who knows only ta 
erotika again at tests to a Socrates who was a fellow-
searcher and not a sly seasoned traveller on the road to 
face looking two ways, towards terror and towards pity, 
both of which are phases of it. You see I use the word 
arrest. I mean that the tragic emotion is static. Or 
rather the dramatic emotion is. The feelings excited by 
improper art are kinetic, desire or loathing. Desire urges 
us to possess, to go to something; loathing urges us to 
abandon, to go :from something. These are kinetic emotions. 
The arts which excite them, pornographical or didactic, are 
therefore improper arts. The esthetic emotion (I use the 
general term) is therefore static. The mind is arrested 
and raised above desire and loathing.• I am indebted to 
James G. Keenan for this reference. 
126carson, 
127carson, 
p. 97. 
pp. 170-171. 
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the Knowledge 0£ "nameless things." For the Socrates whose 
alleged Knowledge is merely o:f "erotic things" is one who 
itnows only the £irst hal£ 0£ the necessary duo 0£ drawing 
abstraction £rom experience--he knows how to set up by 
analogy the "three-dimensional space" in which collocated 
•images :float one upon the other without convergence" 
with •something in between, something paradoxical: 
gros."128 
O'Brien sees in Pla to•s declining use 0£ the £orm o:f 
the Socratic paradoxes a tempering 0£ "the will to 
astonish, inherited £rom Socra t~s.•129 And yet, while 
he does not explici Uy attribute the paradoxes to Socrates, 
O'Brien does acknowledge that the paradoxes and the 
doctrine 0£ the tripartite soul are 
two di££erent ways 0£ presenting the complex and 
original ethics which Plato built upon the 
intellectualism o:f Socrates. In short, they are 
alternative pedagogic techniques. The paradoxes are 
the a££irmation 0£ the rational unity 0£ human nature 
and human action; the partition 0£ the soul is an 
acknowledgement o:f the irrational multiplicity o:f 
both.130 
Havelock's hypotheses on the orality 0£ Socrates support 
the designation 0£ the paradoxes as Socratic, while the 
above quote from O'Brien suggests that the tripartite soul 
128carson 
• 
p . 145. 
l29o•Brien, Paradoxes, p. 197. He notes here that 
"[t]he ethical paradoxes survive to the end in substance, 
and occasionally in form . . " 
130o·Brien, Paradoxes, p. 198. 
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,,as Plato's answer to the problem he perceived in Socrates' 
paradoxical a££irmation. Development of this doctrine in 
dialogues a£ter Robinson's early period likewise supports 
the designation. Carson, in her analysis 0£ the "erotic" 
Socrates, does not differentiate between Socrates and 
Plato, but we may now with more assurance proclaim that it 
1'ould take a Plato to arrive at abstraction, to "divide 
things up by classes, where the natural joints are," to 
engage in "division." For it is by "collection" and 
"division" that we are able to arrive at abstraction: 
•. . . [W]e think by projecting sameness upon di££erence, 
by drawing things together in a relation or idea while at 
the same time maintaining the distinctions between 
them.•131 
Plato could doubtlessly see and chose to depict the 
tendency in his mentor's accustomed procedure; he could see 
the abstractions waiting behind the collocated particulars 
for an interlocutor able to withstand elenchos to its true 
terminus. But Plato was a true "lover 0£ wisdom," willing 
to withstand the procedure 0£ elenchos, and perhaps 
impatient £or its penultimate goal of truth-
acquisition.132 
As it has been described above, elenchos as practiced 
131carson, Eros, pp. 145 and 171. 
132carson, Eros, p. 173, concludes her chapter on 
Socrates with the claim that " he was in love with the 
wooing itsel£. And who is not?" Plato, I submit. 
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l>Y Socrates in the early dialogues is a procedure seemingly 
destined to reach £or something it never could attain, 
1fhether that be the de£inition 0£ universals or the moral 
iJDprovement 0£ those with whom Socrates conversed. A brie£ 
suJDmarY 0£ this study 1 s conclusions on Socratic elenchos 
1fill serve both to indicate why the method failed to at ta in 
its goals as well as to inaugurate the £inal consideration 
o£ elenchos: the tragic dimensions of its failure as 
depicted by Plato in the early dialogues. 
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Part Four: The Tragic (and Comic) Dimensions 
of Socratic Elenchos 
Elenchos as practiced by Socrates in the early 
Platonic dialogues purports to have two distinct but 
ultimately related goals: to establish definition of 
universals on the one hand, and to effect moral 
improvement on the other hand. Although neither goal is 
accomplished, the two are joined in what may be termed the 
true issue 0£ elenchos: the paradoxical doctrine that 
knowledge is virtue. The doctrine is paradoxical not 
because it is unrealistic, but because to gain knowledge, 
Plato assures us, one must undergo elenchos--but to undergo 
elenchos, one must, we are shown, be committed to virtue at 
all costs. 
Plato is everywhere insistent that elenchos is able to 
accomplish its goal of defining universals. The procedure 
is clearly laid out: reversal, recognition, ka tharsis, the 
birth of truth. And, al though truth's birth is never 
witnessed in the early dialogues, its genesis is strongly 
portended in the secondary premises which survive the 
touchstone of elenchos. By eliciting agreement that 
situations derived from the arena of technai are analogous 
to the subject 0£ virtue under discussion, Socrates 
establishes his secondary premises. Elenchos as practiced 
by Socrates thus suggests that particular action must be 
informed by the end it professes to achieve, and this end 
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a nalogy to technai has established as something tbe 
eficial and there£ ore desired. The truth is there to be 1>en 
bad in the secondary premises, as is at tested by the £1igh t 
of ·every discom£ited interlocutor and the confidence of 
everY modern reader tempted to "fiddle with the premises." 
sut the truth must be born--and birthing is painful. 
The procedure 0£ elenchos as depicted by Plato is not 
a cut-and-dried logical progression. Elenchos is 
everywhere shot through with the interlocutor's emotional 
reactions. The reversal elenchos effects is the source 0£ 
confusion. Confusion clears, however, when one comes to 
recognize and accept one's ignorance. Acceptance 0£ 
ignorance elicits wonder in the sense of doubt, and can 
lead to katharsis and to the birth 0£ truth. But katharsis 
necessitates the willingness to let go 0£ that which is to 
be removed, and it is here where most interlocutors are 
foiled. Instead 0£ accepting ignorance, they 'first at tempt 
to blame Socrates £or their con-fusion. 
So 'far the procedure sounds pain£ul. An antidote to 
the interlocutor's con-fusion is administered: the 
Socratic "irony." This irony provides a much-needed 
humorous interlude to the painful engagement. It 
functions on many levels. First, it removes personalities 
from the process and di'ffuses the blame. Then, by removing 
Personalities, irony allows the interlocutor a more 
Objective perspective on the discussion. Objecti'fication 
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provides an antidote to the interlocutor's emotional 
investment in his belie£ system, which can, i£ it is too 
strong, cause him to be unwilling to let go 0£ his £ormer 
beliefs, rendering him not susceptible to the bene£i t that 
shame, his next emotional reaction, can con£er. 
Shame, it has been argued, is a homeopathic remedy to 
the emotional investment 0£ the interlocutor. As the most 
power£ul emotional tool 0£ social control, it is capable 0£ 
producing alterations in behavior.133 But when the 
emotional investment is strong, the reaction of the 
interlocutor is flight to avoid further shame, by which he 
shows himsel£ so emotionally invested in his beliefs that 
he is unwilling to let go 0£ them. 
Elenchos teeters, then, between 'failure and success, 
between tragedy and comedy. Its emotional power, however, 
is not derived entirely from its oscillation between these 
two poles, nor does it end with the interlocutor's escape 
£rom the presence 0£ Socrates. Al though the pain 
experienced during the process may keep the interlocutor at 
a distance, the lure 0£ its potential success remains 
133For shame as an instrument 0£ social control, 
see Alvin W. Gouldner, Enter Plato: Classical Greece and 
the Origins 0£ Social Theory (Hew York: Basic Books, 1965; 
hereafter Gouldner, Enter Plato), pp. 81-90. On shame 
cultures see Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the 
§_word: Patterns 0£ Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton 
Hi££1in, 1946), pp. 222-224. Benedict de£ines shame as •a 
reaction to other people's criticism" and deems it "a 
Potent sanction," whether the criticism is real or 
imagined (p. 223). 
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strong. A desire has been implanted by the agency of the 
analogy to technai, and the interlocutor is left in a 
position where he feels simultaneously attracted to what he 
nas been shown is desirable, virtue, and yet repelled by 
the only way he can acquire it: through knowledge, which 
b.e now senses, having recognized through elenchos his 
former ignorance, this painful process can provide. 
seeskin argues that the real tragedy of elenchos is 
its failure to persuade: its failure to attain the goal of 
altering the behavior of Socrates 1 respondents, of 
effecting a moral improvement that is more than temporary. 
He seems to place the blame for this failure not primarily 
on Socrates, but instead on the interlocutors, none of whom 
in the early dialogues has the "honesty, reasonableness, 
and courage" requisite £or elenchos: 
... the honesty to say what one really thinks, the 
reasonableness to admit what one does not know, and 
the courage to continue the investigation. Kost of 
Socrates 1 respondents are lacking in all three. 
Protagoras becomes angry, Pol us resorts to cheap 
rhetorical tricks, Callicles begins to sulk, Cri tias 
loses his self-control, Keno wants to quit. While 
their reactions leave much to be desired, Socrates• 
respondents do emerge from the pages of the dialogues 
as real people.134 
Sees kin extends the tragedy beyond the limits of Pla to 1 s 
depiction of elenchos to the audience, who can identify 
With the shame of the "real people" interlocutors because 
134seeskin, Dialogue, p. 3. Cf. Teloh, 
"Interlocutors• Characters," p. 34, who cites Gorgias 487a 
for the character traits of interlocutors necessary for a 
fruitful elenchos: "knowledge, good will, and frankness.• 
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tne reader, too, senses that "she will resist the 
conclusions to which [elenchos] leads her." And, quoting 
Jlussbaum, Seeskin claims that the tragedy is ours, £or 
wanting both what Alcibiades represents in Symposium and 
tnat which Socrates represents.135 Seeskin maintains 
tnat the real-li£e interlocutors depicted by Plato 
increase the sense of tragedy 0£ elenchos• inability to 
persuade, for although one may sense the salutary effect 0£ 
elenchos on Meno, who "has become 'gentle towards others,'" 
or Crito, on whom "elenchus has a soothing e££ect," or 
Thrasymachus, who at "the end 0£ Republic I ... becomes 
gentle towards Socrates," the reader "knows that the 
difference will be short-Ii ved ":136 
[Socra tes•J closest associates, Cri tias and 
Alcibiades, became a disgrace to the city. Keno went 
on to a li£e 0£ treachery in Asia Minor and was 
executed. Laches and Hicias both met with 
misfortune. Heither Gorgias nor Protagoras was moved 
to abandon sophistry and pursue philosophy. Worst 0£ 
all, his longtime companion Cri to accused him 0£ 
cowardice for not breaking the law (Crito 45c ££.)--
thereby proving that he missed the whole point 0£ 
Socrates1 speech to the jury. Callicles sums up the 
feeling of most respondents when, after hearing 
Socrates discourse on how to live a life, he says 
(Gorgias 513c): "I don•t know why but somehow what 
you say strikes me as right, Socrates, and yet I feel 
as most people do: you don 1 t quite convince me." 
Seeskin develops at great length the theme 0£ the 
135seeskin, Dialogue, pp. 16 and 148, where he 
quotes Martha Hussba um, "The Speech of Alcibiades: A 
Reading 0£ Plato•s Symposium,• Philosophy and Literature 3 
(1979), pp. 167-169. This article is an earlier version of 
the sixth chapter 0£ Nussbaum, Fragility, pp. 165-199. 
136seeskin, Dialogue, pp. 127 and 130. 
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tnterlocutors' responsibility £or elenchos• £ailure and 
S hiS argument to support his contention that elenchos use 
iS essentially circular: it both requires and leads to 
virtue.137 But i£ we :follow Socrates in his insistence 
tbat virtue is knowledge, we must protest along with 
callicles that Socrates does not quite convince, and :follow 
up on the implications 0£ Seeskin's claim that Socrates• 
failure to persuade is the real tragedy o:f elenchos. 
And yet there remains the suspicion, certainly £or 
reader-auditors and probably even for interlocutors like 
Alcibiades, who cannot keep himsel'£ away :from Socrates, 
that success lurks somewhere beneath the apparent 'failures. 
For reader-auditors, the suspicion is based on the 
conviction that interlocutors are less well-equipped, both 
emotionally and rationally, to spar with Socrates than they 
themselves would be. The humorous aspects 0£ Socratic 
irony, no doubt lost on exasperated interlocutors, are a 
sign that reader-auditors are a:f:forded an objectivity 
greater than that a£forded interlocutors. For 
interlocutors, there is doubtless the sense that, i:f only 
they could give up their investment in their belie£s, they 
would be able to withstand elenchos to its success£ul 
terminus. 
137 See skin, Dialogue, p. 112. Sees kin uses this 
argument to support his convincing theory on the origin 0£ 
Plato•s theory 0£ recollection: that it is a derivative o:f 
the necessity in elenchos 0£ virtue £or its own attainment. 
See especially his pp. 8 and 149. 
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It must, however, be admitted that the 'failure 0£ 
1 nchOS is not entirely attributable to the weak-willed ~
tnterlocutors with whom Socrates converses. While it is 
true that they £ail to have the moral 'fiber requisite £or 
participating in elenchos in good £ai th and enduring it to 
its end, Socrates himself £ails to provide in his analogies 
anything that can withstand the rules for defining 
uni versa ls. As has been shown, the analogies of the 
secondary premises that withstand elenchos are nonetheless 
as grounded in the particularity of action as anything 
proposed by interlocutors and refuted during the course of 
elenchos. Socrates 1 "irony" may be his honest perception 
of his inability to arrive at definition of uni versa ls, and 
his at least residual orality, his position in the history 
of philosophic thought, may provide the reason for his 
failure to arrive at abstraction, but it is a failure 
nonetheless. 
Elenchos, then, hints at comedy, but is shot through 
With tragedy. But that is not all: It is likewise heroic 
in its tragic dimensions. See skin argues that the tragedy 
does not properly belong to the "· .. one person in the 
city who does not profess wisdom, [the] one person who goes 
about proclaiming his ignorance," Socrates, whom he 
contrasts with the old tragic heroes "who claim to 
something no mortal can have ... , [who] have become so 
enamored of their accomplishments that they have lost sight 
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of their limitations." Socrates is likewise, Seeskin 
111aintains, successful in elenchos, where •success is judged 
l>Y the degree to which the respondent can abide by his own 
adroissions, which is to say the degree to which he can 
es:aroine his life without feeling ashamed."138 
But despite Socrates• knowledge of his 
epistemological limitations, and despite the greater moral 
fiber he brings to elenchos, his failure continues to 
assert itself in the paradoxical equation that knowledge is 
virtue. Even if, as Seeskin argues. Socrates does have the 
requisite human knowledge of his own limitations. he 
nonetheless does not impart even this knowledge to his 
interlocutors, all of whom go back to their former lives 
and conduct them as if they know what they are doing. 
Socrates, in his inability to define universals, with his 
knowledge that is human, not divine, both contributes to 
the tragedy that is the lack of moral improvement in the 
interlocutors, and embodies the all-too-human tragedy in 
that "he put before us an ideal of inquiry whose 
ultimate success may be beyond human capabilities."139 
Although Seeskin is correct in seeing the tragic 
overtones of elenchos, he misses its comic undertones. 
For it is precisely the reassertion of the limits of 
"human capabilities," which nonetheless do not stop people 
l38seeskin, Dialogue, pp. 78 and 141. 
139seeskin, Dialogue, pp. 78 and 150. 
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froDl bungling through their lives, that is essentially 
co01ic. And the impersonal aspect of elenchos, Socratic 
•irony," can afford reader-auditors the comic objectivity 
to see the humor in the situation, provided they are not 
overly concerned with defending Socrates against charges of 
insincerity and mockery. Play can be dead-serious, and 
~enc hos, with its tragic overtones and comic undertones, 
was dead-serious play. 
In short, Socrates• practice of elenchos tragically 
fails because of human limitations, whether these be 
Socrates• epistemological or his interlocutors• moral 
Umi ta tions: elenchos does not arrive at the definition of 
universals which can inform action. And yet humans, both 
Socrates and his interlocutors, continue to act and to 
live, for all of their misinformed beliefs. And this is 
comic. Elenchos• potential for achieving its goal is 
strongly asserted, while the limitations 0£ its 
participants are made pain£ully evident. It is the 
collocation of potential, limitation, and survival in spite 
0£ it all that makes Plato's depiction of elenchos 
essentially tragic, but nonetheless comic. Socrates 
settles comfortably between tragedy {Agathon) and comedy 
(Aristophanes) in Symposium no less than he regularly does 
in his elenchos, for it is there that philosophy can be 
born: 
Tragic plays make human beings conscious of their 
condition and of the dimensions of powerlessness 
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implicit in it: tragedies elicit wonder, awe, fear, 
even a sense of scandal. They hit us with a strong 
sense 0£ our limitations; they feed a hunger for 
understanding. There is so much for us to think. 
about, and what we have to think. about gives us so 
much to think. And yet human beings seem to think. so 
rarely--and then so poorly: they keep coming up 
against walls they have failed to see. . . . There is 
nevertheless a redeeming feature in the tragic 
religious awe: insight into our initial inability to 
learn and our subsequent opportunity to learn through 
su££ering brings some relief. 
Comedy has a counter-message .... Of course 
human beings do not learn: but all can laugh at the 
silliness of others and occasionally at their own. 
And laughter brings relief and occasionally some cure. 
Comedy shows that the ideas we have in our 
heads are more foolish than the performances of our 
bodies. . . . If tragedy articulates the seriousness 
of life, comedy by having fun casts a cooling glance 
on the games we play and restores a grasp of some of 
the simplicities of lire. Comedy enhances the power 
to think objectively (if not passionately) about our 
problems. The tragic hunger £or justice, and 
understanding together with the witty levity and 
ironic resources of comedy jointly give birth to 
philosophy.140 
There are ellipses in the above quote because, in 
Plato's depiction 0£ Socratic elenchos, only tragedy comes 
into 'full bloom; comedy is an occasional intrusion on an 
essentially tragic course. We do not see, in elenchos, the 
•repetitious pursuit of simple pleasures" Despland refers 
to; nor do we, at least -from our historical perspective, 
have the feeling that "[i]n any case, no one gets killed 
for ignoring his or her limits; the consequences 0£ 
stupidity turn out to be lots of ridicule or a few 
blows. •141 It b may e, then, merely from an 
l40nespland, Education, pp. 2.40-2.41. 
141nespland, Education, p. 2.41. 
historical 
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perspective, that elenchos becomes a tragedy and Socrates 
tts hero. But this is the case only if one chooses not to 
1>elteve the dead-serious intent behind Socrates' play. To 
do this, however, one must ignore Plato's depiction of the 
uian and his method. 
In his depiction of potential and limitation, of the 
possible and the actual, Plato makes his paradoxical 
socra tes of the early dialogues a tragic hero. For the 
ancient Greeks, to be a hero meant to confront the paradox 
that •to aspire to be like the gods was a hopeless piece of 
dangerous presumption," and yet this same aspiration "was a 
necessary and inevitable spiritual urge."142 In his 
insistence that knowledge may be born through elenchos and 
his simultaneous failure to achieve it, the Platonic 
Socrates continues to aspire--and continues to fail. He is 
heroic in his potential, in his continual aspiration, and 
tragically limited only in the sense that all humans are 
(comically) limited, at least according to the ancient 
Greek view. His interlocutors, by contrast, are 
tragically limited in their heroic abilities to aspire, and 
yet (comically) au-too-human because of their failure. 
By showing his audience Socrates' limitations in the 
realm of knowledge and his interlocutor's limitations in 
the realm 0£ virtue, and putting both in a situation where 
t42cedric Whitman, The Heroic Paradox: Essays on 
!!_omer, Sophocles, and Aristophanes (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell Univ. Press, 1982), p. 22. 
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ne insists that the limitations can be overcome, Plato 
constructs the essentially tragic interaction 0£ potential 
and limitation. Virtue is knowledge, but neither can be 
reached. This tragic interaction between potential and 
limitation is at the very core 0£ the Socratic paradoxes 
and the paradox that was the historical Socrates. Plato 
gives us both in his early dialogues. 
Plato's tragic depiction 0£ Socrates' method is not, 
however, the only depict.ion 0£ t.he method to survive £rom 
antiquity. For, even though it has rarely been perceived 
as such, Aristophanes in t.he Clouds also depicts Socrates 
following his usual procedure. Aristophanes' perspective, 
however, t.rans~orms the method into something primarily 
comic; it will there£ore take an adjustment 0£ vision to be 
able t.o see that Plato and Aristophanes have, in £act, 
taken as their subject the same method. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ARISTOPHANES OH SOCRATES AHD EURIPIDES: 
ELEHCHOS COMICALLY DEPICTED 
part One: Evidence Linking Socrates and Euripides: 
An Overview and an Apologia £or Aristophanes 
Evidence connecting Socrates and Euripides, while not 
abundant, is not lacking. It is claimed, £or example, 
that Euripides studied philosophy under Socrates, and was 
unpopular because he admired Socrates. Socrates is said to 
have helped Euripides write his plays. Socrates, although 
he was not an habitual theater-goer, is averred to have 
made a point 0£ attending new Euripidean productions and to 
have approved 0£ certain sentiments expressed on stage, but 
is described as leaving when he heard what he considered 
objectionable sentiments expressed in Euripides• 
plays.1 
This evidence is, £or the most part, however, 
lFor an inventory and citation 0£ the ancient 
evidence, see Robert J. Yankow, Socratic e11'taT.fiµ'T) 
in Two Plays 0£ Euripides: The Medea and Hippolytus (Hew 
York: diss. Fordam Univ., 1978; herea£ter Yank.ow, Socratic 
> , 
£11'lOT'IJIJ.'I)), pp. 39-43. A collection of biographical 
evidence on Socrates in English translation can be £ound in 
John Ferguson, Socrates: A Sourcebook (London and 
Basingstok: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., £or The Open 
University, 1970). For the evidence on Euripides analyzed 
and a bibliography, see Mary Lefkowitz, The Lives 0£ the 
Greek Poets (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 
1981; herea£ter Le£kowitz, Lives), pp. 89-103 and 163-172. 
See also P. T. Stevens, "Euripides and the Athenians," JHS 
76 (1956), pp. 87-94. --
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untrustworthy. Much 0£ it is written a£ter the £i£th 
century B. C. by men who did not know Socrates and 
guripides, and whose sources, historiographical methods, 
and intentions in writing are either unknown or, when 
Known, are such that they render the in£orma tion -furnished 
suspect. Mary Le£k.owitz, in her Lives 0£ the Greek. Poets, 
has demonstrated that " . virtually all the material in 
all the lives is £iction"; that the material was derived 
from the poets• own works and £rom characterizations 0£ 
the poets £ound in comedy, was written with an intent more 
often to entertain and delight than to in£orm, and was 
molded with an eye to the readers• expectations, i.e. that 
poets . should have lives like those 0£ heroes, 
involving con£rontations, requiring isolation and, 
o£ten, violent deaths; but unlike heroes, poets could 
be portrayed as ordinary or even foolish men, so that 
their creativity would not seem mysterious or even 
particularly di££icult.2 
Doubts about the reliability 0£ the biographical 
tradition do not dispel what is more important for this 
study, namely, that even in ancient times a methodological 
similarity between Socrates and Euripides was perceived. 
Moreover, there is a contemporary witness, not 0£ the 
biographical tradition, who also at tests to a perceived 
methodological similarity between Socrates and Euripides. 
As any reader 0£ Aristophanes• comedies knows, Socrates and 
Euripides are depicted by the comic playwright as sharing 
2Le£k.owitz, Lives, pp. vii-ix. 
113 
similar practices. A striking illustration comes £rom the 
end of the Frogs, where the Chorus censures habitual 
association with Socrates as a corrupting influence on 
guripides• poetry: 
xapl.ev o~v µ..ft 2!wicpa1e1. 
trapaicae.fiµ.evov Aal.etv, 
) I ' 
atroPal.OVTa IJ.OU<JlK~V 
1a Te µ.f;y1.0Ta trapal.1.trovTa 
T~. s TPOYft>Ol.K~S T£xv~s. , , ,. ...... 
TO 0 €1fl 0€1J.VOl<Jl Aoyo1.01. 
' ..... ica1. oicap1.q.~oµ.01.01. 
' > ' 01.aTp1.p~v ..... apyov 
A.fipwv 
1f0l€t<J9Ql 
trapaq.povouvTos 
) I 
avopos. 
It is smart, then, not to sit beside Socrates 
chattering, throwing away music and the greatest 
remnants of the tragic art. Only a deranged man 
passes idle time in solemn words and trifles of trash. 
(Frogs 1491-1499).3 
The above quotation is the most explicit and least 
ambiguous evidence from Aristophanes" plays, which in other 
ways forcefully suggest that Socrates" customary way of 
speaking with his fellow citizens was detectable in 
Euripides• dramatic poetry. Aristophanes, then, as a 
contemporary of Socrates and Euripides, stands the chance 
of being the only witness to a methodological similarity 
shared by the philosopher and the poet. 
Aristophanes, a trustworthy witness? Aristophanes, 
who depicted Socrates" "thinkery" gleefully put to torch at 
3The text used for all of Aristophanes except the 
Clouds is F. W. Hall and W. K. Geldart, eds., Aristophanis 
Comoediae, vols. 1 and 2, 2 ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1906 and 1907). The text used for the Clouds is the one 
established by K. J. Dover, ed., Aristophanes, Clouds 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968; hereafter Dover, Clouds). 
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e nd o£ his Clouds? Whose Frogs showed Dionysus, the tb.e 
patron god of tragedy, forswearing and casting his vote 
against retrieving Euripides from death in Hades? Isn't 
tb.iS man a hostile witness? Yet, even i£ Aristophanes is 
not considered hostile, mustn't one wonder along with 
Lefkowitz, "· how reliable a source is Aristophanes, 
who was not a historian but a comic poet ?"4 
I£, however, it can be argued that Aristophanes is a 
trustworthy witness, then his depictions 0£ Socrates and 
Euripides can be examined for the evidence they give on 
methodological similarity. The perception of this 
similarity is, in fact, the one constant in the history of 
criticism of Aristophanes as a portrayer of Socrates and 
Euripides. The critical literature for the most part, 
however, denounces Aristophanes' representation of the two 
men, and of Socrates especially, as profoundly distorted. 
The reasons cited for this distortion are two: either 
Aristophanes was maliciously hostile, or else he chose to 
serve the muse of comedy at the expense of truthful 
representation. Each of these will be considered in turn. 
The assessment that Aristophanes was motivated solely 
by hostility in portraying Socrates and Euripides is not 
Widespread, but has had, nonetheless, as will be argued 
below, an insidious effect on most of the critical 
literature. The assessment of hostility seems to take its 
4Lefk.owitz, Lives, p. viii. 
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illlpetus £rom a sense 0£ righteous indignation at what is 
considered the gross misrepresentation 0£ (primarily) 
socrates and (secondarily) Euripides and the imagined 
iegacY 0£ this misrepresentation in the lives 0£ the two 
111en. wasn 1 t Aristophanes, a£ter all, answerable in part 
for the opinion 0£ Socrates that led to his being charged 
and ultimately put to death? Plato has Socrates say as 
much at Apology 19a.7-c.5: 
I will take up -from the beginning and ask what is the 
accusation -from which has arisen slander 0£ me, and 
upon which Meletos relied when he wrote this 
indictment against me. Well, then, what is it the 
slanderers say? One must read their statements just 
like the a££idavit 0£ the accusers: "Socrates acts 
unjustly and is a meddler who seeks things under the 
earth and in heaven, makes the weaker argument the 
stronger, and teaches these things to others." Such 
is the accusation. You yourselves have seen these 
things in the comedy 0£ Aristophanes, a certain 
Socrates there born a lo-ft, claiming to walk the air 
and babbling many other absurdities, 0£ which I 
understand nothing whatsoever.5 
Even the habitually jud.icious K. J. Dover, although he 
never overtly accuses Aristophanes 0£ malicious intent in 
regard to Socrates, nevertheless suggests only 
incriminating explanations £or Aristophanes 1 portrait 0£ 
the Philosopher--that Aristophanes was either politically 
motivated, or callously interested in playing to the 
gallery, or inexcusably oblivious to all-too-predictable 
consequences: 
I£ Clouds made li£e hard £or Socrates, did 
Aristophanes care? I£ he entertained a genuine moral 
5see also Apology 18b. 
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indignation against the subversion of custom and 
traditional beliefs, he would have welcomed such an 
outcome; if he was not so very indignant, but wanted 
to raise all the laughs he could and enlist the 
sympathies of the average member of his audience, I 
doubt whether he would have hesitated to buy success 
at the price of Socrates• security. One simple 
consideration suggests, at any rate, that the play is 
not good-natured fun which Socrates• friends could 
enjoy as much as anyone else: people really were 
prosecuted and outlawed or killed for alleged injury 
to the community, and this makes all the di££erence 
between the burning of Socrates 1 school and some 
modern fantasy depicting the boiling of a politician, 
for we no longer boil people (or even discommode them) 
for errors of political judgment.6 
Martha Nussbaum cites "our reverence £or Socrates" as 
primarily accountable £or the Clouds 1 being experienced as 
an "irritating work."7 Similarly, indignation is 
6K. J. Dover, Aristophanic Comedy (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: Univ. 0£ California Press, 1972), p. 119. 
See, however, Dover, Clouds, p. lvi, £or a recti£ication 0£ 
the assumption that Aristophanes• culpability is increased 
by the fact that he should have known of what the Athenians 
were capable: "We can only observe that the Athenians did 
not necessarily do what Ar. told them to do .... " 
Similarly, see Cedric H. Whitman, Aristophanes and the 
Comic Hero (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1964; 
hereafter Whitman, Comic Hero), p. 15, for Aristophanes 1 
imagined delight at being taken, in general, so seriously. 
7Martha Nussbaum, "Aristophanes and Socrates on 
Learning Practical Wisdom," YCS 26 (1980; hereafter 
Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom•r.-pp. 44-45. C£. Whitman, 
Comic Hero, p. 143, who cites Socra tes 1 remarks in the 
Apology as the source 0£ the di££iculty 0£ accepting 
Aristophanes• caricature in the Clouds as "a highly 
distinguished comic creation," but argues against any 
animosity £el t by Plato for Aristophanes. Whitman 
maintains that the testimony of the Symposium "far 
outweighs the passing remarks in the Apology," and 
concludes, "Had Plato really felt an enemy in 
Aristophanes, he certainly possessed the articulateness to 
say so clearly." Whitman in any case considers it 
"dubious" that the Clouds "may have engendered a degree of 
PUblic prejudice against Socrates, nearly a quarter-century 
after the play•s abysmal failure." (p. 8). 
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soJDetimes £elt at Aristophanes' depiction 0£ Euripides 
aJ:>andoned at the end 0£ the Frogs, a scene that becomes 
tantamount to a betrayal when considered in light 0£ what 
,,ere presumed to be :facts about the dramatic poet's li£e. 
guripides• supposed unpopularity becomes the imagined 
reason £or his £inal departure £rom Athens, and the poet's 
JDiserable li:fe--the seemingly logical precursor o:f his 
final and dispirited exit8--get laid, like the charges 
against Socrates, at Aristophanes• :feet. In his discussion 
of Medea 292 :ff., where Medea attributes the envy9 o:f 
8see P. T. Stevens, "Euripides and the Athenians," 
JHS 76 (1956; hereafter Stevens, "E. and Athenians"), pp. 
~94, who assesses in:formation concerning Euripides• 
unpopularity :from the ancient biographical tradition, the 
rarity o:f Euripides• dramatic victories, and the impression 
of the poet derived :from his treatment in Aristophanes. He 
concludes that the picture of the increasingly unpopular 
and isolated poet is probably exaggerated, and not in any 
case :founded upon undisputed evidence. Stevens anticipates 
Lefkowitz•s work by recognizing that Satyros• Lif'e of' 
Euripides "· .. is partly based on the acceptance of' the 
jests o:f Comedy as historical :fact, and on the assumption 
that autobiographical allusions can be discerned in 
numerous passages from the plays of Euripides himself." (p. 
87). 
9The word she uses is cp8ovo5. See 
Lefkowitz, Lives, pp. 95-96, for the same word used in the 
biography of Euripides to explain the comic poets' at tack, 
the attribution of Cephisophon as his coauthor, the 
generalized hatred of the Athenians, and a young man's 
Offensive remark that the poet had bad breath. Le:fkowitz 
does not suggest that the word points to Medea 292 f:f. as 
the origin of these remarks, but maintains instead that the 
characteristic Greek ambivalence toward extraordinary 
achievement became, in the case of Euripides, who 
"Presumably was somewhat arrogant and kept away from 
ordinary people and had no interest in appealing to his 
audiences," the cpOovos invited by a superior stance. 
The biographer's description of Euripides' arrogance and 
isolation, however, likewise suggests Medea as a source; 
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tile citizens to their reaction against her reputation as 
one 'Who is clever, Denys Page gives a poignant description 
of guripides as the unappreciated genius and 0£ 
Aristophanes as the heartless cad 0£ a comic poet who 
contributed to his already considerable distress: 
Foreshadowed, too, already in Medea is the great 
burden 0£ unpopularity which was to oppress the poet 
throughout his lire. The sequel was the ridicule and 
hatred which Aristophanes re-fleets: the climax was 
his voluntary exile to Macedonia in sorrow and 
disillusion. Euripides was not the only teacher whom 
the Athenians persecuted, though they returned to him 
again and again, admiring while they hated, moved 
while they mocked and slandered . . . History traces a 
single undeviating line 'from this passage 0£ Medea 
(lines 2.92 ££.] through the bitter pages 0£ 
Aristophanes to the 'final scene 0£ an old man 
wandering out into the world 'friendless and 
embittered.10 
Yet the assessment 0£ Aristophanes as a bitterly 
hostile witness, while it carries the scapegoat •s boon 0£ 
the emotional purge, is nonetheless un£ounded, not only 
because it relies £or the most part on historical evidence 
shown by Le£kowitz to be 0£ uncertain value, but also 
because it assumes that the plays in question admit 0£ 
obvious interpretations: I£ Aristophanes in his plays 
shows Socrates• school ablaze and Euripides abandoned in 
see Medea's remarks to the Corinthian women at Medea 214 
££. 
10nenys L. Page, ed., Euripides, Medea (Ox£ord: 
Clarendon Press, 1961; hereafter Page, Medea), pp. xii-
Xiii. See also his comment at lines 292 sqq., p. 94: "A 
famous passage: we seem to hear Eur. himself speaking, who 
SUf£ered much unpopularity at Athens. At last 'mortified 
by the hostility o-f his fellow-citizens", as his biographer 
relates, he retired to the court o-f Macedon." 
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Jlades, then Aristophanes must be the one who condones and 
recoJDmends such actions. 1£ Aristophanes in his plays 
sho1fS socra tes 1 school ablaze and Euripides abandoned in 
flades, then the plays ipso £acto are criticisms 0£ Socrates 
and Euripides.11 Such interpretations 0£ the plays, 
ho1fever, as will be suggested, are no more able to stand 
1fben put to close scrutiny than are the quasi-historical 
biographies with which they have association. Only when 
emotional bias against Aristophanes and obvious 
interpretations are abandoned can the complexities and 
subtleties 0£ his comic vision begin to be appreciated. 
The rewards 0£ such an appreciation can be discovered 
in much 0£ the critical literature assessing Aristophanes 1 
portrayal 0£ Socrates and Euripides. Yet this literature 
is, £rom the perspective 0£ this study at least, both 
b~ssed and cursed by a reactionary stance against the 
assessment 0£ Aristophanes as maliciously hostile. In an 
attempt to exonerate Aristophanes £rom the charges 0£ being 
either small and mean or else stupid, this literature 
regularly cites comic convention as the reason behind the 
distortion, and this is a blessing, because such a stance 
inspires examination 0£ the nature 0£ Aristophanes 1 comic 
genius, and obvious interpretations 0£ the plays are not 
111ronically enough, such obvious interpretations 
may in £act be the only source £or the assessment 0£ 
Aristophanes as a hostile witness, since the ancient 
biographers relied on the comedies to make many 0£ their 
seemingly plausible claims. See Le£k.owitz, Lives, passim. 
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able to endure the consequences of this examination. The 
Se of this reactionary stance--the denial that the comic cur 
poet's depictions contain any significant element of 
biStoricity--is, it seems, the enduring byproduct of a 
resistance to accepting the vexing implications behind the 
obvious interpretations of the plays: that there was 
perhaps every reason why Socrates and his school should be 
incinerated and Euripides left to rot.12 
In an attempt, then, to address the £elt need to 
rehabilitate Aristophanes, it is often argued that 
Aristophanes himsel£ bore no overwhelming hostility £or 
Socrates and Euripides, but that he nonetheless confused 
his audience and readers; that his depiction distorts the 
truth with no £orethought 0£ malice, but simply by its 
service to the needs of comic exaggeration and 
simplification. From this perspective, Aristophanes comes 
into his own; he is exonerated as comic poet. Ho one 
better pronounces an apologia £or Aristophanes than Cedric 
Whitman, who discerns the shadow of truth Aristophanic 
comedy mirrors, albeit sometimes darkly: 
Whether or not Old Comedy is a sound historical source 
for the study of £ifth-century Athenian society, in 
12Aristophanes• comedy in £act re£lects, it will 
be argued below (Parts Two and Three), the fifth-century B. 
C. Athenian sentiment that the method employed by both men 
led only to con£usion and disruption. Comedy, objective 
Where reverence £ears to tread, gives a view of elenchos 
from the outside: renouncing awareness 0£ elenchos• 
Ultimate goals 0£ moral improvement and the birth 0£ truth, 
comedy presents elenchos as chicanery. 
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Aristophanes• hands it is a powerful refractor of that 
society, more truthful, perhaps, about the passionate 
inner drives and aspirations than about the political 
or economic details; more concerned, at its best, with 
spiritual wholeness, as all true classic art is, than 
with moralizing about parts. Its mode is one of 
bursting generosity; it seems to use anything that 
comes to hand. Large sprays of wit, satire, 
slapstick., lyric, whimsy, realism, obscenity, and 
sheer nonsense come tumbling out in bacchanalian 
abundance, and in the midst of the cheer£ul tumult, it 
is vain, not to say absurd, to try to catch the poet, 
unmask. him, and make him say his moral catechism. The 
ef£ort to do so always leads to the same maddening and 
irresistible 'figure who avers that he is the best 
influence in Greece, constantly improving his 'fellow 
citizens by de-fending them 'from demagogues, sophists, 
and Euripide~ and 'feeding them on the 'finest comic 
£are conceivable, in contrast to the vulgar and 
poverty-stricken o££erings 0£ his less fortunate 
rivals.13 
And yet, even as some of the critical literature 
grants Aristophanes his comic license and identifies the 
locus 0£ the truth he speaks in the audience whose drives 
and aspirations he mirrors, most of this same literature 
still assumes that Aristophanes• depiction 0£ the Socrates 
and Euripides is, in all 0£ its signi£icant details, 
pro£oundly distorted; and there is a sense in this 
literature that neither Socrates nor Euripides deserved 
such roughshod treatment at the hands of a comic poet who 
did not even have the decency to draw them accurately. 
Aristophanes is 'frequently charged with wrongfully 
amalgamating the two men and with failing to distinguish 
them from broad categories of individuals held up for easy 
ridicule. In this vein is the remark. 0£ Bruno Snell: 
13Whi tman, Comic Hero, pp. 14--15. 
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Whatever the differences between Euripides, Socrates, 
and the Sophists, in Aristophanes they are 
indistinguishable; their only activity consists in 
cleverly lining their pockets through the teaching of 
.,,arious tricks which are destined to wreck the healthy 
morality of the solid Athenian citizen, and to subvert 
the traditional structure of the state.14 
SiPlilarly, Dover, in his attempt to understand 
Aristophanes• reasons :for misrepresenting Socrates in the 
mouds, suggests that the philosopher is made to conform to 
the genus o:f the "intellectual," or even is more broadly 
drawn as the "abnormal man": 
The abnormal man is essentially parasitic on the 
normal; he does no real work, he undermines the 
loyalties on which the city"s continued existence 
depends, and he casts a shadow over the ordinary 
pleasures of life by the unspoken implication that 
there may be other, secret pleasures accessible to him 
alone.15 
Even Whitman, who has such a keen appreciation :for 
Aristophanic comedy, is :firm in maintaining that 
Aristophanes• portrayals 0£ both Socrates and Euripides are 
14Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind: The 
Greek Origins 0£ European Thought, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer 
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953; Harper Torchbook 
ed., Hew York: Harper and Row, 1960; hereafter Snell, 
Discovery), p. 114. 
15nover, Clouds, p. liii. See also Dover•s 
Aristophanic Comedy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. 0£ 
California Press, 1972), pp. 116-120, where he maintains 
that "To suppose . . . that Aristophanes decided to treat 
Socrates as the paradigm of the sophist and attached to him 
any attribute of the whole genus which lent itsel-f to 
ridicule is not particularly difficult." For the untenable 
argument that in depicting Socrates and Euripides, 
Aristophanes drew on the stock character 0£ "The Learned 
Doctor," see F. M. Cornford, The Origin of Attic Comedy 
(London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1914; hereafter Cornford, 
Attic Comedy), pp. 154-163. 
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. allY a-historical: "The Cleon whom Aristophanes 
.-1rtU 
is his own, not history's; his Euripides is his trounces 
· Socrates is his own." Dismissing as trivial any 
o•n: hJ.S 
r
espondence to reality in Aristophanes• Socrates, 
cor 
Whitman describes the portrayal as a virtuoso's 
conglornera te 0£ many men, rolled in to the physically most 
amusing pacK.age at hand with a recognizable name: 
It is less important . . to trace the genuinely 
socra tic touches in the Clouds, than it is to 
recognize the composite image 0£ the intellectual 
climate, under the name 0£ Socrates. The poet might 
have called it by a di££erent name, but Socrates• 
local pre-eminence entitled him to £irst 
consideration. . . . There could never have been any 
question 0£ representing him seriously and accurately. 
Had there been, Aristophanes would scarcely have 
accredited him with practically all the intellectual 
accomplishments 0£ the whole sophistic movement--plus 
the doctrines 0£ Diogenes, which cannot be called 
sophistic. Rather, this was an inspired piece 0£ 
poetic invention to gather together the WeaK.er 
Discourse 0£ Protagoras, some 0£ the rhetorical 
claims 0£ Gorgias, the air physics 0£ Diogenes, the 
linguistic studies 0£ Prodicus, and the ethic 0£ 
Antiphon, or some one 0£ his predecessors, into one 
character. A dash 0£ sheer crooK.ed quacKery was added 
and then the mixture was molded into an image 0£ 
lo£ty, unscrupulous, and cloudy versatility--which 
itsel£ suggests Hippias 0£ Elis. The total brilliant 
imposture was staged under the name 0£ the £unniest-
looK.ing man in Athens, the £at and pug-nosed 
Philosopher whose £ace itsel£ was a comic masK.16 
Whitman liKewise perceives Aristophanes• Euripides as 
a type, having little in common with the historical 
tragedian. In the Frogs, Euripides represents 
16Whi tman, Comic Hero, pp. 57 and 142. P. 
Kara vi tes, "Socrates in the Clouds," CB 50 (1973-1974), pp. 
65
-69, argues that Aristophanes• Socrates di££ers £rom 
Plato's because Aristophanes• only concern was to parody 
Socrates• physical appearance. 
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... the divisive and centrifugal forces of 
relativism, irresponsible rhetoric, and in general the 
new education .... Euripides appears as the 
embodiment of talk., both trivial and shifty, a 
quibbling immoralist concerned on the one hand with 
verbal exactitude, and on the other with morally 
ruinous equivocation. 
t Whitman protests, the image 0£ Euripides in the Frogs, BU. -
who "serves as a symbol £or the ruinous present, and is 
identified with every form 0£ public or private corruption 
and decay" is 
... so distorted and the caricature so much the 
comedian's invention, that to take it literally comes 
close to humorless pedantry. . . . Euripides is the 
eternal spoof artist, the long-haired hoax, made 
funnier than usual by the addition 0£ the name and a 
few 0£ the idiosyncrasies, 0£ a great living 
tragedian.17 
These arguments that Aristophanes depicts broad types, 
perceptive as they may be in certain particulars,18 
nonetheless indicate a de£ensi ve undertone by their 
stringent denial that these are anything other than mere 
types, betraying little 0£ importance about the historical 
Socrates and Euripides. Granting Aristophanes his comic 
license is clearly not enough; it does not entirely dispel 
the need to sa£eguard Socrates and Euripides 'from 
misinterpretation. Such an over-zealous policy 0£ 
17whitman, Comic Hero, pp. 232, 241, and 220. 
18rt will not be argued that there is no 
distortion in Aristophanes' portraits 0£ Socrates and 
Euripides, but instead that these distortions can be 
recognized, in large part, as the reaction to and 
assessment of the elenctic method, which both men used. 
See the discussion below, Parts Two and Three. 
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tectionism, however, by anxiously pro:f:fering evidence o:f pro 
the "types" that the Aristophanic Socrates and Euripides 
supposedly represent, begs the question why Aristophanes 
used Socrates and Euripides. Was it merely that their 
notoriety, a :few idiosyncracies, and a :funny :face made them 
easY marks? Are we to grant so little integrity to 
Aristophanes• parodies? Or is it rather that our 
"reverence" blinds us and our indignation still rankles; 
that we perhaps want in some way to chastise Aristophanes 
:for even an artistically pardonable misrepresentation, that 
we are hesitant to throw these two men once again to the 
critical wolves that have :for centuries worried their 
reputations? If Aristophanes• depictions 0£ Socrates and 
Euripides are allowed any credibility, a breach will be 
torn in carefully considered defenses of the two men. If 
it is granted that Aristophanes in any way accurately 
describes their practices, can it continue to be denied 
that the ef:fects 0£ those practices shown in the plays have 
validity? The distance seems short to a reassertion that 
Socrates and his ilk. brought about the £all of Athens; that 
Euripides personally was to blame :for the death of tragedy. 
But it is not just the possibility that the critical 
literature has been dominated by an unhealthy over-reaction 
to the past that suggests a reason :for reevaluating these 
Portraits: a less prejudicial assessment 0£ Aristophanes 
begins on its own to make the need £or reeval ua ti on 
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apparent. The logic o-£ the "type" begins to crumble under 
tbe weight o-£ instances in Aristophanes• plays that 
demonstrate how uncannily accurate he can be in certain 
particulars of his portraits of Socrates and 
guripides.19 How are we to explain such perspicuity in 
a man who insists on drawing broad and inaccurate types? 
Hust we return to the hypothesis of malicious hostility or 
tbe possibility that condemnation is justifiable? 
Likewise, as comic convention is used to exonerate 
Aristophanes from the charges of malice and ignorance, the 
more obvious interpretations of the two plays in question, 
the Clouds and the Frogs--interpretations which suggest 
full-blown condemnation of Socrates and Euripides--begin to 
lose their conviction when the plays are seen as more than 
the mere progression of their plots. In turn, an 
understanding both for the genre of comedy in general and 
the context required for appreciating its meaning release 
the plays from being considered simply remonstrative. 
Tone, characterization, and the poet 1 s own methodology 
begin to be taken into consideration.20 The burning of 
19see below, Parts Two and Three. 
20rn the Clouds it comes to be recognized, for 
example, that Aristophanes 1 censure of Socrates is 
untenable when one considers that Strepsiades is shown to 
be a swindler before he enters Socrates• school; that 
Socrates 1 own interests are almost entirely harmless (if 
not purely nonsensical); that the absenting of Socrates 
from the agon between Right and Anti-Right needs 
explanation; that Anti-Right is peculiarly prurient for all 
his praise of chastity. In the Frogs, it is observed that 
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r
ates' school and the abandonment 0£ Euripides in Hades 
soc 
acquire the sinister undertone 0£ poetic sanction, after 
onlY when extracted -from their context; as Le-fk.owi tz 
all. 
b.as noted, "· 
.. sm .. 21 
cri ti.ci. · 
. without perspective humour turns into 
Finally, the assumption that 
Aristophanes is an arch-conservative and champion against 
anything that is new, including Socrates and Euripides, is 
called to question and put to task..22 
In conclusion. Aristophanes' legitimacy as a witness 
to a methodological similarity between Socrates and 
Euripides can only be accurately assessed when the 
the most damning criticism 0£ Euripides comes -from the 
mouth 0£ the obviously biased Aeschylus; that Dionysus, who 
decides in -favor 0£ Aeschylus, does so not on any 
discernibly rational grounds, i.e., on the basis 0£ 
Aeschylus' poetic merits or morality, but instead on the 
basis 0£ whim. For discussion 0£ these considerations, see 
below, Parts Two and Three. 
21Le£k.owitz, Lives, p. 98. See also the excellent 
brief discussion of the distortion possible when comedy is 
taken out of context in Gilbert Murray, Aristophanes: A 
Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; hereafter Murray, 
Aristophanes}, p. 86. Cf. Havelock.. "Socratic Problem.'' 
pp. 169-171, for hostility and inaccuracy in representation 
as antithetical to comedy. 
22see especially A. W. Gomme, "Aristophanes and 
Politics," CR 52 (1938), pp. 97-109. For conservatism as a 
comic convention, see, e.g., Whitman, Comic Hero, pp. 13-
14; for the characteristic temperament 0£ the comic poet, 
see Dover, Clouds, pp. lvi-lvii; for Aristophanes' possible 
involvement in and sympathy with many 0£ the new trends 0£ 
the £i£th century B. C., see R. E. Wycherley, "Aristophanes 
and Euripides," G&R 15 (1946), pp. 98-107, and Lowell 
Edmunds, "Aristophanes• Socrates." in Proceedings 0£ the 
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 1, 1985, 
ed. John J. Cleary (Lantham, MD: University Press 0£ 
America, 1986; herea-fter Edmunds, "Socrates"), pp. 227-2.2.9. 
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coroplexitY and subtlety of his comic vision begin to be 
respected, when the examination of his work is unburdened 
both of the indiscretion caused by ignorance or 
preconception and of the reactionary vigilance which is its 
obverse; when the censure, ridicule, and blame that are the 
custom of Athenian Old Comedy are accepted as a mirror of 
what the poet's audience recognizes, not of the poet's own 
thoughts and -feelings or 0£ an unassailable truth; when the 
plays of Aristophanes are considered as wholes, not 
preconceived parts to be mined for evidence of the poet's 
attitudes and beliefs; in short, when critics stop 
opera ting from the primary premise, ironically the mod us 
operandi of the comic poets themselves, that "the man was 
his work."23 
This chapter, then, in Part Two will confirm what has 
recently been only fractionally argued,24 that 
Aristophanes• portrayal 0£ Socrates is an acute parody 0£ 
many facets of the elenctic method (analyzed above in 
Chapter One), the method Socrates is shown using in Pla to•s 
early dialogues. In Part Three it will further be proposed 
that Aristophanes insistently represents Euripides• methods 
as similar to Socrates', a similarity that the Chorus• 
23Lefkow i tz, Lives, p. ix. 
2 4 Hussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 43-97; Eric A. 
Havelock, "The Socratic Sel£ as it is Parodied in 
Aristophanes' Clouds," YCS 27 (1972; herea£ter Havelock, 
"Socratic Self"), pp. 1-18. 
129 
IPoni ti on at Frogs 1491-1499 {quoted above) makes explicit. 
'l'bere is every reason, it can be argued, to look to 
guripides' plays £or evidence of' the Socratic elenchos 
Aristophanes parodied, a method that Aristophanes• 
comedies suggest was an all-too-evident f'eature of 
guripides' drama tic art. 
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Part Two: Aristophanes• Comic Elenchos: 
Socrates' Character and Strepsiades• Predicament 
It may be that historical hindsight has £orever kept 
posterity from unrestrained enjoyment of the humor in 
Aristophanes' portrayal 0£ Socrates; the Clouds, with its 
gleeful incineration of the school 0£ Socrates, perhaps 
master and au,25 eerily anticipate the events of 399 
B. c. Nonetheless, an inability to laugh need not 
constrain us from accepting Aristophanes• portrait as 
humor, and, as will be argued below, humor with its gaze 
directed unblinkingly at its target: Socrates and the 
method he visited upon his unsuspecting fellow citizens. 
For although it is quite possible to de£end Aristophanes• 
depiction 0£ Socrates as a type-portrait, some 0£ the humor 
is lost in the process. 1£, then, we pause, drop our 
indignation at the martyred Socrates blasphemously put to 
torch nearly a quarter century before his time, and instead 
for a moment consider what it must have been like £or the 
fifth century B. C. Athenian--about his own business, 
25Tha t the ending 0£ the Clouds shows Socrates 
burned to death, and as such is evidence that Aristophanes 
foresaw, and indeed advised, a "final solution" £or the 
Athenians• problematic relationship with the philosopher, 
is argued, although not persuasively, by E. Christian Kopf£ 
in his article "Rubes 14-93 fr.: Was Socrates Murdered?," 
GRBS 18 (1977; herea£ter Kop££, "Hubes 14-93 ££."), pp. 113-
122. F. D. Harvey, "Rubes 1493 ££.: Was Socrates 
Murdered?," GRBS 2.2 (1981; hereafter Harvey, "Rubes 1493 
ff."), pp. 339-34-3, o££ers rive sound arguments against 
K:opf£'s interpretation. 
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b le in the assurance that he knew :full well what he colDforta 
d and was about to do--to have been accosted on the 
..,.ante 
t bY an elenchos-wielding Socrates, it becomes stree 
possible to accept that what Aristophanes gives is 
socrates' method objectified :from the interlocutor's 
perspective. 
Objecti:fica tion is one o:f comedy's primary tools: the 
insider's view tends to be serious i:f not tragic.26 
But for the insider who steps back a :few paces, the 
momentous and significant suddenly appear ludicrous. Neil 
Simon gives a delightful description o:f the comedian's 
objective perspective: 
Not long a-fter we were married, my wi-fe and I 
stood toe to toe in the kitchen, exchanging verbal 
punches that were as devastating and as painful as any 
thrown in a championship heavyweight match. Each 
accusation, each emotional blow :found its mark, and we 
both reeled from the awesome destructive power o:f the 
truths we hurled. Then suddenly, because there were 
no adequate words left to express her hurt, 
:frustration and anger, my wife did what now seems to 
be the only sensible and rational thing she could have 
done. She picked up a :frozen veal chop recently left 
out on the table to defrost, and hurled it at me, 
striking me just above the right eye. 
I was so stunned I could barely react; stunned 
not by the blow nor the intent, but by the absurdity 
that I, a grown man, had just been hit in the head 
with a :frozen veal chop. I could not contain myself, 
and a :faint :flicker o:f a smile crossed my :face. 
Suddenly the anger and hostility drained :from me and I 
:found myself outside the situation looking in, no 
longer involved as a man in conflict, but as an 
observer, an audience so to speak, watching two people 
on a stage, both 0£ whom cared :for each other, but 
26see the contrast o:f tragic and comic viewpoints 
in Despland, Education, pp. 240-241 (quoted above, Chapter 
One, Part Four). 
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were unable or unwilling to yield or to submit without 
having £irst gained some small vicious victory. 
Add to the scene the £act that, like the two 
policemen in a Roald Dahl short story who ate the 
frozen mutton leg murder instrument £or dinner, thus 
depriving themselves 0£ their single piece of 
evidence, I wo.uld soon be eating the object that 
nearly destroyed my marriage. And I hate veal 
chops. 27 
As the chop follows a projectile away from Simon's wi£e's 
hand, its intent as weapon is confronted by its aspect as 
food. At the moment when it beans Simon on the forehead it 
becomes totally ridiculous: it is suddenly again food and, 
as such, no weapon to use against a grown man. The chop 
can no longer lay claim to the exalted status as weapon, 
just as the argument can no longer be taken as truly 
destructive: £or if the argument is serious, the chop is a 
weapon and th us crucial evidence which should not be 
eaten. But eaten it will be, and, in the £inal tally, it 
is deemed substandard even as food. 
I£ a passionately and pointedly hurled veal chop can, 
by being extracted £rom its context, lose all the 
seriousness of its intent, imagine, then, how ludicrous 
Socrates and his elenchos could appear to one who, like 
Simon from the argument, has retreated from intense 
involvement. Retreat allows £or the £ading of the 
2 7Neil Simon, "I, a Grown Han, Hit in the Head 
With a Frozen Veal Chop," Introduction to The Comedy of 
Heil Simon, repr. in Arthur H. Eastman, et al., eds., The 
Horton Reader. An Anthology of Expository Prose, 3 e~ 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co,. 1973), pp. 67-68. I am 
indebted to James Keenan £or calling my attention to this 
essay. 
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d object's motive and meaning, which are not perceive 
·dent on the surface. With distance, integrity of the 
e\fl 
,,hole gives way to conspicuous parts that, out of context, 
become idiosyncratic and beg exaggeration. 
comic objectification, which can transform a weapon 
into a bilious main course, a serious incident into a 
ludicrous one, does not, however, fully explain the comic 
transformation elenchos undergoes in Aristophanes' Clouds. 
Aristophanes, a£ter all, was competing £or a prize and was 
therefore eager to gain the belly-laugh that comes alone 
-from a knowing recognition. Aristophanes does not 
there-fore depict, and £or good reason, the Socrates and 
Socratic method of Plato's early dialogues. It is not 
merely that Plato's Socrates, a man passionately concerned 
with virtue, knowledge, and the relentless examination of 
himself and others is not at all funny.2.8 Rather, it 
is that in Plato's Socrates we see one extraordinary man 
viewed by another; this was hardly the Socrates experienced 
by the majority of Athenians. Aristophanes, then, gives us 
a Socrates who serves as an antidote to the one portrayed 
by his devoted disciple Plato; Aristophanes gives us 
2.8one need not, however, resort to the hypothesis 
that Aristophanes• counter-depiction is either a type 
Portrait that so grossly distorts Plato's Socrates as to 
have very little in common with it, nor even that it is a 
Portrayal of the pre-Platonic Socrates, as A. E. Taylor 
argues in Socrates: The Han and His Thought (Garden City, 
HY: Doubleday and Co., 1953; herea£ter Taylor, Socrates), 
PP. 70 ff. 
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rates as he was seen by the man on the street. soc 
The perspective 0£ man on the street was that 0£ the 
pre-literate.2 9 And when this man met Socrates, two 
..,orldS collided. It is di££icul t £or us, living as we do 
in an age 0£ literacy, com£ortable with linear, logical 
modes 0£ thought and abstraction, to imagine what kind 0£ 
experience it must have been £or the average Athenian to be 
con£ronted by Socrates. Aristophanes gives us insight into 
this experience, and it is hilariously £unny. Scholars 
have long argued about who is this Aristophanic Socrates, 
this £loating, babbling lunatic, this oily shyster, this 
aggravating trouble-maker who begs to be brought down to 
earth and £inally is: this is the Platonic Socrates, £rom 
the perspective 0£ the eternally perplexed, be-fuddled, and 
worsted, i.e., the long-su££ering interlocutor. 
We should not wonder, then, to see Pla to 1 s 
metaphysical view 0£ Socrates and elenchos made physical. 
In Aristophanes• play, abstractions are made concrete, 
uni versa ls become particulars, and, in Strepsiades• 
experience, the interlocutor's experience 0£ elenchos is 
disclosed: his initial high con£idence and wonder, his 
growing con£usion and frustration, his pain£ul recognition 
and reversal, his true desires laid bare with all of their 
disconcerting and unforeseen consequences, and what was, in 
2 9see the discussion above, Chapter One, Part 
Three. 
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end the interlocutor's -final wish: to be rid 0£ this tb.e ' 
founding pest; to escape, to get back, somehow--anyhow--con 
to hiS com£ortable world where everything once seemed so 
simple, so concrete, so secure. 
In Aristophanes, then, one can see Socrates practicing 
elenchos, but elenchos stripped 0£ the seriousness 0£ its 
~-
intent30 and revelling in its aspect--in short, 
comically at play in the light that is refracted 0££ its 
surface. And viewed from the interlocutor's perspective, 
socra tes and his elenchos are totally befuddling and 
begging for a fight. Strepsiades, start to finish in the 
Clouds both the comic hero, "Hr. Twister,•31 who 
bungles his way to dubious triumph,32 and the 
30see Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 85-86: 
"It would not be un-fair to say that most of Socrates' 
concern for virtue remains in the realm of personal choice 
and good intentions for others. Aristophanes' portrait 
ignores the good intentions .... " But Nussbaum's 
assessment 0£ the Clouds, as will be argued below, brings 
the play precariously near the realm 0£ tragedy by assuming 
that Aristophanes• main intent is critical rather than 
comic. 
31The name is Reckford's delight£ul rendering of 
"Strepsiades"; see Kenneth J. Reck-ford, "Father-Beating in 
Aristophanes• Clouds," in The Con£lict 0£ the Generations 
in Ancient Greece and Rome, ed. Stephen Bertman (Amsterdam: 
B. R. Gruner, 1976; herea-fter Reck-ford, "Father-Beating"). 
p. 92. 
32The comic triumph is always one o:f dubious 
merit; see Whitman, Comic Hero, p. 56: "Comedy makes life 
'work'. All it takes is imagination, and an unwillingness 
to be hampered by scruples, consistency, and other kill-joy 
limitations." We should not, therefore, allow our delight 
at Strepsiades' audacious, and comically appropriate 
solution o:f arson to be dampened unduly, so that we are 
tempted, with Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 77-79, 
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S
uspecting "mark."--the guileless interlocutor who is 
un 
f "twisted" on Socrates' rack. of elenchos--is just n,i111sel 
to give Socrates and his method a rip-roaring comic tne man 
run for their money.33 I£ we cannot la ugh, it is, as 
~enneth RecK£ord so rightly maintains,34 our loss, £or 
tbiS is a deliciously funny play. 
Accordingly, it will be shown here that what 
Aristophanes gives is a Socrates practicing elenchos, but 
objectively viewed from the perspective of the 
interlocutor. The Clouds will serve as the primary text, 
but time does not permit nor does this study require a full 
analysis 0£ this or of any other Aristophanic play. 
Instead, Aristophanes• depiction 0£ Socrates will be 
drearily to posit that the play ends on a "note 0£ 
anguish," possibly with Pheidippides unwittingly consumed 
in the fire his father lighted. Cf. also Edmunds, 
"Socrates," pp. 209-230. Edmunds' interpretation 0£ the 
Clouds, which builds on that 0£ Nussbaum, leads him to 
conclude, ". . . the consequences (0£ this comedy] are 
grave, uncomical for our view 0£ Aristophanes as well as 0£ 
Socrates. I say this because Aristophanes seems, in the 
course 0£ his comic destruction [of] Socrates, to have 
tarred himseH with his own brush." (p. 227). As antidote 
to Edmunds and Nussbaum, read Reck.£ord, "Father-Beating," 
especially the hilarious pp. 101-103. 
33The similarities between the run-of-the-mill 
comic hero in Aristophanes and his depiction 0£ Socrates in 
the Clouds and of Euripides elsewhere are suggestive and 
intriguing, but cannot be considered at length here. See 
Whitman, Comic Hero, pp. 21-58, on the comic hero as the 
master 0£ poneria and as "grotesque"; pp. 139-140, on 
Socrates as poneros and alazon. 
34x:enneth J. Reck.ford, Aristophanes' Old-and-New 
Comedz:, Vol. 1: Six Essays in Perspective (Chapel Hill and 
London: Univ. 0£ North Carolina Press, 1987; herea£ter 
Rec:K£ord, Old-and-Hew), pp. 392-393. 
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Sidered strictly for the evidence its comic con 
objectification gives of elenchos as analyzed above in 
chapter One. It will be argued that although Aristophanes 1 
comic vision yields an elenchos disjointed and, because the 
inter1ocutor 1 s perspective drags it onto the plane of the 
physical, largely ridiculous, the disjointed parts 
nonetheless give sufficient indication of Aristophanes 1 
familiarity with the method. But this first requires a 
brief recapitulation of elenchos as analyzed in Chapter 
one: its procedure, its potential and tragic dimension, 
and the interlocutor 1 s experience of it. It will then be 
shown that Aristophanes is aware of each of these aspects 
of elenchos. The comic poet, however, as would be 
expected, plays to his audience: he gives greatest play to 
the interlocutor 1 s perspective 0£ elenchos, and there-fore 
parodies only the most conspicuous features of the 
procedure, while merely suggesting his familiarity with 
elenchos 1 proclaimed potential and uncommon attainment of 
that potential. 
The procedure of elenchos, it will be recalled, shows 
a rapid departure from questions that seek to define an 
ethical principle, to seemingly unrelated questions whose 
answers, obvious and inescapable, establish minor premises. 
Interlocutors answer initial questions by giving particular 
action as de£ini tion, which is pronounced unsatisfactory 
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d subsequently revised. The initial de£inition, although an 
formallY abandoned, is in£ormed by a system 0£ belie£s to 
W'hiCh the interlocutor cleaves tenaciously. These belie:fs 
are never openly at tacked, but are nonetheless in the end 
refuted. In establishing minor premises, Socrates elicits 
agreement by using sometimes these belie£s, sometimes 
common-sense interpretations 0£ analogous everyday 
occurrences whose rel a ti on to his thesis the interlocutor 
cannot discern, but with whose interpretations the 
interlocutor cannot help but agree. Minor premises are in 
the end summed up to the pre£erred "indirect" £orm 0£ 
refutation: a thesis is established that entails 
consequences repugnant to the interlocutor himsel£. 
Elenchos, however, does not aim to achieve mere 
refutation. According to Plato, by bringing the 
interlocutor to aporia, a reversal 0£ his initial claim to 
knowledge, elenchos can ideally lead the interlocutor to 
recognize his ignorance and to experience wonder, the 
beginning 0£ philosophy. The interlocutor then, with 
Socrates as midwi£e at his side, ideally would be willing 
to endure the pain£ul birthing 0£ new ideas, and 
Ultimately would be morally improved. But -few 
interlocutors choose to withstand elenchos to its terminus, 
and there£ore elenchos in Plato's early dialogues reveals a 
tragic dimension. Elenchos holds -forth the promise 0£ 
Universals but £ails at their de£inition. It £ails because 
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·nterlocutors do not have the moral £iber it takes to 
its ].. 
d ure elenchos. Both epistemological success and moral en 
Ovement lie at elenchos' end, but its true terminus ilDPr 
not be reached by ordinary human beings. It takes an can 
otner-worldly creature like Socrates to endure its rigors. 
The experience of elenchos is intolerable £or many 
interlocutors; the reversal it devises--highly personal, 
unforeseen, and total--is thoroughly unsettling. The 
interlocutor's emotional investment is assured by elenchos' 
personal aspect: Socrates' insistence that interlocutors 
never argue hypothetically. Socrates, however, in what has 
been termed irony or elenchos' impersonal aspect, denies 
his own personal involvement: the logos, he claims, not 
he, does the refuting. But Socrates' denial contradicts 
the interlocutor's sense 0£ what is happening, for his 
experience of elenchos becomes most unpleasant precisely at 
the point 0£ summing up the minor premises, which the 
interlocutor cannot help but notice Socrates was the one to 
propose. Suspicion 0£ Socrates grows as the interlocutor 
squirms at the prospect of having to abandon either common 
sense or the beliefs that inform his actions, belie£s he 
Proclaims are held by all. Recalling his initial bravado 
concerning the consonance of his actions and beliefs, the 
interlocutor experiences his current recognition 0£ 
ignorance as a total dislocation, which he sometimes 
describes as a numbing or dizziness. The sensation is 
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discomfiting, and the interlocutor is wont to accuse 
socrates of practicing against him some sort 0£ magic or 0£ 
dealing with him in an underhanded way. The interlocutor 
regularly £lees, unwilling to go £orward with elenchos, 
which has revealed to him not only his ignorance, but his 
shame: he is shown to be morally de£icient. The 
interlocutor's realization 0£ his moral de£iciency is 
facilitated by the paradoxes to which elenchos leads. 
Reformulating experience a£ter the pattern of Socrates' 
analogies, the paradoxes look to ends rather than to means, 
join virtue with knowledge, and expose an end that is 
desired but unpursued. Elenchos is thus in one sense 
erotically attractive, £or it reveals the end that is 
desired and yet just out 0£ reach. The interlocutor, 
however, realizes that pursuing this end would require him 
to give up his previous belie£s, beliefs that the many are 
said to share. Abandoning these belie£s would make him 
just like Socrates, who is a "wonder" from the true 
Philosopher's perspective, but £rom an "every man's" 
Perspective, a first-class oddball. 35 Elenchos is 
therefore in another sense repulsive, £or it bares the 
interlocutor's unwillingness to be propelled away from the 
comforts of the familiar and the normal in pursuit 0£ an 
end that he nonetheless agrees is desireable. The 
35see 
~ragUi tY:, 
especially Nussbaum 
p. 184 (quoted below, 
on Socrates• oddness, 
this section). 
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interlocutor's £light -from Socrates' request to continue 
1 nchos is understandable: he prefers to pursue--albei t ~~
no• uneasily--actions in which he has invested his 
emotions, even actions whose in-forming popular beliefs have 
been soundly refuted. Elenchos promises the birth 0£ truth 
and moral improvement, but these desired goals are lost to 
the interlocutor who is unwilling to pursue them. In the 
final analysis, elenchos attracts by what it promises and 
repels by what its uncompleted process demands, and these 
feelings 0£ at traction and repulsion often get displaced 
on to Socrates. 
As unlikely as it may at first seem, it can be argued 
that Aristophanes shows solid familiarity with elenchos as 
it is described above. Scholars have not in-frequently 
called attention to aspects of elenchos evident in the 
Clouds. As early as 1966, Leo Strauss proposed that the 
contest between the two logoi, Right and Anti-Right,36 
at Clouds 889 ££., is an elenchos 0£ Right by Anti-
Right;37 Martha Nussbaum has recently explored and 
3 6r follow the suggestion of Nussbaum, "Practical 
Wisdom," p. 50 n. 15, in choosing these names £or these 
characters, variously elsewhere termed "Right" and "Wrong" 
or "The Weak.er/Just Argument" and "The Stronger/Unjust 
Argument." For designations in the ancient text, see 
Dover, Clouds, pp. lvii-lviii. 
3 7 Leo Strauss, Socrates and Aristophanes 
Univ. o:f Chicago Press, Midway reprint, 1980), p. 
(Chicago: 
31. 
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argued in £avor 0£ Strauss' proposai.38 It is wrong, 
no•ever, to remove the contest 0£ the two logoi from the 
context of the play and suggest that Aristophanes 
criticizes elenchos be ca use 0£ the e£fects of elenctic 
arguments in that scene on Strepsiades' relationship with 
hiS son; an analysis based on this acceptance renders the 
Clouds--as does Nussba urn's analysis--a gloomy piece 
preoccupied with serious intent, more concerned with 
criticism 0£ Socrates' method than it is with comically 
playing up its superficial features. Instead, the whole 
play--Strepsiades' entire experience with Socrates and his 
school--can be argued to be elenchos from the 
interlocutor's perspective, but it must be admitted that 
the elenchos served up by such an analysis is comically 
disjointed. Such an analysis succeeds, however, in giving 
comic antidote to Nussbaum's dreary assessment of 
Aristophanes• purpose in writing the Clouds, and it 
likewise reveals that Aristophanes is quite familiar with 
the method's procedure, with its proclaimed but rarely 
realized potential, and with the elements of elenchos so 
disconcerting to Socrates' interlocutors. 
That Aristophanes was familiar with the procedure 0£ 
elenchos is evident when one takes Strepsiades' entire 
experience with Socrates' school as the whole 0£ elenchos. 
38Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," passim, especially 
PP. 50-67. 
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'l'hiS is justi£iable, £or Strepsiades hardly ceases to be 
affected by Socrates' method a £ter he is unceremoniously 
expelled at lines 789-790. To be sure, even Strepsiades' 
short tenure 
proced ure:39 
at the school shows some 'features 0£ elenchos' 
Strepsiades' preliminary conversations 
with Socrates betray the customary rapid shi£t £rom matters 
of particular action with which the interlocutor is 
immediately concerned, to the realm 0£ uni versa ls whose 
attempted de£inition betrays the interlocutor's belie£s. 
strepsiades no sooner announces his desire to learn how to 
cheat his creditors (239-246) than he finds himsel£ 'first 
being introduced to the only true gods, the Clouds (247-
363), and subsequently involved in a discussion concerning 
the existence 0£ Zeus (364-411). Just such a radical swing 
from the particular to the universal can be found, for 
example, in the beginning of the Euthyphro, where Euthyphro 
no sooner announces his intention to prosecute his father 
for impiety than he £inds himsel'f embroiled in a 
conversation about the gods (Euthyphro 2-6). 
39Hussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 69-70, 
acknowledges that procedures 0£ the Platonic Socrates are 
recognizable in the procedures of the Socrates 0£ the 
Clouds, but she gives this acknowledgement little 
consideration: "Socrates is a midwi'fe o:f ideas (136£.). 
He begins with the present situation and thoughts of his 
interlocutor (695) and reduces him to a state 0£ aporia 
(cf. 702-5, 743-5) by teaching him the depth 0£ his own 
ignorance (842). As Strepsiades says to his son, '(you 
Will learn) as many things as are wise (sopha) among men; 
You will know yoursel'f, how ignorant and thick you are' 
(841f.)." 
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Although it is true that it is not Socrates, but 
strepsiades, who asks the questions in this scene, 
strepsiades' questions are nonetheless indicative 0£ the 
eagerness and sense 0£ real doubt that surround questions 
in the early rounds 0£ elenchos. Socrates, however, does 
offer proof £or his points in the customary ways, by 
appeal to common sense and logic (Clouds, not Zeus, cause 
rain, which only occurs when the sky is cloudy, 369-371; 
zeus doesn't cause lightning, as is evidenced by the £act 
that perjurers escape lightning bolts while innocent 
shrines and oaks are destroyed, 398-402), and by analogy to 
mundane and readily recognizable experience (thunder's 
rumbling in full clouds is analogous to stomach gas ca used 
by food consumed at a -festival, 385-393).40 The scene 
ends with one 0£ elenchos' familiar features, the 
interlocutor's revision 0£ the way things are: Strepsiades 
is now convinced that Zeus' potency has been usurped by the 
Clouds and that his throne has been taken by Dinos, 
"Revolution."41 What this scene gives, then, is an 
40Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom,• p. 74 n. 64, cites 
lines 385 ££. as a "use 0£ earthy examples" characteristic 
of Socratic elenchos, while referring the reader--
mistakenly, it seems--to lines 314, 340, and 342 as 
examples 0£ Socrates' •practice of arguing by illustration 
and analogy.• 
41Reck£ord's translation, "Father-Bea ting,• p. 92. 
Peter Green, "Strepsiades, Socrates and the Abuses 0£ 
Intellectualism," GRBS 20 (1979; hereafter Green, 
"Strepsiades"), p. ~argues that dinos, as "vortex," was 
a notion familiar to Aristophanes' audience from the 
thought 0£ the pre-Socratics, and that Strepsiades 1 
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objectification of two parts 0£ elenchos' procedure: 
r
ates' leading the interlocutor :from the particular to 
soc 
tb.e universal, and his eliciting agreement to minor 
premises that will later have a telling impact on the 
interlocutor's initial position. The signi£icance o:f 
strepsiades' compliance with these minor premises, which 
now seem to have no relation to his assurance that 
defaulting his debts will solve his problems, will come 
home to roost :for him--and then quite li terally--only later 
in the play when all premises are summed up by his cockily 
brazen and truly revolting son. 
The second scene between Socrates and his aged pupil 
(627-790) shows Socrates in his more accustomed procedural 
role as questioner, and vividly portrays elenchos' 
fluctuations between seemingly unrelated issues and the 
interlocutor's intended action. Socrates :first proposes 
that Strepsiades be taught measures or rhythms (639) and 
later undertakes to teach his dull-witted student the 
rudiments 0£ grammar (658 :f:f.), but Strepsiades rigorously 
objects that these subjects have no discernible bearing on 
personification 0£ dinos would cause the audience to 
snicker at the old man, who cannot conceptualize the 
abstract, but instead opts :for anthropomorphism. 
Similarly, Green points out (p. 19), the Cloud-chorus, to 
Strepsiades' mind, must either be composed 0£ real clouds 
or real women. For dinos as borrowed :from natural 
Philosophers and Dinos as a pun on "Zeus" in the oblique 
cases, see J. Ferguson, "ALvos. on the Stage," CJ 68 
(1973), pp. 377-380, and "Al'vos. in Aristophanes and 
Euripides,• CJ 74 (1979), pp. 356-359. 
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tne roa t ter that concerns him: 
What good will rhythms do me in getting my bread and 
cheese? (648) . . . But I don't want to learn any of 
these things, you dreary man! (654-655) . . . Why must 
r learn things that we all know? (693) ... You've 
heard a thousand times what I want! About my debts, 
how I can welch out of them! (737--738). 
strepsiades 1 exasperation is that of the pre-literate, 
vainly trying to follow Socrates' radical divergences in 
~enchos from the particular and the concrete to the 
universal and abstract. Aristophanes in this scene reduces 
this -feature 0£ elenchos' procedure to delight-ful 
absurdity, for in fact Strepsiades' perception is right: 
Socrates' divergences not only seem irrelevant, they 
actually are totally irrelevant.42 
In the Platonic dialogues, where divergences always 
betray their relevance at elenchos' terminus, interlocutors 
express a similar impatience at Socrates' choices 0£ 
subjects, whose significance to the conversation they can 
in no way fathom. Callicles, for example, quickly becomes 
42This is not the case, however, with the 
secondary premises pertaining to the gods in the 
Preliminary scene; see below, this section. Green, 
"Strepsiades," pp. 17-20, points out that Strepsiades, who 
is "anti-conceptual" and "utilitarian," in vain tries to 
make Socrates' instruction relevant: "Strepsiades is not a 
Plain fool; he is fundamentally old-fashioned, and as such 
evinces archaic thought-processes which tend, inevitably, 
towards the specific, concrete' and physical. When any 
ver-bal ambiguity arises, Strepsiades will always pick. a 
Pr-actical interpretation, preferably--since he is also a 
country peasant--connected with money, food or sex." For 
this reason, Green continues, talk 0£ "measures" and 
"r-hythm" turn Strepsiades' thoughts to the sale of grain 
and to sex, respectively, rather than to music. 
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intolerant: 
You're talking about meats and drinks and doctors and 
other gibberish; I'm not talking about these things . 
. . . What's this about cloaks? ... What's this 
about shoes? You persist in talking nonsense. . . I 
swear, you really never stop talking about cobblers 
and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had 
anything to do with our argument. (Gorgias 490-
491). 43 
To the interlocutor in elenchos, whether he be 
canicles or Strepsiades, Socrates' procedure Of drawing 
analogy in establishing minor premises and thus raising 
discussion of seemingly unrelated issues makes Socrates 
appear to be a babbling 1 una tic. And so it happens that in 
the text of Aristophanes Socrates is called the •high-
priest of most subtle nonsense" by the Cloud-chorus 
I (A€11'TOTa TWV < Le:pe:u, 359), and that 
Socrates prays to "tongue" (424), and that Strepsiades in 
the end alleges he was deranged by Socrates' prattle 
c€µou I vapaVO'llO"aVTOS > , a<So.>.e:axq:x, 1480). 
Similarly, in Plato's text, by drawing analogies whose 
significance the interlocutor does not see, Socrates 
appears to be concerned only with irrelevant minutiae. 
Witness further complaints of Callicles in Gorgias: 
This is always the way 
about and puts to proof 
(OJ.1.ll(pa Kat o.>.tyou 
ahead, then, [Socrates], 
Socrates is, Gorgias; he asks 
small and worthless things 
>I a~la). You go 
ask about these small and 
43Cf. Alcibiades at Symposium 221e: "He talks 
about pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers, and 
he always seems to say the same things about the same 
things, so that any inexperienced or foolish man would 
laugh at his words." 
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' ' Kal 01"€VQ petty 
1au1a>. 
things (Ta oµ.lKpa Te 
since Gorgias approves. (Gorgias 497b-c). 
In the Clouds, then, we see elenchos• practitioner, 
socrates, as a man whose interests are con£ined to things 
of diminutive proportion, things normally considered 
insigni£ican t: splinters (130), £lea £eet (144 ££., c£. 
831), gnat guts (156 ££.). Indeed, the byword £or 
socra tes' concerns and practices in the Clouds is 
>.ell' I OS, something ground down to its finest form 
(153, 230, 320, 359, 741; c£. 177-179, where Socrates 
' 
sprinkles Tecppav, "fine ash," on a table and 
£eigns a geometrical experiment to cover his filching a 
cloa:K,44 and 260, where Socrates promises that 
Strepsiades under his tutelage will become 11'al1raA'r), 
"the finest £lour").45 
Socrates' discussions 0£ seemingly extraneous topics 
in the Clouds are the comic representation 0£ analogies 
regularly used in elenchos to establish the minor premises 
that, when added together, will ultimately refute the 
interlocutor's position. And it is through their agency 
that the interlocutor's ignorance becomes manifest. 
4 4see below, this section, £or thievery as the 
comic representation 0£ elenchos' ability to befuddle. 
45For the evidence on A€11''TOS. as subtle, see 
the note on line 153 in Dover, Clouds; c£. also his notes 
at line 320, where he cites Gorgias 497c £or evidence on 
the meaning 0£ 01evol..eoxel1 V, and at line 130, where 
he cites Hippias Major 304a £or a complaint against the 
triviality o:f Socrates• argument. 
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strepsiades' tenure at the school ends abruptly when 
socrates loses patience with the old man's stupidity (789-
190) and ousts him. This forces Strepsiades to take his 
son in hand and send him, despite his protestations, to 
socra tes' school. And while Socrates may be finished with 
strepsiades, elenchos hardly is:46 Strepsiades has yet 
to be brought at least temporarily to his knees and to the 
procedure's customary end when his cheeky brat of a son 
comes home "educated" in the way the old man requested but 
never fully envisioned. 47 
Strepsiades, however, has no inkling that he is still 
in the clutches of elenchos; that the minor premises to 
which he formerly agreed are waiting to be added up with 
others by his son. Strepsiades never envisioned that 
having his son educated by Socrates to cheat his creditors 
would entail something emotionally unacceptable. Upon the 
return of his son, therefore, Strepsiades brings his 
intended action to ef:fect on stage (1213-1302). And, as 
Haney Sherman has pointed out, Strepsiades' con£ident 
confutation o:f the creditors is a parody 0£ Socratic 
46The disassociation of Socrates from elenchos may 
be Aristophanes' representation 0£ elenchos' "impersonal 
aspect" (Chapter One, Part Three); see below, this 
section. 
47The contest between Right and Anti-Right, which 
comes between Strepsiades' ejection and Pheidippides' 
return home, is an objecti:fication more 0£ what may be 
called elenchos' character than o:f its procedure per se, 
and will be considered below. 
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questioning: at 1286, his gleefully impudent retort, 
d > .,, > E09, 
c 
0 
, 
TOICOS, 
, 
Tl 9'1')pLov;" 
the "what is x?." question posed by Socrates in recalls 
eienchos; 
-
at 1289, his confident 
"a stock Socratic reply."48 His joy is short-Ii ved, 
nowever, £or he is no sooner shrift 0£ the agony his 
creditors have caused him than he is visited upon by the 
is 
agony 0£ being beaten by his own son. As Reck-ford notes, 
strepsiades begins the play with the same > • lO\J 
J ' 
lO\J he cries here at line 132.t.49 There he 
called on Zeus in his distress, but Zeus is no longer in 
power, by Strepsiades' own repeated and willing admission 
( 424-425, 827. 12.40-12.41). Strepsiades is now treated once 
again to the elenctic procedure 0£ drawing analogies to 
establish minor premises, and is conclusively shown, in the 
adding up 0£ all minor premises, how truly re vol ting can be 
the reign o-f the new god he previously acknowledged, Dinos, 
"Revolution." 
The old man -first gives an accounting o-£ what went on 
48Nancy Sherman, Aristotle's Theory o-f Koral 
Education (diss. Harvard Univ., 1982.; hereafter Sherman, 
Koral Education), pp. 22-2.3. Sherman is not alone in 
noting the occurrence 0£ the vocabulary and phraseology 0£ 
Plato's Socrates in Aristophanes. Besides Havelock, 
"Socratic Self," passim, see, e.g., {pace Dover, Clouds, 
Pp. Xlii-xliii), R. Philippson, "Sokratische Dialektik in 
Aristophanes• Wolken," RhK n.£. 81 (1932.), pp. 30-38; R. 
Stark, "Sokratisches in den Vogeln des Aristophanes," RhM 
n.£. 96 (1953), pp. 77-89; Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," 
E.._assim; Green, "Strepsiades," p. 19. 
49Reck£ord, "Father-Bea ting," p. 92.. 
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inside (1353-1390), and Reck.ford •s description of the scene 
iS 50 delightful as to bear repeating: "It happens all the 
tinie. The son comes home :from college; the proud :father 
Kills a :fatted cal:f, all is good cheer; but eventually, 
froni some trivial point, a heated discussion arises, 
tenipers :flare, a :fright:ful hostility is bared.11 50 
Although Strepsiades• :first inclination is to try in vain 
to call back. Zeus along with the debt-inducing horsy 
habits o:f his son (1406-1407), there is no turning back. in 
elenchos once one has stated one's true opinion and agreed 
to minor premises. Strepsiades has no choice but to hear 
his son out. 
Pheidippides argues--not as much lik.e a sophist51 
50Reck.ford, "Father Bea ting." p. 97. 
51The intent o:f this chapter is not to deny any 
similarity between Socratic and sophistic argumentation--
Plato's special care in making distinctions bet ween his own 
dialectic and sophistic argumentation (e.g .• Sophist 2.2.5) 
indicates he is not defending against straw men. Even in 
modern critical discussion o:f the undeniable similarities 
between elenchos and the methods used by rhetoricians in 
general and the sophists in particular, however, one may 
find the insistence upon distinction. See, e.g., G. E. R. 
Lloyd, Magic, Reason and Experience: Studies in the Origin 
~ Development o:f Greek. Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 86 and 2.52.-2.54; de Romilly, Magic 
(Cambridge, KA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 36-37. 
Lloyd argues (p. 86) that "Socrates• distinctive 
contribution was to turn the searchlight o:f his scrutiny on 
current moral and political assumptions to expose--as he 
saw it--their shallowness and incoherence." According to 
de Romilly, sophistic "magic" di:f£ers in k.ind -from that 0£ 
Socrates: "Whereas the magic o:f the sophists aimed at 
Producing illusion, Socrates' magic rests on the obstinate 
destruction of all illusions. It is the magic 0£ 
implacable truth ... " (pp. 36-37). For the widespread 
use of sophistical antithesis in the Periclean Age, see 
152. 
l iKe Socrates in elenchos--that it is right £or him to as 
beat his £ather. In this scene, Aristophanes parodies 
socra tes' habit 0£ drawing analogies that look to ends 
rather than to means, as well as the interlocutor's £atal 
reliance on commonly accepted wisdom: Pheidippides £irst 
argues £rom analogy 0£ bene£it52 to beaten sons that 
John H. Finley, Jr., Three Essays on Thucydides (Cambridge, 
KA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), p. 89. 
The intent 0£ this chapter is instead to argue £or 
Aristophanes• £amiliarity with Socratic elenchos. 
Pheidippides' argument, whether or not one may discern in 
it standard sophistic tacks, can nonetheless likewise be 
argued to reveal aspects undeniably Socratic. See the 
following note and Havelock, "Socratic Problem," pp. 169-
170. 
52strepsiades readily admits having beaten 
Pheidippides, de£ending the act by his claim, "I meant the 
>I I > """' best and cared £or you {EYWYE o>, EUvowv IE 
Kal K'l')<5oµ.Evos., 1409)." For Socrates• habitual 
argument £rom analogies to technai, which look to ends 
rather than means, see above, Chapter One, Part Three. See 
also, e.g., Euthyphro 13-15 for arguments £rom bene£it. 
The sophists, especially Antiphon, argued £rom 
expedience or sel £-interest, 10 ouµ.cpepov, which 
could likewise be translated as "bene£it." The di££erence 
between this and Socrates' argument £rom bene£it, at least 
as it is presented in Eu thyphro, is that Socrates 
understands bene£it as therapeutic in a holistic sense; £or 
humans this means it is synonymous with moral improvement 
and care 0£ the soul {as at Apology 29e). Such tender 
nurturance is what both Strepsiades and Pheidippides 
Profess here. Sophistic "bene£it" breaks down into 
something much less laudable and more obviously sel£-
serving, something we would rather term expediency. For 
sophistic expediency as cold-blooded opportunism, see John 
H. Finley, Jr., Thucydides {Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1942; reprint ed., Ann Arbor: Univ. 0£ Michigan 
Press, 1963; herea£ter Finley, Thucydides), pp. 51-54, 
209, and 227. 
Even if one were able to defend Pheidippides• 
argumentation here as more sophistic than Socratic, the 
elenctic progression of the Clouds in its entirety still 
argues for Aristophanes' familiarity with Socratic 
~enchos. It must be remembered that even in Plato's 
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1>eating bene:fits :fathers, and bolsters his argument with 
popularized belie:f (1407-1419). Then, by analogy to cocks, 
p:neidippides reiterates his position, and con:fidently cites 
the great analogy-drawer himsel:f, Socrates, as ultimate 
arbiter when his :father gets o:f:f a plucky reply (1427-
1432). Pot-shots are the de£ense 0£ the truly desperate, 
and strepsiades is clearly in their number. The answers to 
tbe questions his son poses are those -familiar -from the 
later stages o:f elenchos--they are both obvious and 
inescapable--and in addition, the cone! us ion that a :father 
should be beaten by his son is a predictable aspect o:f the 
new reign o:f "Revolution," whom Strepsiades himsel£, in his 
eagerness to learn how to de:fault his debts, readily agreed 
bad dethroned Zeus. Strepsiades cannot now help but 
acknowledge that Pheidippides was right to beat him: "Gee, 
:friends, it looks to me like he's got a point; even to me 
what's reasonable strikes an accord with these things he 
says. It's only :fair that we should be beaten i:f we don't 
do right." (1437-1439). 
We may be surprised that Strepsiades would acquiesce 
to being beaten, but it must be remembered that he has a 
lot at stake. A :few blows at the hands o:f his son perhaps 
can be considered a small price when compared to the debts 
he has cancelled under the reign o:f Dinos. Furthermore, 
dialogues one is shown sophists trot ting out their Sunday-
best in argumentation. 
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tne old man's acquiescence to the beating puts him squarely 
in tne company 0£ interlocutors in elenchos, who readily 
accept and re£use to abandon minor premises which embrace 
and thus do not challenge their belie£s. 
When, however, Pheidippides subsequently uses the 
recently established minor premises to de£end beating his 
mother, he takes Strepsiades to what in the early dialogues 
is the terminus 0£ elenchos• procedure: to indirect 
refutation, the establishment 0£ a thesis entailing 
consequences repugnant to the interlocutor himsel£. 
strepsiades ostensibly has what he claimed he wanted: a 
son who can cheat his £a ther 1 s creditors. Alas, he never 
realized that this son would also be capable 0£ beating his 
own mother. Strepsiades chooses to stop elenchos dead in 
its tracks: if this intolerable position can be argued, 
clearly something is wrong with the whole argument. 
Incredulity and repugnance are mani-fest in Strepsiades' 
reaction to his son's suggestion: 
What are you saying? What's that you say? Now this 
is far worse than the other .... What's next? If 
you can argue this, 1"'11 tell you what's next: 
there's nothing stopping you from throwing yoursel-f 
off a cliff--you, and Socrates, and that weaker 
argument with you! (1448-1451). 
Strepsiades is appalled at the thesis that has just 
been established; he would rather put Zeus back on the 
throne--Zeus whose reign would bring back punishment of 
Per- jurers like Strepsiades himsel£ (cf. 396 ££. and 12.32.)--
than admit to the revolting realities 0£ the reign 0£ 
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~· But once one has stepped into the whirlwind of 
l enchos, return to the old world is nearly impossible, for ~-
tb.e beliefs that buttressed that world have been 
overturned. And so Strepsiades, like so many 
interlocutors before him, seeks escape from Socrates and 
tb.e method that has brought forth a thesis that seems both 
repugnant and yet incontrovertible. The drastic solution 
of burning the school can be viewed as an exercise of the 
comic hero's imperative: al though Strepsiades, like any 
interlocutor, has been refuted and cannot return with 
comfort to his old world, we nonetheless cannot expect him, 
like Eu thyphro and other refuted interlocutors, to slink 
off mumbling flimsy excuses. Such a retreat is unthinkable 
for any self-respecting comic hero. As Reck.ford puts it, 
... we know perfectly well that a good clown (think 
of Laurel and Hardy) is never really hurt. Hore 
important, he can't be kept down £or very long. 
Strepsiades' theme-note emerged in the £irst scene: "I 
may have £allen, but I won't just lie here." He 
always bounces back, like a large rubber ball or Bobo. 
Knock him down, and he will rise again; murder him, 
and his death, like Falstaf£'s, will prove only 
another "counter£eit."53 
Strepsiades' own explanation for his behavior, 
however, gives compelling testimony of Aristophanes' 
familiarity with one of the £eat ures of elenchos that Plato 
maintained was necessary £or moving the interlocutor toward 
53Reckford, "Father-Beating," p. 96; cf. F. D. 
Harvey, "Kubes 1493 ff.," p. 339: "people do not get 
killed in Old Comedy. Insulted, humiliated, beaten, yes; 
threatened with death ... ; even ... wounded; but not 
killed." 
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tne ultimate goals 0£ the birth 0£ truth and moral 
unprovement, £or the con£lagration brings a pointed comic 
justice to bear on the £irst step toward attaining that 
potential: reversal. "The Clouds is £ull 0£ inversions, 
as well as reversals " • Reck.£ord proclaims;54 
clearly the most memorable is Strepsiades' hoisting 0£ 
socra tes with his own petard: "Mr. Twister" goes £rom 
passive object to active subject as he takes torch in hand 
and puts the heat on Socrates. What in the world is he 
doing? Only throwing into reverse the one who has so -fully 
reversed him, as is clear from Strepsiades' brazen, bawling 
replies to the cries and queries 0£ Socrates' students and 
0£ the master himsel£: 
) I 
lOU, 
) I 
> ' > , Oh! Oh! (lO\J lOU) What are you 
doing, man? --What am I doing? Nothing but arguing 
the splinters (<ha1.£11'To.>..pyouµ.al) out 0£ the 
beams 0£ your house! --Argh! Who's minding the £ire 
put to our house? --The same guy you stole the cloak. 
£rom! . . . --You there, up on the roo£! What are 
you doing? --I'm walking on air, and putting the sun 
> "' • 
under circumspection. (aepofJaTw, teal 
- " Cl ll'Eplqipovw Tov 'r)hov.) (1493-1503). 
Strepsiades now ca uses someone to cry > • lO'U 
Strepsiades, whose own recent > • l 0 'U 
Lou announced the reversal 0£ the his ill-considered 
solution £or what in the play's opening moments had 
originally elicited > • lO'U > I lO'U £rom him--his son's 
racing debts. Similarly, Strepsiades, the one pulverized 
to -finest £lour by Socrates, master 0£ 1.£11'1"05 and 
54Reck. £ord, "Father-Bea ting," p. 102. 
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scnolar or splinters, now turns the -figurative 
litera155 as he reduces the roo£ 0£ the school to its 
finest :form, splinters and ash. Strepsiades 1 repetition 0£ 
socrates 1 opening salutation--as the master was lowered to 
the stage with all the majesty 0£ a god--puts Socrates on 
notice that he is get ting exactly what he dished out, and 
~ machina to boot, as i£ Strepsiades the reverser is 
b.imselr becoming a new god, the successor to the so-
recently-enthroned Dinos. Strepsiades the perjurer now 
becomes the de-fender 0£ the gods he himsel£ so readily cast 
aside in de£ense 0£ his swindling ways. Like an angel -from 
Zeus, who incinerates perjurers with his lightning bolt 
(394-397), Strepsiades brings £ire :from on high to destroy 
those who would insult and cast aside the gods. He reduces 
to ashes those who through their teaching reduced heaven to 
a stove and its inhabitants to ashes (95-97).56 In 
good comic 'fashion, Strepsiades conquers by returning tit 
for tat: reversal £or reversal. 
For Strepsiades has su££ered a pro-found reversal: 
55strepsiades 1 persistence in making the abstract 
concrete de-fines him as a true pre-literate. See Green, 
"Strepsiades," especially pp. 16-22. 
56 Arrowsmith, in his translation 0£ the Clouds, 
suggests that Strepsiades 1 burning of the think.ery is a 
return to the metaphor 0£ the universe as a charcoal oven 
(95-97). As such, it could be seen as another aspect 0£ 
Strepsiades 1 reversal of Socrates. See Aristophanes, The 
Clouds, transl. William Arrowsmith (Hew York.: Hew --
American Library, 1962; herea£ter Arrowsmith, Clouds), pp. 
136-137. 
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·ginallY so intent on swindling others, he now identi£ies 
0 ri 
nimself solely as the one swindled 0£ a cloak.. Initially 
50 determined that sending his son to Socrates' school was 
tb.e ideal solution £or his debts, Strepsiades was treated 
to a dramatic exhibition 0£ exactly what having such a son 
in one's home entails, £or his son's education, which 
granted Strepsiades the impunity to threaten and beat his 
ere di tors (1256-1258, 1299-1300), also granted Pheidippides 
tb.e impunity to beat his -father, and--what was to 
strepsiades unendurable--the audacity to propose beating 
his mother. 
Elenchos' reversal regularly is, according to Plato, 
closely attended by recognition, and Aristophanes likewise 
shows that he is -familiar with this -feature 0£ elenchos. 
Strepsiades is brought to a blatant, comic twist on the 
recognition of ignorance -familiar -from Pla to•s defenses 0£ 
the method. In Plato's dialogues, the interlocutor's 
ignorance is not openly confronted; instead the 
interlocutor slowly begins on his own to sense his dri£t 
from knowing, and terms it aporia. In the Clouds, 
Aristophanes does signal -familiarity with aporia,57 
57socrates twice uses words with the stem apor-: 
at 629, he labels strepsiades "lost" (alTopos); at 7 43 
he tells Strepsiades to abandon any though ts in respect to 
~hich "you should £ind yoursel£ at a loss" 
(alTop~s). At 702, the Chorus encourages nimbleness 
~n Strepsiades should he fall "into loss" (eLS 
~vopov); c£., however, 629, where the Chorus uses 
avopov in a context clearly unrelated to elenchos. 
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t he shows, as should be expected, no subtlety or dainty }>U 
restraint in presenting the interlocutor 1 s dawning 
a1fareness o:f his own ignorance. The student who answers 
tne door o:f the Thinkery rudely christens Strepsiades 
) I 
•stupid" (aµ.ae,,s, 135); Socrates repeatedly curses 
tb.e old man•s ignorance,58 and this happens, tellingly, 
1fi th the greatest frequency in the scene at 62.7-790, where 
tb.e shi:ft is radical :from the irrelevant issues o:f 
measures, rhythms, and grammar to the direct consider a ti on 
of Strepsiades• a:f:fairs: 
I have never seen such a bumpkin, nor one so lost (a 11'opo5), st up id, and absent-minded. (62.8-62.9) 
. . . You are clownish and gauche. (655) . . . Perish, 
wretch! (72.6) ... Why don•t you die and go to hell, 
you extremely absent-minded, inordinately stupid old 
coot? (7 89-790). 
A:fter this abrupt expulsion, Strepsiades, down but 
never out, determines to coerce his son Pheidippides into 
attending Socrates• school: "You will know yoursel:f," 
Strepsiades reassures his son, "how stupid and thick you 
are." (842.).59 Strepsiades naively assumes that 
Pheidippides• lessons will have the same result :for son as 
58For a de:fense of Strepsiades' understanding as 
representative o:f that o:f the popular fi:fth century B. C. 
Athenian mind, which tended toward the literal and the 
physical rather than the metaphorical and the abstract, see 
Leonard Woodbury, •strepsiades 1 .Understanding: Five Hotes 
on the Clouds," Phoenix 34 (1980), pp. 108-12.7. 
59see Hussba um, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 
and 74, who in addition points out (p. 72.) that 
YvwoeL de oau-rov is the :famous Delphic 
Cf. Havelock, "Socratic Self," p. 14 n. 38. 
69-70, 
this 
maxim. 
72., 
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tn.eY had for father, that Pheidippides will likewise 
discover his own ignorance. But Pheidippides will learn no 
such thing, for he is not the interlocutor in this comic 
~enchos, and the procedure is not to benefit him, but 
instead is reserved for the benefit of his father, the only 
true interlocutor in the Clouds.60 Strepsiades is not, 
however, merely an interlocutor. He is first and foremost 
a comic hero. 
After his reversal and recognition should ideally 
come, if Plato's claims concerning elenchos are correct, 
katharsis of false beliefs and the birth of truth for 
Strepsiades. But, as was argued in Chapter One, these 
features of elenchos are not seen in the early dialogues, 
and it has been suggested that the idea of purgation as 
well as the midwife metaphor may be Platonic 
invention.61 It is perhaps, then, not surprising that 
Aristophanes gives evidence only suggestive of his 
familiarity with either of these features in the Clouds. 
6 0Pheidippides is never shown in the role of 
interlocutor, and it may be that Aristophanes' care in 
concealing the boy's tutelage under Socrates is directed 
Precisely to the point 0£ establishing Strepsiades as sole 
interlocutor. Dover, Clouds, p. xciv n. 2, proposes that 
Pheidippides' tutelage would merely duplicate that of his 
father, and for this reason Aristophanes wisely omits a 
super£luous and potentially boring scene. Rosemary K. 
Harriott, Aristophanes: Poet & Dramatist {Baltimore, MD: 
J'ohns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986; hereafter Harriott, 
Aristophanes), p. 185, suggests that Pheidippides• conceit 
would have ruined the comic possibilities of the scene in 
the school. 
6 1Burnyea t, "Kidwi£ery," pp. 7-16. 
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'l'lle scene 0£ Strepsiades 1 initiation (254 ££ .) may have in 
it a hint 0£ katharsis in the sense 0£ •puri£ication•: 
strepsiades is dusted with £lour (260-262), commonly used 
on initiates into the mysteries in the process 0£ their 
compulsory puri£ica tion.62 A similarly slight 
re£erence, it has long been argued,63 is made to the 
rnidWi£e metaphor at line 137, where one 0£ Socrates 1 
students, who uses terminology reminiscent 0£ that used at 
'l'heaetetus 149, accuses Strepsiades 0£ causing miscarriage 
of a thought (cppovTLcP 
> , 1 t:E;"IUP'l'll..LEV'l')V; see a so Strepsiades 1 repetition at 
139). K. J. Dover implies that the late and sole 
appearance 0£ this metaphor in Plato marks it as Platonic 
rather than Socratic invention.64 This consideration, 
when combined with the £ew allusions to other authentic 
Platonic terminology in the Clouds,65 and the widely 
, 
spread metaphorical use 0£ TLKTELV and 
62see Dover 1 s notes, Clouds, lines 254 and 256, 
for bibliography and commentary. 
63see, e.g., A. E. Taylor, Varia Socra tica 
(0x£ord: J. Parker, 1911; repr. ed., Hew York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1987; herea£ter Taylor, Varia), pp. 148-
150, and Wol£gang Schmid, •nas Sokratesbild der Wolken,• 
Philologus 97 (1948), pp. 219 ££. 
6 4nover, Clouds, pp. xlii-xliv. 
65see, however, Havelock, "Socratic Sel£," pp. 1-
18. 
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..... 66 yevvav, leads Dover to consider it implausible 
to accept Clouds 137 as an allusion to a metaphor employed 
l>Y socra tes. And yet while both Dover's and A. E. Taylor's 
discussions of this possible allusion refer to a comparable 
metaphoric use of birthing terminology in the earlier 
symposium,67 where Socrates tells of Diotima's 
description o:f the intent behind philosophical inquiry as a 
"birth in beauty" (TOK OS > ev Symposium 
206c), neither remarks that Aristophanes in the Clouds uses 
this very birthing terminology to suggest the 
transformation afforded Strepsiades by his experience with 
elenchos. 
A pun reveals the disparity between what Strepsiades 
falsely assumes is his paramount concern, and what Socrates 
treats and elenchos shows Strepsiades is his proper 
, 
interest: TOKOS, which can mean "interest" on money 
owed, or "birth," or "o:f:fspring."68 For Strepsiades, 
66Pace Taylor, Varia, p. 148: "In a language so 
chary of its metaphors as the Attic o:f the :fifth century, 
I > :> I ~uch -,an expression [cppov-rt.6 E!;'l'll.J.JD.wKas 
E!;"lUP'l'll.J.EV'l'}V] is more vigorous and unnatural than it 
would, unfortunately, be in a language like our own, which 
has been debased by the journalistic style o:f which the 
abuse o-f metaphor and the inability to say a simple thing 
in simple words are so :familiar a symptom." 
67Taylor, Varia, pp. 149-150, and Dover, Clouds, 
p. Xliii Il. 1. 
68LSJ. 9 s. v. DOV4;r, Clouds, p. 234, 
commenting on TOKOL TOKWV at line 1156, notes, 
"There is good word-play here (as in Pl. g. 506E-507 A) on 
TOKos in its ordinary sense 'interest' and its poetic 
sense 'child'," but takes the suggestion no -further. That 
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1'0KOS always means "interest" on money owed (see 
c1ouds 18, 34, 240, 739, 7 47, 1156, 1285, 1286). 
~
however, evident that Strepsiades' "offspring" 
It is, 
pheidippides, an irresponsible, lazy brat, is the true 
cause of Strepsiades' problems, and should be the old man's 
real "interest," not the money he owes on his son's 
behalf.69 Socrates, however, ignores Strepsiades' 
concern over money, and treats him instead as if he is in 
need of a personal re-"birth," by insisting upon 
strepsiades' initiation, which will ostensibly allow him to 
join the company of the wise "souls" who populate 
Socrates' schooi.70 And, as Reck.ford has shown, in the 
scene between Strepsiades and his son, the old man is again 
the pun occurs in Plato is intriguing, to say the least; 
discussion in the Republic is on the "offspring of the 
good." For the word elsewhere in Aristophanes, cf. 
Thesmophoriazusae 843 and 845; Lysistrata 7 42 and 754. 
, 69nover, Clouds, pp. 97-98 at line 34, argues that 
ToKos. in Strepsiades' sit ua ti on does not mean merely 
"interest"; instead, it refers to securities to be taKen as 
a substitute for interest due. If he is right, 
S~repsiades in fact willingly gives up as security his true 
TOKos., his only son. 
7 0Green, "Strepsiades," pp. 15-16, sees in the 
Clouds' references to the mysteries evidence for defining 
Strepsiades as "the classic aµouoos., the "non-
intellectual" described at Theaetetus 155e and Sophist 
246a-b and 259e. A. W. H. AdKins, "Clouds, Mysteries, 
Socrates and Plato," Antichthon 4 (1970), pp. 13-24, argues 
that Aristophanes in the Clouds deliberately ridicules 
Socrates' habit of using the language of initiation into 
the mysteries. See the note on line 143 in Dover, Clouds, 
for a brief summary of Socrates' metaphorical use of 
~ni tia tion in to the mysteries. For psyche in the Clouds as 
l.Ildica ti ve of Aristophanes' awareness of Socrates' doctrine 
Of the soul, see Ha velocK, "Socratic Self," pp. 1-18. 
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re-"born" as the "offspring" who must now, for his own 
good, beaten.71 When it is suggested that 
strepsiades must, with childlike impotence, submit to the 
intolerable beating of his wife at the hands of his son, 
the elenctically induced re-"birth" is -finally rejected. 
The :focus o:f Strepsiades' concern suddenly changes -from 
"interest" to his "o£fspring's" unendurable moral demise, 
and he determines, in good comic -fashion, to get the upper 
hand over those whom he deems responsible: Socrates and 
his school. 
What is being argued, then, is that by extending a pun 
, 
on the word TOKOS. through the use 0£ the moti£ of 
rebirth of Strepsiades as o££spring, Aristophanes subtly 
suggests that Strepsiades, in his experience with Socratic 
elenchos, is encouraged to bring to birth a truth, and 
himself is in some -fashion "reborn." Socrates' insistence 
that Strepsiades take to bed as he undergoes the most 
rigorous part 0£ his elenchos makes sense i£ we understand 
that Socrates intends him to be at "labor"--although 
Strepsiades takes advantage 0£ the opportunity by 
masturbating.72 
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that in the course of 
the play the old man at the very least undergoes a change 
7 1Reckford, "Father-Bea ting," pp. 101 :f:f ., is 
excellent on the ironies 0£ Strepsiades' re ju venation. 
72see Dover, Clouds, p. 191 at line 734. 
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of neart. At the play's terminus Strepsiades, -formerly so 
eager to swindle and so ready to abandon even his lip 
service belie£ in the gods, suddenly decides that those who 
taught him and his son to swindle must be destroyed, 
suddenly realizes with great clarity that the gods must not 
be dishonored and spurned (1476-1477; 1506-1509). The old 
man takes the control that is his birthright as a comic 
hero, and gives an alarmingly e££ecti ve display 0£ his 
regained potency as -father. Whether or not he realizes it, 
whatever his intentions, and regardless 0£ the fact that he 
has perhaps misplaced the prime cause £or his son's 
degeneracy upon those he himsel£ will-fully employed £or 
just such a purpose, Strepsiades has nonetheless taken one 
step away -from his -former misplaced "interest." 
Strepsiades now is capable 0£ taking action (undoubtedly 
vicious, probably vain, perhaps too late) that £or the 
first time shows at least some concern over the progressive 
moral decline 0£ his "o££spring" Pheidippides, who -from the 
beginning, like his -father, showed an appalling lack 0£ 
moral £iber.73 
We would be disappointed, however, if Aristophanes 
Polluted his comedy with the actual moral improvement 0£ 
its hero; Strepsiades must, a£ter all, continue to be the 
rogue and, in the end, get the upper hand. But the play 
7 3Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 67-69, gives a 
good general overview 0£ Strepsiades and Pheidippides. 
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does not, as Nussbaum contends, end on a "note of anguish," 
nor is Strepsiades' burning of the school meant to be tak.en 
as the old man's attempt "to reassert the lost authority of 
nomos by committing what would be, by any nomoi, a horrible 
~
. e"74 The cri.m · gleefully set conflagration is, as has 
been argued, the comically appropriate reversal Socrates so 
deserves--but it may be more. It may be that the birth of 
truth afforded the old man by elenchos is suggested by 
Aristophanes' use of light imagery, perhaps even in 
antiquity an already hack.neyed symbol of Knowledge. The 
blaze from the torches Strepsiades and his slave wield at 
the play's end give glaring contrast to the play's 
beginning, where the old man's meager financial and 
intellectual resources were shown by his slave's inability 
to sustain one lamp's flame. Whereas Strepsiades at the 
play's beginning found himself totally in the dark., he now, 
after his experience with elenchos, is surrounded by light. 
Of course Strepsiades' act would be appalling in real 
life, and is the stuff of which tragedy could be made. But 
this is no tragedy, it is comedy: no corpse is trundled 
out of this con-flagration. Socrates was not burned in this 
fire, but tried and put to death nearly a quarter o-f a 
century later at the hands of those who could no longer 
endure their elenchos-wielding gadfly. 
It has been argued, then, that Aristophanes in the 
74Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 78-79. 
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ciouds gives subtle evidence of his familiarity with 
~
Socrates' profession as midwife of truth, and perhaps even 
hints at elenchos"' possibility for a££ording moral 
iroprovement. And while it must be admitted that the 
subtlety of such a device could easily be lost on an 
audience, Havelock rightly points out that Aristophanes' 
own lament in the play's second parabasis (510-626) 
indicates that the comic poet considered his -first Clouds 
quite sophisticated and subtle.75 Aristophanes claims 
that many of what he considered the play's finer aspects 
were overlooked by an audience that did not meet his 
expectations. He denies--humorously intended -false boasts 
of avoiding cheap shots not to the contrary--that his 
current revision is any less subtle; in fact, he seems 
instead to challenge his audience to rise, this time, to 
the occasion. 76 
Still, it must be acknowledged that Aristophanes' 
depiction 0£ Socrates admits of some morally questionable 
elements. In our eagerness to show Aristophanes"' 
familiarity with Socrates and his method, the disparity 
between the Socrates of the Clouds and the Socrates of 
75Havelock, "Socratic Sel-f," pp. 16-18. See also 
A. W. Gomme, "Aristophanes and Politics,• CR 52 (1938), 
PP. 108-109, for Aristophanes as the poet laureate of 
Athenian intelligentsia. 
76see Dover, Clouds, 
on the two versions of the 
considered in this study. 
pp. lxxx-xcviii, £or evidence 
play, which need not be 
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piato's early dialogues cannot be overlooked, for it is a 
disparity that scholars have found quite disturbing. 
Kenneth Reck ford deems it understandable that modern 
scholars and teachers find unenjoyable the characterization 
of socrates, "a patron saint of philosophers and 
intellectuals," as "an archvillain and imposter, a 
practitioner of scientific humbug, and the enemy of 
religion, morality, and good old-fashioned education 
generally."77 Nussbaum similarly remarks on the 
discrepancy between the Socrates in Aristophanes and the 
one in Plato: 
Plato's Socrates tirelessly exhorts those he meets--
whether citizens or sophists--to pursue virtue and the 
heal th of the soul rather than worldly success. The 
Aristophanic teacher helps students trick their 
creditors, win court cases, gain fame and power; he 
says nothing about virtue or the soui.78 
It should be noted that Nussbaum•s observation 
contains a shift: what Plato's Socrates exhorts is 
contrasted with that which Aristophanes' Socrates 
accomplishes. The contrast, in short, is between the 
intended goal of elenchos and its actual effect. In 
Chapter One it was argued that, even in the dialogues of 
Plato, there is a discrepancy between what elenchos 
Proclaims as intent and what it is seen to effect. For all 
the reader of Pla to•s earlier dialogues is able to see, the 
77 Reckford, Old-and-New, p. 392. 
78Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 45. 
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rooral improvement at which elenchos aims was lost on the 
IiKeS of Meno, Euthyphro, and Alcibiades.79 With the 
exception 0£ the later Theaetet us80 and the perpetually 
silent Plato, one is hard pressed to come up with names 0£ 
those who can be considered unquali-fied successes. 
Martha Nussbaum in -fact argues that the Clouds is in 
large part concerned with o££ering acute criticism of 
socra tic ed uca ti on through elenchos, a criticism which 
"current com-fortable acceptance, even adulation" 0£ 
Socrates and his method--both 0£ which, she notes, were, as 
late as the nineteenth century, still considered 
potentially subversive and dangerously negative---finds 
unacceptable. Nussbaum claims that the Clouds' 
assimilation 0£ Socrates to the sophists and other 0£ his 
contemporaries "suggests an interesting criticism 0£ 
[Socrates'] thought" which "anticipates the main lines 
along which Plato, in the Republic, modi-fies the Socratic 
program 0£ moral education."81 
79see Seeskin, Dialogue, especially pp. 3, 6, and 
125-132, for the discrepancy between the type 0£ character 
elenchos demands and the character of early interlocutors, 
and for the method's limited salutary e-ffect. 
80r. F. Stone, The Trial 0£ Socrates (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Co., 1988), p. 72, brands Theaetetus 
". · . the least wide-a wake of all the submissive yes-men 
given Socrates in the Platonic canon." 
81Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 4-4--4-5 and 50. 
Hussbaum•s discussion 0£ Plato's modi£ications 0£ Socratic 
education in the Republic (pp. 79 ff.) offers compelling 
support for her thesis but cannot be considered here. 
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Nussbaum's assessment, however, is based on her 
assertion that the contest between the two logoi 
constitutes an elenchos in its entirety. The acuity of 
manY of her observations on that contest will be 
acKnowledged below; here, however, it must be recognized 
that concentrating only on that part of the elenchos found 
in the Clouds' contest of the logoi not only allows room 
for misrepresentation of Aristophanes' intent in depicting 
the method, it likewise yields a Clouds that is painfully 
humorless if philosophically perspicacious. To be sure, 
the negative aspects 0£ Aristophanes' depiction could be 
defended as comic in the sense that comedy deals with the 
conspicuous, and nothing is more conspicuous than elenchos' 
potential for failure of its intent. But if Aristophanes' 
depiction of Socrates as the slimy, morally irresponsible 
sophist is taken as serious critic ism, the play once more 
becomes quite dreary.82 This study, however, aims to 
defend Aristophanes' depiction not only as comic, but to 
restore the play as one meant to be considered good fun; it 
therefore becomes otiose to reduce Aristophanes in the very 
Process of this defense to such a dour, if nonetheless 
82Even Nussbaum seems to recognize that her 
assessment has taken the play too far out of the realm of 
the comic; see "Practical Wisdom," pp. 78-79, for her 
suggestion, which she immediately rejects, that 
Aristophanes may hint at the play's close that young 
Pheidippides' life is lost in the conflagration. Cf. 
Kopff, "Nubes 1493 ff.," pp. 113-122. 
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potentially accurate, critic of Socra tes.83 
It should -further be noted that Kussbaum•s assessment 
depends heavily on the supposition that Aristophanes• 
comedY shows little awareness of the possibility of moral 
improvement that elenchos claims to offer. But is this in 
fact the case? It has already been claimed that Socrates• 
treatment o-f Strepsiades as a potential initiate, one in 
need of rebirth, hints at Aristophanes• awareness of 
elenchos' potential for moral improvement of its 
interlocutors. Such a claim gains support -from Eric 
Havelock.'s 1972 article, "The Socratic Sel-f as it is 
Parodied in Aristophanes• Clouds."84 
Havelock. claims that the Clouds betrays Aristophanes• 
familiarity with Socrates' "doctrine of the soul," i.e., 
Socrates• belie£, as reported by Plato in the Apology, that 
83Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," especially pp. 79 
ff., suggests, as was noted above, that Aristophanes' 
conflation of Socrates with the Sophists is part of his 
pointed criticism of elenchos and its practitioner. It 
could be argued with Nussbaum, then, that Aristophanes' 
depiction of Socrates is comic genius again at work, an 
intentional exaggeration in characterization which serves 
to illustrate in no dainty fashion the tragic dimension 0£ 
a method that fails of its potential, much as the blatant 
ridicule of Strepsiades• stupidity was claimed above to be 
the comic representation 0£ the interlocutor's growing 
sense of uncertainty. Nussbaum is perceptive in 
identifying many of the play•s elenctic aspects, and her 
observations will be used below. Nussbaum fails to 
consider, however, that the negative aspects of 
Aristophanes• depiction could be anything other than the 
comic poet's own reservations about elenchos. This study 
Will argue that these aspects represent the view of the 
admittedly befuddled and exasperated interlocutor. 
27 (1972), pp. 1-18. 
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eV'eryone's -first priorities should be thinking, truth, and 
, 
tne improvement o-f one's 'ljrUX'f). • By analyzing 
passages -from the Apology, Havelock. marshals impressive 
,,.erbal evidence in support of his thesis. He argues that 
tne doctrine is represented in the Apology primarily by the 
recurrence o-f certain "think-words" that take as their 
objects either psyche, "soul/ghost," or the re-flexive 
pronoun. The interchanging use o-f psyche with that o-f the 
reflexive pronoun in the Apology suggests, Havelock. 
contends, that Socrates used the noun psyche in what must 
have· been -for his contemporaries a '.startling new sense: to 
mean "sel-f."85 
Havelock. notes that the Clouds admits o-f occurrence o-f 
"think-words" in -formidable numbers, and calls attention 
both to incidents where these words are paired with 
reflexive pronouns as their objects, and to the play•s 
extensive use throughout o-f the re-flexi ve pronoun. 
Havelock.'s evidence reveals a Clouds that is truly 
ensconced in this vocabulary of thinking and attention to 
the "sel-f": Socrates asks Strepsiades, "How comes it that 
you, unaware o-f yourself, fell into debt?" (242); the 
Philosopher persuades his student by claiming, "I will give 
85cf. Taylor, Socrates, p. 137. Dover, Clouds, in 
llis commentary at line 94, dismisses as "lame" the 
Scholiast •s suggestion "that the Socratics were called 
•uxai because Socrates believed in the immortality o-f 
the soul--as i-f no one else did." Dover makes his point, 
but misses, as did the scholiast, Aristophanes• humor. C-f. 
his pp. xxxiii-xxxi v. 
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U instruction £rom yoursel£ ... " (385); during his yo 
intensive course 0£ study, Strepsiades is encouraged by 
socrates to "Think through one of the procedures 0£ 
yourself." (694), and by the Chorus to "Think, yes think, 
and scrutinize. By all means condense your (own) sel£ and 
mal<.e it spin." (700-702); Socrates repeats that his 
reticent student must "Keep thinking," must "Cover up and 
start thinking Begin with yoursel£; discover what 
you want and then express it." (727-728).86 These are 
but a £ew of the examples Havelock offers. The humor is, 
as Havelock himself readily admits, quite sophisticated, 
relying as it does "on the device 0£ parodying a verbal 
syntax which, i£ contemporary and posthumous records are 
compared, can be identified as in all probability 
Socratic."87 As humor demanding £rom its audience a 
keenness and an appreciation for subtlety, Havelock's 
evidence supports what this study has already argued and 
what Aristophanes himself contends, that the Clouds is a 
highly sophisticated piece. 
But sophistication is not its only suit. The Clouds 
also offers, as Havelock points out, evidence for 
Aristophanes• awareness of the Socratic doctrine of the 
soul in the form of humor that is delightfully reductive 
86see Havelock, "Socratic Self," pp. 10-14-. 
trans la lions are his. 
87 Ha velock, "Socratic Sel£," p. 15. 
The 
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and that exploits the superficial and concrete. Socrates 
and his cohorts are introduced as "ghosts": "Here you see 
the think-tank, inhabited by intelligent ghosts" (94), 
strepsiades intones. Aristophanes continues the visual pun 
on the Socratic concern for the psyche by depicting the 
occupants of the thinkery as "ghost-like, i.e. pale and 
underfed." 88 
So much Havelock perceptively observes, but the pun on 
psyche as the locus of Socrates• concern is likewise 
continued by the poet in the motif of initiation and 
rebirth, mentioned above in conjunction with Socrates• role 
as midwife of truth. Socrates• insistence that Strepsiades 
undergo ini tia ti on is an insistence upon symbolic death and 
rebirth, which would qualify the harried old man as one of 
the number of psychai, "ghosts/souls." Support for this 
contention can be found in a passage from the Birds, where 
Socrates is described as a conjuror of souls visited by the 
notorious coward, Peisander: 
At a lake in the vicinity of 
unwashed Socrates was conjuring 
{'vuxaywyet). Peisander came 
see the spirit (deoµe:vos 
8 8Havelock, "Socratic Self," 
the Sciapodes,89 
up spirits 
there, wan ting 
, > ~ 
'ljl'UX'r)V ldE:t V) 
p. 15. 
to 
that 
8 9LsJ9 translates "Shade-footed" or "Shady-
feet," and explains that these are "a fabulous people in 
the hottest part of Libya, with immense feet which they 
used as sunshades as they reclined," citing as one 
authority the scholia at Birds 1553. For the Sciapodes 
here as a mushroom used in the Eleusinian Mysteries, see 
C. A. P. Ruck, "Mushrooms and Mysteries. On Aristophanes 
and the Necromancy of Socrates," Helios 7 (1981), pp. 1-28. 
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deserted him in li£e. Then just like Odysseus, 
holding as victim a camel-lamb, he cut its throat, but 
he went away. Up £rom below towards the camel's blood 
then came £or him the bat, Chairephon. (Birds 1553-
1564). 
The passage clearly pokes £un at Socrates• doctrine 0£ the 
"soul"; here he is the psychagogos,90 the conjuror and 
persuader, who £ails to e££ect moral improvement. 
Peisander remains the coward he always was,91 and only 
the likes o-f the bloodless Chairephon hearken to Socrates• 
call: a "soul" is indeed conjured up, but one that is 
ghoulish and other-worldly. 
An expansion on the pun on psyche may even be 
recognized in the Clouds' location 0£ Socrates and his 
"gods," the Clouds themselves, in the realm 0£ the 
etheriai.92 Al though relation o-f psyche to the verb 
90For the use o-f "i'UXaywyn v and its cognates 
to describe tragedy's and rhetoric's magical ability to 
beguile, see de Romilly, Magic, p. 15, who cites 
Aristotle's Poetics 1450a and Plato's Phaedrus 261a. 
91Taylor, Socrates, p. 39, po in ts out that 
"philopsychia, concern for one's psyche, meant the 
cowardly hanging on to 'dear li£e' which leads a man to 
'funk' in the field." Socrates, then, who himsel-f is 
concerned with the psyche, logically cannot, by pun-
analogy, cure Peisander•s cowardice. 
92socra tes• position aloft has invited much 
comment. Nussbaum•s assertion, "Practical Wisdom," p. 70, 
that "[Socrates'] initial appearance dangling in a basket 
(223ff.) indicates his remoteness from the interlocutor, 
h.is detachment £rom such 'earthly' matters as moral 
habituation and the management of the passions," is merely 
an extension of the regularly argued position that 
Socrates' air-treading underscores his difference from the 
common man, and suggests either an assumption of 
superiority or else the vaporous nonsense he regularly puts 
forth. See, e.g., Dover, Clouds, pp. 125-126, and Whitman, 
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•'-'xw is contested,93 certainly association of the 
"ghost/spirit" with the "air" is one that can be witnessed 
as far back as Homer, where psychai are by simile compared 
with bats flit ting through the air (Odyssey 24-.1-7), and 
are seen to elude the grasp like so much smoke (e.g., 
Iliad 23.100). It is not surprising, then, that the "wise 
:;.....----
ghost" Socrates treads the air and mingles his thoughts 
with it, that, as an eternal "soul" he considers 
strepsiades "ephemeral" (223),94- that he is associated 
with the "half-dead" (504-), and "soul-drinking bugs" (712) 
and "bats," who, like the psychai brought up from the 
underworld, drink life-blood and flit about (Birds 1564-, 
cf. 1296); that he invokes Aer and Aither (264--265) and 
swears by Brea th and Aer (627), and that he recognizes the 
air-treading Clouds as deities (252-253, 365). This 
airborne Socrates, then, can as easily be argued to be the 
Socrates whose concern was only for the psyche and, by 
Comic Hero, p. 139. 
For the air-treading Cloud-chorus as betraying 
"triteness, inflation, and pervasive lack of point" in 
their opening song, see Michael Silk, "Aristophanes as 
Lyric Poet," YCS 26 (1980), p. 107. 
93LSJ 9 
--· 
s.v. 
I 
1"\JXW and 
Nevertheless, as Edwin Menes pointed out to me, "the 
absence of an etymological relationship does not preclude a 
si~nifican t punning relationship, e.g., owµa 
O'l'JIJ.a." 
9 4 Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 75, cites this 
line as evidence that the Socrates of the Clouds considers 
himself, as did the Platonic Socrates in the Apology, the 
servant of powerful deities, here the eternal Clouds; in 
this line he proclaims his association with their permanency. 
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comic extension, with all things 0£ the "air," as it can be 
argued to be a Socrates who has been misconstrued as an 
inconsistent a theist, or as one who is mistakenly shown as 
a physicist cut from the same cloth as, say, Diogenes 0£ 
. 95 Apouonia, or one who has been depicted as the 
typical intellectual, -full of "hot air," with his head "in 
the clouds." 
This last interpretation 0£ the Clouds' up-in-the-air 
imagery--whether applied to Socrates himsel£, the Cloud-
chorus, or the new "god" Dinos--is one popular with the 
play's many interpreters,96 and £or good reason. 
Entailing as it does the sense of con-fusion that "every 
man" £eels when confronted by the abstract world 0£ the 
intellectual, Aristophanes' use 0£ the image to depict a 
type is apropos. But using this imagery to depict Socrates 
practicing elenchos is a stroke 0£ genius. To the pre-
literate interlocutor 0£ Socrates, the abstract uni versa ls 
Socrates urges them to de-fine in elenchos are as di££icult 
to grasp and pin down as is the "ghostly" Socrates 
95Dover, Clouds, pp. xxxv and 127, n. on line 230. 
According to the latter, Diogenes 0£ Apollonia believed 
that the soul is air, and used the adjective .>..£11'To5 
to describe both. 
96see 
£.2mic Her~, 
and 115 ££. 
e.g., 
pp. 
Dover, Clouds, pp. lxvi-lxx; Whitman, 
127-128; Reck-ford, "Father Beating," pp. 93 
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97 
nimsel£. In Aristophanes' depiction 0£ Socrates as a 
floating "ghost," then, it is possible to recognize not 
onlY the philosopher's alleged concern with the "soul," but 
also, more generally, the odd £igure such a man must have 
cut among his £ellow Athenians. Martha Nussbaum has given 
a striking description 0£ the Socrates 0£ Plato's 
symposium, the disturbingly other-worldly creature: 
Socrates is weird. He is, in £act, 'not similar to 
any human being'. We £eel, as we look at him, both 
awestruck and queasy, timidly homesick £or ourselves. 
We £eel that we must look back. at what we currently 
are, our loves and our ways of seeing, the problems 
these cause £or practical reason. We need to see 
ourselves more clearly be£ore we can say whether we 
would like to become this other sort of being, 
excellent and dea£.98 
We see this oddball Socrates all over Aristophanes' 
Clouds, not only in his stat us as psyche, or in his 
£amiliar role as the distracted think.er--here comically 
shat upon by a lizard--but also in young Pheidippides' 
horror at the prospect of joining the ranks 0£ Socrates' 
students, which caste would catapult the boy fully out 0£ 
the realm 0£ normalcy, as he himsel£ recognizes (102-120). 
Pheidippides' reaction recalls that 0£ the Alcibiades 0£ 
the Symposium, whose attraction to the philosopher was ever 
cancelled by the repulsion he felt at what Socrates' way 0£ 
97Green, "Strepsiades," pp. 23-24, connects the 
"hot air" imagery with vapidity 0£ abstraction to one who, 
like Strepsiades, understands only the concrete and 
Situational. 
98Nussba um, Fragility, p. 184. 
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life demanded. Tenure in the ranks of the "wise souls" 
demands as prerequisite a Kind of death, which even the 
eager Strepsiades dreads and finds scary (504; 507-508): a 
death of all that is -familiar and normal and cozily 
secure. 99 
For the pre-literate -firth-century B. C. Athenian, 
talking with Socrates was, in short, like stepping into a 
whirlwind. Recall the sense of vertigo experienced during 
elenchos by interlocutors such as Theaetetus (Theaetetus 
t55c): this in Aristophanes• play is the reign 0£ Dinos, 
"Revolution," established by the agreement of Strepsiades 
himself shortly after he has been in the thrall of 
Socrates. RecK-ford is especially insight-ful on this point, 
although he does not relate it to elenchos: 
This earth, which seemed so solid, is floating on air. 
Our lives are shot through with illusion; nothing 
holds, neither Law nor Nature. We have clearly come--
as in all times 0£ personal or cultural transition--to 
the dizzy brinK o-f the abyss o-f meaninglessness and 
absurdity.100 
99sherman, Horal Education, pp. 23-24, taKes a 
negative view or this aspect of elenchos, and misses, it 
seems, all o-f Aristophanes' humor: "Thus, the elenchus is 
a painful and debilitating process that sucKs dry the 
spirit ... from its victims. At 723, Strepsiades wails 
to the Chorus: Not only have my clothes and complexion 
vanished at the hands 0£ the Socratics. but my life has 
vanished . . . . The implication is that in banishing 
customary beliefs and values--beliefs about god, piety, 
and respect, the Socratics perhaps rupture the emotional 
fiber 0£ li£e. They destroy a person's well-being and 
moral stability." 
lOORecK£ord, "Father-Bea ting," p. 115. RecK£ord 
sees the Cloud-chorus, with its constancy 0£ change, 
expressive 0£ the persistence 0£ illusion, as connected 
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rn Aristophanes• up-in-the-air, ghostly Socrates, who 
communes with the clouds and encourages the succession 0£ 
zeus bY Dinos, we can detect the historical philosopher 
whose way of life, values, beliefs, and methods amazed, 
astounded, and ultimately repelled his -fellow citizens. 
Who but Socrates is willing to "die" £or the truth, willing 
to give up the body and its desires to become a "ghost," 
however wise? It is no wonder, then, that rinding onesel£ 
in this etherial realm of abstraction would be perceived as 
dizzying; or that placing onesel£ willingly in the 
admittedly seductive clutches 0£ such a man would 
ultimately be perceived as an experience in which one had 
been duped, tak.en as an easy mark., hoodwink.ed, and robbed 
of one's everyday garb. 
This brings our discussion to the previously mentioned 
negative aspects of Socrates' characterization in the 
Clouds. For in seeming contrast to Socrates-the-ghost we 
have another Socrates in Aristophanes' play: Socrates-the-
shyster. Can it be that Aristophanes set these two 
depictions side-by-side and never noticed the con-fusing 
discrepancy? Hardly. Socrates in this play is, it is 
true, a detached, spiri t-lik.e ascetic, and yet also a rogue 
and a thie£, one who steals with the -finesse and aplomb 0£ 
the pro£essional. Furthermore, under Socrates• 
With the idea 
"Aristophanes• 
9_uarterly 22 
behind Dinos. See also K. J. Reck.£ord, 
Ever-Flowing Clouds," Emory University 
(1967), pp. 222-235. 
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instruction Strepsiades gains his desired end 0£ cheating 
nis creditors, and he is encouraged in this by the Clouds 
socrates worships, Clouds who in the end self-righteously 
censure the old man £or the very practice they had 
previously urged. Strepsiades' son is thoroughly corrupted 
bY tne two arguments in Socrates' employ, one 0£ which 
urges moral license, the other of which is exposed as 
nypocritic. The old man in the play's -final moments is 
driven to the point where he realizes that the true 
corruptors 0£ his son are Socrates and his cronies, and it 
is this realization that impels him to set £ire to the 
school. Are we then driven to argue that Aristophanes' 
intent is to impart harsh criticism of Socrates and his 
method? Not necessarily. 
The negative aspects of Socrates' characterization, 
the way his associates, the Clouds and the Logoi, are 
depicted, and even the -final burning 0£ the school can be 
appreciated as an uncannily perceptive rendering 0£ the 
interlocutor's experience of Socratic elenchos, put into a 
comic perspective which both exaggerates and objecti£ies. 
Aristophanes' view 0£ elenchos is indeed perspicacious, but 
not £or all that necessarily censorious.101 We can 
101Arguing that Aristophanes is not critical of 
Socrates is shadowboxing -from a defensive position, and 
Yields predictably unconvincing results. See, £or example, 
Murray, Aristophanes, pp. 87-105; Thomas Gelzer, 
"Aristophanes und sein Sok.rates," MH 13 (1956), pp. 65-93; 
Harmut Erbse, "Sok.rates im Schatten der Aristophanischen 
Wolk.en," Hermes 82 (1954; hereafter Erbse, "Sok.rates"), pp. 
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never Know what Aristophanes thought 0£ Socrates, but we 
can recognize that in his portrayal 0£ the philosopher, 
Aristophanes was as -fully aware 0£ the enigma that is 
~enchos as he was 0£ the enigma that was its practitioner. 
Aristophanes could give vent to harsh criticism when 
occasion called £or it. Whitman recalls Aristophanes' 
rantings against the likes 0£ Cleon to make this point, and 
further notes that, although Aristophanes describes 
Socrates with what would normally be considered censorious 
385-420. Murray admits that there is a likeness to 
Socrates, but denies that his honor is attacked; instead 
the play is a joke on bumpkin-meets-scholar, a "clash 0£ 
'humours:• as Murray puts it {p. 95). Gelzer removes 
culpability £rom Socrates by making him the symbol 0£ the 
new education and eristic; Erbse considers Aristophanes' 
Socrates a creation the poet uses to provide his play with 
a £ocus £or all its disparate elements. The current study 
no more denies than it asserts that Aristophanes in the 
Clouds is critical 0£ Socrates. Instead, it merely argues 
that the portrait is comically accurate. That Socrates and 
his elenchos are disruptive and discomfiting is as obvious 
£rom Aristophanes' play as it is £rom Plato's early 
dialogues, but that the two are culpable £or the moral 
decline 0£ the Athenians is in no way evident in either 
author. It is possible, to be sure, to argue £rom the 
perspective 0£ the late dialogues 0£ Plato or £rom that 0£ 
Aristotle, as does Nussbaum in "Practical Wisdom," passim, 
that elenchos is a negative tool and there-fore a dangerous 
one to use £or moral improvement, in that its results are 
unpredictable and inconstant. But moral improvement is 
only one 0£ many aspects 0£ elenchos, one 0£ its aims, 
according to Plato. This study is concerned with elenchos, 
not moral improvement per se; it is concerned with Socrates 
as practitioner 0£ elenchos, not with his supposed -failure 
at raising the moral consciousness 0£ Athens. Aristophanes 
mirrors elenchos accurately, although comically--both the 
method i tsel£ and the e££ect it regularly has on 
interlocutors. The £act that Aristophanes' portrait has 
Yielded so much controversy in interpretation is perhaps a 
testimonial to its accuracy in portraying the man and his 
method, both 0£ which have long been controversial 
subjects. 
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words, the portrait o:f the philosopher is one that lacks 
tne rancor common to harsh criticism.102. This is not 
to say that Aristophanes engages only in gentle mocking o:f 
103 socrates. Such affectionate teasing is unworthy of 
tne type of comedy that Aristophanes produces. Instead, he 
gives us a Socrates who is as big and bold in his 
roguishness as he is thoroughly eccentric in his 
concentration on the psyche. That this portrait is an 
accura te--though comic--represen ta ti on o:f elenchos' effect 
on the interlocutor will now be defended. 
It would be di-f-ficult to deny that Aristophanes fully 
intended his audience to view Socrates, at least in one 
aspect, as a rogue, a rather uncommon criminai.104 
When Strepsiades first identi:fies for his suspicious son 
the academic society into whose membership he hopes to urge 
the boy, he hesitates to name Socrates and his associates, 
and instead labels them Te 
, , 
Kaya9ol, the 
standard epithet for men considered "true gentlemen" (101). 
Pheidippides, however, not fooled by his father's at tempts 
at evasion, names names and does not blanch at giving what 
102Whi tman, Comic Hero, pp. 142.-143. 
103Pace Arrows mi th, Clouds, pp. 12.-13. 
l04The point is that, in acknowledging the roguish 
elements of Aristophanes' depiction of Socrates, one need 
not be thrown into the position either of de:fending the 
historical Socrates, by making Aristophanes' depiction a 
mere type, or of at tacking the historical Socrates, by 
assuming that Aristophanes is thus criticizing Socrates. 
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:n.e considers the unvarnished truth: "Oh, no! You mean 
t:n.ose rogues (ltOV'l'JPOl), I know! Those impostors 
. (1'0\JS a>..a~ovas), 1 05 pale-raced, shoeless, to 
whose number belong that ill-possessed Socrates and 
chairephon!" (102-104 ). 
While at -first blush this might be excused as the 
over-reaction 0£ a spoiled boy who would rather race horses 
in the sun than put his e£fort into academic pursuits, 
Pheidippides' assessment 0£ Socrates as a rogue is borne 
out by Aristophanes• portrayal 0£ the philosopher as a 
clothing thief. The student who haughtily answers the door 
to Strepsiades• urgent pounding proudly describes his 
master at work, procuring a meal ticket £or himsel£ and his 
cohorts: "He strewed -fine ash over a table, bent a skewer, 
then taking it [to serve as] a pair 0£ compasses,106 he 
stole a cloak -from the wrestling-school." (177-179). This 
feat is a source 0£ amazement £or Strepsiades: "Why then 
do we wonder at (9auµa~oµt:v) that Thales?," he 
105whi tman, Comic Hero, pp. 139-140, considers 
Socrates the alazon, the "quack" whose hold on poneria 
rivals that 0£ the usual comic hero. Whitman sees the term 
alazon as descriptive 0£ Socrates• aptness at thievery, but 
does not attempt to explain the meaning behind 
Aristophanes• depiction 0£ Socrates as a thie£. C£. also 
PP. 26-27 and 96 £or Whitman's more general consideration 
0£ the alazon and its relation to the eiron, both 0£ which 
Strepsiades (449) hopes to become after his tenure with 
Socrates. 
106Following 
Clouds, abridged 
87 at line 178. 
K. 
ed. 
J. Dover, ed., 
(Ox-ford: Univ. 
Aristophanes, 
Press, 1970), pp. 86-
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intones, and thereupon demands immediate entrance to the 
school. Similarly, a£ter Strepsiades has been expelled, 
pheidippides notices that his £ather's education has not 
come without a price: --"And £or this you lost your 
cloaK?" --"I didn't lose it; I thought it away 
(ic:a1all't:<ppovTtKa)." --"And your shoes, what have you 
done with your shoes, you old £001, you?" --"As Pericles 
said, I have lost them to what was need£ul." (856-859). 
These blatant charges of thievery against Socrates can 
only be taKen as serious by someone who is looking to picK 
a £ight with the comic poet, someone willing at the same 
time to overlook the fact that Aristophanes shows Socrates 
engaging in all manner 0£ unlikely things--like making his 
entrance in an ex machina basket--simply to make the 
caricature 0£ the philosopher ludicrously accurate. Dover, 
commenting on the student's initial description 0£ 
Socrates' adeptness at thievery, notes, "Demetrios 
(loc.ci t.) quotes this passage [177-179] as an 'unexpected' 
joke, 'which has no connexion with what has gone 
before/"107 but this is precisely Aristophanes' point 
in making Socrates a sneaky thie£. Recall how 
interlocutors in Plato's dialogues came to Socrates with 
their opinions firmly entrenched, and how soon it was that 
they became divested of those opinions. Recall how often 
interlocutors charged Socrates with sorcery, how, £or 
107oover, Clouds, p. 118 at line 179. 
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e:xarople, Euthyphro was convinced that Socrates could, like 
Daedalus, make inanimate objects move. The Platonic 
socra tes, when practicing elenchos, was to his 
interlocutors a source of wonder, just as he is in 
Aristophanes' play to the dull-witted Strepsiades, whose 
exclaroation at line 180 attests to the wonder he feels at 
the philosopher's comic practice of elenchos-as-thievery. 
How is Socrates in elenchos able to do what he does? 
Elenchos is indeed like thievery; it accomplishes the 
unexpected by unnoticed means; it achieves re£u ta ti on by 
using as arguments analogies which at the time seem 
unconnected to the discussion at hand. 
Of course Socrates is a rogue generally, and, more 
specifically, a thief. Recall how common it is £or 
interlocutors as well as £or modern commentators to re-fuse 
to believe that Socrates' pro-fession 0£ ignorance is 
sincere; that his claim to impassive involvement is honest. 
Correspondingly, in the Clouds, Socrates is called an 
imposter, an alazon (102), whom Strepsiades assumes will be 
able in turn to teach him to be an impostor and a 
dissembler, an eiron.108 Whitman is at pains to 
108The Ii tera t ure on comic "types" is extensive, 
and the subject cannot be considered at length here. For 
the classic, though now considered overly rigid, 
characterization 0£ the comic alazon and eiron, see 
Corn-ford, Attic Comedy, pp. 132-141 and 148-152. A more 
modern consideration of the meanings 0£ alazon and eiron 
can be round in R. Stark, "Sokra tisches in der Vogeln," RhH 
96 (1953), pp. 77 £. 
For the argument that Aristophanes' portrayal 0£ 
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distinguish Socratic irony £rom the irony 0£ the comic 
ro but he misses the potential £or similarity when ne • 
socratic irony is considered £rom the perspective 0£ the 
increasingly suspicious interlocutor: 
rt is a mistake to con-fuse the irony o-f the comic hero 
with that 0£ Plato's Socrates, though Socrates, 
clearly and o£ten, made use 0£ it to get the better 0£ 
his opponent, and not seldom with subtle comic e££ect. 
For the irony o-f Socrates leads the opponent, at least 
theoretically, toward ultimate submission be£ore a 
philosophic logos; the irony 0£ a comic hero leads to 
his own swaggering triumph over all reason or 
opposition, in the name 0£ an impudent sel£ which has 
become liberated £rom all small restraints 0£ 
consistency or responsibility .109 
Socratic "irony" is, a£ter all, o£ten deemed a ruse, a 
posture, because it seems unlikely that there is no 
subter£uge in elenchos, where interlocutor a£ter 
interlocutor is robbed 0£ sel£-assurance and the status 0£ 
one who knows, without once becoming aware that this is 
happening until it is already too late, until it is all 
over. And then, the master stroke: Socrates looks in to 
the £ace o-f his con-founded interlocutor, whose claim to 
knowledge he has just appropriated, and brazenly alleges 
that he has done nothing whatsoever. But then, what thie-f 
admits his guilt? Aristophanes' depiction 0£ Socrates-as-
rogue in the Clouds, whether in his guise as thie£, 
imposture, or dissembler, is elenchos' uncanny ability to 
Socrates bears the mark 0£ Socratic irony as analyzed by 
Kierkegaard, see K. Kleve, "Anti-Dover or Socrates in the 
£..loud~," so 5B (1983), pp. 23-37. 
l09Whitman, Comic Hero, p. 27. 
188 
secure un£oreseen reversal, and its so-called "impersonal 
aspect," comically depicted £rom the interlocutor's 
t - 11 0 perspec ive. 
That Aristophanes shows Socrates in the Clouds 
stealing clothing instead 0£ anything else is perhaps not 
merely a serendipitous choice. Socrates, a £ter all, does 
laY everyone bare with his elenchos: as he impatiently 
explains to Strepsiades, who is hesitant to obey the 
philosopher's demand that he strip 0££ his clothing, "It is 
the custom [here] to go about naked" (4-98).111 And 
indeed, i£ one wants to associate with Socrates, one must 
have no scruples whatever about showing to the world 
everything that one has. 1£ commitment to the soul's 
nurture can be so ludicrously depicted on the physical 
plane by making Socrates and his cohorts into pallid, 
blood-sucking ghosts, one can likewise imagine that the 
soul-baring requisite £or interlocutors in elenchos can 
similarly be reduced to a baring 0£ the body, either with 
or without consent 0£ the person involved. 
llOEdmunds, "Socrates," pp. 221-2.2.2, considers the 
Cloud-chorus Aristophanes' representation 0£ Socratic irony 
(read: mockery), " ... as an attitude, as a stance toward 
the world." Edmunds makes much o-f the Chorus• mockery and 
deception, and yet is amused that " . . . it did not occur 
to [Strepsiades] that the Clouds themselves were ironists." 
111see Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 74: "This 
Socrates is out to strip away his pupil's preconceptions--
it is the custom to enter naked into the phrontisterion 
(ll98)--and to expose the inconsistencies in his current 
beliefs (c£. esp. 369, 398)." 
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Elenchos is, a£ter all, a process whereby the 
interlocutor, by putting his subjective belie£s to the 
touchstone 0£ objective logic, only gradually becomes 
conscious that his initial bravado was ill-£ounded. As was 
argued above (Chapter One, Part Three), elenchos' personal 
aspect--which in Plato's dialogues takes the -form 0£ 
Socrates' insistence that interlocutors express only their 
own views--is integral to the interlocutor's dawning 
awareness 0£ his own ignorance. In the Clouds, 
Aristophanes represents this process o-f gradual awakening 
primarily through the agency 0£ the Cloud-chorus.112 
The mimetic ability 0£ the Cloud-chorus is elenchos' 
personal aspect per se, comically depicted on a physical 
rather than on a mental plane. The Chorus is insistently 
personal: its talent £or imitation reveals the nature o:f 
whoever comes within its -field (348-355);113 and it 
112Interpretations o-£ the Cloud-chorus generally 
stress their changeability; see the discussion above, this 
section, £or up-in-the-air imagery. Charles Segal, 
"Aristophanes' Cloud-Chorus," Arethusa 2 (1969), pp. 143-
161, does not consider the Chorus' mimetic abilities, but 
argues instead, by pointing to the Chorus' persistently 
concrete, poetic language and its association with nature's 
beauty, that the Chorus are more properly identified 
throughout the play with Right. 
113As Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 76, 
comments: "Insofar the Clouds are symbolic o:f Socratic 
teaching, they display it as elenctic and negative, 
imparting no insight into anything but the interlocutor's 
own defects, leaving beyond the structure 0£ the elenchos 
only a -formless nebulosity." C£. Martha Nussbaum, 
"Commentary on Edmunds[' 'Aristophanes' Socrates']," in 
~oceedings 0£ the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient 
Philosophy, Vol. 1, 1985 (Lantham, MD: University Press o:f 
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liKewise demands 0£ the contestants in the set contest 
between Right and Anti-Right: .. speaK your nature" 
. 
( 1' 'fJ v ""' aauTou 
, 
Cf'UCJlV 
~ , 
€lll'€, 960) . 
But by also maKing this insistently personal Chorus 
the vehicle by which the initial bravado, intermediate 
nagging doubt, and £inal a waKening of Strepsiades are 
expressed, Aristophanes in his nebulous Chorus gives a 
concrete representation of the effect on the interlocutor 
of elenchos' personal aspect: the change £rom ignorance to 
Knowledge, i.e., recognition. The Cloud-chorus, having 
drawn near Strepsiades, reveals in their waning 
approbation of Strepsiades' action the old man's own 
evolution £rom self-assurance, to doubt, to recognition 0£ 
America, Inc., 1986; herea£ter Nussbaum, "Commentary"), pp. 
231-240, especially p. 236, where she again stresses, "The 
Clouds taKe on the shape or £orm 0£ the person to whom 
their attention is directed; they become what they see. 
Their £unction is to show or reveal something about the 
pupil's own nature." Nussbaum taKes her earlier argument 
further, however, by noting that " ... in at least two 
cases [the Clouds] taKe on the shape 0£ the interlocutor's 
appetitive desires " (p. 237). Edmunds, 
"Socrates," argues that the Cloud-chorus represents 
Socrates' daimonion as well as his "ironic" (i.e., mocKing) 
stance; Nussbaum, "Commentary," p. 234, counters that 
Socrates' references to his daimonion could be interpreted 
as " ... an ironic way of alluding to the supreme 
authority of dissuasive reason and elenctic argument." 
The members of the Cloud-chorus, as Strepsiades is 
Perplexed to note, have noses. For their noses as 
indicative 0£ deception, rather liKe the phrase, "lead by 
the nose," see A. KohnKen, "Der Wolken-Chor des 
Aristophanes," Hermes 108 (1980), pp. 154-169. 
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A£ter their entrance at 274, which is -followed by a 
list 0£ their requirements 0£ devotees and promises to them 
at 412 ££., the Cloud-chorus, engaging -first in high-
hearted encouragement, reflects Strepsiades' willingness to 
entrust his £ate to the power of cheating and his gullible 
aspirations that this new power will spell £or him an 
enviable future: the Chorus assures Strepsiades that his 
new education will procure £or him a "£ame high as heaven" 
and the "most enviable li£e" 
, , 
oupavoµ.'T)KES, 
461; ~'l'}Aw101a1ov f3tov, .!J6.!J); Strepsiades in addition 
will become weal thy by selling to others the rhetorical 
sK.ills he is about to obtain (468-475).115 At 510-517 
the Chorus again encourages the old man, and praises the 
courage shown by him during the initiation he has just 
undergone. 
After Strepsiades' unsuccessful tenure as student, 
however, the Chorus becomes advisory, signalling the shift 
114Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 76, sees the 
Cloud-chorus as Aristophanes' critic ism 0£ elenchos: 
"Insofar as the Clouds are symbolic of Socratic teaching, 
they display it as elenctic and negative, imparting no 
insight into anything but the interlocutor's own defects." 
C£. Harriott, Aristophanes, p. 184: " the Clouds 
observe human -failings." 
115Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 80 n. 72, 
notes that it is not Socrates, but instead "it is the 
Clouds who are the goddesses 0£ rogues and who promise 
Strepsiades the accomplishment 0£ his dishonest ends (316-
18, 331-4)," but does not recognize that the Chorus, in 
this, is re-fleeting Strepsiades' own desires. 
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from Strepsiades• reckless self-assurance to a sense that, 
to save his original trust in the powers 0£ cheating, a new 
strategy must now be undertaken. But his eagerness to 
salvage his belief likewise marks Strepsiades as ripe for 
refutation: after advising Strepsiades to send his son to 
the school, the Chorus turns quickly to Socrates116 to 
apprise him that Strepsiades--eager, con-fused, and elated 
(eiOLl.J.OS; > I e:ic lte:lt X'r)yµ.e:vou > I e:tr'r)pµ.e:vou, 806 
and 809-810)--is now every thief's dream: the easy mark, 
but he may not be one for long (see the Chorus• 
I 
admonition, -raxe:ws, 810-812). 
That the tide has measurably turned against 
Strepsiades is appropriately shown right after his moment 
of glory, when he has driven his creditors off the stage, 
and just before his comeuppance, when his son "beats" him 
at his own game. The Chorus' foreboding pronouncement at 
1303 -ff. explicitly connects Strepsiades• cheating with the 
result to come, one which he had never imagined: 
See what it is, to long passionately for what is 
wrong! For this old man, in passionate longing, wan ts 
to de-fault his loans. There is no way today he can 
avoid getting back straightaway some bit of that nasty 
business he has begun; it will make him "smart." For 
I think that soon he will find that very thing he once 
upon a time was looking for: his son to be clever for 
him, to give voice to views contrary to the just, and 
so to prevail--even if he speaks things utterly 
depraved--over all those with whom he holds 
116Dover•s discussion of the con-fusion over who it 
is the Chorus addresses in lines 804--813 argues 
Persuasively for Sacra tes; see Dover, Clouds, p. 197 at 
lines 804--813. 
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intercourse. But maybe, maybe he'll sometime wish his 
son were dumb. (1303-1320). 
strepsiades' final revelation comes from the Cloud-
cnorus at 1452 ff. After cursing Socrates and Anti-Right, 
strepsiades in vain tries to blame the Clouds for their 
part, only to learn that his current plight is one for 
which he is personally and solely responsible: 
--I have suffered this on account of you, Clouds; to 
you I turned over all my affairs. --You yourself are 
for yourself the cause of these things; you 
turned117 yourself: to roguish a££airs. 
(~UTOS µe~ o~v oa~T~ ,au TOU\WV 
aLTLOS, OTPE:vas OE:aUTOV E:LS lt'OV'r)pa 
vpayµaTa) --But why didn't you counsel me back 
then, instead 0£ leading on an old country bumpkin? 
--We do these things whenever we find some lover 
(epaaT.fiv) of roguish a ff airs; we launch him 
into wrong, until he knows to fear the gods. (1452-
1461). 
To summarize, then, the Cloud-chorus is Aristophanes' 
representation of elenchos' personal aspect. They not only 
are reputed to be able to give a physical rendition o~ 
someone's nature (a feat which would unlikely be 
accomplished on stage), they likewise reveal Strepsiades' 
own progression from self-assured bravado, through doubt 
and the sense that all is not well, to his final, though 
fleeting, recognition that he has only the desires that 
Underpin his beliefs to blame. Recall the similar 
Progression from self-assurance to doubt experienced by 
117Edmunds, "Socrates," p. 224, notes this pun on 
Strepsiades' name, but interprets this as " ... making £un 
of the old man." This interpretation fits Edmunds' thesis 
that the Cloud-chorus represents a mocking Socratic irony. 
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guthYPhro and Meno (see above, Chapter One, Part Three), 
and hOW quick they were to assume that it was Socrates who 
led them astray, how eager young Euthyphro was to leave 
when, as was argued, the implica lions 0£ his belie£s' 
demise became glaringly apparent. In Aristophanes' play, 
the interlocutor's sense o-f how he--or rather, his belie£s 
--are -faring in elenchos is given voice by the agency 0£ 
the Cloud-chorus, who begin by heartily encouraging, and 
proceed through cautionary advice to unbridled reproach. 
Is it any wonder, then, that Strepsiades burns the 
thinkery to the ground? For it is not only as comic hero--
here reversing his own elenctic reversal--tha t he per-forms 
what in real li£e would be an admittedly £oul act, but also 
as interlocutor in elenchos. The early Platonic dialogues 
are testimony to the £act that £ew humans are able to 
withstand the harsh realization that all that they hold 
dear is, at best, suspect and, more likely, totally 
fallacious. Recall Euthyphro, in his haste to leave on 
unspeci£ied business, or Alcibiades in the Symposium, whose 
acknowledged shame at the recognition 0£ own de£iciencies 
left him ambivalent about Socrates: "Many are the times I 
would gladly £ind him no longer among men on earth, but i£ 
this were in £act to happen, I know that I would su££er 
greater distress than ever; the result is that I have no 
idea what to do with this man at all." (Symposium 216c.1-
3), 
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strepsiades in the Clouds has already been shown 
squirming as he undergoes the rigors of elenchos; as 
Nussbaum and others have pointed out, the bedbugs that 
beset the old man at 633 ff. are Aristophanes' comic 
depiction 0£ the discom£ort this method can visit upon 
socra tes' in terlocu tors.118 Add to this the £act that 
strepsiades agrees to submit himself to all sorts of 
physical discomfort ( 4-4-0-4-4-2), that he gets rained upon 
(267-268), is peppered with £lour and scared out of his 
wits (256-260), and is -finally soundly beaten by his own 
son (1321 ££.). In the end, the old man experiences a much 
more obvious but no less unpleasant recognition than 
Euthyphro or Alcibiades were seen to experience: "Alas, 
Clouds, your words are hard, but just! For it was not 
right that I refused to pay the money I borrowed." (14-62-
1464). 
In summary, then, the mental exasperation regularly 
experienced by interlocutors at elenchos' terminus, which 
in Plato's dialogues gets displaced onto Socrates, is in 
ll8see Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 75, who 
remarks, "Talking to Socrates undoubtedly was like being 
bit ten and drained; talking to the others [i.e., sophists 
like Gorgias] was as easy as eating." See also Sherman, 
Koral Education, p. 23, who notes that, at lines 94-1-94-8, 
Anti-Right threatens Right with "stinging" arguments 
(K€VTou1-1.evo5). For interpretation 0£ the bugs as 
representative of Strepsiades' distress in general (first 
caused by his son's "biting" debts, 12 £., and only later 
by Socrates), see Whitman, Comic Hero, p. 14-1. Whitman 
makes the additional point that Strepsiades' discomfort is 
also alluded to in his name. 
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tne Clouds acted out on the physical plane. This is quite 
appropriate, for it is on this very plane that Aristophanes 
snows Strepsiades' mental anguish during elenchos. In 
addition, even Socrates' doctrine of the soul was similarly 
presented as a physical reality, while elenchos' amazing 
capacity for procuring unforeseen reversal was depicted as 
tneft of clothing. 0£ course Strepsiades should physically 
destroy even as he has suf£ered--a t least in his own eyes--
physical destruction. Poor Strepsiades yowled at his own 
destruction 
> , (a1To).).uµ.al, 707; > > .... GlTO).OUOlV, 
715); it is justifiable, then, that destroying Socrates and 
his cohorts be urged by Strepsiades in turn 
> .... (a1To>.E:LS, 1466), and that out from the school 
should come a comically gratifying penultimate cry 
> .... (a1To>.€lS 1499). The jolt when comic 
justice meets history is ours to feel, not for those who 
were to sit in Aristophanes' audience and howl their 
appreciation at tit for tat. 
Only an overly defensive historical perspective can 
raise the objection that Strepsiades wrongly lays the blame 
at Socrates' feet, that, after all, Socrates is, by his 
absence from the contest of the two logoi, dissociated from 
the positions presented there by Anti-Right, who prevails. 
Nussbaum is right, then, to argue that Gelzer and Erbse err 
in defending Socrates against the charge of being a 
corrupting influence by claiming that blame is rightly 
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ascribable to Strepsiades; £or, as Nussbaum points out, 
even the Platonic Socrates argues--against the sophist 
Gorgias and elsewhere--that the student who acts badly does 
so because his teacher has failed.119 As insightful as 
is Nussbaum•s analysis 0£ the contest between the logoi, 
ner imputation to Aristophanes 0£ a critical perspective 
on socra tes as an ed uca tor--reminiscen t 0£ the implied 
views of the later Plato and those expressed by Aristotle--
is attributable to her emphasis on the contest 0£ the logoi 
as the primary locus in the Clouds 0£ Socratic elenchos. 
Instead, the contest should be considered as only one facet 
of Aristophanes• presentation of elenchos. Many of 
Nussbaum•s excellent observations can be reconsidered in 
this light. 
That Socrates is absent £rom the contest is a great 
good joke, and should not be passed of£ as mere theatrical 
convention, whereby £i ve actors are seldom £ound on stage 
in comedy;120 in addition, it is at least arguable that 
Aristophanes could fairly easily have, £or example, 
absented Pheidippides, if he so chose. Socrates• departure 
from the stage, marked by his announcement, , ' "au-ros. 
, , 
QUIOlV IOl V ~oyolV, , ' 
€YW 0, vap 
, ' 
all'Ecroµ.al" (886-887), is a pointed reference to what 
119Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 4-7. 
120see 
"Practical 
14. 
Dover, 
Wisdom," 
Clouds, p. lxxvii; Nussbaum, 
p. 4-8; Sherman, Moral Education, p. 
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nas been termed the "impersonal aspect" of elenchos: 
socra tes' insistence that it is not he, but the logos that 
does the refu ting.121 But putting forward as antidote 
to socra tes' supposed "innocence" the theory that, since 
Anti-Right argues elenctically, he is therefore the 
"philosophical persona of Socra tes,"122 who is then 
clearly culpable: "His attitude is at best morally 
121see the discussion above, Chapter One, Part 
Three. Sherman, Moral Education, pp. 14-15, al though she 
argues that the limited number of actors is the most 
plausible explanation for Socrates' absence, tentatively 
suggests that "I£ anything, Socrates' absence during the 
contest 0£ the two logoi seems to underscore the ironic, 
mocK. claim made in the Euthyphro that while Socrates sets 
logoi in motion, once moving they take on an agency 0£ 
their own independent 0£ his manipulations (91d-e, 15b)." 
Erbse, "Sokra tes," p. 398, argues that Socrates remains, 
> , 
and that his avecroµaL at 887 indicates merely that 
he is withdrawing any influence he might have over the 
contest. 
This study, by arguing that Socrates' actual absence 
is the comedic representation of elenchos' impersonal 
aspect, in no way means to deny what Nussbaum, "Practical 
Wisdom," p. 66, points out, that Pheidippides associates 
Socrates with the position argued by Anti-Right. Socrates' 
claim to be separate from the logoi he employed was 
regularly disbelieved by interlocutors, who accused him of 
using some sort of sorcery to throw the argument. It is 
not surprising, then, that Pheidippides would proudly, as 
later would the outraged Strepsiades, attribute Anti-
Right's program to Socrates. It is surprising, however, 
that Nussbaum would follow suit. 
122sherman, Moral Education, p. 16. Nussbaum's 
claim, "Practical Wisdom," p. 51, is slightly more 
cautious, "The personi£ication 0£ the two logoi is a handy 
dramatic device. But when they appear before the pupil in 
Person, ready to tell the Chorus what their natures are 
(960), we may also be seeing a telling and particular 
representation of Socratic epistemology at work." 
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neutral; at worst he condones deceit "123--this is, 
again, shadowboxing, now even more so, with a new offensive 
taKen against a previously fabricated defensive position. 
It is, to be sure, absolutely correct that Anti-Right 
argues elenctically; Nussbaum describes it succinctly: 
The debate is not really an argument bet ween 
proponents of rival programs, but something much more 
unusual in the rhetorical tradition: an elenchos of 
the moral views of one speaker by the arguments of the 
other. Anti-Right yields the first, expository place 
to his rival, announcing that he will debate 'from the 
things he will say• (942)--starting only -from the 
views expressed by his opponent. Using these he will 
'shoot him down' (944) using new and inventive 
(Kainois, 943) arguments. These two are not logoi in 
the same sense. One expounds, the other argues; one 
sets out a view, the other speaks against it (c£. 
enantiais gnomaisi, 1037, cf. 1314; antilexai, 1040). 
And, as it will turn out, the aim and achievement o-f 
this negative procedure will be to show Right that he 
himself does not really believe in the education he 
defends. This is not to say that there is no positive 
content to the position of Anti-Right; it will turn 
out both to embody substantial moral assumptions and 
to produce tangible results. But in -form and spirit 
it is much less like a contest in rhetoric than like 
another Kind of debate that also conceals its positive 
contribution: the Socratic elenchos.124 
The contest is, however, better understood as the 
later stages of elenchos rather than as the whole of 
123Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 48. It is 
mistaken to argue that an elenctically argued position 
Which prevails must therefore be sanctioned by Socrates who 
staged the contest; indeed, if one were to take such a 
Posi lion regarding elenchos in the Platonic dialogues, 
Socrates would have to be accused of cleaving to all sorts 
of belie£s that are unmistakably contrary to the 
convictions he continually professes. Besides, this is 
not, as I argue, the end· of the elenchos. 
124Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 51-52. C-f. 
Sherman, Moral Education, pp. 20-21. 
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~· i.e., better understood as that part of elenchos 
wnen the connection between the emotion and cognition is 
made evident, when the emotions that underpin beliefs 
surface and win out. Nussbaum's description of Right's 
conduct during the contest is, though she does not remark 
on this, peculiarly reminiscent 0£ behavior common to 
Socrates' interlocutors when the first flush of self-
assurance has worn of£: 
Never . . does he present a reasoned argument £or 
his position. He reminisces in sentimental fashion 
... ; what he does say (at 1002ff.) is so vague and 
remote as to be very little help. In the exchange 
with Anti-Right, he cannot for a minute hold his own 
in argument; he allows himself to be upset by moves so 
obviously specious that we wonder at his credulity 
(esp. 1050ff.). He is clearly indifferent to reason 
and to the reasoned justification of his opponent's 
proposals. His weapons are abuse, intolerance and 
disgust. One claim is answered by a threat (899); 
others by name-calling and unsubstantiated slurs 
(909-11, 916-18, 925-9, 1046, 1052-4, 1016-23); a 
hackneyed argument, easily answerable, by vomiting 
into a basin (904-6, c£. Ach. 584-7).125 
Recall how difficult it was £or Socrates to get 
interlocutors to play the game by the rules: don't tell me 
particular instances, he would insist, tell me what x is. 
Recall the pre-literate aspects 0£ interlocutors, how 
"indifferent to reason" the pre-literate can seem to 
Pla to•s literate readers, how easy it is for Socrates, a 
Pre-literate showing the influence of literacy, to win a 
game whose rules he alone understands. Recall, finally, 
how, in Seeskin's words, "Protagoras becomes angry, Polus 
125Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 57. 
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resorts to cheap rhetorical tricks, Callicles begins to 
sulK, Cri tias loses his sel-f-control, Meno wants to 
quit."126 This contest is, indeed, profoundly similar 
to elenchos' later stages, when incontrovertible logic 
meets the emotions that underpin beliefs. 
Further support -for this contention is to be -found in 
what Nussbaum calls "an anomalous element"127 in 
Right's arguments: a heavy undercurrent o-f sexuality 
which, in the culmination o-f the contest, is brought up to 
the surface -for all to see. For it is precisely Right's 
own desires--a t 973 -ff. comically exaggerated as a 
prurient, voyeuristic over-emphasis on the steps boys 
should take to remain modest--tha t, when exposed, ca use him 
finally to admit defeat and run o-f-f like many an 
interlocutor.128 It is not without point that he 
disrobes as he departs in haste: he, too, has had his 
desires, latent in the mesh of his program o-f education, 
exposed by elenchos. He admits this by giving up his 
previous pose and joining the euruprok toi he agrees 
l26seeskin, Dialogue, p. 3. 
127Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 55. 
1281 am not convinced by Nussbaum's analysis, 
"Practical Wisdom," pp. 64 -ff., of the euryproktoi jokes at 
108'1- -f-f. as suggestive o-f a doctrine o-f "passive hedonism." 
As Dover notes, Clouds, p. 2.27 at line 1084, one could 
become euryproktos not merely -from repeated anal 
intercourse, but also from being subjected to the notorious 
"radish treatment" used to punish adulterers, mentioned 
here by Anti-Right. 
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coIIlPrise the majority. 
Here, then, is the wrenching collocation 0£ pro£essed 
beliefs and true desire, so common to elenchos. And when 
strepsiades, who has witnessed the whole contest, chooses 
Anti-Right over Right, he bares his own mistaken desire: 
to cheat his creditors at all cost. Nussbaum cites line 4-3 
as evidence 0£ Strepsiades' 
"hedonism"; to this may be added his eagerness to hold 
"intercourse" with the Cloud-chorus (252-253) and his 
preference for masturbation over the labors of cognition 
(733-734). Such a man will have little trouble accepting 
the pleasure-£illed program 0£ Anti-Right; in £act, in 
choosing Anti-Right Strepsiades exposes his own desire: he 
shows himsel£ to be a "lover of roguish deeds" (irov'l')pwv 
, ' 
epaol'f)V I vpa yµa1wv, ill-59).129 His desire 
to cheat, £or which he must have access to Anti-Right's 
rhetorical skills, blinds him to what comes with them. But 
as Strepsiades chooses Anti-Right, he blindly chooses as 
well the revolutionary and blatant disrespect 0£ all 
authority that will soon infest his own son. Strepsiades 
unknowingly chooses the very thing which, in the end, will 
"beat" him into recognizing how truly misguided his own 
desire to default his debts has been. 
129strepsiades' "desire" to cheat is necessitated 
by his inability to control his son, who is spoiled by his 
Wife. That Strepsiades' di£ficulties with his wife are in 
Part sexual is discussed by RecK£ord, "Father-Beating," p. 
113. 
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Nussbaum argues that Strepsiades' change of heart is 
worth little, and has the undertone of tragedy: 
. . whatever he does he has lost his son. He may be 
able, in his old age, to return to his own nature; the 
son's more malleable personality has been turned £rom 
him by Socratic questioning. To imagine him returning 
to the old paternal ways would be an optimism nowhere 
justified in the play.130 
Nussbaum may be right, but the "anguish" she senses in the 
ending can perhaps be considered an overstatement of what 
in Chapter One was described as the tragic dimensions of 
elenchos, the erotic dangling of that which elenchos 
portends but is rarely shown to at ta in: definition of 
universals that can lead past ignorance to the birth 0£ 
truth, and moral improvement 0£ Socrates' interlocutors. 
Instead, Platonic dialogues end in avowed ignorance and 
with the suggestion that interlocutors lacK the moral fiber 
requisite to withstand elenchos. But the potential remains 
poised, and the £inal impression one gains 0£ elenchos is 
the erotic gap between pro£ession and achievement. 
This eroticism of elenchos may be represented in the 
Clouds by the increasing sexual raucousness as the play 
comes to its climax:131 the latent sexuality of 
130Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 79. 
131Whi tman, 
"It must be noted 
scarcely found in 
debts, law suits, 
Comic Hero, p. 123, on the con test: 
that the moti£ of sex is elsewhere 
the Clouds, whose practical concerns are 
barley, and horses." 
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Right's speech132 and the blatant appeal to pleasure by 
A.nti-Ihght are only the most obvious examples o-f this. 
sussbaum, -following Henderson, remarKs on the possibility 
that the physis the Chorus at 959-960 encourages Right to 
reveal is a not very veiled reference to £lashing the 
penis133 (which Right, by his disrobing at exit, in 
fact does).1 34 Recl<.£ord suggests that Strepsiades 
routs the creditors with an erect phallus to the rear, and 
that Pheidippides' "banging" on his -father and proposed 
"banging" on his mother carry heavy sexual 
con no ta tions.135 Even Strepsiades' burning 0£ the 
132For which see Dover, Clouds, pp. 215-217, and 
Whitman, Comic Hero, p. 123, ". the Just Discourse, 
ostensibly moralizing on the subject o-f boys• behavior 
toward male lovers, repeatedly bursts out in images o-f such 
pruriency that editorial abatement in school editions is 
driven to greater lengths than in the case 0£ his openly 
unregenerate adversary." 
133Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 63 n. 39, 
citing Je££rey Henderson, The Maculate Muse (New Haven and 
London: Yale Univ. Press, 1975), p. 5. Nussbaum sees the 
debate as revealing "the impotence 0£ the old morality in a 
time 0£ social -ferment." 
134For Right •s shedding 
his initiation in to Socrates' 
Note on Clouds 1104-1105," CP 
0£ his cloal<. as signalling 
school, see L. M. Stone, "A 
75 (1980), pp. 321- 322. 
135Reck£ord, "Father-Beating," pp. 96, 113-114 and 
n. 20. If in fact physis was understood as a euphemism for 
"penis," line 1078, where Anti-Right urges Pheidippides to 
~se his physis (xpw 1!] <f'U<Jel), would support this 
1 nterpretation. See Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 63 
n. 39, who cites line 1078 as an example of physis = penis. 
Contra physis as penis, see K. McLeish, "<IJu<JlS. A 
Bawdy Jol<.e in Aristophanes?," CQ 27 (1977), pp. 76-79. 
Dover, Clouds, notes at line 1300 that Strepsiades 
threatens his creditors not with a poke to the buttock, but 
a goad in the anus, a cruel practice used on pacl<.-
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tJJ.inKery--i£ it can in -fact be interpreted as a return to 
tJJ.e metaphor o-£ the universe as a charcoal oven 136 , 
wJJ.ere all men are charcoal 
)/ (av9paKES, line 97)--may 
carrY sexual connotations, £or it has been argued that 
cJJ.arcoal is an erotic symbot.137 And while such 
raucous sexuality is right at home in comedy, a more subtle 
counterpart 0£ it can likewise be £ound in elenchos as it 
draws to its close, when desire is laid bare to con£ront 
all that the interlocutor has agreed is logically 
consistent and correct. Comically exaggerated in the 
Clouds, desire exposed by elenchos is brought by 
Aristophanes, liKe so much else be£ore it, brashly onto the 
physical plane. 
As the Clouds draws to a close, however, the erotic 
allure 0£ the unattained gets lost, much as it does in the 
early Platonic dialogues, to a growing sense 0£ outrage and 
repulsion. Alcibiades and Euthyphro chose avoidance and 
escape; the bawdy comic hero Strepsiades turns to arson. 
And, I believe, had we been in the audience -for which this 
version 0£ the Clouds was intended, we would have cheered 
and hooted as Strepsiades turns the tables and maKes 
Socrates "smart," as Strepsiades "enlightens" Socrates with 
animals. 
136Follow ing Arrows mi th, Clouds, pp. 136-137. 
l37 J. Glenn, "Coal as an Erotic Symbol," The 
Psychoanalytic Review, 60 (1973), pp. 297-300. Glenn cites 
Aristophanes• Peace, line 440, as one example. 
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:ois new "brilliance," so painstakingly won. 
rn the £inal analysis, the Clouds is a thoroughly 
p:n.ysical, delight£ully comic antidote to the pain£ul mental 
laboring towards truth Socrates and his elenchos induced in 
interlocutors. By viewing the man and his method £rom the 
perspective 0£ those who £elt con£ounded and accosted 
rather than those who felt inspired and enthralled, 
Aristophanes gives us a Socrates and an elenchos that are 
recognizable from the early dialogues of Plato, but 
objecti£ied and disjointed. From Plato's philosophic and 
tragic perspective, Socrates and elenchos are wondrous and 
paradoxical; from Aristophanes' chosen perspective, the 
perspective of the pre-literate Athenian who found himsel£ 
con£ronted by Socrates, Socrates and the elenchos he 
practiced are quite another thing. Socrates is weird, 
roguish, and laughable: a pale ghost, a thie£, a babbling 
lunatic. The e££ect he had on his interlocutors begins 
with wonder and attraction, but after he has belittled and 
bewildered and discomfited them to a point near death, 
stripped them of all their beliefs--their normal garb--and 
exposed them, and brought down before their very eyes their 
whole world, Socrates in the end is a man who begs to be 
given just what he has dished out. The man who spent his 
time asking his £ellow citizens to enlighten him, £inally, 
and quite literally, in Aristophanes' play, gets what he 
asked £or. His world, his "Thinkery ," is burned to the 
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ground. Socrates is, as the Athenians were by him, 
"enlightened," and in the con-flagra tion we are shown what 
the Athenians came to Know through talKing with this 
irritating man: enlightenment burns liKe £ire. 
208 
Part Three: Comic Elenchos Revisited: 
Aristophanes on the Character and Plays o-f Euripides 
The Aristophanic evidence on Euripides differs in form 
from that on Socrates. Euripides appears as a character in 
three plays produced over some twenty years (Acharnians, 
425 B. C., Thesmophoriazusae, 4-11 B. C, Frogs, 4-05 B. C.), 
is mentioned by name in four others (at Peace 14-6 ff. and 
532 ff., Lysistrata 283 and 368 £., Ecclesiazusae 825 f-f., 
wasps 61 and 14-14-), and lines from his plays are a regular 
subject of parody and comment. Euripides 1 part in the 
frogs is a large one, and yet he does not figure as 
prominently as does Socrates in the Clouds, the only 
Aristophanic play in which the philosopher is a 
character.138 Aristophanes does not give his audience 
a Euripides who functions as the Socrates of the Clouds 
does, i.e., as the examiner in a complete elenchos; but 
this need not entail rejecting the thesis that Aristophanes 
depicted Euripides as a practitioner of elenchos. 
In depicting Socrates, Aristophanes used certain comic 
images and motifs that, it was argued above in Part Two, 
show his familiarity with Socra tes 1 practice of elenchos. 
It can likewise be illustrated that Aristophanes uses many 
of the same images and motifs in depicting Euripides. 
There is, however, a difference: while Aristophanes made 
138socrates is mentioned only twice outside of the 
Clouds, at Birds 1555 and Frogs 14-91. 
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~ concrete largely in the character of Socrates, in 
the case o-f Euripides, Aristophanes uses comments on the 
tragedian's plays as well as characterization of Euripides 
to depict his practice of elenchos. This suggests that, in 
Aristophanes• comic view, what Socrates practiced on the 
streets was the same thing that Euripides did on stage in 
his plays. Indeed, Aristophanes• Chorus insists at the end 
of the Frogs that Euripides lost the contest in Hades to 
Aeschylus for just this reason: that Euripides• poetic art 
betrays the influence of conversation with Socrates: 
It is smart, then, not to sit beside Socrates 
chattering (:Ewicpale:l 11'apaicae.fiµ.e:vov AaAetv), 
throwing away music and the greatest remnants of the 
tragic art. Only a deranged man passes idle time in 
, ' 
solemn words and trif~es of trash ie11'l 
creµ.volcrl Aoyolcrl icaL cricaplcp'l')crµ.olcrL A.fipwv). 
(Frogs 1491-1499). 
This bold statement is only the most obvious place 
where Aristophanes compares Socrates• practice and 
Euripides• works. Repeatedly in depicting Euripides the 
comic poet uses the same images and motifs he used in 
depicting Socrates in the Clouds. A general similarity 
between the Aristophanic Socrates and Euripides has been 
detected by scholars of Aristophanes, who nonetheless do 
not taK.e Aristophanes' comment at Frogs 1491 ff. as a 
telling revelation about the methodology used by Euripides 
in Writing his plays. Instead, they explain that 
Aristophanes perceived the two men as broadly similar 
because both played a part in the intellectual 
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t . 139 revolu ion. Kenneth Reckford claims, 
Far -from sharing the philistine view o-f Euripides and 
Socrates as teachers of immorality, [Aristophanes] 
sees them both quite fairly as spearheads of the 
educational and cultural revolution of his time; 
beneath the comic slander (which runs parallel to the 
philistine prejudice, but must not be taken seriously) 
both exemplify a loss of simplicity in the Greek 
world, an ea ting of the apple of knowledge. 
Moreover, both Socrates and Euripides extended the 
cultural revolution, brought it home to ordinary 
people through the media of teaching and theatre (we 
would say, college and television), and profoundly, in 
their di-fferent ways, disrupted the old mental and 
cultural bond between child and parent.140 
In a later work, Reckford expounds upon what he means by 
the "di-f-ferent ways" of Euripides and Socrates: 
... Euripides remains a catalyst for change in his 
way, as Socrates in his. He exemplifies the power o-f 
new ideas in a popular medium. In his tragedies the 
older traditions of religion, democracy, and the 
family are subjected to conscious and often 
destructive scrutiny, just as in Socrates• teaching 
139A list of four identical charges Aristophanes 
levels against Socrates and Euripides may be found in 
Victor Martin, "Euripide et Menandre face a leur public," 
in Entretiens sur l'antiquite classique, Vol. 6, 1958, 
Euripide (Geneva: Vandoeuvres, 1960), pp. 266-269. 
For a comparison o-f two equally generalizing and thus 
distorting assessments of Euripides and Socrates, as 
evidenced in Aristophanes• attitude toward Euripides and 
Nietzsche's toward Socrates, see R. Friedrich, 
"Euripidaristophanizein and Nietzschesokra tizein. 
Aristophanes, Nietzsche, and the Death o-f Tragedy," 
Dionysi us .q. (1980), pp. 5-36. 
1110Reck-ford, "Father-Bea ting," pp. 99-100, -final 
italics added. C-f. E. A. Havelock, "Why Was Socrates 
Tried?," in Studies in Honour of Gilbert Norwood, ed. Mary 
R. White (Toronto: Univ. o-f Toronto Press, 1952), pp. 95-
109, -for the theory that Sacra tes• "school" in the Clouds 
was the emblem o-f his very real disruption o-f the old 
educational system, in which fathers controlled the 
education o-f their sons. Socrates posed a threat to the 
social control a-fforded by this educational system, and for 
this reason he was tried. 
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they are brought, without exception, be£ore the bar 0£ 
reason. It is no wonder that Aristophanes treats the 
two "learned doctors" in similar ways; nor that both 
times, in the Clouds and in the Frogs, he goes beyond 
satire to deal with deeper issues, 0£ cultural and 
educational change, to which Socrates' teaching and 
Euripides• writing point.141 
Reck£ord's comments on Aristophanes' view 0£ Socrates 
and Euripides are suggestive 0£ what this study ultimately 
will argue: that there is between Socrates and Euripides a 
difference in medium, but no perceptible di££erence in 
their method or in its e££ect. Reck-ford is, 0£ course, 
only one 0£ several scholars who have recognized the 
similarity between Socrates and Euripides in Aristophanes' 
plays. William Arrowsmith, £or example, who -finds 
Aristophanes' depictions 0£ Socrates and Euripides 
misrepresenta ti ve, remarks, 
The distortions practiced upon Sokrates are typical 
and not exceptional. They are, £or instance, 
completely 0£ a piece with Aristophanes' systematic 
distortion 0£ Euripides; i£ Euripides' words are 
quoted against him, they are invariably taken £rom 
their context and parodied by will£ul 
misunderstanding. But those who are angered by the 
spectacle 0£ Sokrates mocked have never li£ted a 
£inger in de£ense 0£ Euripides.142 
This study does not propose to take up Arrowsmith's 
challenge to de£end Euripides, any more than it has 
Previously sought to de£end Socrates. Instead, it will be 
argued that the Aristophanic evidence reveals that 
141Reck £ord, Old-and-New, p. 428. 
142Arrowsmi th, Clouds, p. 12. 
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guripides was perceived to use in his plays a method like 
that used by Socrates among his £ellow citizens, the very 
thing Aristophanes' lines at Frogs 1491 ££. so boldly 
proclaim. And while it is true that Aristophanes' 
guripides is never shown conducting, as did Socrates in the 
c1ouds, an entire elenchos,14-3 the evidence nonetheless 
force£ully suggests a methodological similarity between the 
two. Additionally, as was true 0£ the Aristophanic 
socra tes, it will be seen that the Euripides Aristophanes 
depicts is not his own, but instead the Euripides 
Aristophanes• audience could laugh at in recognition, a 
Euripides whose work was perceived to have much in common 
with Socrates' practice 0£ elenchos. 
Indeed, in the Frogs, the play in which Euripides• 
poetry is examined at greatest length, Aristophanes uses 
words with the stem elench- more than in any other 
play.144- At Frogs 894- Euripides, as he is about to 
14-3rf, as this study will argue, Euripides' 
practice of elenchos was in his plays rather than in his 
daily conduct, we should not be surprised that Aristophanes 
would not choose to depict Euripides' practice of elenchos 
per se. After all, depiction of an entire Euripidean play 
as an elenchos would require, undoubtedly, too sustained 
and too cerebral an analysis for comedy's purposes. 
Besides, Socrates' practice of elenchos provided 
Aristophanes with material lacking in the case 0£ 
Euripides: a sole interlocutor whose plight made £or easy 
comic pickings. See below, Chapter Four, Parts One and 
Two, for the Chorus as the audience's agent "interlocutor" 
in Euripides' theatrical conduct 0£ elenchos in Medea. 
144-The fact that such words are not used by 
Socrates in the Clouds is perplexing, but does not, I 
believe, invalidate the suggestive power 0£ this evidence. 
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erobarK on his contest with Aeschylus, prays to his peculiar 
" that I may rightly cross-examine these logoi 
) ..... ) I Cl 
I attack" (op9ws € >..eyX€l V " av aVTWj.J.Ql 
xoywv); a :few lines later at 908 he boasts that he will 
begin his de:fense o:f his own poetry a:fter having put 
Aeschylus to test (TOUTOV VpwT> 
E:J.€yi;w); at 922 Euripides admits he is agitated 
because he is re:fu ting Aeschylus ) ' (aUTOV 
€i;e.A.€yxw); and at 959-961 Euripides boasts that he 
not only put everyday, common things to the test o:f 
elenchos, but that he submitted his own art to such 
testing: "I brought in domestic matters--things we use 
and live with--and put them to proo:f > ( €1; y> n av 
) I 
ei;'l'}>..e:yxoµ'l')v); those who knew--anyone--could put my 
art to the test (!;UVEldOTES. ' yap otiTot 
JI 
av j.J.OU ' T'l')V TEX V'l'JV) ... 
Aeschylus in this play, by contrast, has to be urged 
by Dionysus to "cross-examine and be cross-examined" 
c€>..eyx •• 
) I 
e:>..e:yxou, 857), and indicates that he 
considers the only valid "cross-examination" o:f poetry to 
be the very concrete weighing o:f lines on scales 
The dates o:f the two plays in question (Clouds 420-417, 
.~ 405) may provide an explanation: it may be that 
Socrates' practice was only regularly termed elenchos some 
time a:fter the production o:f the Clouds. Or it may be that 
~ristophanes in his characterization 0£ Euripides 
intentionally used words he Knew would recall the method 0£ 
Socrates, with which (not vice versa) he was comparing the 
method used by Euripides in composing his plays. Either 
a1 tern a ti ve is highly speculative. 
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) ' (t:ll'l 
' TOV oTaBµov ' yap 
, ' 
auTOV 
, 
ayayELV 
Cl 
' 
, 
01TEP T'r)V lTOL'r)OlV 
µ.ovov, 1365-1366). And although Aristophanes once in 
this play as in other plays uses words with this stem 
without identi£iable re£erence to the type 0£ cross-
e:xamina tion Socrates practiced,14-5 the use 0£ these 
words seven times in the Frogs in re£erence to the contest 
between Euripides and Aeschylus is (at least) highly 
suggestive. This dictional phenomenon is made still more 
compelling as evidence because, 0£ all Aristophanic 
characters, Euripides is the one who uses words 0£ this 
stem most £requently (£ive times); and, in £act, Anti-Right 
in the Clouds is the only other character to use these 
words more than once (twice, at Clouds 104-3 and 1062; see 
the discussion above in Part Two). Finally, Euripides• 
prayer £or help in put ting logoi to elenchos at 894-, and 
his claim at 959 ££. that he not only conducts but submits 
to elenchos, mark his practice 0£ elenchos as Socratic. 
Further indication that the Aristophanic Euripides was 
a practitioner 0£ Socratic elenchos may be £ound in 
references to Euripides• penchant £or questioning 
everything and everybody and in re£erence to his teaching 
others, through his plays, to question in like manner. At 
~ 958 Euripides credits his plays with teaching men, 
145see Frogs 
~lesiazusae 485, 
7 4-1, Knights 1232, 
Lysistrata 4-84-. 
Plutus 57 4-, 
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"to be suspicious, to consider all things well" 
cu1To ,-o 1T£'loea l, 
..... 
1T£Pl VO£l V Cl airav1"a); at 971 ff. he 
further describes what it is he has taught men through his 
dramas: 
r introduced them to thinking (cppov£LV) by 
bringing reasoning and examination (.>.oyLoµ.ov 
. , 
Kal OK£yl v) in to the art, so that now they 
reflect on all things and discern other things 
....._, Cl " ' ' (vo£lV airav1a Kal <h£lc5£va1. ia ,, 
a Ha) and live their home lives better than before 
> ..... 
and examine well (KavaoKolT£lV), "How's that?," 
"Where's this?," "Who took ~hat?" (lTWS 10\J,-> 
€xEL; lrOU µ.oL Tool; TLS: 10\JT> €>..af3€;) .. 
{Frogs 971-979). 
The final, persistent questions are especially reminiscent 
of Socrates' practice in elenchos, although Euripides' 
entire description certainly makes his art sound Socratic 
rather than what is sometimes termed sophistic.146 
Sophists did not, so :far as we know, pride themselves on 
presenting men with questions, but with answers. 
Sophists were, of course, great talkers, but the 
concern of many of them was persuasion, which cannot be 
served if one is perceived to be a babbling lunatic. But 
this is precisely how Aristophanes• Euripides and his 
Plays, like Aristophanes' Socrates before him, are 
Presented: as ever talking about things, but making little 
sense. "Prattling" and "chattering" are how Aristophanes 
likes to describe Euripides and the effect his plays have 
146For the argument that Aristophanes' hostility 
to Euripides is because he considers him a sophist, see D. 
A. Deli, "Algunas Incognitas de la Ecuacion Euripides 
Aristofanes," Argos 1 (1977), pp. 76-84. 
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nad, and whether Aristophanes uses words related to the 
v-erb or to it is clear that 
guripides' words are incomprehensible because their 
signi£icance is puzzling. This is exactly what the Chorus 
indicates when it asserts at Frogs 1491-1497 that Euripides 
"sits chattering beside Socrates" (2:wKpa TEL 
1(apaKa0.fiµe:vov ).a).e:tv) and idles away time "in solemn 
words and tri£les 0£ trash" 
) . (E:ll'l OE:µVOlOl ).oyOlOl 
. 
ic:al OKOplcp'flOµOlOl )..fipwv) . The Frogs is -full 0£ 
other such re£erences. For example, Heracles wonders that 
there is a dearth 0£ poets "more prattling than Euripides" 
, , (Eu pl ll'l dou ).a).ioTe:pa, 91); the Chorus 
comments on Euripides' "sharp-chattering tooth" 
, , (01:;u).a).ov , , odovTa, 815); Aeschylus calls 
Euripides a "gossip gleaner" ( o Twµuhoou).).e:K Tad'JI, 
841); Euripides describes his reducing regimen £or poetry 
as consisting in part 0£ "chatterbox juice" (xu).ov 
01wµu>.µa1wv, 943); according to Aeschylus, 
Euripides taught men "to make a practice 0£ chattering and 
prattling" (Aa).Lav > ...... E:ll'lT'rJOE:UOQl . l(Ql oTwµuAtav, 
1069) and Euripides himsel£ he deems "ever-chattering" 
(KOTE:OTwµu>.µeve:, 1160). In the Acharnians, a play 
Produced nearly twenty years earlier than the Frogs, 
Dikaiopolis similarly describes a Euripidean character as 
"chattering" (oTwµu).os., 429). 
To make the charge 0£ "prattling" and "chattering" is 
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to perceive that the accused talks nonsense, something that 
the ordinary person -finds inconsequential and banal. A 
similar charge o-f incomprehensibility was levelled against 
socrates, both by interlocutors in Plato's dialogues and 
humorously by Aristophanes in the Clouds, -for precisely 
this reason: Socrates• concern was with what seemed to 
other men to trivial and mundane. Aristophanes' Euripides 
and his poetry betray similar concerns. Euripides' verses 
are themselves treated as trivial; re-ference to them is in 
diminutives: Euripides composes "versicles" 
in its various in-flections, 
Acharnians 398, Frogs 942, Peace 532) or "phrasicles" 
C I 
(P'fJIJ.OTlOV in its various in-flections, Acharnians 
444 and 447, Peace 534). In addition, in the verse-
weighing scene at Frogs 1378 ££. Euripides' lines are every 
time lighter than Aeschylus', undoubtedly because, as 
Euripides himsel£ has boasted, he put poetry on a diet to 
take away its heaviness {Frogs 939 ££.). Euripides' art is 
like the practice o:f Socrates in that Euripides, too, tends 
to bring things down to their -finest, most pulverized, 
:form: in the Frogs, the Chorus describes the contending 
Euripides as one who "will pulverize by talk" 
147c. del Grande, "'Evu>.>.La in Aristo£ane," 
in Kwµ<tJdOTpay.fiµaTa. Studia Aristophanea W. J. W. 
Koster in Honorem, ed. R. E. H. Westendorp Boerma 
~A~sterdam: Hakkert, 1967), pp. 47-50, recognizes in 
Etru>.>.La a charge 0£ triviality, and argues that by 
its use Aristophanes signi£ies that Euripides is a minor 
Poet, one too concerned with sexual subjects. 
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(ica-ra>.ell'TO>.oy.fioel, 828), and Euripides himself boasts 
of having introduced in his poetry the squares of the 
"finest ground" rules (AE11'Twv, 956). In a similar 
"Vein are Euripides" demand for instruments at Frogs 799 ff. 
so he can "put the tragedies to the touchstone, word by 
word" 
,, 
£11'05. paoavle'lv ' Tas 
802). and the Chorus" description of the substance of 
Euripides• speech as "something 'filed down" (Tl 
, 
ica1"€Pf>lV'l')J.1.EVOV, 901). 
But besides being concerned with things that appear 
inconsequential, Euripides, like Socrates, attends to what 
is mundane, or, generally, to what others consider beneath 
serious concern. Callicles" complaint at Gorgias 490-491 
that Socrates persists in talking about "meats and drinks 
and doctors and other gibberish" is illuminating not only 
when one considers Strepsiades" frustration with Socrates 
at Clouds 648 ff. (see above, Part Two), but also when one 
witnesses the comic business at Acharnians 415 ff. There, 
after Dikaiopolis has requested rags, a cap, a beggar"s 
staff, a little basket with a hole burned through it, a 
little tankard with a broken rim, and a little pitcher 
Plugged with a sponge, Euripides laments "Listen, fellow, 
You"re robbing me of my tragedy.• (464). After 
Dikaiopolis continues with requests £or withered leaves to 
fill the basket, Euripides moans, "You"re destroying me! 
Here! Ky plays are clean gone!" (470). This scene could 
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be chalked up merely as an extended bit satirizing 
guripides• alleged penchant £or beggars--which indeed is a 
part 0£ its humor--were it not £or similar pronouncements 
on Euripides" plays in the Frogs: at 959 Euripides claims, 
"l brought in domestic matters 
1fpayµa-r»--things we use and live 
> ,.. 
(OlK€LQ 
with ... . . at 1197 
ff. Aeschylus belittles Euripides" prologues by showing how 
easily one can £it in them everywhere a "little bottle 0£ 
oil" (A'T)KU9Lov), and claims that a "little 'fleece" or 
a "bag" (Kct>dapLov, 9uAaKov, 1203; note that two are 
diminutives148 and all are very common items) would be 
equally easy to insert; at 1331 ££. Aeschylus hilariously 
parodies Euripides" monodies by reciting a classic case 0£ 
"much ado about nothing": a women bewails at great length 
the the-ft 0£ a cock as i£ it were a thing 0£ portentous 
moment. Euripides" plays, then, according to Aristophanes, 
are as chock-£ull 0£ the junk 0£ everyday li'fe as are 
Socrates" discussions on the streets 0£ A thens. 
But Euripides is not, according to Aristophanes" 
plays, merely a benign chatterbox. Euripides and his 
characters are shown to be rogues, as was Socrates, and 
Euripides and his plays attract and teach roguish behavior. 
In the Frogs, Dionysus describes Euripides as a •rogue• 
(vavoupyos, 80); at lines 104 and 106 Heracles 
148Au three may be diminutives, 
t~e codices, 8uAauov, is pre£erred 
9uAaKov 0£ the scholia. 
i£ the reading 0£ 
to the 
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denounces Euripides' poetic style as consisting 0£ "knavish 
tricks" and as being "thoroughly depraved" (Kofla.>.a; 
iraiJ.ll'OV'l'JPa); Aeschylus credits Euripides with having 
turned the Athenians into, among other things, "knaves" 
and "rogues" (Kofla.>.ous I ll'avoupyous, 1015) and 
with having dragged out onto stage and taught "roguishness" 
. 
(1'0 
I 
ll'OV'l'JPOV, 1053); Aeschylus later deems Euripides 
himsel£ a "rogue and liar and o££ering swiper" (o 
> ' ' . ll'<XVOUPYOS av'l')p Kal Kal 
fJwµ.o.>.oxos, 1520-1521; c£. 1085). This last label, with 
its charge 0£ thievery, indicates why Euripides, his 
characters, and his art have a reputation so like that 0£ 
Aristophanes' Socrates: it is not merely because he is a 
cunning contriver and uses subtle devices (see, e.g. 
Acharnians 445, Thesmophoriazusae 198-199, 927, and U31-
1132), but rather because Euripides makes use 0£ the same 
sneaky devices Sacra tes was perceived to have used. This 
is made clearest by the speech at Frogs 771 ££., where 
Aeacus describes what happened upon Euripides• arrival in 
Hades: 
When Euripides came down, he made a display 0£ his 
powers to the thieves and cutpurses and parricides and 
burglars (TOlS AWll'OduTalS Kal TOlO"l 
Pa.>..>.avTLoToµoLs Kai TOlO"l vaTpa.>.olaLO"l Kal. 
Tol xwpuxoLs)--these are the majority in Hades--and 
these, listening to his opposing arguments and 
twistings and turnings (Twv avTL.>.oylWV Kat 
.>.uyLoµwv Kai. aTpoq>wv), went mad and named him 
cleverest. (Frogs 771-776). 
The Aristophanic Euripides, then, is depicted as a 
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tnief and therefore attracts to his side a claque of 
tnieves because he, like the Aristophanic Socrates, is able 
to secure the unforeseen, the peculiarly elenctic reversal. 
And yet this ability cannot save Euripides from the 
comically appropriate tit for tat. Euripides is hoist with 
:tJ.iS own petard in the Frogs as was only one other character 
in Aristophanes: Socrates in the Clouds, who likewise 
suffers his own words redirected against him.149 At 
1471 ff. Dionysus retorts to Euripides• objections at being 
left in Hades with words identifiable as parodies of lines 
from the Euripidean plays Hippolytus, Aeolus, and Polyeidus 
or Phrixus, respecti vely:150 "My tongue swore, but I 
will choose Aeschylus. . . . What is shameful, if it seems 
not so to the viewers? .. Who knows if to live is to 
die ?" (Frogs 1471, 1475, 1477). 
In Aristophanes• plays, "thieves" like Socrates and 
Euripides operate undetected by sowing verbal confusion; in 
149nover, Clouds, p. 267 at line 1503, cites 
Thesmophoriazusae 51 as a parallel scene, but 
inappropriately, because the words of Agathon•s slave (line 
43) used by Mnesilochus against him are not put to the 
service of quid~~ reversal, but are instead a brief 
Piece of comic business that goes nowhere. 
150"My tongue swore" (Hippolyt us 612) was so 
notorious as to invite no comment in the scholia. W. S. 
Barrett, ed., Euripides, Hippolytos (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1964; hereafter Barrett, Hippolytos), p. 274 at line 
612, notes Aristophanes• allusions to the line also at 
'!'._hesmophoriazusae 275 and Frogs 101 as evidence of its 
notoriety. 
For attribution of the other lines, see Scholia in 
!_ristophanem, ed. W. J. W. Koster, Frogs 1475 and 1478, and 
~holia in Euripidem, ed. E. Schwartz, Hippolytus 191. 
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socrates' case, this was accomplished by concentrating on 
wnat seemed to be matters entirely unrelated to the subject 
assumed to be at hand. The Aristophanic Euripides is 
similarly con£using to those around him. Dover rightly 
notes a similarity in the con£usion 0£ Mnesilochus speaKing 
with Euripides at Thesmophoriazusae 13-20 and that 0£ 
strepsiades speaKing with Socrates at Clouds 227-236; but 
the con£usion between Mnesilochus and Euripides starts at 
the play's very beginning and is not merely, as Dover 
maintains, "[t]he total misunderstanding 0£ a scienti£ic 
argument by an ignorant man n151 Instead, the 
con£usion 0£ Hnesilochus comes £rom the £act that he has, 
at line 4, asKed a straight£orward question, "Where are you 
taking me, Euripides?," in reply to which he has been 
treated to a discourse which seems to have no bearing on 
the question asKed. He must listen to Euripides hold -forth 
on the diversity 0£ hearing and seeing and to a story 0£ 
the creation 0£ the eye and ear in living creatures at the 
beginning 0£ time, both 0£ which are vast generalizations 
on the particular instance at hand: i.e., that i£ 
Knesilochus were only to look straight in -front 0£ him, he 
wouldn't have to hear from Euripides where they were 
going, £or their goal, the house 0£ Agathon, lies dead 
ahead. But these generalizations are such that their 
signi£icance to Hnesilochus' question is lost to him; 
151Dover, Clouds, p. 128 at lines 235-236. 
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instead, he can only express his perplexity at what in the 
world this discussion has to do with his question (vws. 
,.t;yels.;, 6; c£. 9, 13, and 22). Mnesilochus is 
con£used because Euripides, as Socrates was seen to do in 
the Platonic dialogues and in the Clouds, has made a rapid 
shi£t £rom the particular (where are we going?) to a 
universal (one need not hear what one may see; hearing and 
seeing £rom the beginning 0£ time have been separate). We 
are reminded 0£ Strepsiades, who was £aced with a Socrates 
whose practice 0£ drawing analogy Aristophanes rendered 
absurd by having Socrates discuss things totally 
irrelevant--rhythm and the like--to Strepsiades' very 
simple question: how to get out 0£ his debts. 
The confusion that arises £rom drawing analogies is 
the result 0£ the perception that x has nothing whatsoever 
to do with y, and, as such, is similar to the confusion 
that arises when two opposites are equated. In 
Aristophanes' plays, Euripides is the master 0£ such 
equations. Euripides himself, according to Cephisophon at 
Acharnians 396, "not within, is within" > (OUK £voov, 
,, 
E:Vdov > , t:OTl V). In the Frogs, Aeschylus cites a 
Euripidean line, "not to live is to live" > (OU 
' To ~1lv, 1082), which Dionysus, after having su££ered 
confusion upon hearing Euripides suggest that the 
mistrusted should become the trusted and vice versa 
. 
Ta V \JV 
.,, 
alJ'lOTa 
c , 
'f]ywµeea, . Ta 
J' 
,, 
ov1a 
,, 
a'lt'Lola, 1443-1444), uses against 
guripides in a way that £orce£ully suggests that such 
equations 0£ opposites are hyperbolic shorthand £or analogy 
that likewise seems to equate two unrelated subjects: "Who 
Knows i£ to live is to die, to breathe is to dine, to sleep 
iS a sheepskin?" (llS oCoEv :> El 
. 
10 
I 
µEv 
f:a1l ica10avE'lv, 
. 
10 'U'VElV 0 E l 11' V El V , 
. 
10 
1477-1478). 
Such total con£usion is, in any case, reminiscent 0£ 
one aspect 0£ what precedes the aporia152 that reigns 
at the end 0£ the early Platonic dialogues: the sense 0£ 
vertigo, resulting £rom the perception that things Keep 
moving £rom their once stable locations. In Euripides' 
plays, then, as happens in discussions with Socrates, 
things get turned entirely topsy-turvy (see Chapter One, 
Part Three). Opposites converge in Euripides' plays (to 
live is to die) no less than they are wont to do in the 
course 0£ the early Platonic dialogues, where, £or example, 
it slowly dawns on young Euthyphro that his "pious" act 0£ 
prosecuting his own £ather has the stench 0£ impiety about 
it. Euripidean plays show once sure dissimilars £inding 
equation (to breathe is to dine, to sleep is a sheepskin) 
no less than they do in Socratic elenchos, where Socrates' 
analogies, initially so apparently irrelevant to what is 
152The term aporia is not used in the Frogs in the 
technical, Socratic sense, nor is it used in re£erence to 
Euripides. See Frogs 806 and 1465. 
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being discussed, have a telling e££ect in the -final 
5 yuogizing stage. That Aristophanes shows Euripides as 
the master con verger 0£ opposites and dissimilars marks the 
tragedian as -fomenting con£usion that bears a peculiarly 
elenctic impress. 
And still it is not only in his procedure that 
Aristophanes• Euripides is shown to resemble Socrates; £or 
the tragedian in his plays brings out the truth, the way 
things really are instead of' the way they are pro£essed to 
be, no less than does the Aristophanic Socrates, whose 
prowess at clothes "thievery" bares men's bodies. The 
Aristophanic Euripides is never accused 0£ lying; on the 
contrary, the complaint against him is that he persists in 
revealing the truth. The at tempt 0£ women in the 
Thesmophoriazusae to charge Euripides with slander is shown 
to be motivated by their anger at his exposure 0£ the truth 
about their drinking and carousing, which 0£ course makes 
it di££icult £or them to continue to engage in these 
practices (Thesmophoriazusae, passim, especially lines 395 
££. and 473 ££.). Likewise, at Frogs 1052 ££., Aeschylus• 
charge against Euripides in regard to women like Phaedra is 
not that he has distorted the truth, but instead that he 
has dragged it out in the open and taught it. 
With truth-baring comes the disclosure 0£ desires, the 
desires that in-form belie£s and actions. The Aristophanic 
Socrates• cross-examining elenchos was shown to e££ect such 
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a disclosure, by £orcing Right in the Clouds to admit and 
graphically to reveal his latent desires. The Aristophanic 
guripides is no. less subtle in his plays. Not only does 
ne, with only seeming incongruity, put "to desire" 
(epav) at the center 0£ the list 0£ things he 
introduced in his plays ("to reflect, to see, to 
deliberate, to turn, to desire, to use cunning, to be 
suspicious, to consider all things well," Frogs 957 ££.); 
but Aeschylus' boast that he can £ind a place £or 
or 9uAatc.OV in any 
Euripidean prologue may allude to persistent sexual 
references in Euripides' works.153 Finally, Aeschylus 
at Frogs 1046, responding to Euripides' jibe that " 
there was never anything 0£ Aphrodite in you [i.e., your 
153The literature on these three words is 
extensive. See, e.g., c. H. Whitman, "AHKY9ION 
AIIOAE~EN," HSCP 73 (1969). pp. 109-112 (who sees only 
the oil -flask as carrying a sexual connotation, since it 
has a suggestive shape and the word has a suggestive first 
syllable); J. G. Griffith, "A'r)tc.U9tov avwAe:oe:v. A 
Postscript,• HSCP 74 (1970), pp. 43-44 (who confirms the 
identi£ication of a\rroA.fiKu9os with 
> ' 
t9ucpaAAos); R. J. Penella, "K<tJdaptov in 
Aristophanes Frogs," Mnemosyne 26 (1973), pp. 337-341 (who 
argues that all three items refer to male genitalia). 
Against sexual connotation, see, e.g., Z. P. Ambrose, "The 
Lekythion and the Anagram 0£ Frogs 1203," AJP 89 (1968). 
PP. 342-345 (who sees the three items as suggestive 0£ an 
anagram, and, as such, criticism that Euripides says the 
same thing under di££erent guises); J. Henderson, "The 
hekythos and Frogs 1200-1248," HSCP 76 (1972), pp. 133-
144- {who argues the word symbolizes poverty and sinister 
activity); D. Bain, "A'r)KU9tov avwAe:oe:v. Some 
Reservations,• CQ 35 (1985), pp. 31-37 (who claims sexual 
connotations are not borne out by the context 0£ the 
Passage). 
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plays]," retorts, " ... well, but she sat down on you 
[i.e., your plays] and yours much too much."154- That 
ts, the chatterbox, ever-questioning tragedian was not only 
1<.nown £or his ability to be-fuddle by equating dissimilars 
and :for his insistent baring o:f the truth, but :for his 
constant exposure o:f the goddess o:f desire, the troubling 
Aphrodite. What an odd, elenctic mixture 0£ attributes! 
The practice o:f elenchos won :for Socrates the 
reputation o:f an oddball; that Euripides• plays were 
perceived by his -fellow Athenians as being as weird as was 
the man Socrates is apparent in the £act that Aristophanes 
portrays Euripides as writing his tragedies alo:ft, -floating 
in the air lik.e Socrates. As was argued above in Part Two, 
the up-in-the-air imagery applied to Socrates is not only 
appropriate to his comic stat us as psyche, but is also 
expressive o:f the pre-literate interlocutor's sense o:f the 
insubstantiality o:f Socrates• subject 0£ choice in 
elenchos: the unseen universals beyond the concrete 
particulars with which the interlocutors constantly dealt. 
In the pre-literate•s view, unremitting re£erence to the 
abstract puts one in the realm 0£ the insubstantial; thus, 
in comedy, such a one would o:f course -float, having no 
15ll-Further evidence o:f Euripides• proclivity :for 
s~xua1 subjects may be round in the tragedian's own use o:f 
Ta 11''1) as a pun on Ta 1Te'TJ at line 862 o:f the 
~; see G. W. Dick.er son, "Aristophanes• Ranae 862. A 
Note on the Anatomy 0£ Euripidean Tragedy," HSCP 78 (1974-), 
Pp. 177-188. 
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ballasting substance to hold him down. And £loat Euripides 
does, in the Acharnians of 4-25 B. C., and with no less 
grandeur than his soul-mate Socrates. In place of the awe-
filled Strepsiades is Dikaiopolis, come for some tragic 
rags, and instead of the haughty disciple is Cephisophon; 
but the scene is much the same as its counterpart in the 
Clouds: 
{Cephisophon, of Euripides) His mind, without, is 
gathering versicles and is not within; himself, , , 
within, makes tragedy a-loft (avaf3a<5'T)v). 
(Euripides, to the insistent Dikaiopolis) I'll 
trundle mysel£ out, but I have no time to come down. 
(Dikaiopolis) You make [tragedy] a-loft, is 
it possible out of the loft (KaTaf3a<5'T)v)? 
(Acharnians 398-4-11). 
As we view Euripides writing his tragedies, -floating 
"a-lo£t," we know he will share this air with Socrates, 
whom Aristophanes was to depict in the same etherial realm 
a few years later. And while it was clearly possible to 
write tragedy "out of the loft," Euripides did not choose 
to do so. Instead, by remaining resolutely "a-loft," 
Euripides incurred many 0£ the same charges levelled 
against Socrates, because he used, on stage and to the same 
effect, essentially the same methods the philosopher was 
using on the streets of A thens. Aristophanes knew this 
method well enough to show Socrates using it in the 
Clouds, and well enough to insist that Euripides was using 
it in his plays. 
Yet Aristophanes le£t £or posterity the task 0£ 
testing this claim. For, to him, it was clear. He never 
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felt obliged to do more than proclaim the comparison and 
suggest its validity by depicting Socrates and Euripides as 
aliKe. We 0£ course do not wonder that Aristophanes in his 
plays did not choose to analyze in depth a play 0£ 
Euripides, to show that the claims he made about Socrates 
and Euripides were true, £or such an analysis would have no 
place on the comic stage. And while centuries have passed 
and scholars have persisted in observing similarities 
between Socrates and Euripides, no one thus £ar has put the 
bold claim 0£ Aristophanes to the test. The time £or 
testing is long overdue. Accordingly, the £inal chapter 0£ 
this study (Chapter Four) will make a beginning 0£ 
vindicating Aristophanes' depiction 0£ Socrates' 
conversations and Euripides' plays as methodologically 
similar, by arguing that Euripides' Medea is elenchos 
trans£erred to a di££erent medium. 
But be'fore this de£initive task is undertaken, the 
next chapter will show that modern critics 0£ Euripides 
have--no less insistently than Aristophanes but not so 
consciously as he--spoken 0£ Euripides' method 0£ composing 
his plays in terms that make it sound suspiciously like 
Socratic elenchos. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
SOCRATIC ELE.RCHOS A.RD MAIEUSIS IR EURIPIDES' PLAYS 
part One: The History 0£ Euripidean Criticism Reconsidered 
This study sought, in its £irst chapter, to de£ine the 
procedural elements and characteristics 0£ Socratic method. 
The second chapter examined the Aristophanic evidence on 
Socrates and Euripides and showed, not only that 
Aristophanes explicitly states that Euripides• work bore 
the impress o'f Socrates• practice, but also that 
Aristophanes can be presented as an in-formed witness. This 
is because his comic depiction 0£ Socrates, which has much 
in common with his depiction 0£ Euripides, shows 
£amiliarity with Socrates• practice 0£ elenchos. Since, 
then, Aristophanes, a con temporary 0£ Socrates and 
Euripides, has depicted the methodological similarity 0£ 
the two, the next logical step is to look to the work o'f 
Euripides 'for evidence 0£ Socrates• method. 
It would nonetheless discourage this study's thesis 
i£, in the long history 0£ Euripidean interpretation, the 
influence 0£ Socrates• method on Euripides• work had never 
been discerned. But such is not the case; £or al though no 
one has argued what will now be argued, that Euripides• 
work duplicates the method characteristic 0£ Socrates in 
the early Platonic dialogues, the critical literature on 
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guripides points toward, without explicitly £ormulating, 
this thesis. As early as 1923, F. L. Lucas remarked, 
"Socrates ... is persistently linked with Euripides by a 
tradition, which cannot be entirely discounted except by 
that type 0£ scholar who re£uses to believe any £acts about 
antiquity which he has not himself invented."1 
scholars have nonetheless persisted in discounting this 
tradition by their silence on the subject, while critical 
estimation of Euripides belies this silence. 
A clear example 0£ the intuited link between Euripides 
and Socrates is found in the general critical 
interpretation the two have shared. To begin with, in 
guripidean interpretation2 there is little agreement on 
lF. L. Lucas, Euripides and His In£luence (Boston: 
Marshall Jones Company, 1923; herea£ter Lucas, In£luence), 
p. 40. 
2This study has no intention of tracing the 
history of Euripidean interpretation; in any case, this 
task has been recently undertaken and superbly executed by 
Ann Horris Michelini in the first chapter 0£ Euripides and 
the Tragic Tradition (Madison, WI: Univ. 0£ Wisconsin 
Press, 1987; hereafter Michelini, Tragic Tradition), pp. 1-
51, "A History of Euripidean Interpretation.• This chapter 
is a gold mine of bibliography and scholarship. 
Michelini•s history is a critical one; she identifies 
various scholarly trends and th us makes the task of sorting 
through the critical literature on Euripides a much happier 
one. A briefer overview of contradictory trends in 
Euripidean scholarship may be -found in Hermann Rohdich, Die 
euripideische Tragodie: Untersuchungen zu ihrer Tragik 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1968; hereafter Rohdich, 
Tragodie), pp. 13-18. A still use:ful survey of Euripidean 
scholarship, although already somewhat outdated, is C. 
Collard, Euripides, Greece & Rome: Kew Surveys in the 
Classics, Ho. 14 (Ox:ford: Clarendon Press, 1981; hereafter 
Collard, Euripides). 
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1fhat Euripides was doing in his work.. Albin Lesky 
declares, "Kaum eine andere Gestalt der antik.en Literatur 
ist in ihrer Vielschichtigk.eit so schwierig zu £assen wie 
guripides."3 Lesk.y's opinion is con£irmed by the 
contradictory results 0£ the many attempts to pin down 
guripides and his work. under one label. Peter Burian 
reflects in despair: "Having been subjected over the years 
to Euripides the Rationalist, the Irrationalist, the 
Idealist, the Realist, the Patriot, the Escapist, and many 
more, we may now well ask. whether there is any Euripides 
left at au.•4 H. D. F. Kitto is no more optimistic as 
he contemplates how Euripides has £ared in the critical 
literature: 
... he has been represented as a deplorable atheist, 
as the daring and noble critic 0£ an immoral and 
e££ete Olympian religion; as a "botcher," as the 
contriver 0£ in£initely subtle plays that meant one 
thing to the simple and something much more exciting 
to the clever; as the preacher 0£ a philanthropic 
liberalism and rationalism, as a total irra tionalist; 
as a sour misogynist, as the £irst Greek. to recognise 
that women too are 0£ the human race.5 
Only those who see as the essence 0£ Euripides' work. 
its inability to be classi£ied have avoided contradictions. 
3Albin Lesky, Geschichte der Griechischen 
Literatur, 3 ed. (Bern and Kiinchen: Francke Verlag, 1957 
and 1958; herea£ter Lesky, Geschichte), p. 409. 
'I-Peter Burian, "Euripides the Contortionist," 
Arion n.s. 31 (1976), p. 96. Burian concludes his review 
{p. 113) by labelling Euripides "enigmatic." 
5H. D. F. Kitto, Poiesis: Structure and Thought 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. 0£ Cali£ornia Press, 
1966), p. 3. 
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'l'bese critics recognize in Euripides6 a peddler of 
paradoxes, a Protean contortionist. Indeed, Erich Segal 
designates Euripides the "poet of paradox" and maintains 
tba t "[e]very play of Euripides seems to be asking a 
question or else boldly stating some mythical and/or visual 
paradox."7 Michelini, after tracing diverging opinions 
of Euripides1 interpreters, describes Euripides1 protean 
mutability: 
The skillful and facile theatrical technician who 
proceeds to spoil his plays out of moral principle is 
matched by the doctrinaire philosopher who cannot 
resist weakly pretty poetic fancies. The specialist 
in female emotional maladies (Leidenschaft) turns cold 
rhetorician, just as we become absorbed in his art. 
We break our hearts over the most harrowing and 
pa the tic of tragedians (tragikota tos), only to find 
ourselves in the next scene repressing a terrible urge 
to snigger. The most violent and improbable 
6As will be noticed from some of the following 
comments, there is some tendency to confuse the poet with 
his work. See, as a caution against such tendencies, 
Harold Cherniss, "The Biographical Fashion in Literary 
Criticism," University 0£ California Publications in 
Classical Philology 12 (1943), pp. 279-292. C£. 
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 95: "As a general rule, 
preference should be given to traits that seem to 
characterize the plays directly, in preference to those 
that attach to Euripides himself.• 
7Erich Segal, "Euripides: Poet of Paradox,• in 
Greek Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Erich 
Segal (Hew York: Harper and Row, 1983), p. 249. A. R. 
Thompson, The Dry Kock: A Study of Irony in Drama 
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1948), p. 156, 
lists the "paradoxes" one can find in Euripides 1 plays; for 
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, paradox is integral to 
Ruripidean drama. See, e.g., her p. 68: "The perversity 
of Euripidean theater has a natural tendency to generate 
Paradoxes and thus to involve critics in self-defeating 
exercises"; and p. 118: ". . . in its use of ambiguity 
Rur-ipidean art remains an art of paradox, taking its usual 
Position of affirmation in denial." 
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expedients have long been tried against these 
anomalies, without success, and without consensus, 
since one such exploit merely provokes another 0£ a 
di££erent stamp.8 
Equal inability to characterize and equally pro£ound 
~isagreement in interpretation can be £ound in the critical 
literature on Socrates in the early Platonic dialogues. 
now Socrates the man and Socrates• practice 0£ elenchos are 
to be interpreted continue to be hotly debated. Socrates 
and his practice, too, have proven enigma tic, paradoxical, 
and hard to pin down. That such opinions 0£ the 
philosopher and his work are a commonplace can be a££irmed 
by even the most casual examination 0£ the literature on 
Socratic elenchos.9 
But the interpretation 0£ Euripides• work and 0£ 
Socrates• method has more in common than a recognition 0£ 
the perplexity the two consistently inspire. In Euripidean 
criticism are £ound pronouncements on Euripides• work 
that, taken together, give a £ull array 0£ the procedural 
elements and characteristics 0£ Socrates• practice 0£ 
elenchos as analyzed in Chapter One. And while it is true 
that at £irst glance Euripides• plays bear little 
resemblance to the dialogues, the method 0£ the dialogues 
8Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 50. Michelini 
(p. 95 n. 1) credits Harald Merklin, Gott und Mensch im 
Hippolytos und den Bakchen des Euripides (diss. Heidelberg, 
1964), pp. 38-39, with the description 0£ Euripides as a 
Proteus. 
9For some examples, see above, Chapter One, Part 
Three. 
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and the tragedies, and even the effects of that method, can 
be shown to be similar. 
And yet there is an apparent dissimilarity between the 
dialogues and Euripides 1 tragedies: they are of different 
genres.10 Nevertheless, though Euripides is certainly 
a tragedian, part of the long-standing critic ism of his 
work, dating back to antiquity, has been that he is a 
philosopher only thinly disguised as a tragedian . 
Athenaeus (13.561a) labels Euripides • c 0 ' OK"IVU.05 
•LAooo•os," and the scholiasts criticize what was 
considered superfluous philosophizing in his plays (see, 
e.g., at Alcestis 779). Nietzsche, infamous for his 
criticism of Euripides 1 prosaic, philosophic approach to 
tragedy, sensed that behind Euripides 1 philosophic 
•execution• of the genre was the sinister figure of 
Socrates. Nietzsche believed that Euripides in the end 
regretted having invaded the poetic terrain of tragedy with 
prosaic philosophy, but it was, alas, too late: 
Dionysus had already been scared £rom the tragic 
stage, by a demonic power speaking through Euripides. 
Even Euripides was, in a sense, only a mask: the 
deity that spoke through him was neither Dionysus nor 
Apollo, but an altogether newborn demon, called 
Socrates.11 
10see Nussbaum, Fragility, pp. 122-123, £or the 
argument that such genre distinctions are not ancient. 
UNietzsche, The 
~ritings 0£ Nietzsche, 
Modern Library, 1966), 
Sneu, Discovery, pp. 
Birth 0£ Tragedy, in The Basic 
transl. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
p. 82. See also the discussion 0£ 
113-135. 
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Nietzsche's hostility, however, did not lend to critics the 
pa use for reflection its very excessiveness recommends. 
Michelini traces the small success of early attempts to 
consider Euripides as a philosopher.12 The worst 
distortions were practiced by those who presumed to 
excavate Euripides" plays for bits of evidence to 
reconstruct his philosophic views.13 Even today, 
though without the earlier excesses, critics persist in 
treating Euripides as a philosopher.14 F. L. Lucas 
exhorts the discretion necessary in making such an 
assessment: 
After Euripides the dramatist there remains Euripides 
the thinker,--the subject to-day of a vast and growing 
literature, much of it vitiated by disregard of an 
obvious principle, which book. after book. recognizes in 
theory in its first chapter, and ignores in all that 
follows. You cannot credit a dramatist 
indiscriminately with the opinions of his characters; 
this mistake is as old as the poet•s own audiences, 
who seem to have been in some ways quite peculiarly 
12Kichelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 8-10. 
13wilhelm Nestle, Euripides, der Dich ter der 
griechischen Aufklarung (Stuttgart: Verlags w. Kohlhammer 
GmbH., 1901; reprint ed., Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag 
Aalen, 1969), is the worst offender of those using this 
methodology, best described as •cut and paste.• R. G. A. 
Buxton, Persuasion in Greek. Tragedy: A Study of Peitho 
{Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982; hereafter Buxton, 
Persuasion), p. 148, calls this type of approach •. . . an 
extremely naive form of dramatic criticism, depending as it 
does on highly selective quotation.• 
14witness, £or example, the confident 
Pronouncement of E. R. Dodds, •Euripides the 
Irrationalist,• CR 43 (1929; hereafter Dodds, 
"Irrationalist•),-p. 97: • while Sophocles is a 
dramatist, Euripides happens to be, like Bernard Shaw and 
Pirandello, a philosophical dramatist.• 
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imbecile, so that "immoral utterances" like 
Hippolytus• (612) "With my tongue I swore it--never 
with my heart," or praise 0£ money in another play, 
were greeted with bellows 0£ righteous 
indignation.15 
Euripides, then, is o-ften considered to be a 
philosopher, but the disparity 0£ opinion concerning his 
philosophic outlook marks him as no ordinary philosopher, 
or at least as no philosopher in the modern sense 0£ the 
word. Instead, Euripides is a disturbing sort 0£ 
philosopher, one very like the Platonic Socrates 0£ the 
early dialogues: a philosopher who asks questions he does 
not answer, and who pro££ers no identi-fiable, consistent 
doctrine.16 
Euripides• penchant -for questions to which he gives no 
answers is o£ten observed. "Zur Grosse des Euripides 
gehort, dass er die Frage stellen, aber nich t hat losen 
mogen," was Karl Reinhardt's conclusion on the 
playwright.17 Bernard Knox is less complimentary: 
15Lucas, In£1 uence, pp. 28-29. See, however, 
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 89, who sympathizes with 
Aristophanes' and the audience's latching onto what she 
considers intentionally provocative epigrams because 
Euripides •. . . le-ft so little room open -for a blow. At 
the end o-f the play, there might be nothing -for [the 
audience] to £ix on except a £ew questionable and catchy 
witticisms." 
16see Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 10, 
especially nn. 34 and 35, £or bibliography on £ailed 
attempts to identi£y consistent doctrine in Euripidean 
Plays. 
17Karl Reinhardt, "Die Sinneskrise bei Euripides," 
in Euripides, ed. Ernst-Richard Schwinge (Darmstadt: 
Wissenscha£tliche Buchgessellscha£t, 1968). p. 541. 
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"[Euripides] seems unable or perhaps unwilling to resolve 
the discords his plays in£lict on our ears; even his 
masterpieces leave us £ull of disturbing questions."18 
That "[Euripides] seems more concerned to raise questions 
than to answer them, to cast doubts than to show how the 
doubts are to be resolved," is the verdict of D. W. 
Lucas;19 Gilbert Horwood similarly notes that 
"Euripides settles nothing , .. 20 and Albin Lesky 
agrees, " . uberall ist die Intensitat der Fragestellung 
um ein Vielfaches grosser als die Sicherheit der 
Antwort.•21 
As a philosopher, then, Euripides is less than 
satisfactory to the modern reader, who has come to expect a 
philosopher to espouse and defend a definable doctrine. 
Instead, Euripides, like Socrates, is lacking in doctrine, 
and he is sometimes considered 11 t tle more than a conduit 
of the sundry philosophical influences of his time. 
"Euripidean plays present no central idea and persuade to 
18Bernard Knox, "Euripides: The Poet as Prophet," 
in Directions in Euripidean Criticism: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. Peter Burian (Durham: Duke Univ. 
Press, 1985; hereafter Knox, "Prophet"), p.1. 
19D. w. 
(Aberdeen: 
Poets), p. 
Lucas, The Greek Tragic Poets, 2 ed. 
University Press, 1959; hereafter Lucas, Tragic 
176. 
2.0Gilbert Horwood, Essays on Euripidean Drama 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. 0£ Cali£ornia Press, 
1954), p. 49. 
Geschich te, p. 409. 
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nothing . " • Michelini proclaims; D. W. Lucas 
similarly comments: 
The 'philosopher of the stage', far from being a 
philosopher in the technical sense, was an eclectic 
lover of wisdom ready to set himself in imagination 
within the framework of many different systems and 
unwilling to commit himself to any schooi.22 
Leon Parmentier finds Euripides' work to be •en quelque 
sorte un miroir oil viennent se refleter .. toutes les 
choses contemporaines."23 Albin Lesky, after citing 
the tradition that Euripides was a student of various 
philosophers and sophists and a friend of Socrates, notes 
that Euripides' plays show the in£luence 0£ these men's 
ideas and yet contradict them: "Gekannt wird er diese 
Manner haben und Beriihrung mit ihren Ideen in Rach£olge und 
Widerspruch wird an vielen Stellen seines Werkes 
kenntlich.•24 C. Collard likewise cautions against 
identifying Euripides' philosophy with any particular 
individual, or even with the spirit 0£ the age: 
Ancient sources assert his acquaintance with leading 
sophists' or with Socrates--or at least with their 
ideas. Similarities and echoes are everywhere, 
sometimes apparent controversial engagement, but never 
consistently enough to justify the earlier modern view 
of Euripides as a publicist, in the guise 0£ 
dramatist, :for new theories or codes, let alone any 
one thinker's theories, a 'poet 0£ the 
Enlightenment•.25 
22Lucas, Tragic Poets, p. 243. 
23Leon Parmentier, Euripide et Anaxagore (Paris: 
Bouillon, 1893), p. 13. 
24Albin 
{Got ting en: 
Lesky, Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), p. 150. 
25collard, Euripides, p. 30. 
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All 0£ these observations, however, are £airly broad 
generalizations that require little proof. They merely 
identify Euripides as one whose plays raise questions and 
offer no answers. But in so describing Euripides 1 work, 
scholars have recently begun to use terms reminiscent of 
Plato and of Socrates. Both William Arrowsmith and 
Christian Wolff, for example, have used the term 
"dialectic" to describe Euripides1 drama.26 That 
ancient tragic drama in general shares with the Platonic 
dialogues "a central structural feature, the elenchos or 
cross-examination," has been asserted by Martha 
Hussbaum.27 Hore recently, Michelini has applied the 
label "elenchus• to the tendency 0£ Euripides 1 plays to 
raise questions. She associates this tendency, however, 
with the Sophistic enlightenment (in which she considers 
Socrates played a part), not with Socrates in particular: 
A posture 0£ alienation . . . is precisely what does 
characterize the new historical, philosophical, and 
rhetorical prose genres of the firth century, all 0£ 
which have associations with the Sophistic 
enlightenment; and it was these genres that Euripidean 
drama used as the source 0£ its particular tone and 
style. The prose artist, instead 0£ acting as a 
source 0£ tradition and its preservation, is a critic 
26William Arrows mi th, "A Greek Theater of Ideas,• 
Arion 2 (1963; herea£ter Arrowsmith, 11Ideas11), p. 55, 
re£ers to "the complex 'dialectic 1 0£ Euripidean drama•; 
Christian Wolf£, •Euripides,• in Ancient Writers Greece and 
Rome, Vol. 1, ed. James Luce (Kew York: Scribners, 1982; 
herea£ter Wol££, "Euripides"), p. 236, describes the story 
Of Alcestis as "interwoven with a kind of dialectic of 
opposed values." 
27Nussba um, Fragility, p. 128. 
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who puts traditional values to the elenchus or who 
wishes to make his audience accept as true the 
"weaker logos," that is, the inverse of what they 
would normally believe and expect.28 
The critical literature, then, has of late begun to 
acknowledge a loose association between Euripides1 
methodology and Socrates 1 • And yet, such testimony, 
suggestive though it may be, pales beside the long history 
28Kichelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 70. Michelini 
uses the word "elenchus" several times (cf. pp. 127, 213, 
297), but she never at tempts to compare the methods of 
Socrates and Euripides. She indicates that she considers 
the two di££erent in that Socrates "attempt[ed] to 
harmonize the contradictory ethics of moral right (dike) 
and heroic achievement (arete) by subordinating the latter 
to the -former," while Euripides, "by keeping the old and 
the new moralities in balance, and by playing the 
contradictions of one against the other, ... betrayed 
both of them and laid bare for us the full meaning of the 
Greek cultural revolution." (p. 127) Michelini seems to 
suggest that Socratic influence in Euripidean plays is 
thematic, that is, as evidenced in "the Euripidean 
convention of a sacrificial arete" (p. 91), in plays that 
"anatomize the workings 0£ a new morality of altruism" (p. 
226), and in the emphasis on cooperative over competitive 
virtues (pp. 229-230). Michelini sees in Phaedra 1 s 
musings on virtuous action in Hippolytus and in Kedea 1 s 
remarks on akrasia in Medea that "Euripides is giving free 
play to some of the problems that made this [Socratic] 
argument [that nobody willingly commits a moral error] so 
interesting and fertile for fifth-century thinkers," and 
she suggests that Phaedra 1 s speech "looks more like a 
tribute to Socratic in£luence than a 'polemic1 against the 
Philosopher." (p. 304). For Michelini, the idealistic 
self-sacrifice, passivity, and integrity of the 
misunderstood and maligned Hippolyt us mark him as a 
"Socratic hero" (pp. 305-310). Michelini includes Socrates 
as a "Sophist" without explanation (p. 140), and adamantly 
resists the notion that "Socratic doctrine" can be 
extracted from the work of Plato or other authors (p. 304). 
For Dionysus in Bacchae as an alter-Socrates, see 
Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, "Tragedy and Religion: The 
Bacchae," in Greek Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism, 
ed. Erich Segal (Bew York: Harper and Row, 1983), pp. 371-
373. 
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of Euripidean interpretation, where the striking similarity 
between the methodology of the two has been a dominant 
though tacit theme, particularly in discussions of those 
aspects of Euripidean drama that have been subject to the 
most controversy. 
For example, a sense of the presence 0£ the sine~ 
~ of elenchos, i.e., of two counterpoised 
posi tions,29 one of which is refuted, is everywhere in 
tbe critical literature on Euripides. Euripidean drama has 
the reputation 0£ developing a plot and at the same time 
posing something that is coun terplot, something that 
undermines the plot and makes characters on stage, as well 
as the audience in the theater, call into question the 
inevitability of the plot's progression. What, then, in 
the Platonic dialogues is made discrete by identi£ication 
with at least two separate interlocutors, is in Euripides 
somehow less discrete. This lends to Euripidean plays what 
Gilbert Murray termed "a certain unintelligible note of 
discord."30 
29conard, Euripides, p. 32, calls this "the 
antithetical mode," and claims that it is "[a]pparently 
instinctive to the Greeks." The presence of this mode in 
Euripides signals in£luence 0£ the sophists, who "developed 
it into an instrument of formal argumentation .... • In 
addition, Collard notes, "Polar statements and discussions, 
polar conceptions of setting and action, pervade Euripides 
. . . . 
" 
30Gilbert Murray, Euripides and His Age, 2 ed. 
(London, Hew York, and Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946; 
hereafter Murray, Euripides), p. 50. 
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The critical literature on Euripides has, however, 
resisted leaving this discord unintelligible. One proposal 
is that the poet himself took the part 0£ dissident: 
guripides, it is claimed, either was betraying his 
disbelief in the Olympian gods who peopled the traditional 
stories that were his primary material or was undercutting 
the heroic ideals the stories embodied. 
A. W. Verrall is the most notorious--but certainly not 
the only--champion 0£ the view that in Euripides• plays is 
unmistakable evidence that the playwright did not believe 
in the gods 0£ his countrymen: 
The creed 0£ Euripides was that 0£ nascent philosophy, 
science, and rationalism; bet ween which and the 
worship 0£ the popular gods there was a war to which 
modern religious controversies o££er no parallel. .. 
. The duty preached by the philosophers, and by 
Euripides as a public teacher known to be in sympathy 
with philosophers, was the duty 0£ thinking on system, 
0£ not adopting, without evidence or investigation, 
contradictory hypotheses on di££erent days 0£ the 
month or at di££erent stages 0£ a journey; a duty 
which, as was seen with ever increasing clearness, 
would i£ pursued make it impossible to use at all such 
conceptions as 'Apollo', or 'Artemis', or 'Demeter•, 
and reduce even 'Zeus• to the position 0£ an 
inconvenient and misleading name.31 
31A. W. Verrall, Euripides the Rationalist 
(Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1895; hereafter Verrall, 
Rationalist), pp. 79-80. C£. also the second chapter 0£ 
Paul Decharme, Euripide et l 1espri t de son theatre (Paris: 
Garnier, 1893; reprint ed., Brussels: Culture and 
Civilization, 1966; hereafter Decharme, Euripide et 
l 'esprit), pp. 59-103, which begins, "Une des £ormes de 
l'espri t philosophique chez Euripide est la critique 
appliquee aux idees que ses contemporains se £aisaient des 
dieux et aux legendes qu•on racontait a leur sujet." 
Dodds, "Irrationalist," p. 101, concedes Verrall1s position 
as £act: "That, in £act, Apollo and the Furies and the 
rest of the denizens 0£ Olympus and Tartarus are £or 
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Cedric Whitman and others locate the dissonance of 
guripides• work in a broader arena, i.e., in the poet's 
deliberate distortion of the heroic world of the 
traditional tales that served as his primary material: 
Throughout his life, Euripides made use of heroic 
fiction, without ever shaping a heroic figure .. 
What Euripides did not do was abandon either the 
framework or the implications of the myth in which all 
these characters move. The -framework continues to 
surround them, slaves, minions, and demythologized 
heroes alike, and the overtones are still those of the 
wide universal world of the grand tradition. The 
result is a jarring discrepancy of ethos between the 
two £actors, a kind 0£ deliberate polytonality, as i-f 
tragedy were now being written in two keys at 
once.32 
Euripides no more than dramatic -fictions has been 
abundantly proved by Verrall and others: there is no need 
for me to labour the point." L. H. G. Greenwood, Aspects 
of Euripidean Tragedy (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1953), 
passim, -followed Verrall; see his pp. 4 and 18 for gods as 
representing "concealed unbelief" and as "-fantasy." 
32cedric Whitman, Euripides and the Full Circle 0£ 
Myth (Cambridge, HA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974; hereafter 
Whitman, Full Circle), pp. 112-113. C£. D. J. Conacher, 
Euripidean Drama: Myth, Theme, and Structure (Toronto: 
Univ. 0£ Toronto Press, 1967; herea£ter Conacher, 
Euripidean Drama), who detects a discom-fort with myth in 
Euripides• varying "approaches" to it; see Conacher•s -first 
chapter, especially pp. 12 ff., where the claim is made 
that Euripides "[n]ever -fully accept[ed] the world 0£ myth 
as the real basis of his tragedies" (p. 12), and both 
"makes use of and yet abuses the 'other world' of myth" in 
the Heracles (p. 14). See also the remark o-f Collard, 
Euripides, p. 30: " . . [Euripides] is so clearly 
uncomfortable with the traditional religious and moral 
values which tragic myth enshrined .... " Similarly, to 
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 51, Euripides• art is 
" ... an art that opposes tradition." Cf. Ekbert Faas, 
Tragedy and After: Euripides, Shakespeare, Goethe 
(Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1984; 
hereafter Fass, Tragedy), pp. 44-45. For character 
degeneration as one of Euripides• techniques £or debunking 
myth, see Emily HcDermot t, "Euripides and the Decline of 
Character: A Soap Opera Connection," CO 61 (1984), pp. 
245 
Christian Wolff suggests that dissonance in Euripides 1 
plays is in some sense the hallmark of the end of the 
tragic genre itself: 
Kore and more in the course 0£ the latter part 0£ the 
fifth century B. C., tragedy approaches the exhaustion 
of its traditional and conventional resources. For 
Euripides, this increasingly creates a tension between 
maintaining the established requirements of the genre 
--such as the use of a circumscribed body of myth or 
the presence 0£ a participating chorus--and a need to 
revitalize, perhaps even break with, them by 
innovation and change.33 
But behind Euripides the dissident, one can sense the 
presence of two collocated positions and the refutation 
characteristic of elenchos. For even when scholars do not 
assign to Euripides the role of dissident, they recognize 
in his work the interplay and opposition of counterpoised 
elements. Wolff, -for example, calls attention to the 
general "contradictoriness" o-f Euripidean drama and notes 
the "uneasy, unresolved juxtaposition• particularly in the 
Medea; Arrowsmith speaks of the •pattern of juxtaposed 
incongruities" and "critical counterpointing of ... 
elements"; and Collard wonders if the "correspondences and 
balances" 0£ episodes "emphasize the thoroughness of the 
contrasts, o-ften reversals, they embody.1134 Michelini 
105-108. 
33wolff, "Euripides,• p. 234. 
34wolff, "Euripides," pp. 256 and 241; Arrowsmith, 
"Ideas," p. 39; Collard, Euripides, p. 16. Cf. A. P. 
Burnett, Catastrophe Survived. Euripides 1 Plays of Mixed 
Reversal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971; hereafter 
Burnett, Catastrophe), p. 16, on Euripides 1 disturbing 
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proposes that there is in Euripides' work an "aesthetic of 
balance and counterpoint:" 
The complexity denied to the icy clarity of Euripidean 
rhetoric is reconstituted in structure. in the 
interplay and counterpoint of the ideas themselves. 
and of the speakers who present them. The "drama of 
ideas" uses ideas to build aesthetic. not logical, 
structures, in which important elements are often 
presented only under cancellation by other opposing 
elements.35 
Nevertheless, in Euripidean plays, two or more 
positions do not merely get presented. Instead, refutation 
is a regular feature in this arena of ideas. H. D. F. 
Kitto discerns a character-centered refutation when he 
says, "Euripides, to our great surprise, will round upon a 
sympathetic character in the last act .•36 More 
recently. Michelini describes Euripides' skill at 
refutation in a peculiarly Socratic way when she remarks, 
Euripidean theater is involved with the same cultural 
concerns that are raised by the theater of Sophokles; 
but its relation to these concerns is secondary, in 
that it represents them almost always by a process of 
inversion. . . . To say No is the function of 
Euripidean art, and this continual negation always 
juxtaposition of "one familiar action with another that was 
equally familiar, but contradictory in pattern." 
35Michelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 120 and 119. 
36H. D. F. Kitto. Greek Tragedy, 3 ed. (London and 
Hew York: Methuen, 1961; hereafter Kitto, Tragedy}, p. 
253. Whitman, Full Circle, p. 129, sees in Euripides' "war 
Plays" refutation on a larger scale, what he calls "· 
reversals of moral perspective that come from outside, 
rather than from any inherent, organic dynamics of the 
action such as would bring them about inevitably; they are 
arbitrarily imposed by the hand of the poet in order to 
evolve a counterpiece that somehow negates the first half 
of the play." 
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looks toward something else, ad umbra ting that other by 
the play 0£ its re£usal, its irony.37 
It is clear, then, that Euripidean plays share with 
Socratic elenchos the collocation 0£ two opposing 
positions, one 0£ which is re£u ted. It may be objected, 
however, that this counterpoint, or juxtaposition, or 
whatever else it may be called, is still not the same as 
the give and take 0£ elenchos, where the interlocutor is 
subtly urged by Socra tes 1 argumentation from one position 
to another, and to yet another, until it becomes clear 
that his ultimate position is one that he himsel£ can 
neither deny nor maintain, and, realizing that he is 
refuted, he experiences the dislocation known as aporia. 
The critical literature does, however, give testimony that 
there can be -found in Euripides• plays the changing 
position 0£ the interlocutor and the aporia of Socratic 
elenchos. 
The changing position of the interlocutor is 
recognizable in what has been sometimes been termed the 
"emotional labili ty" of Euripidean characters. 
"Instability, conflict, and change seem to mark many of 
Euripides 1 characters,• Collard observes, •so that 
understanding them is problema tic. 1138 Arrowsmith 
37Kichelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 126. 
38collard, Euripides, p. 9. "Emotional labili ty" 
is Hichelini's phrase; see Tragic Tradition, p. 113. 
Michelini argues (p. 114) that this emotional !ability gets 
in the way of the audience 1 s ability to maintain concern 
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identifies the mutability of character in Euripides with 
the interplay of ideas when he claims that certain 
characters change "· .. because their function is not that 
of rounded characters or 'heroes" but specifications of the 
shaping ideas of the play.• He continues: 
. . . the one kind of character which Euripides" 
theater cannot afford is that splendid integrated 
self-knowledge represented by the "old fantastical 
Duke of dark corners" in Measure for Measure; 
Euripides• theater is all Angelos, Lucios, and 
Claudios, average, maimed, irresolute, incomplete 
human nature .... Horal judgment is, as Euripides 
tried to show, no less precarious and dif£icult than 
the comprehensive description of reality.39 
R. G. A. Buxton also senses in Euripides• characters ideas 
being developed: 
. . [Euripides"] works are composed of a series of 
interlocking arguments. Various characters put cases, 
trying to persuade each other, and the audience, of 
the validity of their position. The effect of the 
play consists of nothing less than the complex impact 
of all the interlocking persuasions, arguments and 
cases.40 
A. H. Dale similarly notes that 
... in a well-constructed Euripidean tragedy what 
controls a succession of situations is not a firmly 
conceived unity of character but the shape of the 
whole action, and what determines the development and 
finesse of each situation is not a desire to paint in 
the details 0£ a portrait-study but the rhetoric 0£ 
the situation--what Aristotle calls 
for the characters. 
39Arrowsmith, "Ideas,• p. 43. Cf. Kitto, Tragedy, 
PP. 274-275, for •schematic treatment" of characters. 
4 0Buxton, Persuasion, p. 150. 
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' 4 1 6LaVOLa. 
Dale's "rhetoric o:f the situation• ~s nothing less than the 
£luidity o:f a position successfully attacked. One need 
only recall Socrates' interlocutors, who change their tack. 
to avoid total de-feat 0£ their position, to recognize that 
any attempt to characterize someone in such a situation 
would ultimately be :futile. It is no wonder, then, that 
Euripides' characters can seem so inconstant. 
One can likewise :find observations in the critical 
literature on Euripides on the particular kind o:f 
.. 
refutation Socrates practiced. Fo~ Euripides does not 
merely leave the impression that one o:f the two positions 
has been soundly trounced. Instead, Euripides leaves the 
a udience42 in a state o:f aporia, lost and confused 
instead o:f convinced 0£ a well-argued surety. Kurt von 
Fritz sees the discrepancy between plot and ending as the 
impetus to an intended and enduring confusion. Von Fritz 
41A. K. Dale, ed.1 Euripides, Alcestis (Ox-ford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978), p. xxvii. See, however, D. J. 
Conacher, "Rhetoric and Relevance in Euripidean Drama," AJP 
102 (1981)1 pp. 3-25, whose argument; £or dramatic relevance 
o:f certain rhetorical set-pieces an·d consistency o:f 
characterization in Euripides' plays does not necessarily 
invalidate Dale's perception. 
42I will argue below, Chapter Four, Part Two, that 
the characters on stage likewise give evidence 0£ aporia1 
but to date I have not found in the critical literature 
connection 0£ this phenomenon to Socratic elenchos. For 
aporia as the theme of a Euripidean play (without re£erence 
to Socratic elenchos)1 see C. A. E. Luschnig, Tragic 
!Poria: A Study 0£ Euripides• Iphigenia at Aulis (Berwick, 
Victoria, Australia: Aurea I Publica tions1 1988), passim. 
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concludes his discussion of Alcestis: 
Alles dies ist die Wirkung der schneidenden Dissonanz, 
die Euripides in fast alle seine Stucke gelegt hat, 
und die in vielen davon auch in der krassen Diskrepanz 
zwischen der Handlung und dem scheinbar gliicklichen 
Ende zum Ausdruck kommt. Eben diese Wirkung beweist, 
dass die Dissonanz, wie Euripides es wollte, auch von 
denen gehort worden ist, die das Ratsel, warum sie so 
tie£ aufgestort wurden, nicht losen konnten.43 
Bernard Knox, after calling the world Euripides creates on 
stage "· one of disruption, violence, subversion, 
uncertainty, discord," goes on to describe the total ef£ect 
of this poet's works in terms reminiscent 0£ aporia: "In 
Euripidean tragedy old certainties are shattered; what 
seems solid cracks and melts, £ounda tions are torn up, 
direction lost.•44 Walter Jens agrees: "Hier gibt es 
nichts Festes, keine Bindungen, auf die man sich verlassen 
diirfte .45 William Arrowsmith terms this same 
phenomenon an "impasse," which he sees as " the 
dramatist's way 0£ con-fronting his audience with the 
necessity of choosing between apparently antithetical 
43Kurt von Fritz, Antike und moderne Tragodie: 
Neun Abhandlungen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962; herea£ter von 
Fritz, Tragodie), p. 316. 
44Knox, "Prophet," pp. 5 and 8 (italics added). 
Cf. Albin Lesky, A History of Greek Literature, transl. 
James Willis and Cornelius de Heer (Hew York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell, 1966; hereafter Lesky, History), p. 392, who 
quotes the remark of H. D. F. Kitto [Entretiens sur 
l'antiquite classique, Vol. 1, 1952 (1954), p. 228] that 
with Euripides, "you never know where you are." 
45walter Jens, "Euripides," 
Ernst-Richard Schwinge (Darmstadt: 
Buchgesselscha£t, 1968), p. 26. 
in Euripides, ed. 
Wissenscha£tliche 
251 
realities or positions." Later, Arrowsmith continues to 
describe this impasse as one which extends out beyond the 
boundaries 0£ the literary piece and into the minds 0£ its 
in tended audience: 
... [Euripidean theater] presents its typical 
actions as problems and thereby involves the audience 
in a new relation, not as worshippers but jurors who 
must resolve the problem by decision. But because the 
problem is usually incapable 0£ outright resolution, 
is in £act "tragic," the audience is compelled to 
£or£ei t the only 1 uxury of making a decision--the 
luxury of knowing that one has decided wisely. 
Something--innocence, comfort, complacency--is always 
£orfeited--or meant to be forfeited--by the audience 
of jurors. And this suggests that the essential 
anagnorisis of Euripidean theater is not between one 
actor and another but between the audience and its own 
experience, as that experience is figured in the 
plays. Anagnorisis here is knowing moral choice, 
exercised on a problem which aims at mimicking the 
quandary of a culture.46 
The critical literature, then, again and again 
observes that Euripides 1 plays display the overt procedural 
elements 0£ elenchos; but the literature likewise detects 
in the plays the presence of elenchos 1 more subtle 
procedural elements, the practice of getting the 
interlocutor to agree to· a counterpoised set of questions, 
which, although they at first seem unrelated to the 
business at hand, show themselves in the end, when brought 
together, to entail an analogous situation that contradicts 
some aspect of the interlocutor 1 s position (see above, 
Chapter One, Part Three). These analogies, then, when 
46Arrowsmith, "Ideas," pp. 45 and 53. See Chapter 
One, Part Four, for Seeskin 1 s similar observation on 
Platonic dialogues. 
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applied to the interlocutor's position, bring it down to 
destruction. The same subtle, contrapuntal construction 
o£ a partially hidden, seductive, contradictory position is 
at the heart 0£ Euripidean theater.47 That critics 
nave detected the presence 0£ this type 0£ re£utation in 
Euripides• plays may be argued £rom their impatience at 
what appears to them to be the poet's penchant £or the 
irrelevant--a charge that was more than once levelled 
against Socrates. 
Chapters One and Two demonstrated that one impression 
that the habit 0£ counterpointing analogies gives is that 
the counterpointer appears to be a babbling lunatic who 
brings up all manner 0£ thing not germane to the subject at 
hand. Such an impression 0£ Euripides can be £ound in the 
critical literature. Compare Callicles• impatience with 
Socrates• choice 0£ topics £or discussion (•What •s this 
about cloaks? ... What's this about shoes? You persist 
in talking nonsense . ,• Gorgias 490-491) with the 
obvious impatience 0£, £or example, Gilbert Horwood, who 
claims Euripides •entered the theatre still groping.• In 
concluding his discussion 0£ the •the sudden 
inconsistencies ... ; the £its 0£ inopportune, i£ not 
47This study will argue that Euripides is able to 
e££ect such a contrapuntal construction poetically, by 
using moti£s and images analogously to re£u te (and even 
point the way out of) the seemingly inevitable tragic 
progression 0£ the plot. The characters, broadly speaking, 
mani£est the particulars of the interlocutor's position in 
elenchos. See below, Chapter Four, Parts One and Four. 
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unseemly, open-mindedness; the changes o:f mood; the 
ramshackle or even sel:f-contradictory plots" to which 
Euripidean drama is prone, Norwood bristles with 
Calliclean, self-con:fident disapproval: 
One :fact accounts :for these lapses: with [Euripides] 
intellectual control o:f imagination was apt to :fail 
abruptly .... Euripides--can it be denied?--more 
than once began a play with no clear notion of how it 
was to develop. . . . When this irresponsible mood 
[i.e., of being unable to control his characters] lays 
hold on Euripides he chases every hare that shows its 
scut. O:ften it is as handsome and nimble a beast as 
ever was coursed in March, but it means equivocal 
reputation :for the man who promised his guests a 
leopard.48 
Norwood later grudgingly intones that the "genius• 0£ 
Euripides perhaps excuses him: we should be 11thank£u1• to 
receive whatever we get :from him; a:fter all, Euripides is 
"notoriously uneven• and had "never read Aristotle: i:f in 
the course 0£ composition a quaint :fancy struck him, down 
it went into the play, and a :fig :for consistency!1149 
In an earlier work, however, Norwood was more tolerant: 
". . . nothing is better known about Euripides than that 
his writings are full o:f 'inconsistencies,. that is, o:f 
things which we, :for our part, :find ourselves unable to co-
ordinate." Such inconsistencies leave one, Norwood is 
sure, " . . . wondering ... 'why does [Euripides] mention 
48Norwood, Essays, pp. 48-49. 
49Norwood, Essays, p. 103. C:f. J. F. Dobson, 
"Euripides Unbound," CR 22 (1908), p. 211, :for an imagined 
Euripides• impudent rejoinder to Sophocles: "Consistency 
was made for slaves.• 
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this?' and 'why does he express it in this odd 
fashion?'"50 Inability to appreciate the aptness of 
Euripidean 'inconsistencies• leaves other scholars like C. 
Collard with little else to do but sound a note of regret: 
"[Euripides] was rich in moral or philosophical ideas and 
illustrative generalizations, clever and striking in their 
deployment. These can occur without special dramatic need 
or contextual aptness 
Beside such impatience and regret, however, there has 
been an increasing tolerance and, finally, even a respect 
for Euripidean "inconsistencies" or "anomalies." A. W. 
Verrall was the pioneer of this tolerance.52 It is 
unfortunate that his approach to Euripides--notoriously 
capricious, uneven, and, ultimately, totally 
indefensible53 __ has made his name a byword for the 
50Gilbert Horwood, The Riddle of the Bacchae: The 
Last Stage of Euripides• Religious Views (Manchester: The 
University Press, 1908), pp. 3 and 131. Cf. Kitto, 
Tragedy, p. 194, on the Chorus• ode on childlessness in 
Kedea: "When such desperate deeds are afoot, why does 
Euripides insert this pleasant little essay?" 
51couard, Euripides, p. 25. 
52verrall, Rationalist, passim. 
53Kichelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 1-16 and 
passim, gives Verrall full critical consideration, noting 
that he is the 'first to attempt to defend Euripides against 
the earlier critical tradition, which had abused Euripides• 
work because it failed to measure up to the canonical work 
of Sophocles. Michelini does not mince words, however, on 
Verrall's failings: "His methods amount almost to parodies 
of traditional scholarship" (p. 15); and yet she is able to 
discern an eerie congruity between Verrall and Euripides: 
"It is not by accident that the single most influential 
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bizarre and idiosyncratic.54 One nonetheless gets the 
sense that Verrall, had he not been reacting against a 
critical tradition that was openly hostile to Euripides, 
might have been capable 0£ sound interpretation. Witness, 
£or example, what Michelini rightly deems •verrall at his 
best•:55 
Once £or an, let us not £latter ourselves that we can 
take the lead 0£ Euripides, and show him how he might 
have improved this or that, i£ he had only known what 
he was doing. . . . i£ anywhere we suspect him 0£ 
dulness, we should quietly mark. that place £or 
something which probably we do not understand.56 
A similar humility in the £ace 0£ Euripidean 
•anomalies• has been expressed in the critical literature 
0£ recent years, and corresponding at tempts to interpret 
Euripides• work. have started with the assumption that such 
•anomalies• are intentionally important pointers to the 
meaning 0£ the work.. David Kovacs, £or example, makes an 
appeal for a holistic interpretation of Euripides, one that 
would respectfully confront what, upon first glance, 
appears to be anomalous: 
scholar to write on Euripides was one whose thesis had a 
strong flavor 0£ absurdity and paradox. Such an anomaly 
cannot be dismissed; it must be understood.• (p. 3). 
54na vid Kovacs, The Andromache of Euripides: An 
Interpretation (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1980), p. 6, 
perhaps best describes the most distressing feature 0£ 
Verran•s contribution in commenting on "the perverse 
ingenuity characteristic of his work.." 
55Hichelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 13 n. 48. 
56verrall, Rationalist, p. 119. 
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. . . our task as interpreters is never to respond to 
small segments of the work in isolation but precisely 
to interpret a whole. That whole, though it is 
certainly ambiguous as an autonomous text, is 
nevertheless not infinitely elastic. It consists of 
disparate elements all contributing to a single plan, 
and i£ we have misidenti'fied the plan or misconstrued 
the individual elements or both, there will be some 
things that do not £it. A view 0£ a Greek tragedy 
that can say little or nothing about the contribution 
0£ one speech or scene to the whole, that must ignore 
or apologize for another speech or scene, is unlikely 
to be correct. An interpretation that can •save the 
phenomena,• including elements that are puzzling, 
alien, or repellent to modern taste ... has a chance 
of reproducing the author1 s artistic intent .... 
The critic should there£ore set a high value on a 
text 1 s puzzling or repellent 'features. They are his 
chief de£ense against subjectivity.57 
Michelini agrees: 
These awkward moments are neither errors nor 
meaningless blots, but elements 0£ considerable 
aesthetic signi£icance, valid parts of a system of 
literary meaning that derives from the Euripidean 
play 1 s combative relation to its audience.58 
Euripidean •anomalies• and •inconsistencies,• then, 
have not always been well received, but have nonetheless 
been a long recognized feature of his work., a feature that 
attests to counterpointed analogies like those used by 
Socrates and often received with similar dis-favor by his 
interlocutors. Further evidence for counterpointed 
analogies in Euripides 1 plays may be found in a second 
impression that this practice leaves, this time not only on 
57navid Kovacs, The Heroic Kuse: Studies in the 
Hippolytus and Hecuba 0£ Euripides (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1987; hereafter Kovacs, 
Heroic Kuse), pp. 8-9. 
58Hichelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 71. 
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the interlocutor, but also on the reader-auditor: i.e. 
that, although the conclusion is one o-f avowed ignorance, 
something has been suggested that lies just beneath the 
sur-face--something unstated but nonetheless attainable, if 
only one is willing to "fiddle with the premises.•59 
As fraught as Euripidean interpretation has been with 
unsuccess-ful and inconstant at tempts to extract from the 
text the poet•s philosophical orientation and thus the 
plays" meanings, critics have not refrained from trying to 
argue for meanings not readily apparent or easily defended. 
Michelini pinpoints the heart of this con-fusing scholarly 
phenomenon when she says, 
The persistent sense that things on stage in a 
Euripidean play cannot be what they seem is familiar 
to every reader. This sense of something concealed or 
held back, of insincerity, is at the root of the 
Verrallian interpretations that seek to decipher the 
plays as a code is deciphered, once for all 
time.60 
Michelini in the above quote obviously touches on irony, a 
much debated feature of the Socratic method. Irony will be 
further discussed below under the topic "impersonal 
aspect"; the point here is to illustrate that critics, 
like the reader-auditor of Plato"s early dialogues, sense 
in Euripidean plays the same sort of hidden meaning, a 
meaning extractable after some "fiddling.• The obvious 
59The phrase, again, is from Seeskin, Dialogue, p. 
11. 
60Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 71. 
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excesses o:f Verrall gave only a brief respite :from such 
:fiddlings; the critical literature soon revealed, side by 
side with Euripides the subtle dissident, a new Euripides, 
this time the subtle traditionalist. 
The 1960"s and 1970"s were :fertile decades :for 
excavating such hidden meanings in Euripidean plays. Thus, 
according to Desmond Conacher, one must :first discern 
Euripides" treatment 0£ myth before the poet •s sincerity or 
lack thereof in regard to his subject matter can be 
assessed. Euripides was on the other hand, according to 
Andreas Spira•s interpretation 0£ the deus ex machina and 
Anne Burnett •s analysis 0£ the poet •s use 0£ certain plot 
types, also regarded as consistent in his outlook, as an 
espouser o:f an enduring cosmic order defended by the gods. 
And while Hermann Rohdich argued that Euripides introduced 
into his plays the sophistic world view only to repudiate 
it and thereby reassert the validity of more traditional 
views, Philip Vellacott insisted that Euripides" admittedly 
subversive and subtly presented ideas carried with them an 
undeniable i:f indeterminate "human or moral purpose" that 
went beyond the apparent sensationalism o:f their 
dramatization.61 
61The works alluded to are: Conacher, Euripidean 
Drama; Andreas Spira, Untersuchungen zum Deus ex Machina 
bei Sophokles und Euripides (X::allmunz: Lassleben, 1960); 
Burnett, Catastrophe; Rohdich, Tragodie; Philip Vellacott, 
Ironic Drama: A Study o:f Euripides• Method and Meaning 
(Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1975; hereafter Vellacott, Ironic 
Drama). The quoted words appear on Vella cot t "s p. 94. 
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In short, even a£ter Euripidean criticism escaped -from 
the long history 0£ censure 0£ the poet, there has been a 
recurring sense that Euripides• poetic technique involves 
something very much like maieusis, i.e., that it urges 
looking beyond the apparently inconclusive endings 0£ the 
plays to some unstated but suggested truth. By an act 0£ 
critical retrospection, the poet can be suspected 0£ 
knowing this truth all along, and 0£ leading his audience 
to "bring to birth" this truth. 
The suspicion that the poet knows what he does not 
openly say brings our discussion to the £inal way that 
counterpointed analogy is acknowledged in the critical 
literature on Euripides' plays: that the poet is 
designated a trickster. It will be recalled £rom Chapter 
Two that Socrates' practice 0£ elenchos earned him just 
such a designation in Aristophanes' Clouds, and that the 
Aristophanic Euripides -fared no better. It is amusing and 
suggestive, then, to £ind that Euripides has acquired the 
same reputation among modern critics. Michelini re£ers the 
reader to "the suspicion 0£ Leeuwen that the audience is 
being tricked (verba dari) by the poet," and hersel£ 
remarks that "(t]he mockery to which Euripidean 
protagonists are subjected is 0£ course derisory not only 
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 26-2.7 and 38-46, discusses 
all 0£ the above works and £its them into the history 0£ 
Euripidean criticism. See also her bibliography £or 
reviews 0£ these works. 
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of them, but of the audience as well." Michelini calls 
Euripidean drama "a drama of mockery" and later declares, 
"Euripides chose to present himself as deceiver and 
charlatan, the poet as liar .. 52 Collard agrees, 
alleging that "Euripides• .. deceptions• extend also to the 
audience."63 There is a sense, then, that Euripides, 
no less than the Daedalus-like Socrates of the Euthyphro, 
manipulates and moves things around to the consternation of 
those around him. This sense of being tricked is, as was 
argued in Chapter One, one of the byproducts of 
counterpointed analogies, elenchos• most subtle procedural 
aspect. 
To sum up, the critical literature discerns in 
Euripides• plays both Socratic elenchos• overt procedure as 
well that procedure's most subtle aspect. It will now be 
shown that the literature likewise acknowledges in 
Euripides• plays what was termed in Chapter One elenchos• 
"Socratic Character•: its impersonal and personal aspects, 
its confrontation of cognition and emotion, and its 
peculiar mix of at traction and repulsion, which results in 
an urge both to approach and to escape. 
Chapter One•s discussion of elenchos• impersonal 
62Johannes van Leeuwen, De Aristophane Euripidis 
censore (Amsterdam: Spin, 1876), p. 27, cited in 
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 85 n. 76. The other two 
quotes can be found on her pp. 85, 89, and 124. 
63couard, Euripides, p. 6. 
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aspect argued that what has been termed Socratic "irony" 
was no pose at all. Instead, this "irony" served to 
depersonalize the elenctic procedure, th us making possible 
an objectivity that otherwise would have been di££icult to 
maintain, given the highly personalized involvement 
Socrates demands 0£ his interlocutors. The term "irony" is 
one £amiliar in the literature on Euripides; indeed, Philip 
Vellacott•s controversial study took £or its title Ironic 
Drama: A Study 0£ Euripides" Method and Heaning.64 
Whitman gives testimony to the damage done to Euripidean 
studies as well as to the poet "s reputation by Euripidean 
"irony" misconstrued: 
Throughout his li£e Euripides dramatized myths, but 
always with irony, sometimes as delicate as that 0£ 
the Alcestis, sometimes intensely caustic, as in the 
Heracles, so that the mythic and ironic modes, to use 
Northrop Frye•s terms, seemed to strive in hopeless 
and irreconcilable con£lict, which suggested to many 
critics, ancient as well as modern, the view so o£ten 
repeated in the handbooks, that the poet was 
satirizing the mythology 0£ traditional religion, 
demolishing clay-£ooted gods, and teaching reason. 
Yet the positive substance 0£ Euripides" rationalism 
has never been revealed by anyone, and its very 
existence has been devastatingly cross-examined by E. 
R. Dodds, so that one is le£t with a sorry picture 0£ 
the poet destroying with sly malice something that he 
could not replace with anything better, and, i£ 
Verrall could be believed, taking a puerile joy in it. 
Nietzsche even saw him as writing to please Socrates, 
and Socrates alone, as i£ Socrates were guilty as 
charged, and Euripides his gi£ted accomplice in the 
dismantling 0£ religion. That 'fantasy has faded, but 
the con-fusions linger, and the question 0£ what 
64-London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975. 
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Euripides was really doing with myth remains.65 
It is clear that Euripides 1 reputation has su££ered 
the same £ate as that 0£ Socrates, who, because 0£ his use 
0£ irony, is accused in the Platonic dialogues as well as 
in the critical literature of smugly sniggering up his 
sleeve all the while that he delights in the destruction of 
other men 1 s illusions. And even though, as Whitman notes, 
this assessment 0£ Euripides has £aded, the literature on 
Euripides consistently acknowledges his use 0£ irony. 
Whitman himself contrasts Euripides 1 use of irony in the 
early plays, which he calls "the poet 1 s own irony 
externally imposed," with irony as used by Aeschylus and 
Sophocles: "internal irony coextensive with the 
dramaturgical forces 0£ action and character. 1166 
Michelini, £allowing Whitman, identi£ies "[t]he keynote 0£ 
Euripidean drama• as •an irony that precludes a direct and 
consistent approach, even to the 'low 1 elements that are so 
conspicuous in the plays.11 67 That Euripidean irony 
affects the audience 1 s perspective is surely a more 
important critical insight than what little can be derived 
from attempts to determine the poet 1 s own attitude toward 
his subject matter, which is, a£ter all, a futile exercise. 
65Whitman, Full Circle, p. 106. Whitman 1 s 
understanding of Euripides' irony begins on p. 108. 
66Whi tman, Full Circle, p. 108. 
67Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 66. 
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Euripidean irony, then, like that used by Socrates, 
has the e££ect 0£ distancing and thereby allowing the space 
necessary £or emotional detachment and a more objective 
perspective. Whether or not this technique is termed 
"irony,"68 an encouragement to objectivity is well 
attested in the critical literature on Euripides. Kitto, 
£or example, calls this encouragement Euripides' 
"disconcerting aloofness" 'from his characters.69 
Schlesinger asserts that "Euripides composes £or mood 
control--that is, to avoid the accumulation 0£ an undesired 
emotional e££ect."70 Michelini agrees: "[t]he 
Euripidean plot denies the audience a wholehearted 
participation in the pathetic circumstances 0£ the dramatic 
protagonists.•71 
And yet the use to which Euripides puts irony does not 
end with detachment. The detachment is used, as it was by 
Socrates, as the necessary precursor £or objective thought 
and, finally, for fostering the realization that one does 
68A discussion 0£ the problems involved in using 
the term "irony• may be found in w. D. Smith, "Ironic 
Structure in Alcestis,• Phoenix 14 (1960; hereafter Smith, 
"Ironic Structure"), pp. 128-129. 
69x:i tto, Tragedy, p. 253. 
70 Alfred Cary Schlesinger, Boundaries 0£ Dionysus: 
Athenian Foundations £or the Theory of Tragedy, {Cambridge, 
KA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1963; hereafter Schlesinger, 
Boundaries), p. 19. For Euripides' detachment, see also 
Wol££, "Euripides,• pp. 233 and 237. 
71Kichelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 86. 
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not know. Schlesinger brie'fly notes that Euripidean 
tragedies can demand 0£ their audience •a considerable 
degree 0£ judicial detachment.•72 But by £ar the most 
insight'ful statement on Euripidean irony is by William 
Arrowsmith. who, without acknowledging it, describes 
Euripides• irony in terms reminiscent 0£ Socratic elenchos: 
In any traditional perspective, Euripidean theater is 
complex and uncom'fortably strange, almost exasperating 
to a taste 'founded on Aeschylus and Sophocles. Its 
premises, as we have seen, are unlike, and almost the 
inversion 0£ those 0£ the traditional Greek theater. 
Typically it likes to conceal the truth beneath 
strata 0£ irony because this is the look 0£ truth: 
layered and elusive. For the same reason it presents 
its typical actions as problems and thereby involves 
the audience in a new relation, not as worshippers but 
jurors who must resolve the problem by decision. But 
because the problem is usually incapable 0£ outright 
resolution, is in £act •tragic,• the audience is 
compelled to 'forfeit the only luxury 0£ making a 
decision--the luxury 0£ knowing that one has decided 
wisely. Something--innocence, comfort, complacency--
is always £or£eited--or meant to be £or£eited--by the 
audience 0£ jurors. And this suggests that the 
essential anagnorisis 0£ Euripidean theater is not 
between one actor and another but between the audience 
and its won experience, as that experience is 'figured 
in the plays. Anagnorisis here is knowing moral 
choice, exercised on a problem which aims at mimicking 
the quandary 0£ a culture. As such, it is a pattern 
0£ the way in which the psyche is made whole again, 
and the hope of a culture.73 
Arrowsmith, in describing Euripidean irony, gives an 
inadvertent but accurate description 0£ the irony Socrates 
72schlesinger, Boundaries, p. 66. 
73Arrowsmith, "Ideas,• p. 53. 
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uses in elenchos.74 Here is the same confession that 
the truth is difficult if not impossible to attain, the 
same need to discard the conceit of knowledge, and the same 
hope £or psychic well-being to be gained £rom searching and 
coming to recognize that one does not, and indeed perhaps 
cannot, know. 
Behind Euripidean irony, in short, is what Chapter One 
argued was the sincere Socratic conviction 0£ ignorance. 
Arrowsmith sees the conviction of ignorance as central to 
Euripides• work: "The immediate, salient -fact 0£ 
Euripides• theater is the assumption o-f a universe devoid 
of rational order, or of an order incomprehensible to 
men.•75 Wolf£, in discussing Euripides• extensive use 
0£ recognitions in his later plays, likewise describes the 
poet's obsession with ignorance, this time with reference 
to Plato: 
The recognitions dramatize one of Euripides• main 
preoccupations in his later plays, human ignorance and 
human need to know. This is the realm that Plato will 
describe as the area of opinion, doxa, which means 
"what people think," their consensus on a matter (a 
notion associated with the democratic process), and 
also "illusion" or what is supposed from the 
subjective, individual viewpoint, in contrast to what 
74An opposing view is argued by Smith, "Ironic 
Structure," p. 128, who contrasts Euripides• irony, the 
method "0£ presenting a point 0£ view and at the same time 
qualifying or contradicting it by means 0£ a satirical 
treatment" with Socratic irony, "understatement which 
o£fers an apparently £alse sur£ace meaning but which points 
to a pro-founder truth beneath ('I know nothing.')." Smith 
concludes that the two are related, but not the same. 
75Arrowsmith, "Ideas," p. 36. 
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is claimed to be universal truth. Euripides has an 
acute sense of the dra.111a and pathos of human 
ignorance. It is the decisive mark of human 
vulnerability. and al>ove all of the isolated person in 
his or her subjective being. It is, so to speak, the 
passive determinant 0£ what makes us human, and it 
rinds power£ul expression in the emotions.76 
Recognizing ignorance, however, as will be recalled 
from Chapter One. is not possible in a discussion £rom 
which one remains coolly detached. It is here that what 
has been termed elenchos' personal aspect shows its effect, 
:for Socrates' insistence tnat interlocutors argue only what 
they believe, not hypotheses, assures their emotional 
involvement in the subject matter. It should not surprise 
us, then, to find in the critical literature observations 
on Euripides' singular adeptness at drawing his audience 
into identi£ication with the characters on stage. Side by 
side with Euripidean detachment, Wolf£ declares, there is 
Euripidean conviction.77 
The personal aspect of elenchos shows itself in 
Euripides• work in what have been termed his "realism• or 
•anachronism.• The realislll of his characters has been 
at tested as far back as Aristotle. who, at Poetics 60b.33-
34 reports that 
> • 
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Collard remarks upon this Euripidean realism and its 
potential effect: 
76wol:ff 
' 
"Euripides," pp. 2.59-2.60. 
77wolff 
' 
"Euripides," p. 33. 
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Euripides 1 theatre ... shares with our own the 
representation 0£ credible human beings, however 
extreme their predicaments: they :feel, think., talk., 
hold themselves and move, doing the actions and 
gestures o:f their time, some unique to it, some 
universally human and so out 0£ time, because that is 
how Euripides, how any dramatist, conveys reality . 
. . . it may be the everyday-realism, and the :familial 
or -friendly intimacy o:f so many settings, which 
paradoxically keep the persons within the range o:f 
experience and easy identi£ication.78 
Michelini, in contrasting the characterization 0£ 
Clytaemestra at the hands 0£ Aeschylus and 0£ Euripides, 
gives vivid testimony to how convincingly :familiar the 
Euripidean portrayal would have been to his audience: 
Aischylos• Klytaimestra is a monster 0£ heroic 
stature, resembling no woman 0£ her time. The 
audience who watched the drama 0£ male against -female 
played out in the Oresteia were not likely to be 
moved, as Aristophanes claimed Euripides 1 audiences 
were, to check under the bed :for an Aigisthos when 
they returned home £rom the per£ormance. Because 
Euripidean women have not been placed in a remote, 
heroic past world, where clashes with everyday life 
are muted, they generate a discom£ort that is a part 
0£ the continuing Euripidean assault on the tragic 
norm.79 
A more audience-speci£ic £orm 0£ realism is 
anachronism. That Euripides transported into the archaic, 
heroic past o:f the stories that served as his subject 
matter mannerisms and concerns characteristic 0£ £i:fth 
century B. C. Athens is a charge against him as old as the 
scholiasts. The scholiast on Hecuba (ed. Schwartz, line 
254), £or example, complains, "This is just like Euripides, 
78couard, Euripides, pp. 16 and u. 
bibliography, see also his p. 13 n. 26. 
For more 
79Kichelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 81. 
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imposing things from his own time on heroes and confounding 
the two times (Kal > £01'l ,.. 1'0lOU1'0S c 0 ;) I Eupl1fl6'1)S, 
I . c • 
""' 
u . 
11'£pla 11'1'WV Ta eau1'ov 1'0LS 'l)pWOl KQl 
' 1'0US 
I 
xpovous ouyxewv)." Collard similarly remarks, 
.. [Euripides] brought his polis into the mythic world 
more obviously and consistently than Sophocles and even 
Aeschylus.•80 Kenneth Reck-ford makes the point that 
Euripidean anachronisms in Medea close the distance between 
the audience and the characters in the play: 
The anachronistic, fifth-century ideas with which 
Euripides enlivens his myth point to no program £or 
better Athenian living; but they do bring the tragedy 
nearer home for the audience, and by extension for 
ourselves, by focusing the general failure 0£ human 
aspirations in specifically Athenian terms.81 
By the technique of anachronism, then, Euripides disallows 
the complacency of distance and forces his audience to be 
involved in an immediate way. P. E. Easterling comments on 
the jarring effect of Euripides• use of anachronisms: 
All these subversive devices complicate the effects of 
the heroic stories by reminding the audience of the 
clash between the time of the story and their own 
present time, suggesting, often enough, that they 
should look closely at the disturbing implications of 
the heroic tales and not allow themselves to be 
anaesthetised by their glamour or by their familiarity 
on the Attic stage.82 
In summary, Euripides uses techniques that have the 
80couard, Euripides, p. 32. 
81x:enneth J. 
99 (1968; hereafter 
Reck£ord, "Medea's First 
Reckford, "First Exit"), 
82p, 
Tragedy," 
E. Easterling, 
JHS 105 (1985), 
"Anachronism 
p. 9. 
in 
Exit," 
p. 340. 
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same e:f:fects as the impersonal and personal aspects o:f 
Socratic elenchos. Euripides, like Socrates, encourages 
both objectivity that allows room :for cognition and 
identi:fication that ensures emotional involvement. 
Michelini sums it up nea Uy: 
Euripidean theater plays a dangerous game with its 
audience, luring them in with pathos and charm, but 
chilling their sympathy always, just at the crucial 
moment when the watchers would have become incapable 
o:f detaching themselves :from the dramatic illusion. A 
biased and sentimental pity is deliberately evoked, 
only to be expunged by a wave o:f astringent 
irony.83 
It is not surprising, then, that the literature 
recognizes in Euripides• plays a con:frontation between 
emotion and cognition--the very con:frontation that builds 
to a crescendo in elenchos as practiced by Socrates. Albin 
Lesky, £or example, vividly describes this con£rontation: 
•na steht das Pathos £lammender Leidenscha£t neben 
handl ungs£remden Ra tionalismen w84 Michelini 
similarly remarks 0£ Euripides, "The specialist in :female 
emotional maladies (Leidenscha:ft) turns cold rhetorician, 
just as we become absorbed in his art.•85 And finally, 
R. P. Winnington-Ingram summarizes the outcome 0£ this 
con:frontation 0£ emotion and cognition in Euripides in such 
a way as to evoke memories o:f that moment in Socratic 
83Hichelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 93-94. 
Geschich te, p. 409. 
85ffichelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 50. 
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elenchos when the interlocutor realizes the emotional 
unacceptability o:f inescapably logical conclusions: 
The devastating power o:f emotion in human li:fe--that 
is indeed something by which Euripides was obsessed, 
not least during the period in which he wrote the 
Hippolytus; and he was hardly sanguine about the 
ability o:f men, individually or collectively, to 
control this power by intelligence.86 
But such a confrontation o:f emotion and cognition is, 
as will be recalled :from Chapter One's discussion o:f the 
interlocutor's experience o:f elenchos, :fraught with 
contradictory impulses. There is the erotic allure o:f the 
as yet unrevealed truth, and then the painful prospect o:f 
admitting one's ignorance and reforming one's actions 
according to strange new standards. There are both 
attraction and repulsion at elenchos' terminus, and 
likewise, it seems, :for the audience o:f Euripides' plays. 
P. T. Stevens, after considering the evidence :for 
Euripides' legendary unpopularity among the Athenians, 
concludes that while Euripides was probably "unorthodox 
sometimes and disconcerting," he was nonetheless "a 
dramatist whose plays everyone wanted to see.•87 
86R. P. Winnington-Ingram, "Hippolytus: A Study 
in Causation," in Entretiens sur l' antiquite cla~sique, 
Vol. 6, 1958, Euripide (Geneva: Vandoeuvres, 1960; 
hereafter Winnington-Ingram, "Hippolytus"), p. 173. 
87stevens, "E. and Athenians," p. 94. C:f. the 
similar conclusion o:f Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 73, 
"Euripidean plays were and are notoriously good theater; 
and an archon who gave a chorus to Euripides could be 
certain that the audience would not be bored or 
disappointed." 
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Michelini similarly not.es "[t.]he apparent.ly cont.radict.ory 
aims 0£ Euripidean t.heat.er, t.o enthrall and delight., as 
well as to a££ront. and irritate ... ," and concludes her 
chapt.er "Euripides and His Audience: The Tactics 0£ Shock" 
by describing the ambivalent. impulses Euripidean theat.er 
was meant to evoke: 
An out.break 0£ rage and reject.ion -from t.he audience, 
t.he dreaded uproar in t.he t.hea t.er (t.horybos), is 
court.ed--and then allayed by a reversal that. disarms 
resent.ment and seems £or a time to right the moral 
universe. Besides the vibrat.ion between t.wo ext.remes, 
t.here are also -fainter overt.ones 0£ dissonance built. 
int.o scenes that. seem to compel sympathy or 
repugnance, overtones t.hat become dominant once t.he 
next variation begins to un£old. By approaching the 
audience in this way, Euripides guaranteed that they 
would never be able entirely t.o deny him their 
attention, t.hough he would never gain their entire 
approvai.88 
Euripides with his plays, it. seems, roused in his 
audience no less intense £eelings 0£ attraction and 
repulsion than those experienced by the A t.henians who both 
eagerly engaged in conversation with Socrates and hastened 
t.o escape t.he dist.urbing conclusions his practice 0£ 
elenchos suggested. The reason £or the similar reaction 0£ 
Euripides• audience and Socrat.es• int.erlocut.ors is t.hat. 
both men practiced the same method--Socra t.es in seemingly 
casual conversation and Euripides in constructing his 
plays. 
This chapter has thus £ar shown that. the crit.ical 
literature on Euripides gives ample t.est.imony in support 0£ 
88Kichelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 74 and 94. 
272 
the above thesis. Euripides, like Socrates, was considered 
to be a philosopher, but a peculiar one, one who could only 
be consistently classi'fied as unclassi'fiable, whose medium 
was paradox, asking questions but giving no answers, and 
advancing no identi'fiable doctrine. In Euripides 1 plays 
one can detect the overt procedural aspects o'f Socratic 
elenchos: two counterpoised positions, one o'f which is 
re'futed, the changing position 0£ the interlocutor, and the 
aporia at the procedure 1 s end. One can even 'find evidence 
'for the subtle procedural a,spect o'f counterpointed 
analogies. Finally, Euripides 1 plays exhibit the Socratic 
character 0£ elenchos: its impersonal and personal 
aspects, its con'frontation o'f emotion and cognition, and 
its ability to elicit both attraction and repulsion. 
It is clear, then, that correspondences between the 
methodologies o'f Socratic elenchos and Euripides 1 plays 
have been strongly sensed. It remains the 'final task o'f 
this study to illustrate those correspondences by a 
thoroughgoing analysis 0£ a Euripidean play. 
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Part Two: The Periods 0£ Euripides' Work 
and the Choice 0£ Medea 
Choosing to establish the operation 0£ Socratic 
elenchos in Medea, one 0£ the earliest Euripidean plays, 
raises the question 0£ when Socrates himsel£ began using 
the method. It would seem imperative to argue that the 
production 0£ Medea in 431 B. C. did not precede Socrates' 
practice 0£ elenchos on the streets 0£ Athens. And yet, 
the tantalizing but inde£inite evidence on Socrates' 
intellectual development89 does not indicate when he 
took to practicing the method he is shown using in the 
early Platonic dialogues.90 But it is not necessary 
that Medea come a£ter Socrates' practice 0£ the method, £or 
illustrating the similarity between Euripides' and the 
early Platonic Socrates' methods does not require what this 
study does not pretend to do: to argue that the historical 
Socrates actually used the method, or used it £irst. 
Since, then, the question 0£ priority is moot, any 
play 0£ Euripides may be chosen. As it turns out, there 
89For at tempts to assign a chronology to Socrates' 
early li£e and to date the "autobiography" at Phaedo 96a 
££. and Chaerephon's visit to the Delphic oracle (Apology 
21a ££., c£. Xenophon's Apology 14), see, e.g., Guthrie, 
Socrates, pp. 58-88, and Taylor, Socrates, pp. 37-88. 
901£, however, Chapter Two's analysis 0£ the 
Clouds is correct, we could hazard the guess that Socrates' 
practice 0£ elenchos was in 423 (the date 0£ the £irst 
Clouds) £amiliar enough to the Athenian citizenry to raise 
a la ugh 0£ recognition. 
274 
are compelling reasons for choosing an early play rather 
than a late one. For although critics di££er on the 
evolution 0£ Euripides' work through his middle and late 
periods, distinguishing features 0£ the early plays are 
more widely agreed upon.91 It happens that these 
features mark the early plays as more promisingly 
illustrative of elenchos than those from the middle and 
late periods. 
First, early plays are recognized as being more purely 
tragic than the ones that £ollow.92 Some modern 
commentators see tragedy as an elenctic genre,93 even 
though they may not label it as such. Recall Hussbaum's 
observation that tragic drama shares with Plato's 
philosophic drama the central structural feature of 
91Either 42.7 B. C. or 417-415 B. C. are cited as 
the dividing point between early and other plays. For an 
overview of critical opinion on the periods of Euripides' 
work, see Michelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 23, 39-40, 75 
and 89-91; and Collard, Euripides, p. 5. 
92.The exceptions, 0£ course, are the early 
Alcestis, usually designated tragicomic, and the late, 
tragic Bacchae. For the early period 0£ Euripides• work 
as high tragedy, see, e.g., Kitto, Tragedy, pp. 188-90. 
Kit to (p. 311) deems Alcestis one 0£ Euripides' 
tragicomedies, and Bacchae •almost in a class 0£ its own• 
(p. 370). See also Andre Rivier, Essai sur le tragique 
d'Euripide, 2. ed. (Paris: Di£fusion de Boccard, 1975), 
passim, but especially pp. 139-148, who includes Bacchae in 
with Alcestis, Medea, Hippolytos, Iphigenia at Aulis, and 
Heracles under the designation •1e tragique,• while other 
2.75 
plays are designated either "le romanesque" or "le pathetique." 
93rn the original Chapter Two of this 
dissertation, since set aside, it was argued that the genre 
of tragedy as conceived by Aristotle in the Poetics shared 
much of elenchos' procedure and character. 
elenchos,94 and add to it the following observation o'f 
Froma Zeitlin, which unwittingly attests to tragedy's 
elenctic nature: 
... tragedy is the epistemological form par 
excellence. What it does best through the resources 
of the theater is to chart a pa th from ignorance to 
knowledge, deception to revelation, misunderstanding 
to recognition. The characters act out and live 
through the consequences of having clung to a partial 
single view of the world and themselves .... If 
tragedy, as I have suggested, is the epistemological 
genre par excellence, which continually calls into 
question what we know and how we think we know it, it 
does so often by confronting the assumptions of 
rational thought with those psychological necessities 
that may not be denied.95 
It therefore seems reasonable to seek the operation of 
elenchos in a play recognized as tragic, rather than in one 
that has been considered a hybrid of tragedy and another 
genre. The later plays of Euripides, then, are not likely 
candidates for analysis, since these plays are often 
defined as not purely tragic, but are instead variously 
designated as tragicomedies, melodramas, or romantic 
94Hussbaum, Fragility, pp. 128-129; on p. 133 
Nussbaum argues that tragic elenchos works primarily 
through the emotions, while Platonic elenchos teaches by 
appeal to the intellect alone. 
95Froma I. Zeitlin, •Playing the Other: Theater, 
Theatricality, and the Feminine in Greek Drama," 
Representations 11 (1985; hereafter Zeitlin, "Playing the 
Other"), pp. 72-74. Zeitlin refers the reader to Jean-
Pierre Vernant, •Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek 
Tragedy," in Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, ed. Jean-
Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Haquet (Hew York: Zone 
Books, 1988), pp. 29-48. See especially Vernant•s p. 38: 
"In a tragic perspective man and human action are seen, not 
as things that can be defined or described, but as 
problems. They are presented as riddles whose double 
meanings can never be pinned down or exhausted." 
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tragedies.96 Even more generally, however, the tragic 
dimension 0£ elenchos (see Chapter One, Part Four), i.e., 
elenchos' apparent lack 0£ success at attaining its stated 
aims, suggests that a play with a happy or even a neutral 
ending would not reproduce elenchos' interlocutor's descent 
to acknowledged ignorance and the ultimate de£eat o-f his 
position.97 
A second characteristic o-f early plays indicating 
their a££inity with elenchos is that these plays display, 
more consistently than later ones, Euripides' above 
discussed (Part One) propensity £or posing questions, and 
that they £ocus more consistently upon broad moral 
issues.98 Michelini, £or example, agreeing with 
Schadewald t •s delineation 0£ Euripides• stylistic 
development in the decades a£ter the mid-420's, notes that 
"vigorous polemic against conventional views is replaced by 
96Tragicomedies: Kitto, Tragedy, 309-329, and 
Whitman, Full Circle, pp. 138-139. Melodramas: Horwood, 
Essays, pp. 21-22, and Kitto, Tragedy, pp. 330-369. 
Romantic tragedies: Conacher, Euripidean Drama, pp. 265 
and 341. 
97 See Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 85: "In a 
£ew 0£ the late plays, the cynicism becomes more benign, 
and the scramblings 0£ the protagonists are sometimes 
rewarded with a success that, £or all their plot ting and 
contriving, they have not completely earned." 
98According to Eric Havelock, "The Evidence £or 
the Teaching o-f Socrates,• TAPA 65 (1934), p. 283, "Acted 
drama, or dramatized conversations, was the traditional 
Greek method 0£ discussing and analysing moral ideas." 
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a more 'resigned' stance.•99 And Whitman detects, in 
three late Euripidean plays, what can only be described as 
the hardening 0£ Euripidean speculation into dogma. There 
is, he maintains, in these plays truth "built 'from within 
the plays themselves" or rather "woven into the 'fabric" o-f 
the plays, which contain "revelations 0£ inherent truth, 
like axioms rightly stated."100 Similarly, Friedrich 
Solmsen traces in the later plays a growing indi££erence to 
broad, philosophic issues and to the moral issues that 
received ironic treatment in the early plays, and a 
correspondingly increasing emphasis on the individual's 
concern over his own problems, his own quest £or 
happiness.101 Early Euripidean plays, then, more 
closely approximate both the general 'focus and the broad 
program 0£ elenchos in the early Platonic dialogues. 
Third and last, early Euripidean plays are similar to 
elenchos in 'featuring the throes 0£ heightened emotion that 
accompany the questioning 0£ personal values. Many 
99Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 79, in reference 
to Wol£gang Schadewald t, Monolog und Selbstgesprach; 
Untersuchungen zur Formsgeschichte der griechischen 
Tragodie, Neue Philol. Unters. 2 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1926), 
pp. 131 ££. See also Michelini, p. 90, where she notes in 
plays 0£ the 420's and a£ter themes 0£ "patriotism and 
doctrinaire moralism." 
100Whi tman, Full Circle, pp. 139-140. 
101Friedrich Solmsen, "Euripides• Ion im Vergleich 
mit anderen Tragodien," in Euripides, ed. Ernst-Richard 
Schwinge (Darmstadt: Wissenscha£tliche Buchgesellscha£t, 
1968), p. 453; reprinted 'from Hermes 69 (1934), p. 408. 
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scholars, beginning with the Schlegels, have denounced the 
emotionalism 0£ Euripidean plays,102 but the early 
plays are widely recognized as the most highly emotional, 
ridden as they are with themes 0£ sexual deviance and an 
emphasis on women.103 Webster, £or example, 
characterizes the pattern 0£ Euripides' early plays as 
£ollows: "Each year he produced one play about a bad 
woman, one play about an unhappy woman, and one play 0£ a 
di££erent K.ind."104 The extent to which scholars 
identi£y with early plays the predominance 0£ high emotion 
or, more speci£ically, the erotic, can be seen in LesK.y's 
inclination to group together £or discussion with early 
plays those that display emotionalism.105 
Two plays, however, £rom the early group are 
conspicuous in showing the con£lict between cognition and 
emotion that is integral to elenchos: Medea and 
Hippolytus. For this reason both Kitto and Lesky assign 
102For discussion 0£ this point and bibliography, 
see Michelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 5-6 and especially n. 
16. 
103Michelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 75-79, 
discusses Euripides' move away £rom themes 0£ sexual 
deviance and the emphasis on women, and assigns the mid-
420's as the time when this move began. 
10 4T. B. L. Webster, ""'T....;;;h'--e_..;;;;T;.,;;r;_a~g._e_d...;,..;:;;i..;;;;e..:;s'---o-'£"--'E;..;;.__u_r_1;;;_· &p_i_d_e_s 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1967), p. 116; c£. p. 31. 
105LesK.y, Geschich te, p. 422. 
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these plays to a category 0£ their own.106 That these 
two plays depict this con'flict is not, however, the only 
reason for considering them leading candidates for this 
study's analysis. There is, in fact, a related but a much 
more seductive reason for illustrating elenchos' operation 
in one of these two plays. 
This is because both Medea and Hippolytus have long 
been studied for possible signs of Euripides' attitude 
toward "Socratic doctrine." I speak, 0£ course, 0£ the 
controversy over Medea 1078-1080 and Hippolytus 380 ff. In 
the former, Medea proclaims, in seeming de'fiance 0£ the 
Socratic paradox that one does the good if one knows it, 
that she knows the harm she is about to do, but will do it 
anyway. In the latter, Phaedra addresses herself to the 
puzzle of human akrasia (inconstancy) in the 'face of a 
perceived good, and meditates on the ca uses for not doing 
what one knows one ought to do. Speculation on these 
lines' relation to Socratic doctrine began in 1948--when 
Bruno Snell suggested that the lines spoken by Medea (Medea 
1078-1080) and Phaedra (Hippolytus 380-4-30) respectively 
gave impetus to and conveyed sentiment against Socratic 
106Kitto, Tragedy, p. 250 ("The tragedies fall 
into two groups, the Medea and Hippolytus, and the war-
plays or social tragedies."), more so than Lesky, 
Geschichte, p. 4-22 ("Im die um Kedeia und Hippolytos 
geschlossene Gruppe . . "). 
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doctrine--and continues to the present day.107 And 
while it is not the intention 0£ this study to try to 
determine the philosophic orientation 0£ Euripides £rom the 
words spoken by his characters--surely an exercise in 
£utility and presumptuous £ony108 __ i t nonetheless 
would seem cowardly to avoid choosing one 0£ the two plays 
in which the critical literature has discerned something 
distinctly Socratic. 
Joseph Campbell, in the videotaped series, "The Power 
0£ Myth," cites an old Irish query, "Is this a private 
'fight, or can anybody join in?"109 In analyzing one 
0£ these two plays, I plan to enter the £ray, but to move 
its 'focus away £rom the purely speculative realm 0£ the 
poet 1 s own philosophy to a subject more suitable £or a play 
whose author is long dead: the method used to create his 
play 1 s e££ect. For here we have all the evidence we need: 
l07Bruno Snell, "Das £riihste Zeugnis uber 
Sokra tes," Philologus 97 (1948; herea £ter Snell, 
"Zeugnis"), pp. 125-34; c£. Snell 1s slight revision in 
Scenes £rom Greek Drama (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. 
0£ Cali£ornia Press, 1964; herea£ter Snell, Scenes), pp. 
59-69. For Snell supporters and detractors, see below, 
Chapter Four, Part Two. 
108on this point, see Kovacs, Heroic Muse, p. 3, 
who quotes Northrop Frye, A Hat ural Perspective: The 
Development 0£ Shakespearean Comedy and Romance (Hew York, 
1965), p. 43, on the indecency 0£ reducing a poet "· .. to 
an ego with something to 'say. 1 " 
109Transcripts 0£ the tapes, edited and reordered, 
were subsequently published. See Joseph Campbell, The 
Power 0£ Myth, with Bill Moyers, ed. Betty Sue Flowers (Hew 
York: Doubleday, 1988; herea£ter Campbell, Power). 
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we have the play itself. 
But why Medea rather than Hippolytus? Medea is 
preferable for one, critical reason: the domination of the 
play by its protagonist duplicates what was seen in the 
model dialogue, Eu thyphro, analyzed in Chapter One--the 
focus on and refutation of the views of one person. For it 
will be argued below that it is primarily Medea 1 s world-
view,110 a view with which many Athenians in the 
audience would feel special affinity, that is ultimately 
found to be emotionally unacceptable when taken to the 
impeccably logical conclusions to which its premises 
point. 
UOffedea 1 s world-view is shared by Jason, aspired 
to by Creon, and approved by the Chorus. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCRATIC ELEllCHOS ARD MAIEUSIS Ill EURIPIDES' MEDEA 
Introduction 
A tragic play is not a philosophic dialogue. 
Similarity 0£ method, not essence, is what must be shown 
here, and to do so requires dismembering the text. To 
trace in Medea what were described in Chapter One as the 
constituent elements 0£ Socrates" method in the early 
Platonic dialogues requires that its parts be considered in 
turn be-fore they be restored to the sum that is their 
whole. Such an analysis and reconstitution will show that 
Euripides• Medea operates in every aspect like an early 
Platonic dialogue. 
Similarity of intent will be demonstrated -first. It 
will be seen that in Medea, definition 0£ three related 
universals is what is sought and proposed. These can be 
identified by the occurrence of key abstract nouns; their 
definition is proposed through etymologically related 
adjectives describing particular individuals per-forming 
particular actions. 
The £ate 0£ these particulars, however, is the same in 
Medea as was the £ate 0£ the interlocutor's proposed 
definitions in elenchos. In short, they are ultimately 
refuted. Through the preferred "indirect establishment" 0£ 
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the thesis, particulars in Medea are 'forced to undeniably 
logical conclusions that are nonetheless emotionally 
repugnant. 
It will be argued that in this play one can discern 
the same evidence £or reversal and recognition as in the 
early Platonic dialogues. The Chorus, who serve1 as 
the primary interlocutor, experience the interlocutor's 
trans-formation 'from boast£ul con'fidence in their certitude 
to a halting awareness 0£ the limitations 0£ their 
knowledge. Sel£-assurance gives way to 'feeling lost: the 
Chorus describe their recognition as aporia, mark the 
defeat of the definitions they supported by trying to 
project onto others blame £or the de'feat, and yet, i'f only 
momentarily, display a form of wonder and uncertainty that 
is the mark of the budding philosopher. Medea, and 
secondarily Jason and Creon, all of whom manifest the 
definitions, illustrate failure of these by their own 
reversals. Medea alone betrays recognition of her 
reversal, but chooses escape. 
The choice of escape at the end of Medea is made for 
the same reasons that interlocutors chose to leave at the 
end of elenchos. For, unless one wants to begin to define 
the universals anew, there is nothing but to abandon the 
1r have chosen, £or the sake 0£ consistency, to 
treat "Chorus" as a plural noun, since I o'ften refer to the 
Chorus as "the Corinthian women" and must thereafter use 
the pronoun "they." 
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now repugnant particulars. As in elenchos so in this play: 
the particulars are abandoned, le£t, literally, in suspense 
at the end as escape is made. There remains only the vague 
suggestion 0£ de£inition £or the universals, and the queasy 
suspicion that their satis£actory de£inition would entail 
turning the known world on its ear. 
The play proper, then, ends in aporia. It will next 
be proposed that aporia is not, however, the true terminus 
0£ Euripides 1 play. To support this proposition, we shall 
examine two 0£ the poet 1 s tactics to bring the truth to 
birth outside the play 1 s con£ines, in the audience 0£ 
theater-goers, as Plato in his dialogues le£t this task to 
the reader-auditors. 
The £irst 0£ these tactics is two£old: the so-called 
"personal" and "impersonal" aspects 0£ elenchos £amiliar 
£rom the dialogues. It will be shown how Euripides renders 
the re£utation e££ected in the play "personal," i.e., 
power£ully relevant, not only to the Chorus 0£ Corinthian 
women, but to the Athenian audience as well. He likewise 
renders it "impersonal," by allowing the Chorus and his 
audience the requisite objective distance £or attempting to 
come to de£inition 0£ the universals. In short, Euripides 
both engages his audience and pushes them away so that they 
can re£lect upon what they see and £eel. Like Socrates 0£ 
the early Platonic dialogues, Euripides collocates the 
actual with the possible, the known with the unknown, the 
285 
particular with the universal. His Medea is, in the end, 
tantalizingly suggestive at the same time it is repulsive. 
Euripides• -final tactic to bring the truth to birth is 
the Platonic Socrates' counterpoint 0£ analogy. In Medea 
this counterpoint is provided by subtle poetic devices: 
metaphors, images, and motifs, which show affinity for one 
or more of the definiends. These poetic devices are put to 
two uses, to overturn the particulars proposed as 
definition and to suggest, but not defend, a preferred 
definition for the uni versa ls. 
In conclusion, then, it will be argued that Euripides• 
elenchos is like that of the Platonic Socrates: highly 
provocative, but not--ul tima tely--nega ti ve. 
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Part One: Proposed De£ini tions in Medea: 
Arete, Sophia, and Eros 
Introductory Remarks 
The universals whose de£inition the Medea considers 
are £amiliar to any reader 0£ the play. Primary 
consideration is given to arete ("heroic" excellence), 
while arete's relationship to two other abstractions, 
sophia (wisdom/cunning)2. and eros (generative desire) 
is secondary. And although these three abstract nouns are 
not o£ten used (arete twice, 62.9 and 845; sophia twice, 82.8 
and 1086; eros eight times, 8, 152., 330, 530, 62.7, 698, 
714, 842.), scarcely a line goes by in which de£inition 0£ 
at least one 0£ these universals is not implied, openly 
discussed, or boldly asserted; thus, their ring 0£ 
£amiliarity. In the critical literature the "heroic" 
aspects 0£ Medea,3 the sophistry passing £or wisdom 0£ 
2.As will become apparent, my discussion 0£ sophia 
owes its inspiration primarily to Arrowsmith, "Ideas," pp. 
47-48, who asserts that Medea "is based upon a central key-
term, sophia." This term, Arrowsmith rightly argues, "is 
an extremely complex term," comprising "Jason's cool sel£-
interest, the magical and erotic skills 0£ the sorceress 
Medea" as well as "that ideal Athenian £usion 0£ moral and 
artistic skills which, £ostered by eros, creates the 
distinctive arete 0£ the civilized pOlis." This last is 
"the standard by which the actions 0£ Jason and Medea are 
to be judged." 
3one 0£ the best-known treatments 0£ Medea as hero 
is that 0£ Bernard Knox, "The Medea 0£ Euripides," YCS 2.5 
(1977), pp. 193-2.2.6; reprinted in Word and Action. Essays 
on the Ancient Theatre, pp. 2.95-32.2. (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979; herea£ter Knox, "Medea"). Knox 
(pp. 2.97-2.98) gives an impressive array 0£ attributes Medea 
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one or more 0£ the characters,'! and the disturbing 
nature 0£ Medea's desire5 are frequent subjects. And 
yet, so compelling are the positions presented in this play 
that critics tend to side strongly with or against 
characters, praising or blaming them as i£ they were real 
people 6 
Such tendencies confirm how emotionally engaging this 
elenchos is; critics can barely keep £rom choosing sides. 
But £or the moment, at least, emotional engagement with the 
shares with the Sophoclean-type hero. C£. Wol££, 
"Euripides," p. 238; George Gellie, "The Character 0£ 
Medea," BICS 35 (1988), p. 16 (herea£ter Gellie, 
"Character"); P. E. Easterling, "The Infanticide in 
Euripides' Medea," YCS 25 (1977; herea£ter Easterling, 
"Infanticide"). p. 183. Suzanne Hills, Euripides Medea: A 
Study in Dramatic Hythopoeia (diss. Stan£ord Univ., 1976; 
hereafter Hills, Hythopoeia). pp. 101-103, elaborates on 
Knox, adding, e.g., that Medea's heroic stature is enhanced 
by "occasional epicisms in her speech." 
4-Jason is regularly charged with sophistry; see, 
e.g., Rohdich, Tragodie, pp. 55-59; Conacher, Euripidean 
Drama, p. 189; Carrie E. Cowherd, "The Ending 0£ the 
Medea," CW 76 (1983; herea£ter Cowherd, "Ending"), p. 134; 
Easterling, "In£anticide,• p. 184; Stephen Ohlander, 
Dramatic Suspense in Euripides' and Seneca's Medea (Hew 
York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1989; herea£ter 
Ohlander, Suspense), p. 95. 
5Host recently, Rick H. Newton, "Medea's 
Passionate Poison," Syllecta Classica 1 (1989; hereafter 
Newton, "Passionate Poison"), pp. 13-20. 
6The dangers 0£ "The Documentary Fallacy" are 
discussed by A. J. A. Waldock, Sophocles the Dramatist 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1951; paperback. ed., 1966), 
pp. 11-24. I owe this reference to James G. Keenan. C£. 
Hicole Loraux, "Herakles: The Super-Hale and the 
Feminine,• in Be£ore Sexuality: The Construction 0£ Erotic 
Experience in the Ancient World, ed. David K. Halperin, et 
al. (Princeton, HJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 22-
23. 
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text must be postponed until the attempt to de-fine in this 
elenchos is considered. We must 'first look to the inter-
related de£inition 0£ the just mentioned universals, and 
then to how they £are in elenchos, and 'finally to the 
artistry 0£ Euripides, who, like the wily Socrates, has 
picked this 'fight and subtly shapes its inexorable 
progress. 
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Arete, Sophia, and Eros: The Quest £or Sel£-Advancement. 
Al though the abstract > , noun apel""I is used but 
twice in the play (629 and 845),7 Medea is largely 
concerned with appropriate human behavior. Excellence in 
behavior is assumed to be the natural province 0£ the 
power£ul--in short, 0£ "heroes"; it is de£ined by a quest 
to be known £or promoting one's own interests, and a code 
o£ conduct that supports this quest. The validity 0£ this 
quest and code is unchallenged. As remnants 0£ a heroic 
past, they are adhered to, and their adherents are 
respected i£ sometimes £eared. But when translated into 
the play•s present, where the status quo has dislodged the 
very underpinnings 0£ excellence, the code is de£ormed and 
the quest becomes deadly. The nonetheless enduring appeal 
0£ the quest and code is obvious in that neither is 
completely abandoned, at least not by the Chorus. 
The two other abstractions the text is concerned to 
de£ine, sophia and eros, are integral to the de:fini tion 0£ 
arete and cannot, there:fore, be arti:ficially separated :from 
its de:finition. Both sophia and eros are valued only 
inso£ar as they are able to advance arete as the play 
7 The text used :for Medea is Page, Medea. I have 
chosen this over the more recent text o:f Diggle because I 
object to many o:f his excisions, especially the excision 0£ 
lines 1056-1080. 
For word study o:f the text, I have relied on Marianne 
McDonald, A Semilemma tized Concordance to Euripides' Medea 
{Irvine, Cali£.: Univ. o:f Cali:fornia Press, 1978; 
herea:fter McDonald, Concordance). 
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defines it; their definitions are distorted by the 
exigencies of the code and quest whose purposes they serve. 
As in Socratic elenchos, de£inition 0£ universals in 
Medea is approached through the description 0£ particulars. 
such definition is, however, problematic in that no 
definition should be confined to instances in which the 
abstraction itself is uttered. Such an approach would be 
limited and nonsensical; concepts as broad as excellence, 
desire, and wisdom are discussed not only when absolute 
reference is made to abstract nouns. We are, admittedly, 
on firmest ground when such references occur. As far as 
the three universals in Medea are concerned, arete, sophia, 
and eros, definition of arete is most difficult to trace, 
for besides occurring only twice in abstraction, it finds 
its primary expression in generalized approval or censure 
of individuals and their actions. Eros is somewhat easier, 
for it is both more frequently discussed in abstraction 
than are arete and sophia, and its expression can likewise 
be found in nouns and verbs which obviously denote erotic 
engagement. In Medea, this includes eros 
anthropomorphized as the gods Aphrodite (Cypris) and the 
Erotes, and the physical manifestation 0£ the force in 
nouns meaning "bed" (e.g., > I £\JV'l"I, AEK "l'pov, 
, 
KOl 1''1')). Sophia"s definition is easiest of all; 
although it occurs infrequently as the abstract noun 
sophia, Medea is heavy with descriptions of individuals by 
recourse to the adjective sop hos. The related adjective 
I 
6£LV05 gives £urther guidance. 
And yet, since a play is unlike a dialogue in that no 
one person is posing the question, "What is X?" to which 
other persons are proposing answers, tracing de£inition in 
Medea is not as easy as tracing de£inition in a dialogue, 
and must proceed by certain assumptions. First, it will be 
assumed that the very use 0£ abstract nouns contains an 
implied i£ not clearly stated de£inition. Second, it will 
be assumed that description 0£ an individual or an action 
by using words similar in meaning or cognate to one 0£ the 
abstract nouns likewise contains a de£inition. Third, a 
de£inition--whether by re£erence to an abstract noun or to 
a particular individual or action--may be assumed to have 
been proposed and supported by an expression 0£ approval, 
while its rejection takes the £orm 0£ censure. In short, 
the establishment and rejection 0£ de£inition gleaned £rom 
the admittedly rare discussions 0£ the abstract nouns will 
be supplemented by tracing the approval and disapproval 
with which the characters and their actions are described. 
Finally, it will be assumed that approval (or disapproval) 
can be assessed: 1) by the occurrence 0£ words denoting 
"good• and •£ine• ("bad," "ugly•) and the like;8 2) by 
8 r 'follow Adkins, Merit, p. 30, who lists among 
"the most power£ul words 0£ commendation used 0£ a man both 
in Homer and in later Greek• the £allowing: arete, 
agathos, esthlos, chrestos, kalon; comparatives ameinon, 
beltion and kallion; superlatives aristos, beltistos, and 
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patent expressions of approval or agreement (disapproval or 
disagreement); 3) by espousal or emulation of like and 
thereby validating (opposing and thereby dissenting) 
positions or actions. In Medea, it is the Chorus 
primarily, and the minor characters (although the Hurse is 
a special case) secondarily, who serve as the interlocutors 
in this would-be dialogue, and it is therefore the Chorus 
primarily, and the Tutor, Hurse, Creon, Aegeus, and the 
Messenger to whom one must turn £or expressions 0£ 
approbation and censure. 
In tracking these expressions of approbation and 
censure, it soon becomes apparent that generalized 
approbation 0£ behavior, which signals definition of arete, 
is above all given to what A. W. H. Adkins has termed the 
"competitive virtues,• and to what Bernard Knox and others 
have described, in part incorrectly, as the "heroic" 
aspects or Medea.9 Unreserved approval is--a t least at 
kalliston. 
9I first realized that to describe Euripides• 
Medea as heroic was missing the mark. when I felt qualms 
about comparing her to Achilles or Odysseus. In the 
conclusion to a paper read to the Illinois Classical 
Conference in 1985, I described Medea as an "individual 
with no society, an Achilles who will never ransom Hector•s 
body, an Odysseus who can never go home." 
The critical literature is full or descriptions of 
Kedea•s heroic aspects, but there is often hesitation to 
describe her without qualification as a hero. See 
Elizabeth Bryson Bongie, "Heroic Elements in the Medea 0£ 
Euripides,• TAPA 107 (1977; herea"fter Bongie, "Heroic 
Elements"), pp. 32. and 30, who deems Medea "probably the 
most genuinely 'heroic• figure on the Greek. stage• in 
vocabulary and characterization and analyzes Medea as •an 
2.93 
heroic play 0£ the Sophoclean type." Yet Bongie tends to 
narrow heroes when comparing Medea with them. Medea is 
compared, e.g., to Achilles reacting to his insulted honor, 
or to Ajax "who cares not a whit £or the hideous crime he 
has almost perpetrated but only £or his tarnished prestige, 
his loss 0£ time." (pp. 29-30). Bongie seems to sense some 
discordant notes in this picture, £or example when she 
contrasts Antigone's "positive aim in li£e" with Medea's 
"negative aim inspired by the same values" (p. 31). C£. 
also p. 32 n. 17: "Quite conceivably, by the very 
exaggeration 0£ Medea's heroic qualities, Euripides is in 
£act criticising the system 0£ values that produced such 
results." This system 0£ values, as Bongie describes it 
(p. 30), is taken £rom Adkins, who deems it "competitive" 
rather than "heroic." Bongie's use 0£ the term "heroic" 
£orces her to interpret Medea's exit on the sun-chariot as 
a "puri£ication," symbolic 0£ the "glory she has won in the 
eyes of the gods." (p. 54). Furthermore, Medea becomes, " 
... in the code 0£ the ancient heroic system, a veritable 
'saint.'" I £ind this statement, quali£ied though it is, 
impossible to accept. 
Helene Foley, "Medea's Divided Sel£,• CA 8 (1989; 
herea£ter Foley, "Divided Sel£•), pp. 79-81, 'follows Bongie 
and Knox, Medea, in seeing Medea •s heroic aspects, but 
avoids engaging in hero worship. Perhaps the reason is to 
be £ound on p. 76, where Foley compares Medea to Ajax, 
Odysseus, and Achilles, yet suggests that Medea "models her 
sel£-image . . . on a masculine heroic and even military 
model . . . ." (emphasis added). According to Foley, by 
con£lating Achilles and Odysseus, •two brands 0£ heroism 
that epic views as partially contradictory, Medea shows 
hersel£ a pathetically con£used imitator 0£ heroic 
masculinity." (p. 81). Foley's discussion 0£ Medea's 
destruction 0£ "the heroic integrity 0£ her ethic" is 
excellent; see her conclusion that Euripides "comes close 
to labeling the '£riends-enemies• ethic as destructive 0£ 
humanity and human values and thus suitable only £or gods." 
(p. 82). C£. Wol££, "Euripides," p. 238, £or Euripides' 
uncovering 0£ contradictions in the heroic code. See also 
Margaret Williamson, "A Woman's Place in Euripides' Medea,• 
in Euripides, Women, and Sexuality, ed. Anton Powell 
(London and Hew York.: Routledge, 1990; herea£ter 
Williamson, "Woman's Place"), p. 26: "Her [Medea's] heroic 
stance is paradoxical and contradictory not only in its 
central £ormulation but also in its consequences: the 
distinction on which it rests has already been subverted by 
Medea hersel£, and it leads yet again to the destruction 0£ 
the most intimate bond 0£ philia, that between parents and 
children." 
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£irst--gi ven to the competitive and autonomous character 
who has a reputation :for advancing his own interests, 
while secondary, and much more wistful and provisional 
approval is given to the cooperative and connected 
character whose success is measured in his protection o:f 
and consideration £or others. 
This hierarchy 0£ values is :first delineated by the 
Hurse in her prologue.10 She re£ers to Jason and the 
Argonauts obliquely as the men• 
> ,.. (av6pwv 
apl<JTWV, 5), the only sincere use O:f the super la ti Ve 
See also the unelaborated but quali£ied remarks 0£ 
Conacher, Euripidean Drama, pp. 189 and 196, who, although 
he terms Medea "heroic," likens her, in the earlier scenes, 
" . . . to a hate-ridden Philoctetes as yet undisturbed by 
the 'friendship 0£ Heoptolemus, or to a stubbornly resent£ul 
Achilles, untried by the loss 0£ Patroclus.• 
Similarly, Emily McDermott, Euripides• Medea: The 
Incarnation 0£ Disorder (University Park and London: 
Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1989; herea:fter McDermott, 
Incarnation), pp. 55-56, agrees that Medea is in some 
aspects set "squarely in the heroic tradition," and yet 
notes that " ... standard [heroic] sentiments are 
misapplied by Medea." Furthermore, Medea's " ... 
ascription to the heroic code must necessarily involve the 
demolition 0£ the £emale and speci£ically maternal aspects 
0£ her . . . " 
Finally, according to Arrowsmith, •Ideas,• p. 38, 
Euripides, by using recognizable aspects 0£ •traditional 
heroism" to construct Medea's character, exposes " ... 
the Widening gul£ between reality and tradition, between 
the operative and the pro£essed values 0£ his culture . 
" Such exposure was, o:f course, Socrates• practice in 
elenchos. 
10Lines 1-17 0£ the prologue have excited attack, 
Primarily on the basis 0£ the illogical quali:fication 
describing happy circumstances in lines 11-15. A summary 
of the arguments and suggested emendations may be £ound in 
David Kovacs, "Euripides, Medea 1-17," CQ 41 (1991), pp. 
30-35. Kovacs proposes a lacuna be:fore line 11. 
295 
of the adjective agathos in the whole play.11 Coming 
as it does in the first few lines, it lends power£ul 
approval to Jason and his expedi tion.12 It is not, 
however, approval without qualification. The reason £or 
the Nurse's unattainable wish--that this heroic quest 0£ 
the past had been nipped at its inception--is that she sees 
a chain 0£ cause and e££ect13 reaching from the actions 
of these "best men," through Medea's being stricken with 
love, through her destruction 0£ Pelias and general 
assistance to Jason, to the stat us quo: "Now all things 
are enmity, and the dearest things are diseased" (vuv 
> ' 
€X9pa 
, 
vav-ra, ' Kal VOO€l ' Ta 16). 
The result, then, 0£ the quest £or heroic excellence has 
been the creation of a world 0£ enemies, the spread 0£ 
disease in all that is most dear. 
The Nurse's prologue does not, however, merely ponder 
UThe text 0£ Medea, while heavy with negative 
words like kakos, is sparse in words 0£ positive 
connotation, like aga thos and kalos. These words alone, 
according to McDonald, Concordance, appear as follows: 
kakos, 56 times; aga thos, once; kalos, once. Both aga thos 
and k.alos are, besides, in some way negated. A possible 
explanation £or this may be the heavily negative 
orientation 0£ zero-sum competition (see below, this 
section) toward harming enemies over helping friends. 
12see Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 63, £or the use 0£ 
epic language by the nurse. C£. Deborah Boedeker, 
"Euripides• Medea and the Vanity 0£ AOrOI," CP 86 
{1991; herea-fter Boedeker, "Medea"), p. 104. 
13For a discussion 0£ the Nurse 1 s prologue as an 
example 0£ a utopian wish, see Friedrich Solmsen, 
Intellectual Experiments 0£ the Greek Enlightenment 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 66-67. 
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the achievements of' the "best men"; it likewise. in its use 
of' the noun eros (8). indicates the place that generative 
desire plays in such achievements. The Hurse clearly sees 
Medea's ~ as the impetus to her advancement of' Jason's 
suit. In addition, the interplay between eros and what 
may be deemed "the heroic code of' competition" is clear in 
the description the Hurse gives to Medea's f'alling in 
love: she was "struck in her thumos with desire £or Jason" 
')I (E:pWTL auµ.ov >Jaoovos. 8). 
Although the Nurse's situating passions within the thumos 
is not at all surprising. the use of thumos in this play, 
as will be argued below (Part Two), is peculiarly limited; 
in this play, thumos is regularly the source of' motives £or 
competitive advancement, whether this takes the f'orm--as it 
does here--0£ helping £riends or--as it more regularly 
does--of' harming enemies. 
And yet. although the Hurse does not explicitly state 
it as such, it is clear f'rom her view of' events thus f'ar 
that the erotically impelled aid to this heroic quest has 
had some disturbing issue.14 Medea's eros-stricken 
14Mills, Mythopoeia, pp. 63-64, notes how the epic 
voyage is rendered destructive in the prologue, and that, 
just as Medea is "smitten" by love (8) in the play's 
beginning, Jason is likewise "struck" at the play"s end--by 
a Piece of' the Argo. Cr. Bennett Simon, Tragic Drama and 
the Family: Psychoanalytic Studies f'rom Aeschylus to 
Beckett (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1988; 
herea£ter Simon, Tragic Drama). pp. 72.-73, who points out 
that epic is bemoaned at the beginning, ridiculed at the 
end. 
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tbumos has e-f-fected horrors in the past and the Hurse -fears 
that it will do so in the -future: Medea, who persuaded the 
children o-f Pelias to kill their -father (9-11), will 
doubtlessly engage in violent retaliation -for Jason's 
betrayal (37-43). Eros is obviously a loose cannon on the 
deck of human a-f-fairs;15 this is clear -from the 
destruction that has r~sul ted -from its arousal in Medea. 
The second use o-f the abstract noun eros, 152 (this time in 
its poetic :form, eros), is even more explicit in 
associating eros with destruction. There the Chorus ask 
Medea, whom they have just heard wishing :for death, 
What in the world is this desire o-f yours :for the 
unapproachable bedding-down, poor :fool? The end that 
is death rushes :forward; do not pray :for it. (1'lS 
OOl 11'01'E 1'a5 a11'Acl1'0U KOlTaS EPOS, Q 
µ.a1'aLa; Oll'EUOEL 9ava1'ou 1'EAEU1'clV• IJ."16E:v 
T06E AlOOOU, 151-154). 
These words show a powerful association, not only in 
Medea but in the Chorus as well, between eros and death. 
The Chorus, it is true, censure Medea's desire -for death by 
labelling her •poor :fool" and urging her to desist; but the 
poet has them nonetheless, in their description of death, 
, 
use the erotically suggestive KOL 1'as ("bedding-
down"), albeit modified by the oxymoronic > I a11'Aa1'ou 
("unapproachable,• i.e., "dire"). Disturbing 
associations, these: desire -for death; death as a bed, 
15The phrase is Ethel Person's, in her Dreams o-f 
Love and Fate-ful Encounters. The Power o-f Romantic Passion 
(Hew York, HY: Viking Penguin, 1989). p. 14. 
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approach to which is discouraged; proximity as danger. It 
is as i£ ~· normally associated with the generation 0£ 
life, is here instead the guarantor of violence i£ not 
death. This will not be the last time such associations 
are made (see below, Part Five). And yet, since in the 
prologue the Hurse sees everything as stemming £rom the 
sailing of the Argo (or rather, £rom the £elling of the 
tree that went to build its oars), it is hard to tell 
whether the legacy 0£ violence results from Kedea 1 s 
erotically smitten thumos or rather £rom the glorious past 
deeds 0£ the "best men." 
The ambiguity is not accidental: eros is £irmly 
entrenched in the arena 0£ competition where dangerous 
issue such as the Hurse describes is not only possible, but 
predictable. This may seem, at least to modern readers, 
surprising. Yet it is precisely to this use which Jason, 
both in the past and in the present (though, as will be 
argued, he is not alone in this), puts eros. The Hurse 
implies what Jason will later (526-531) be proud to admit: 
that in the past, he relied on eros in his quest £or the 
fleece, by which he won his status as one 0£ the "best 
men." 
Likewise, in speaking 0£ the present, the Hurse 
informs us that Jason has now made another strategic erotic 
attachment: "Jason beds a kingly marriage, having wed the 
Child of Creon, who rules over this land" (yaµ.OlS 
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>Jaawv 
,..., 
fJaaL.>..llCOLS. 
, , 
£uvat£1"aL, 
, 
y•ru.1. a S. K:peOV1"05. 
Cl 
os. 
, 
QLO"UJ.I. V{J xaovos., 18-19). These lines, 
which describe in explicitly sexual terms the acquisition 
of social advancement, in themselves go a long way toward 
illustrating how £ar removed £rom modern ideas 0£ eroticism 
is this play's definition 0£ eros. For not only is eros a 
loose cannon {so much even we could recognize as common 
wisdom in our day), it is also a means to social 
advancement.16 This is -further illustrated by the £act 
that the "child o-f Creon"--Jason's new bride--remains 
unnamed: she is, just as Jason will later maintain (593-
597), not the object of his eros; instead, her erotic 
interest is used, as Medea's was before her, to gain 
Jason's goal of competitive advancement. 
Medea's response to Jason's new attachment shows the 
16John J. Winkler, Constraints of Desire: The 
Anthropology o-f Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece (Hew York 
and London: Routledge, 1990; herea-fter Winkler, 
Constraints), pp. 77-79, notes that in the ancient Greek 
magical texts, requests £or erotic allure are a regular 
part o-f prayers £or social success. After giving by way of 
illustration a prayer to Helios in which the petitioner 
asks, among other things, £or wealth, good reputation, 
charm (charis), looks, beauty, and persuasiveness, Winkler 
explains the logic 0£ this admixture as follows: "The 
petitioner would like to shine in his community not only 
with external marks 0£ physical success but most 
particularly in personal quali ti tes, because the truly 
significant interactions in which his value is continuously 
judged and rated by others are those where he shows his 
individual excellence. To get the edge on competitors 
o£ten means charming or outfoxing them rather than -fighting 
or insulting them, so generalized prayers £or success 
frequently include what may seem to us a rather peacock-
like pride in looking good and being seen as sexually 
appealing.• (p. 77). 
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validity bot.h of t.he Hurse"s pronouncement that. now hat.red 
is epidemic and of our description of eros as a loose 
cannon on the deck of human a£fairs: to the advice of 
friends Medea is unresponsive 
c (WS , ll'E'l'POS 
8aAaO<H05 
> , QKOUEI. vouee-rouµ.ev"' 
28-29), •she bewails [as if he were dead] her dear 'father" 
(11'a -rep> > , q>L.Aov, 31), "she hates her Q1J'Ol.IJ.Wf;!I 
,.. . ,.. . 
children" (o-ruye1. 6E 1l'a1.6a5, 36; c£. 117. ., I. 
-rouo<S> ~x8e1.5; and Medea"s curse against t.he children 
at 112-114: 
, 
ica-rapa-ro1. o.>.01.oee 
,,... 
o-ruyepas 
. 
µ.a-rpos 
. 
auv 11'a-rpi.) . In addition, the 
Hurse expects that Medea "will not endure being treated 
badly" > (ou<S> > , QVEl;E'l'OI. KQKWS 11'aoxouoca1, 38-
39) and will retaliate viciously (40-43). Finally, the 
Hurse predicts that •no one joining in enmity with her will 
easily come out beautifully victorious" >I (OU'l'OI. 
c , 
p~61.w5 
>I 01.ae-ra1., 
YE ouµ.pa.>.wv >I ex8pav > QU'l'!I 
44-45).17 
In short, as 'far as Medea is concerned, the world has 
17Michael Shaw, "The Female Int.ruder: Women in 
Fi£th-Century Drama," CP 70 (1975; herea£ter Shaw, "Female 
Intruder•), 'following Page, Medea, at line 45, notes that 
"'Beautiful victors" . . . is an athletic term, a male 
term." Hills, Mythopoeia, pp. 98-99, cites this as one 0£ 
many athletic metaphors used in the play (see its 
repetition at 765; c£. agon at 235, 366-367, 403, and 1245; 
terms £rom wrestling and other competitions occur at 27 4-
276, 546, 557, and 585). Buxton, Persuasion, p. 165, 
points out that ica.A.ALVl.KOS is "an epithet 0£ Herak.les 
and a term redolent 0£ Pindar"s world 0£ athletic 
immortality." See also Foley, "Divided Sel£," p. 75. 
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Severed in hal£, there are £riends and there are been 
enemies. But more than that: in the process 0£ Jason's 
quest, and the use to which eros has been put, the world 0£ 
•£riends" has been violated.18 The quest has taken 
precedence; £ormer £riends are lightly turned into enemies 
in the wake 0£ the unrelenting pursuit 0£ sel£-advancement. 
So much the Tutor says when he comments on Jason's 
willingness to let his children su££er exile: "The old 
give way to new alliances; that one is not a £riend to 
this house.• (11'a>..ala KQlVWV A.£l 11'£TQl 
, 
KOUK 
, 
£K£lVOS. TOLCJch: <Swµ.aalv 76-
77). Such £luidity 0£ attachment is common, as the 
discussion below will show, to the type 0£ arete pursued by 
competitors like Jason. 
But the stalwart Hurse has trouble de£ending or 
18J. Roger Dunk.le, "The Aegeus Episode and the 
Theme 0£ Euripides' Medea," TAPA 100 (1969; herea£ter 
Dunk.le, "Aegeus Episode"), p. 101, sees sel£-interest as 
motivating mistreatment 0£ £riends. According to Seth L. 
Schein, "Philia in Euripides' Medea," in Cabinet 0£ the 
Muses, ed. Mark. Gri££ith and Donald J. Mastronarde 
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990; herea£ter Schein, 
"Philia"), pp. 57-73, the concept 0£ philia was ambiguous: 
it signi£ies "solidarity or a££ection• and is at the same 
time -fundamentally instrumental. By the last part 0£ the 
£i£th century philia was primarily a political alliance and 
"came to be seen more and more as merely a use£ul 
connection which individuals manipulated and exploited £or 
their own advantage." (p. 59). Jason and Medea, then, are 
not aberrant. The play, according to Schein, "explores the 
ambiguities" inherent in the concept 0£ philia. C£. 
Williamson, "Woman's Place," pp. 24-25, on Jason and 
Medea's violation 0£ the very code they espouse, 0£ helping 
Philoi; Newton, "Passionate Poison," p. 13, by omission 
seems to exonerate Jason: "it is the mark. 0£ Medea to 
con£ound the distinction between £riend and £oe." 
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censuring Jason. With her wish, "Kay he perish not" 
. , 
(~AOL TO µ.ev IJ."1, 83), she manages both to curse 
Jason and yet, by a technicality, not to curse her master; 
she does, however, openly express her disapproval by 
describing him as kakos: "But he is caught being vile to 
hiS £riends" 
> • (a-rap , KQKOS y> >I WV > ES 
aALOK€Tal, 84). In less than one hundred lines, 
then, Jason has gone £rom aristos to kakos, and all in the 
mouth 0£ one Nurse. He will descend even £urther, to 
pankakistos, when Medea gets hold 0£ him. 
The Tutor, however, who enters at line 49, is blithely 
incredulous that the Nurse £inds Jason's conduct unusual: 
Who isn't this way? Were you born yesterday? Don't 
you k.now that everybody loves himself more than his 
,,._, C ' "°" I ~ 
neighbor (1l'as TLS au-rov Tou 11'£Aas µaAAov 
cplAEl)? Some do it justly, some £or the sake 0£ 
< ' I C ' I g~in (Ol IJ.€V dlKQlWS Ol 0€ K€pdous 
xaplv). And just so the father, for the sake of a 
> " Cl bed (€UV"JS ouveKCaJ), doesn •t love these 
boys. (85-88). 
The Tutor here, as Medea will later, interprets Jason's 
actions as motivated by erotic pursuit ("£or the sake 0£ a 
bed"), but the Tu tor lacks Medea •s jealousy and is able to 
go further and equate erotic pursuit with the pursuit of 
gain.19 We have just been informed 0£ so much by the 
Hurse•s description 0£ Jason's choice 0£ bed partners (a 
kingly marriage, 18); we will later be in-formed by Jason 
19Kusurillo, "Euripides• Medea: A 
~econsi~eration,• AJP 87 (1966; herea£ter Kusurillo, 
Reconsideration•), pp. 53 and 57, misses this point, and 
there-fore believes that Jason is in £act motivated by lust. 
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himself (593-597), and even later by Medea (700) that this 
"bed" Jason pursues is £or the sake 0£ cozying up to 
royalty, not a new and younger bride. In short, Jason puts 
everything at the service 0£ self-advancement, even his 
generative desire. But the Tu tor claims that it goes 
£urther: the love one £eels, the love that defines 
£riends and, more generally, those dear, is more self-
re£erential than not. Jason, like all others, loves 
himsel£ first; those near him, whether they be his sons or 
his friends, will inevitably come second. 
This ethic makes just about any action possible, and 
closeness--whether erotic ~r £ilial--there£ore dangerous 
because it puts one in striking distance 0£ someone who, 
£or self-interest, is likely to lay aside emotional 
investment in order to use or harm one. And so it should 
be no surprise that the Nurse, who has already expressed 
her concern at Medea's glowering at her children (36), now 
warns them not to go near their mother in her ill-humor 
91; cf. 101-
102, . Jl.'ll 
> , 
eyyu5, 
and the discussion above 0£ the Chorus' phrase, Tas. 
> I 
avAaTou I KOL TQS. at 151-152), and ill-wishes Medea 
upon her enemies instead 0£ her friends > I (ex0pous. ye 
I 
~L€VTOL 1 . 1-L"I Tl, 95). 
The Nurse's last wish is the half articulation of a 
code whose full expression later in the play is Medea's 
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1 na tion of her decision to kill her own children: exP a 
Let no one consider me despicable and weak nor gentle, 
bU t of another sort, :t;a.ea vy to my, enemies, and ~indly to 
mY triends (1-L'11c5~1.s 1-L,£ cpau~·riv. tc.ao0£!''11 
VOl-Lltt:TW IJ.'l')d:. 'l')OU,Xala~, a>.},? 9?T£pOU 
Tp01tOU, papt:laV £X9po1.s Kai. cplAOl.OlV 
t:uµt:v:fl, 807-809). 
This code--of helping friends and harming enemies--a t first 
glance may seem contradictory with the espousal 0£ sel£-
advancement. Yet by making the defining characteristic 0£ 
friend and foe the action one delivers to others, and 
there£ore logically receives at the hands 0£ others. this 
code, read one way, puts the individual and his interests 
at the center.20 And, in £act, when viewed in light 0£ 
self-interest, the code loses its force 0£ helping as soon 
as self-interest dictates that gain lies in the disposal or 
mistreatment 0£ former friends. 
Espousal has so far been made, then, £or two not 
necessarily antithetical standards 0£ excellence: 1) 
making oneself known through the successful completion 0£ a 
venture that advances one .. s own interests, and 2) helping 
friends and harming enemies.21 Approval 0£ the first 
20see Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 70-71, £or the 
individual-centered world. Simon, Tragic Drama, p. 82, 
sees in Medea the perversion of the golden rule, so that 
you "do unto others as others have done unto you." This, 
Simon suggests, is a result 0£ Medea 1 s "identification with 
the aggressor." 
21For evidence on ancient Greek espousal 0£ 
helping friends and harming enemies, see Mary Whitlock 
Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in 
Sophocles and Greek Ethics (Cambridge: University Press, 
1989), pp. 26-59. 
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iS evident in the Nurse's (albeit qualified) description of 
n a nd his men as aristoi, in her unconscious use of the Jaso 
t · e icau.I. VLKOS. ( 45), which in itself expresses adjec iv 
the beauty o-f conquest, and--although to a lesser degree--
in the Tutor's unshaken recognition of personal gain as an 
an-too-common motive (87). Approval of the second can be 
found in the Tu tor's automatic assigning Jason to the 
class of not-friend because of the wrongs against Medea and 
the children he will tolerate (76-77). It is also evident 
in the Nurse's half-hearted malediction against Jason (83): 
he is, as her master, both philos and, as one who harms her 
mistress, ou philos, in her obvious contemptuous 
description of him as k.akos by his actions against philoi 
(84), and--finally and most especially--in her whole-
hearted and unreserved wish that Medea's wrath may be 
visited upon her enemies and not her friends (95). 
In addition, the play has proposed a concomitant 
definition of eros as an assistant--albeit unpredictable--
to acquiring arete. Although to this point Jason is the 
only one who has been shown to manipulate desire so as to 
attain the end of being considered "excellent" in this 
Play•s terms, we shall see that such a tactic is used even 
by Medea, who is currently the victim of such manipulation. 
Ironically, the Chorus, who reacted negatively to Jason's 
use of eros for such ends, will accept without comment 
Medea •s admittedly more subtle but similar use o-f eros. 
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As will become even more evident later, the Chorus• 
blind loyalty is in large part a £unction 0£ their status 
as £riends to Medea. The Hurse•s loyalty is similar, but 
not quite so blind since not £ired (as we will see the 
Chorus• is) by prejudice against Medea's (and their 
vicarious) enemy Jason. A reader with modern Western 
Christian sensibilities may incorrectly assume that the 
Hurse, who knows all that Medea does, should censure 
Medea's vicious past and £uture vicious potential. But she 
does not. Instead, she merely thrice intones that she 
knows what Medea is like: her "character is heavy/severe" 
I ..... ((:lapElQ 4PP"IV, 38), she is retaliatory (39-
43), and "clever/terrible" (6ELVTt, 44). Furthermore, 
the Nurse's description 0£ Medea as deine, with its 
connotations 0£ both cleverness and the horri£ic, gives 
warning 0£ what, exactly, will be meant by the designation 
0£ Medea as sophe, "clever/wise," i.e., "smart." The 
adjective deinos, joining as it does intellectual prowess 
with destructiveness, is an apt term £or describing Medea's 
brand 0£ "smartness"; it is no coincidence that this same 
adjective will be used to describe the product 0£ Medea's 
cunning: the horri£ying deaths 0£ the princess and Creon 
(1121, 1167, 1184, 1202, 1214; c£. Creon's dread 0£ Medea•s 
doing something deinon at 356) as well as Medea's murder 0£ 
her own children (403, 859, 1243, 1294). In short, the 
Hurse•s description 0£ Medea as deine is the £irst 
307 
. ation that intellectual prowess will be used as a inti.m 
force of destruction, not Of crea tion.22 
But we must note again that while the Hurse fears 
Medea •s actions (36, 39), she never openly disapproves of 
ner. The Hurse•s tone, if anything, is one of pity, 
distress, and foreboding. It is true that the Hurse 
nerself would not choose t.o live as Medea and her kind; 
tnis is evidence of indirectly expressed censure. But in 
ber reflection on such lives at 119 ff., the Hurse stops 
short of denouncing Medea as she had Jason, and in this we 
can discern bot.h her loyalty t.o her mistress and a 
grudging respect., alt.hough perhaps one born of fear. Kore 
importantly, though, the Hurse•s generalization on Medea 
gives definition to the t.ype of individual most. likely t.o 
be emulated or described in terms of high approbation 
elsewhere in the play: 
The moods of tyrants (Tupavvwv) are scary 
(c5e:lva), because even when little ruled and much 
> I > I ' in command (o.>.ly> apxoµ.evol, 11'0.>..>.a 
icpaTouvTes.) they find it difficult to change their 
temper. Truly it is better to accustom oneself to 
live on equal terms cE:v> :roololv); may I at. 
least grow old in not-greatness (Ev µ..f) 
µ.e:ya.>.OlS.), securely. For invoking moderate 
things first succeeds (Twv yap µ.eTplwv 11'PWTa 
µ.ev d11'e:L'v Touvoµ.a vu~), and to make use 
of [moderate things) is by far best £or man. 
Ex.celling (Ta t11'eppa.>..>.ovTCal) effects 
no pro£it £or mortals; but greater ruin, when god is 
angered, he brings to houses. (119-130). 
d ~2":ills, Kythopoeia, pp. 119-120, sees in the 
~script.ion 0£ Medea as deinos an expression of her 
divinity. 
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The Nurse's bid £or humble obscurity and moderation is 
rkable as a counterpoint to the opinions 0£ the Chorus, rema 
Medea, Creon, and Jason, all 0£ whom espouse and emulate 
(but, in Creon's case, only hal£-heartedly) the opposite: 
to be in command and not be ruled, to have power over many 
things, under no circumstances to live on equal terms, but 
instead to aspire to greatness which is mastery. Winning 
has nothing to do with the moderate.23 but instead is 
excelling over against others, pure and simple. 
The most highly approved conduct in this play is not 
what we at least would deem "heroic," but is instead, 
suggestively put, getting on top and staying there.24 
This is what Gouldner calls "the Greek contest system," 
23Alan Elliott, ed., Euripides. Medea (London: 
Oxford Univ. Press. 1969; herea£ter Elliott. Medea). p. 75. 
comments that the sentiment expressed in lines 119-130 is 
akin to µ.'l')dev llyav. That this sentiment was an 
integral part of and yet antithetical to the Greek contest 
system is noted by Gouldner, Enter Plato. p. 44, and Philip 
R. Slater, The Glory 0£ Hera (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968; 
hereafter Slater, Glory). p. 40. Slater agrees with the 
infamous pronouncement 0£ Bertrand Russell, which he 
quotes: "[The Greeks] had a maxim, 'nothing too much1 ' but 
they were in fact excessive in everything.• The Nurse's 
advocating moderation as success is a striking contrast to 
the "win at all costs• ethic of the zero-sum game. The 
Hurse•s creed, which James G. Keenan summed up to me as 
"winning is tying for second," is one step away £rom 
proposing that "winning is losing" (or1 to put it in the 
terms of Joseph Campbell, "sacrifice is bliss"). 
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 92, sees the motif of self-
sacrifice in Euripides• works as evidence of a connection 
between Euripides and Socrates. 
24Th. is turn of phrase was suggested to me by the 
s;atement of Winkler, Constraints, p. 37: "The very £act 
0 
considering social and sexual relations together 
Provokes the question, 'Who's on top?'" 
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. b. be describes as "a zero-sum game in that someone can 
yb.l.C 
Only i£ someone else loses."25 According to win 
Gouldner, a complex 0£ behaviors and belie£s is 
characteristic 0£ the Greek contest system, whose 
orientation--to achievement won through competitive 
struggle--permeates nearly every aspect 0£ sel£-identity as 
well as relations between sel£ and others.26 
Tbe objective of participants in this contest system 
is simple: to achieve, through one's own individual 
efforts, as much recognition as possible. The achievement 
is not complete unless one has the reputation of 
predominating over all others on the 'field 0£ contest. 
Gaining such a reputation necessitates that one "be in all 
circumstances 'free and independent of the constraint 0£ 
another 
Actions to achieve recognition o-f one's predominance 
may take the 'form of actual attack upon another, threatened 
attack, or competition. This last, which Gouldner suggests 
25Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 41-77; the quotation 
is taken 'from p. 49. See also Winkler, Constraints, pp. 1-
98, passim. 
26Arrowsmith, "Ideas," pp. 33-36, gives a succinct 
overview 0£ the "breakdown of the old community, the 
overwhelming destruction of [the] mythical and coherent 
world-order" and "transvaluation of morals" that occurred 
in the last hal£ of the 'fifth century B. C. Arrowsmith 
quotes Thucydides, History 3.82 ££., a passage that can be 
read as a thumbnail sketch of the realities 0£ zero-sum 
competition as described by Gouldner. 
27 Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 12 (quote); c£. also 
PP. 42-43 and 48. 
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iS a sublimation 0£ actual attack, may occur in any number 
o£ arenas: competition can be physical, intellectual, or 
economic. There are basically only two ways 0£ winning: 
either one raises onesel£ or cuts the other down. "Playing 
£air" is not important; winning is, and to win one may 
break rules, use people as objects or interchangeable 
parts, and violate traditional codes 0£ conduct. There is 
only one commitment--to onesel£ as the victor. To achieve 
victory one must be smart (thus Medea's renowned sophia), 
be able to control one's emotional impulses (it is here 
that we can discern Jason•s judicious choice 0£ where to 
expend his erotic impulses), and be willing to be ruthless 
enough to do whatever is necessary to win (as will be the 
case with Medea).28 
The zero-sum system inspires £our concomitant 
attitudes, which make sense only in context 0£ the contest. 
The £irst 0£ these, that the risk taken must be very high, 
has a double impetus: £or one who aims at £ame, risking 
what is dearest makes one legendary as a competitor, while 
gaining the high stakes risked by one's opponent increases 
one's own £ame. The second attitude, that envy is as 
savored as the de£eat 0£ a £oe, makes sense in an arena 
Where there is only one victor. In such a circumstance, 
envy is the natural companion to victory, which itsel£ is 
28Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 48, 50, 56, 71-72, 
and 107. 
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P ushed only by someone else
1 s de£ eat. The third 
accom 
attitude is related to the competitor 1 s autonomy. Pitted 
1.. s, alone against all others, the competitor must as he 
resist dependence and thwart all attempts to put him under 
constraint. He there-fore values reciprocity and 
retribution, :for he must repay what has been given to him, 
whether it be good or ill. "Helping :friends and harming 
foes" becomes his creed, the individual-centered creed so 
highly touted in Medea, that covertly measures others by 
their services £or or actions against one. The -fourth and 
final attitude re-fleets the teleology o-£ such competitors: 
means are chosen £or their ability to achieve ends, and 
since there must be total commitment to achieving ends, 
any means will do. This is what Gouldner calls "total 
commitment rationality": the willingness to carry out, 
regardless the cost, a rationally conceived plan.29 It 
will be such willingness on Medea 1 s part that brings this 
play to its disturbing climax. 
As should already be clear, the zero-sum system has 
its human costs. For the competitor himsel£, there is the 
lunacy 0£ what must have been a 'frantic and never-ending 
engagement in potentially sel£-destructive competition. 
There is no rest in a zero-sum game, £or the minute one 
attains what appears to be the summit, either a higher 
2 9Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 
and 65-66. -------
13, 43, 46, 49, 56, 
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·t offers itsel'f as the new goal 'for one's opponents, 
summJ. 
or one becomes the target o'f all other competitors, who are 
to a man eager to pull one down. One must continually, as 
Gouldner puts it, "hurl [one]sel'f back into the 'fray." The 
competitor becomes prone to violence which appears and is 
deemed necessary. Such an escalation o'f "necessary" 
violence will be one o'f the most horri'fying visions 
Euripides' play presents. Continual engagement in crisis 
leads, however, not only to escalation o'f violence, but to 
the recreation of crisis itself, for it is only the edge of 
crisis in competition that holds competitors together, 
ironically enough, in league.30 
At all other times, competitors are alone and 
alienated 'from others, and this is the second price that 
competition exacts: it creates a world o'f autonomous, 
highly sel'f-conscious beings 'for whom social discord is the 
norm, and feelings of separation, isolation, and insecurity 
are de rigeur.31 We will shortly see evidence of such 
isolation and self-consciousness in Medea. Insecurity 
encourages what Gouldner terms "low object attachment," 
30G ouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 54, 74, and 109. For 
the Greeks as excessive, see also p. 59, and Slater, Glory, 
p. 40. 
31see George B. Walsh, "Public and Private in 
Three Plays of Euripides," CP 74 (1979; herea'fter Walsh, 
"Public and Private"), pp. 294-295, for the tension bet ween 
PUblic life and private life in the Iliad: " ties of 
'family seem to inhibit distinction, and the private life 
seems to be incompatible with heroic action." 
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the ability to slough off connection to things and 
i.e., 
as to avoid the pain experienced when the persons so 
competitor must put these in jeopardy or when they are 
lost. Friendships and intimacies are therefore fluid--
precisely the status quo described by the Tutor in Medea at 
85 ff.; people and things are used and discarded, or 
treated like interchangeable parts--as was Medea before the 
play's beginning, and as will be the children at the play's 
climax. Fluidity of attachment further contributes to 
desire for immediate gratification rather than pursuing 
long term goals, for these, after all, may be overturned at 
any juncture.32 At the play's close, Medea espouses 
precisely such pursuit of immediate gratification at the 
expense of long term goals. 
But what undermines security and destroys faith in 
human relations nonetheless promotes, according to 
Gouldner, the development of rationalism, 
an orientation in which the relation between 
means and ends is subject to deliberate calculation; 
in which ends or goals are constituted as perceptually 
organized foci set off from the contextual ground in 
which they are embedded; and in which other aspects of 
the surround are also taken from their context and 
evaluated primarily in terms of their anticipated 
capacity to realize the goai.33 
In a zero-sum system, then, the mind--like the emotions--
becomes a tool for achieving the goal of victory. 
and 
32Gouldner, 
106-108. 
Enter Plato, pp. 15, 
33Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 70. 
54, 60-61, 66-74, 
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means to ends is the mind's primary task; DiScerning 
is valued, morality discarded: thus, Medea's 
efficiency 
. al choice to kill her children to effect her goal of i.mmor 
punishing her enemy. Treachery and duplicity are not 
disdained (Medea uses both and is never cri ticized),34 
and their use in turn deepens distrust between individuals. 
The mind is prized over emotions, which cannot calculate 
and besides are distrusted, for they must always be in 
control lest they betray one and bring defeat (so at line 
1049 Medea chides herself -for lack 0£ control). Detachment 
from one's own emotions becomes as important as detachment 
from objects and others.35 In short, one should expect 
in such a system the same subservience of desire to the 
acquisition of the goal of self-advancement already seen in 
Jason in Medea. 
As one would guess, the moral costs 0£ this system are 
high. Individuals see themselves in competition with the 
group instead 0£ members of it; the value of cooperative 
virtues is diminished. Gouldner traces participation in 
the contest system to the breakdown 0£ tribalism and the 
rise of urban centers, when kinship was no longer an "all-
embracing ma tr ix" and the once unquestioned rules of 
tradition were cast aside. The Greek taboo against excess 
34Cf. Winkler, Constraints, p. 75, who describes 
duplicity as "· .. a permanent state of defensiveness 
against intrusive enemies . . . " 
35Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 65-71. 
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Commendation 0£ temperance were, in Gouldner•s view, and 
to the contest system and vain attempts to 
counter 
t e the behavior 0£ contestants whose behavior could moder a 
no tonger be moderated. The concentration on obtaining 
:fame blinded contestants, ironically, to any opinion 
opposing their progress. Shame became an ine££ecti ve tool 
o:f social control because the need -for a high opinion 0£ 
oneself outstripped all other opinion; i-f all else were 
lost, the contestant could choose to ignore current opinion 
as irrelevant to the ultimate prize: posthumous -fame won 
by ranking high in the eyes 0£ those yet to be born.36 
With its -focus on the individual, then, competition in 
a zero-sum game is ultimately anti-social. Even its 
seemingly most social aspect, the code 0£ "helping -friends 
and harming enemies," spells danger in its individual-
centered logical extreme: -friends are those who help one, 
and enemies are those who hurt one. The world is readily 
divided into two camps, -friends and enemies, with the 
greater -focus on enemies, since it is only to enemies that 
one can lose and, in addition, one way 0£ winning is by 
harming enemies. Divisiveness is endemic--as the Hurse in 
Medea says "all things are hatred" (16)--and harm becomes 
the action 0£ choice. Violence is not just predictable, it 
is endorsed. 
36Gouldner, Enter Plato, 
and 97. 
pp. 15, 44, 58-59, 72-74, 
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Tbe espoused excellence in Medea, the profile of the 
Dlous competitor, is a concentration on harming one's autono 
r helping one's friends, and, as such, is a enemies ove 
of divisiveness. There are two opposing camps, promotion 
tbe Ebiloi and the echthroi or ou philoi. Every one of the 
minor characters introduced thus far operates under such a 
division. Tbe Hurse, Tutor, and Chorus are all philoi to 
Medea: all but the Chorus are household retainers and by 
definition philoi. The Chorus de:fine themselves as philon 
to the house (138).37 Creon, as will be seen, is 
willing to be an enemy to Medea (2.90), while Aegeus will 
define himsel:f as :friend (664). Jason is no longer a 
philos to the house (77), and is there:fore by de:fini tion an 
echthros to all but Creon, and perhaps the cautiously loyal 
Hurse. Although Jason attempts to define himself as a 
philos to Medea and the children (459), and Medea refers to 
herself and the children as :friends whom he has harmed 
(470), she makes it clear that he is in :fact no :friend, 
except in hypothesis ( 499). 
It is important to understand, then, that the Chorus• 
disapproval o:f Jason is because, as enemy to Medea, he is 
enemy to them; Medea, on the contrary, is a :friend and 
therefore deserves their help and support. Right and wrong 
t 37 Ohlander, Suspense, p. 52. n. 10, suggests that 
. he Chorus• total support of Medea is a Euripidean 
~~v~nti~n, and one that goes against the tradition o:f the 
ri.nthi.ans as slayers of the children. 
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·n the £irst hal£ 0£ the play at least--not measured 
are--i 
t bY the relativistic standards 0£ the code: the esceP 
Us P roclaim that Medea rightly punishes Jason Chor 
' 
> , , 
(eVdlKW5 yap £KT£l0"!} VOO"lV, 267-
268), the husband who has wronged her; they in£orm Jason 
· their opinion, his action has been wrong that,. in 
,.. 
( dOK £1.5 11'podous. 
,.. 
dpav, 578). Their 
. 
O"'f'IV ch.oxov 
concept 0£ 
> OU 
justice, is 
one o£ an individual-centered reciprocity, not one sprung 
£rom social consciousness or broader concepts 0£ right and 
wrong. In short, in their support 0£ a £riend over an 
enemy, one can see the Chorus' espousal and practice 0£ the 
code 0£ "helping £riends and harming enemies"; their 
loyalty can hardly be de-fended on ethical grounds. The 
actions o-f Medea and Jason are at least equally 
despicable, even only those actions known to have taken 
place at the time 0£ the play's beginning. 
But the Chorus do not support Medea over Jason merely 
because she is -friend and he is enemy; they censure Jason 
and are willing to stand silently by so that he may be 
harmed (267) because Jason is, in addition to being their 
enemy vicariously through Medea, their enemy vicariously 
because 0£ his sex:38 in this he is a representative 
• 
38Arrowsmith, "Ideas,• p. 49, cites the Chorus" 
Pro£ound resentment ... against male domination" to 
~XPlain the ease with which Medea convinces them to help 
er. 
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o£ the class that has prevented their advancement to 
er
ior status. Jason is a man, a husband; they, as women 
sUP 
· ves nave long been kept in£erior to the likes 0£ 
and •i • 
nun. TheY do not like this. They, like Medea and Jason, 
to be on top, and are willing to witness the use 0£ crave 
narm to get there. 
In short, the Chorus advocate the aggressively 
competitive creed 0£ the zero-sum game practiced, as we 
nave glimpsed already, by both the two main characters. 
This is £irst obvious -from Medea's use o-f it to gain their 
support. Her opening monologue (214-266) assumes on their 
part a competitive hostility which must be overcome and 
redirected. As has long been recognized, her speech is a 
masterpiece 0£ manipulation. 39 But what has been 
largely overlooked is that such a masterpiece can only 
succeed with a highly competitive and willingly hostile 
group.'10 Such a group is the Chorus o-f Corinthian 
39For the speech"s rhetorical -flair, see P. Mazon, 
•ne quelques vers d'Euripide (Medee, 214-229)," RPh 27 
(1953), pp. 119-121. C-f. Reck£ord, "First Exit," pp. 336-
337, and Pietro Pucci, The Violence 0£ Pity in Euripides• 
Medea (Ithaca and London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1980; 
herea£ter Pucci, Violence), pp. 61-77. 
400hlander, Suspense, pp. 60-64, argues that 
Euripides, by not letting on that he was not going to 
follow versions of the myth wherein the Corinthians killed 
Kedea•s children, left the audience in suspense; i-f 
Ohlander is correct, Medea's treatment of these women as 
Potentially hostile is even more plausible. R. G. Ussher, ~~~ripides Medea 214 ff.," CP 55 (1960), pp. 249-251, 
Poses that Medea uses oeµ. vous at 216 not in 
reference to herself, but to the Corinthian women. Her 
opening words are, therefore, according to Ussher, "de£iant 
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women. 
Medea's £irst sentence signals her recognition 0£ 
hostile competitiveness. 41 She tells the women their 
that she has come outside "lest you in some way £ind -fault 
with me" (µ.fi ' j..LOl Tl µeµcp'l')o9Ct:J, 215). Medea here 
diSPiays not only the sel£-consciousness typical 0£ the 
zero-sum competitor, she likewise by this statement shows 
her awareness 0£ the dynamics 0£ the competition. Fault-
finding in a zero-sum society is more serious than what we 
may cavalierly dismiss as gossip-mongering; in such a 
society one's chances £or advancement can be thwarted by 
malevolent rumor.42 Medea accurately describes the 
kind of unjust and ready-to-hand censure typical 0£ 
participants in zero-sum games, who are quick to destroy 
the other to advance themselves:43 Medea knows that 
one can incur at best indi£ference, at worst a bad 
and attacking." I agree in part; Medea, however, is too 
smart to encourage, by attacking, a counter-attack, when 
What she wants is to make these women allies, not enemies. 
Reck-ford, "First Exit,• pp. 334-339, takes a di££erent 
tack in analyzing Medea•s speech. In it, he detects an 
ambiguity that indicates the tragedy 0£ Medea, once 
intelligent and passionate, now su££ering so much that she 
becomes cold and inhuman. 
41Medea later describes to Creon (292-305) her 
past experience with the hostility and envy 0£ others. 
Even if she has -fabricated this experience, her statement 
shows that she is well aware 0£ the potential for such a 
reaction on the part of competitors. 
42Winkler 
• 
Constraints, pp . 58-59. 
43See Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 55-58. 
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t ion by merely minding one's business (217-218), and reputa • 
O me people will simply hate one on sight (220-that s 
221).44 Medea is therefore eager to impress upon 
e Potentially hostile women that she is neither haughty theS 
(216) nor does she mean to give offense (224); she has kept 
herself from them because she has been unexpectedly 
destroyed (225-228). 
This last is a reassuring display of vulnerabil-
ity.45 By spilling out her tale of woe Medea communi-
cates to the Chorus not only that she is a deserving object 
of pity, but that she, once perhaps viewed by them as a 
suspiciously withdrawn foreigner, is not worth considering 
as competition.46 She is already destroyed, and may 
therefore visit upon them no harm. She cannot thereby be 
considered an enemy; they are--friends (227). 
44-This last is deemed unjust (2.19) not because 
hating per se is not just, but because hating on sight is a 
violation of the reciprocity code of conduct followed by 
zero-sum competitors; by contrast "unjust" people hate 
though "having su££ered no injustice" (221). 
45Medea"s exploitation of her alleged 
vulnerability (see Gellie, "Character," p. 17) is a 
constant in her repertoire 0£ manipulation. It is easy to 
discern when Medea is engaging in, as Foley, "Divided 
Self," p. 74, terms it, "-feminine role-playing" with men, 
but she is not above using it, as here, on her own sex. 
Pucci, Violence, p. 72., speaks of Medea's rhetoric as 
"mov[ing] back. and forth between the contradictory -figures 
of master and slave." 
to . 
460dysseus similarly uses the disguise 0£ a beggar 
discourage the suitors from considering him a contender. 
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And so, Medea may join them, albeit -falsely,47 in 
lural "We women," she intones at 230-
.£irst person P · the :a. 
t he most wretched creatures 0£ all things that 231, •are 
and have intelligence.•48 Her description 0£ 
are alive 
. common wretchedness is no less an appeal to their 
their 
·udice against the opposite sex--a trait we will see preJ 
they share with Jason--than it is designed to make the 
blood o£ a competitor boil: women must willingly submit 
themselves to the mastery o-f another (o£a11'oT'l')V T£ 
awJJ.aTOS. Aaflav, 233), even pay dearly £or the 
privilege! The whole sordid predicament 0£ trying to get a 
good deal £or one's money Medea describes competitively 
as "the greatest contest" 
> • (aywv , tJ.£YlOTOS., 
47 So, e.g., Easterling, "ln£an ticide," p. 182: 
•we are le£t in no doubt that this is a -formidable woman; 
and, despite all that she has said in this scene about the 
limitations 0£ the -feminine role, it is clear that she 
herself is capable 0£ overcoming them." See also Stewart 
Flory, •ffedea•s Right Hand: Promises and Revenge," TAPA 
108 (1978; herea£ter Flory, "Right Hand•), pp. 70-71, who 
notes that Medea's extraordinary marriage contract with 
Jason made on her own behal£ makes her "a larger-than-li-fe 
female." C-f. Williamson, "Woman's Place," pp. 18-19. 
Foley, "Divided Sel£," pp. 74-75, similarly points out that 
Kedea is no typical house-wi£e, and that she o£ten -feigns 
femininity to manipulate others. McDermott, Incarnation, 
pp. 43-64, examines the tensions between the realistic and 
the demonic in Euripides• characterization 0£ Medea. Medea 
as woman is an anomaly: sympathetic and revoltingly 
unnatural. 
48Medea •s descriptions o-f the plight o-f women are 
realistic. See Helene P. Foley, "The Conception 0£ Women 1
: Athenian Drama," in Re-flections 0£ Women in Antiquity, 
; · Helene P. Foley (New York: Gordon and Breach Science 
0
:blishers, 1981), pp. 129-130, £or prose text con£irmation 
several 0£ Medea's points. 
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49 for the task of protecting one's repu ta tion--an 235), 
n
suming one in a zero-sum competi tion--deems escape 
au-co 
a bad marriage impossible for women (236-237). The 
from 
hope for is a husband who does not strain best one can 
against the yoke; this makes one's life enviable (241-243). 
The competitor, recall, covets envy, perhaps even this 
sorrY excuse for it.50 
It is clear throughout this description that women are 
constrained and have no power (see 232 and 239, 6e'l; 
247, QVclYK"'l) 1 While power and Choice are Solely in 
the hands of men (see 242, pi~. and 244-245). The 
description is thoroughly degrading to anyone with an ounce 
of self-respect and a need for self-mastery; for the highly 
competitive it is incitement to riot. Medea ends with a 
rousing call to arms: 
"They say that we live life without danger at home, 
while they do battle with the spear. They don't know 
what they"re talking about (KaKWS cppovouvTES); 
I'd rather stand three times beside a shield than give 
birth once.• (248-251).51 
49Foley, •Divided Sel£,• p. 75. 
50Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 43 and 55-58; cf. 
Slater, Glory, pp. 39-40. 
51Hedea's comparison between the front line 
warrior and the child-bearing woman is, according to Simon 
Gol~hill, Reading Greek Tragedy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1986; herea£ter Goldhill, Reading), pp. 116 
~nd 121-122, a comparison between the transitional moments 
~n the lives of young men and young women. Cf. Simon 
D~ldhill, "The Great Dionysia,• in Nothing to Do with 
(/0~Ysos?, ed. John J. Winkler and Froma I. Zeitlin 
u:i.nceton, HJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 107-
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n
e sentence Medea reasserts the supremacy 0£ women by 
In o 
n who are, a£ter all, misin£ormed -fools (recall degrading me 
that competition need not be only in the physical realm, 
that it also invaded the realm 0£ the intellect),52 and 
one-third the courage 0£ women; she takes back the 
who bave 
power of choice by ber own pre£erence £or bearing arms over 
birthing;53 she advances the already implied keenly 
competitive role 0£ wi£e by saying that one 0£ her 
functions, giving birth, is the equivalent 0£ three times 
Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient 
Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (Hew York: Zone Books, 1988), 
p. 34, remarks that "Harriage is £or the girl what war is 
for the boy . . . ." Vernant continues--tellingly, in 
light 0£ Medea's trans-formation in the play--that a girl 
who rejects marriage (or, one could argue, a woman who is 
ejected £rom marriage) " ... £inds herself to some extent 
forced toward war£are, and paradoxically becomes the 
equivalent 0£ a warrior." See the even more telling 
comment 0£ Joseph Campbell, Power, p. 12.5, who, a£ter 
noting that the Aztecs placed warriors killed in battle in 
the same heaven with mothers who died in childbirth, 
asserts, "Giving birth is definitely a heroic deed, in that 
it is the giving over 0£ onesel£ to the li£e 0£ another." 
It is here that one may begin to discern the 
difference between the "hero" and the zero-sum competitor, 
the latter 0£ whom never "gives over• him or hersel£ •to 
the life 0£ another• and, there-fore, has no claim to being 
a "hero." 
52Hedea"s weapon in the zero-sum game is her 
cleverness. See H. I. Finley, The World 0£ Odysseus, 2 
r~v. ed. (Hew York: Penguin Books, 1978; herea£ter 
Fi.nl~y, World 0£ Odysseus), p. 12.0: ":Nothing de-fines the 
quall.ty of Greek culture more neatly than the way in which 
the idea 0£ competition was extended -from physical prowess 
to the realm 0£ the intellect . . . • 
53Pucci Violence, 
Point. ' 
pp. 66-69, is excellent on this 
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front 
on the 
well fight to 
lines. 54 
win.55 
Harriage 
This is a 
is war, so one may as 
sentiment appealing 
t o those who have been on the bottom way too long, are onlY 
and tired 0£ their subservience, and sense that in sick 
•us vs. them• game only one side can win. thiS 
Medea has there-fore skill-fully reminded the Chorus 0£ 
what to them is quite pain£ul: they are subservient, 
helpless, constrained, degraded. They must pay £or their 
degradation and endure being considered lucky £or it. 
Medea easily wins the Chorus over because she appeals to 
them not merely as women, but rather as competitors who are 
sick of losing. 
Medea at the same time de-fines hersel£ as an 
aggressively competitive person, and one who is skilled at 
playing the zero-sum game. What defines Medea as a zero-
sum competitor is her manipula tion56 0£ assets critical 
54Simon, Tragic Drama, p. 89, sees Medea's 
equation of childbirth and battle as a re-formulation 0£ 
women's duty to bear sons who will bear the shield £or the 
polis. 
55The phrase "Harriage is war" is taken 'from Susan 
Starr Richards, "How to Win at Marriage," Ms. Magazine, 
Karch 1983, pp. 44-49, who claims that she came to 
recognize her own mistaken desire to "win" as "what comes 
of seeing yoursel£ as the last 0£ a long line 0£ losers--by 
Which I mean women." (p. 49). C£. the Janis Joplin song, 
"Women is Losers," whose lyrics include the regret£ul "men 
always seem to end up on top"; the sentiment is similar in 
John Lennon and Yoko Ono's "Woman is the Rigger 0£ the 
World." 
th 56HcDermott, Incarnation, pp. 45-48, may be right 
at Medea knowingly -falsely assumes the role 0£ the 
average Haus£rau; if so, this is more evidence that Medea 
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her reputation in general and her particular 
these (to her) alien women. As a competitor, 
status with 
. politic :for her to dispel any negative accruals to 
it J.S 
ner reputation and to ensure that these women will remain 
a111es. The :first she has accomplished--in a wily display 
of vulnerabili ty--by redirecting their suspicions about her 
reserved nature; the second she accomplishes by delineating 
for them the degrading lot they share with her. 
But Medea's identi:fication as a player in a cutthroat 
competitive game does not stop with her concern :for 
impression management and securing allies. In the last 
part o:f her opening monologue, Medea claims she is 
different :from the Corinthian women 0£ the Chorus because 
of her isolation and alienation.57 Such isolation and 
alienation, however, are hallmarks 0£ one whose major 
concern is sel£-advancement.58 Parallels can easily be 
drawn to Achilles, whose isolation was similarly sel£-
is using the intellectual tools 0£ the zero-sum competitor. 
See Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 68, £or treachery and 
duplicity as one aspect 0£ the contest system. 
57Margaret Visser, "Medea: Daughter, Sister, Wi£e 
and Mother," in Greek Tragedy and Its Legacy, ed. Hartin 
Cropp, et al. (Calgary, Alberta, Canada: Univ. 0£ Calgary, 
l986; herea£ter Visser, "Medea"}, p. 151, explains, 
however, that "[i]n marriage, a woman is a :foreigner." C£. 
Re~kford, "First Exit," p. 354, who notes the appearance 0£ 
this idea in Alcestis, where Admetus claims it is a · 
•stranger woman" (yuv.fi 9upal'os, 805) who has died. 
58See Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 106, £or -feelings ~f separateness and isolation as one of the tensions of 
individuality. 
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it was put to the service of achieving his sole 
. of receiving the honor he felt he deserved. desire, 
•s current plight, as commentators indignantly point 
11edea 
59 f course of her own making: all that she out, is o 
suffers now, as she will be eager to remind Jason (475 
) is because of her desire to help Jason, who was her ff .• 
sole interest (228-229). Medea is not selfless, Jason 
selfish. They are both dominated by self-interest, both 
jocKeying for the mastery to gain the objects of their 
desire. 60 
Medea's isolation and alienation, then, which she uses 
to emphasize her distinction, must in one sense have had 
the ring of familiarity to the competitive members 0£ the 
59see 
• 
e.g., Easterling, "Infanticide," p . 182. 
6 0E. M. Blaik.lock., "The Nautical Imagery 0£ 
Euripides• Medea," CP 50 (1955; herea-fter Blaik.lock., 
"Rautical Imagery"), p. 236: "The Medea of Corinth is to 
be understood in the light of the Medea of Colchis. The 
situation is a consummation. If the moralities are to be 
sought, it was a betrayal which led to this story of mutual 
treachery. 1£ motives and catastrophe are to reveal their 
source and origin, it is in the past of both Jason and 
Medea." C£. Dunk.le, "Aegeus Episode," p. 99: ". . . it 
would be a mistake to see Medea's passion for Jason as a 
self-sacrificing love . . . ." Pace Cowherd, "Ending," p. 
l3t: "[T)he -fact remains that Medea took. her oaths because 
of love. On the other hand, . . . Jason was simply looking !0 his own advantage." Cowherd's thesis 0£ Medea as 
feeling" and Jason as "unfeeling" forces her to ignore J~son•s expressions of grief at the end of the play so that 
: e m~y maintain that Jason "· .. expresses no feeling 
or his children." (p. 134). 
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61 And al though the di££erences she describes 
chorus. 
are not 
imagined--she is literally alone62 (she has 
h er city, her father's home, and cannot enjoy the iost 
o£ £riends, 253-254) and an alien (256)--Medea 
colDpanY 
nonetheless stresses her helplessness, so recently put 
forth as their common plight. In this, she maintains the 
thread 0£ their similarity, £or her description 0£ her 
alleged contrast to them £inds her as one whose world is 
full o£ things she does not have, whose every action is 
blocKed by negators (255-258; the use 0£ negatives is 
remarKable here), and who is acted upon instead 0£ acting 
255, 256). In short, she 
remains nonetheless one 0£ them, helplessly constrained by 
others, liKe all women 0£ her earlier description.63 
By the time she comes around to listing the things she 
lacKs, there£ore, these women will be hard pressed to 
recall (i£ indeed they knew it) that Medea hersel£ has been 
61see Easterling, "In£anticide," p. 180, £or the 
stress on Medea's foreignness as a way to emphasize her 
vulnerability and isolation. 
62Arrowsmith, "Ideas," pp. 41-42, sees the 
depiction 0£ loneliness as a £ate common to all humans as a 
striking £eature 0£ Euripides' tragedies. 
63Bongie, "Heroic Elements," p. 35, cites the 
murder 0£ Medea's brother and the Nurse's warnings about 
Kedea•s temperament (172) as evidence that Medea, "no 
shrinking violet," does not con£orm to the Chorus' image 0£ t~e "helpless £emale creature." Indeed, "[Medea's] 
(situation never was the same as that 0£ an average woman." p. 36). 
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£or at least some 0£ her desola tion.64- The 
are ripe to grant her request £or silence, which she 
cnorus 
ly couches both in tentative indefiniteness and clever 
. itY ("i£ £or me some way, some device may be £ound passi.v 
. . . . 
• 260) as well as in another rousing appeal for 
woJDen to rise above their reputation as £ear£ul cowards: 
She asserts, can be bloodier than anyone when it woJDen, 
reallY matters to them (264--266). 
And when does it really matter to a woman? "Whenever 
she happens to have lost honor in bed." Cl > (oTav cP E:S 
> • 
£VV"IV 
> I "!OllC"l~E:V'r} K UP!l1 265). Does this mean 
that sex, or--to put on it what Winkler calls "vanilla 
connotations"--love,65 is all that matters to women? 
Hardly. For i£ we return once more to the -first part 0£ 
Kedea•s speech to the Corinthian women, we £ind that £or a 
woman, good reputation and enviable li£e--both things to 
which the zero-sum contender aspires--are secured through 
good relations with her husband, her "bed-mate": there is 
> 
no such thing as a respectable divorce £or a woman (ou 
. 
yap > • avaAAayal I Y\JVOlf,;lV, 236-237), 
and if she makes a miscalculation in dealing with her bed-
mate (.;uve:uvET!J, 24-0, as synonymous with "husband" at 
640hlander, Suspense, p. 54-, notes that, in any 
case, Medea's 0££ stage sel£-accusations, in which she 
~eems to be addressing her own soul in regret £or her past 
t~eds, would elicit sympathy £rom anyone who overhears 
em. 
Constraints, p. 72. 
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2 ) her life will not be the enviable one she 2.37 and 24 ' 
describes as possible 
had this not happened (t'llAWTos 
If a woman is "dishonored" in bed, her 
S tatus is at risk.. This is a far cry from the "hell social 
nath no fury" spins commonly put on interpretations of this 
passage. 66 Medea is talking about repu ta ti on here, not 
a privately suffered sense of having been scorned.67 
For ,.,0 men in general as well as for the men in this play, 
there is a connection between eros and one's social status. 
For men, eros is used to achieve a higher social standing; 
for women, the connection is something more integral and 
beyond their control: their degree of success with their 
•bed-mate" is in direct proportion to their social success. 
It is no wonder, then, that Kedea•s description of women 
66pace Page, Medea, pp. xiv-xv11. Cf. Musurillo, 
•Reconsideration," passim, to whom Medea is "a woman 
wronged," or "a woman scorned," and £or whom line 330 ("Ah, 
what a great evil love is £or men!") is "the £inal theme 0£ 
the play.• (p. 74). C£. also his p. 73, where Medea is "a 
pure woman . . . wounded in the weak.est and most sensitive 
part 0£ her nature." 
67Bongie, "Heroic Elements," pp. 28-29, is 
especially good on this point: "No reference is made, it 
should be noticed, to a broken heart. . . . [T)he k.ey to 
[Medea's character) is not rejected love and jealousy, but 
a sense 0£ slighted honour and a £ear 0£ loss of respect 
and status." Cf. Bernd Seidensticker, "Euripides, Medea 
1056-80, An Interpolation?," in Cabinet of the Muses, ed. 
Mark. Griffith and Donald J. Kastronarde (Atlanta, GA: 
Scholars Press, 1990; hereafter Seidensticker, "Medea 1056-
80•), p, 98. 
1 
~ Easterling, "Infanticide," p. 183: "There is a 
c ash here between Medea's self-image as a hero of the old 
~tyle braving a great ordeal and her awareness of the 
estructiveness of thwarted female passion." 
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. g bloody-minded when dishonored in bed does not 
becomi.n 
. the Chorus as odd. Here is a battle worth fighting. 
str.lke 
such a description 0£ women as able to be "bloody-
. d d" can only win the day with a group to whom it 
aai.n e 
l s to be bloody when it matters. The women 0£ the appea 
Chorus define themselves as eagerly vicious by granting 
Medea's request £or silence. It will be all she needs 'from 
them. As they pledge silence, they 'further show their own 
agreement with the code 0£ harming enemies: "I will do 
this; £or justly you punish your husband, Medea" 
J I (t:VdlKW5 ' yap 
J I 
ETElO!) 
I 
ll'OOlV, 26 6). 
one can hardly posit in this group willing passivity and 
horror 0£ bloodshed. They are, in essence, sicking Medea 
on Jason, and are eager to stand by and watch as the £ur 
flies. It will be a vicarious victory £or them. 
But this victory is hardly secured. What threatens it 
is the predicted order for Medea's exile with her two 
children,68 now issued upon his entry (271) by a 
brusque and bristling Creon.69 Creon's exiling Medea 
68Exile was no tri£ling sentence, physically or 
psychologically. Jean-Pierre Vernant, "A .. Beautiful Death' 
and the Disfigured Corpse in Homeric Epic," in Mortals and 
Im~ortals: Collected Essays, ed. Froma I. Zeitlin 
(Princeton, HJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991; hereafter 
Vernant, "Beauti£ul Death•), p. 54, recalls that Achilles 
~ompared his dishonor with the plight 0£ the exile, whose 
ate was to be "a less than nothing (outidanos), a homeless 
and worthless dri£ter, a k.ind 0£ nonperson (Il. 9.648)." 
ent 
69Alth?ugh Creon is blatantly threatening upon his 
b t ranee, :11-i.s_ command 0£ theatrical space nonetheless 
e rays his inferiority. Bernard Gredley, "The Place and 
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es the £act that Medea's actions--based on the 
underscor 
that she is a participant in a zero-sum game--have 
attitude 
misguided. Creon and his daughter have won, 
not been 
f re someone must have lost. They win only at Medea's tnere o 
> , 
These are there£ore her enemies (Ex9poL, 
cost. 
278), £or they willingly harm her to advance their own 
interests. Creon likewise considers Medea an enemy: upon 
his entrance he calls attention to her scowling countenance 
and the £act that her th umos has been roused against her 
husband (vooEL 9uµouµf:v 'I') v, 271). The participle 
can hardly be adequately translated by the English phrase 
•angry at your husband"; Creon makes it clear that he 
expects that Medea's roused thumos will inspire retaliatory 
action. He £ears she may do his child some deadly harm 
(282).70 He recognizes that Medea has been deprived 0£ 
a husband in this his gain (286); he has heard 0£ her 
threats. Furthermore, Medea is sophe; this, combined with 
her skill £or doing much harm, makes her a woman to be 
feared (285). 
Creon's fears of the sophe Medea suggest that sophia 
Time of Victory: Euripides• Medea," BICS 34 (1987; 
hereafter Gredley, "Place and Time"), P:--30, notes, "He 
comes to Medea; his palace, though the centre of communal 
authority, occupies a marginal position in theatrical 
space, displaced and decen tred at the end of an eisodos." 
70
creon•s fears are not misguided, for Medea is 
uncannily proficient at discerning weaknesses she can use 
aga· 
o£ inst her enemies. See J. o. de G. Hanson, "The Secret 
Medea's Success," G&R 12 (1965), pp. 54-61. 
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17: 
, . ._. being defined as something use£ul in de£ea ting an enemy; 
.jJldee d that this is the de£inition 0£ sophia posited here 
i• apparent from Medea's response to Creon's £ear. To 
11J1derstand her response, however, we must first understand 
who it is Medea believes she is addressing, and to discern 
tbJlt, we must look at Creon's announcement that he will 
take precautions against Medea. In this announcement, he 
laJ'• claim to the code 0£ behavior preferred by nearly 
e.-eryone in this play: "As -far as rm concerned, it is 
better now to be hated 
> , (a 11'EX8E<J9a t.) woman, by you, 
than to be made so£t (µa.>.8auo8ev8Cat.1) and later 
1roan greatly." (2.90-2.91). 
In this statement, Creon identifies himsel£ as one who 
considers it better to have enemies than the regrets that 
come with being so£t, yielding, approachable. In short, 
Creon espouses, but cannot, to his mis-fortune, live up to 
Hedea•s disposition: she, too, has a distaste £or softness 
and being gentle; she is heavy /severe, according to the 
Burse (38) and the Chorus (12.65), which is just what she 
wants to be, at least to her enemies (809); she makes but a 
Pretense 0£ softness, according to Creon (316; Medea 
herself at 776 admits to such a pretense regarding her 
intended words to Jason); later she chides herself £or 
softness (1052) and finally sends £rom her sight the 
Children with their so-ft skin and sweet breath (1075-
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10'1 6 >· 
To designate this so£tness as e££eminacy, and 
tia.ere£ore to argue that Creon•s and Kedea"s disdain 0£ 
softness is a rejection 0£ the £eminine, is one step in the 
t . 72. Th G k. h d th right direc ion. e ree s, owever, use e 
designations "so£t" and "£eminine" in their rhetoric 0£ 
competition. To be "so£t" or a "woman" means to be weak.; 
tb.at is, to be passive and the loser.73 Creon's own 
bluf£ing disdain 0£ so£tness is an attempt to reject 
in£eriori ty in competition. Such a rejection is not, 
there£ore1 £or Creon obviously or even £or Medea, a 
rejection 0£ the £eminine. Medea chooses, as Creon wishes 
he could by his words choose, to be the superior 
competitor, to be "hard." In a world £ull 0£ actual and 
potential enemies, such a tack. is not untoward, as the 
fatal consequences 0£ Creon"s ultimate so£tening will 
71simon, Tragic Drama, p. 78, indicates how little 
touching there is in the play, and how touch is again and 
again described as abrasive or even torturous. 
72see, e.g., Bongie, "Heroic Elements," pp. 39, 
•ho typi£ies Medea "s reactions as "masculine" in arguing 
against "scorned woman" interpretations. Foley, "Divided 
SeH,• pp. 73-83, gives a gripping analysis 0£ Medea •s 
struggle as one between her "masculine" and "£eminine" 
•elves, and £urther delineates how Medea exploits 
ezpectations others have 0£ her as a £emale. Shaw, "Female 
I~truder," pp. 2.58-2.64, argues that Medea begins the play 
!'b th many 0£ the traits 0£ a typical Greek. woman, but 
Cl ec_omes a man" {p. 2.61) in her vengeance and desire to 
a.omi.nate. C£. Schein, "Philia," p. 67, £or Medea"s use 0£ 
asculine vocabulary at 12.40-12.41. 
•pi ~3Wink.ler, Constraints, p. 50. 
ayi.ng the Other," pp. 69-71. 
C£. Zeitlin, 
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But in this scene, Creon still has the power to thwart 
lledea's plans; Medea must there-fore succeed in manipulating 
b.illl out 0£ his competitive superiority.74 She tries to 
40 this £irst by addressing his £ear that she is sophe, 
that is, that he sees her as having in this a competitive 
edle over him. Medea tries, unsuccess£ully, to counteract 
Creon's £ear 0£ her sophia as a competitive edge by 
despising her reputation for cleverness. She labels it a 
ireat bane to a competitor: it has more than once worked 
to her detriment instead 0£ 
'W'PWTOV, 
11eya>.a 
> • 
au.a 
>I t:LpyaaTaL 
# 
KaKa, 
> ,.. her -favor {ou vuv µ.t: 
KpE:ov, 
292-293). In short, 
though it may appear a competitive advantage, it is not. 
It is there-fore in Creon's apprehension and Medea's 
attempts to soothe it that we get the play"s first 
pro££ered de£inition of sophia: it is a means to bring 
about the end of advancing one"s own interests; here, by 
harming one"s enemy. Sophia in others, then, is to be 
£eared. Nothing Medea can do will convince Creon 
Otherwise. This is all to his credit, for in this scene we 
74Hills, Mythopoeia, pp. 105-106, sees Hedea"s 
SOPhia in argumentation in her ability to present herself 
~s other than what she is. Here, she tries to soften 
W~~o.n"s perception of the dangers of her competitive savvy. 
a h.amson, "Woman"s Place," p. 21, detects three distinct 
1 PProaches Medea tak.es in her assault on Creon. She is .~-:..t _successful in the first, which is made in "abstract 
JUdicial language." 
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the sophe Medea manipulate her enemy into harm's 
•i'tness 
••r· 
For it is Medea sophe who continues, by way 0£ 
uzation on sophia, to try to persuade Creon not to 
,enera 
· d she does this both by resuming her at tempt to be afrai i 
· Creon's perception 0£ sophia as a competitive 
undermine 
eclte and by appealing to Creon's own pro-fessed 
competitiveness. Arter -first baldly stating that her 
reputation has, in £act, o£ten harmed her (292-293), Medea 
claims that sophia is such a liability that anyone with his 
head on straight will re£rain -from teaching his children to 
be too •smart" (294-295).75 This is because a "smart" 
person does not, among the stupid, have the reputation 
sought by a competitor, because he seems useless (296; c£. 
298-299), or because such a person incurs envy as a 
recognized superior (297; c£. 300-301 and 303, 305). Medea 
is walking a fine line here, however, for at the same time 
that she is tacitly admitting to the superiority 0£ one who 
is sophos (only stupid people think such a person is 
useless and not "smart," while others who are considered--
but are not really--smart are hostile in their envy), she 
•Cain tries to convince Creon that this admitted 
superiority is a liability, £or one either has no 
reputation or incurs enmity. 
Bur. ~5Rohdich, Tragodie, pp. 48-49, argues that 
1 l.Pl.des suggests in this scene that Kedea•s own nteu · . 
and igence i.s all-too-human, i.e., obtained by nurture, 
is not thereby supernatural. 
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sut this time Medea adds a new wrinkle to her 
she backs Creon into a corner by implying that 
if creon distrusts her because 0£ her sophia, he must be 
·ous or stupid--maybe both. In either case, i£ Creon 
e11v1 
admits that he considers Medea "smart," he places her on 
top: being •smarter" means she has the competitive edge; 
))eillg envied means she is already recognized as better 
(303). Ir, then, Creon is a real competitor, he must 
airee with Medea and stop considering her "smart," £or 
otherwise he shows himsel£ to be at a disadvantage. But 
Creon does not so agree, because, as he will soon admit, he 
is blurring at being a hardened competitor. 
Medea, however, has taken him at his word, and 
continues to appeal to him in competitive terms. She tries 
to dispel his £ears that she is by her "smartness" superior 
to him, -first by encouraging him to believe that she "is 
not so smart" (305). She then baldly states that he, in 
'fact, has the advantage as tyrant (309). Besides, he has 
not harmed her (309) and cannot there-fore be considered her 
enemy; her rage is against her husband, not Creon (310-
311). She bears no grudge against him--he, competitor that 
he is, should let his th umos guide him in choosing a 
husband £or his daughter (310); his choice has been 
Prudent e6pas. 311; Cr. 
•imilar claim at 549 that his betrayal 0£ Medea was 
On the contrary, Medea wishes him well 
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(312-313). She--not the type to try to fight a tyrant, 
11 (307-308)--admits, in a false display of self-reca 
!Dent that she is vanquished by her betters efface • 
(acpet.aaovwv VLICWJJ.EVOl), defers to his apparent 
r and begs to be allowed to stay (314-315). po we 
This tactic, however, does not work with Creon because 
b.e has JDore at heart than his own interests. Indeed, he 
proclaiJDed as much in his first speech--his fear was for 
biS daughter, not himself (283)--but somehow Medea and we 
were :fooled by his blu:f:f.76 And bluf:fing he was, :for 
b.e is JDUCh more easily won over by an appeal to the 
champion o:f quiet virtues he is than to the competitor he 
b.as pretended to be. It takes a bluffer to know one, and 
Creon at :first makes a show of firm resolve by calling 
attention to the discrepancy between Medea 1 s ability to 
speak things "soft to hear" while planning--he shudders to 
iaaeine--some evil thing (316-317). She is, he knows, not 
saying what she really feels; he knows her thumos has been 
roused (as he indicated at 271) and that she is feigning 
congeniality and compliance: she is the type that is not 
76Bongie, "Heroic Elements," p. 38, proposes that ~dea i~ instead using a clever strategy: "By putting to b eon first a request she knows he cannot grant, and then !e Pretending to be very upset when he refuses, Medea 
P Pares the ground for a much smaller request that he 
::Uld hardly be so ungracious as to refuse, especially 
ton~~-she appe_als to his feelings as a parent." According 
Cr l.~ analysis, Medea must realize straight 0££ that 
*ee~~~ is blu££ing, £or being seen as gracious and having 
com gs 0 £ connection are not the concern of the hardened 
Pet1 tor he professes to be and has so far been. 
338 
f'. 
t o guard against, a "smart" person who keeps silent 80 easY 
. 
aocpos., 320). 
Creon seems to know this woman well. We will later be 
by Medea herself that he was completely accurate in told. 
tbiS characterization of her: she was only fawning on him 
to get what she needed (368-369). That Creon would connect 
Iler •smartness" with an ability to keep silent as to (read: 
lie about) her true £eelings gives us another wrinkle on 
the de-finition of sophia in the competitive arena. The 
aoehos individual in a zero-sum game is the one who--to use 
a close paraphrase 0£ Winkler's description 0£ astute 
conduct in a scarcity economy--appears -friendly, tries to 
aa:simize his pro£it, lies through his teeth, and plays his 
cards close to his vest.77 This is the portrait 0£ 
110meone •smart," a winner. But Medea cannot win this way 
with Creon, £or Creon knows her too well. At 321 he 
.repeats his order £or her to depart. All seems, but is 
not, lost. For it is now that Medea starts playing to the 
real Creon and gains her success. 
By admit ting his connectedness to others and even 
•rmbolically extending it to an aknowledged enemy, by 
_responding to an appeal £or aidos, and by allowing himself 
to be touched, Creon reveals his true, non-competitive, 
cooperative nature. In these three ways Creon's previously 
stated Pre£erence for acquiring an enemy over making 
77Winkl er, Constrain ts, p. 108. 
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concessions to one and su££ering £or it (290-291) is 
exposed as the blu££ that it is. Creon even admits as much 
as he reluctantly grants Medea's request £or one day's 
reprieve: "It is not at all my natural temperament to be 
tyrannical, and I have, in the act o-f showing aidos, many 
times been destroyed." 
u ('llKlCJTa > • TOUIJ.OV 
, 
-rupaVVLKOV, 
> , 
at60UIJ.€VOS 
348-349). 
Creon's statement recalls the Nurse's re£lections on 
the moods of tyrants (TupavvtaJv >--.ftµ.aTa, 119), and 
forces the realization that the real tyrant here, the 
autonomous competitor, is Medea, not Creon. For what Creon 
allows, both Medea and, in £act, Jason repeatedly resist. 
Creon is not like them. As noted above, he marks his 
de£iciencies as an autonomous competitor in three ways. 
First, Creon does not k.eep the attachment he has to others 
as a priority lower than his responsibility to himsel£. 
By contrast, Jason shows his ability to do this in his 
remarrying £or political advancement, Medea in killing her 
children to get the better 0£ her enemy. Second, Creon 
heeds aidos, whereas an autonomous competitor like Jason 
does not,78 especially when aidos con£licts with his 
7 8The reason that the competitor is shameless is 
~Pelled out by Jerome A. Hiller, The Way 0£ Su££ering: A 
p eography 0£ Crisis (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. 
~ess, 1988), p. 109: "When we operate on the basis 0£ the 
;~11 t~ control, we are aware 0£ only one kind 0£ 'evil': 
it e -failure ~-f existence to con£orm to the plan we have -for 
· From this point 0£ view, a being has worth only 
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tion of himself as superior. For this reason, Jason 
perceP 
b le to shake off Medea •s branding him as "diseased" iS a 
with anaidei[a) (472).79 Third, Creon fails to keep 
l f inaccessible to the touch of one he considers an him Se 
my unlike Medea at 1320-1322. ene • 
creon is almost the opposite of Jason and Medea. He 
readilY admits that, for him, his child is his first 
priority, his country second (329); he thereby defines 
himself as concerned for others above himself. He is not a 
keen and autonomous competitor and is consequently open to 
the in£luence 0£ aidos,80 to which Medea appeals 
insofar as it performs some instrumental function for me. 
I experience a being as evil whenever it stands over 
against me, insisting on its Otherness. Seen from this 
point of view, evil occurs in its most radical form when a 
crisis upsets my whole way of living at the most 
fundamental level. It is important to notice that when we 
define good and evil in these terms, we cannot possibly 
conceive of ourselves as evil. For from such a vantage 
Point, evil is, by definition, that which runs counter to 
our wills. By taking the view that the goodness of a being 
depends on its measuring up to my criteria of what it ought 
to be, I put myself in the position 0£ being the one who 
sets up criteria, not the one who has to measure up to 
them. That is why, when operating on the basis 0£ the will 
to control, we are incapable 0£ shame." Pace A. P. 
Burnett, "Medea and the Tragedy of Revenge," CP 68 (1973; 
hereafter Burnett, "Tragedy of Revenge"), pp. 9-10, who 
attributes Hedea•s freedom from shame to her status as non-
Greek. 
'f . 79According to Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 95, shame 
•ails as a sanction in the contest system where there is 
t~~ 1n~ense _concern with victory." It may also fail when 
re is a di.screpancy between what others think 0£ one and 
one•s own sel£-image. 
80Th· 1.s, as Buxton Persuasion, pp. 159-160, points 
out is "[t] . • 
ev • o his [Creon's] moral credit, but to his 
entua1 downfall." For an excellent definition of aidos, 
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326) and to Which Creon £inally admits he 
11as more 
than once succumbed 
> I {aLoouµt:vos., 349). It 
t that these two uses 0£ the verb aideomai are 1S signi£ican 
ly ones in the play: aidos, as the Chorus will soon u1e on 
proclaim, is gone £rom Hellas (439-440). It seems to 
reside only in this one man, Creon. It will not, just as 
he suspects, serve him well. It in £act signals him as 
sof~ a weak and easily overcome contender in this 
dangerous game he hal£-heartedly plays. 
so too does his allowing himsel£ to be touched (339). 
BJ' this Creon needlessly81 puts himsel£ in the position 
of the supplicated; he must now choose either to ensure 
that Medea is removed by an act 0£ violence, or else he 
must willingly extend to her--this woman he considers his 
enemy, a threat to what he holds dearest--the consideration 
normally given only to a philos. He chooses the latter and 
shows himsel£, in competitive terms, in£erior to the woman 
who now grovels at his knees, but who later will rise in 
see Vernant, "Beauti£ul Death," p. 52. 
81John Gould, "Hiketeia," JHS 93 (1973; herea£ter 
Gould, "Hiketeia"). pp. 84-85, notes that the supplicated 
~an, like Odysseus at Euripides• Hecuba 342-345, take 
counter-measures• to see to it that the supplicant is 
:nable to gain hold 0£ him. Creon here, like Odysseus 
1 here, has ample warning that a "£igurative" supplication 
.;
1 
about_ to be made actual: Gould sees evidence £or 
IUrati.ve• supplication as early as 324 {c£. Creon's 
:ords at 325); it becomes actual only at 338. Creon, 
h:•ever, £ails to take the necessary precautions to avoid 
80.::::g to submit or--wha t is a rare case, according to him {p. 80)--having to use physical £orce to extract 
self £rom Medea •s supplication. 
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t at this act so far beneath her. 
disgus 
The act of supplication, Gould argues, is not entirely 
· t 1· s ambivalent, teetering between self-debasing--i 
abasement and symbolic aggression.82 In displaying 
yulnerabilitY, it ostensibly acknowledges the superiority 
o£ the supplicated, since the supplicant by his act "has 
teaiporarilY opted out of the 'contest system• of social 
relationships that characterises normal behaviour between 
And yet, suppliancy does so by the 
brash act of taking physical hold of a person and refusing 
to let go. Winkler describes the inviolability of the 
Athenian citizen, for whom touch was taken as a profound 
insult because it was what one did to social 
inferiors.84 And while it may be argued that Medea •s 
gesture of supplication is something else entirely, it is 
clear from Creon 1 s immediate, albeit reluctant, compliance 
to do something that he has good reason to believe will 
destroy him (349) that he has been dominated more than 
entreated. Indeed, Bennett Simon has shown that in this 
Play touch is violation, and that Medea is one who not only 
Will not allow herself to be touched, but who equates touch 
• 
82Gould, "Hiketeia," 
Place and Time," p. 30. 
pp. 94-97. Cf. Gredley, 
83Gould, "Hiketeia," p. 94. 
84Winkler, Constraints, pp. 48-49. 
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,,ttll Vlounding.85 And, as the Nurse's :forebodings have 
suggested, even proximity spells danger. 
creon, then, who has espoused the play•s pro£:fered 
definition o:f competitive arete, shows himsel£ to be not up 
to carrying it 0££, at least against a contender like 
Kedea. For just as she used a display 0£ vulnerability to 
gain the support o:f the Chorus, Medea uses with Creon a 
pretense o:f sel:f-abasement to get :from him what she wants: 
one day. 
In short, Medea •s exhibition of' vulnerability is as 
false as Creon's proclaimed espousal o:f the competitive 
code. A:fter Creon departs, Medea lightly shrugs o:f:f the 
Chorus• concern over her isolation and the obstacles she, 
without resources, must overcome (357-363). Instead, she 
rises :from her abased posture to assume a competitor's 
stance: she promises the Chorus that Jason and his bride 
have contests and small troubles 
,, 
yet to come, no (e:-r> 
>I , 
' > ' E:la> aywve:s ICQl OU O"IJ.llCPOl 
I 
VOVOl, 366-367). Finally, there is Medea's 
contender's disgust at having comported herself as an 
inferior: "For do you think that I would ever have :fawned 
so Upon that man, i:f I weren't to gain something or weren't 
85Simon, Tragic Drama, pp. 77-78. Flory, "Right 
Hand," pp. 69-74, traces in Medea the transf'ormation -from 
~OVing_ to hostile touch. Flory notes (p. 69) that denying 
p h~ right to touch is cruel. C£. Newton, "Passionate 
d ~I.son," p. 13: "The touch o:f Medea •s hand, it seems, 
w i.s_tort~, perverts, and poisons all relationships with 
hJ.ch l. t comes in to con tact." 
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something £or mysel£? I would not have spoken to 
devising 
W ould I have touched his hand." (368-370). biDl nor 
While it may not be surprising that Medea openly 
"
ledges that her pleading touch veiled a sense 0£ 
ackno 
superiority, it perhaps shocks modern Western sensibilities 
uiat she so brazenly displays her deceit-fulness, hatred, 
and villainy to these women, and they never once demur. 
Kedea, however, knows these women as the competitors that 
they are, and there-fore -feels no compunction about 
displaying to them the competitive use to which she puts 
her •smartness," her vigor £or competition, and her 
proneness to violence. She contemptuously points out to 
them Creon's in-feriority in intellectual competition (he is 
a fool £or having believed her, 371),86 and 
unselfconsciously savors the imagined de£ea t 0£ her three 
enemies: Creon, his daughter, and Jason (374-375). 
There is no question, then, £or the Chorus or Medea 
that she is right to kill these enemies; though they may 
have their own reasons £or wanting to see Jason punished, 
the Chorus do not protest that this gentle soul--their own 
king!--and his daughter be k.illed;87 Medea's only 
K 86Husurillo, "Reconsideration," p. 55, shares 
edea•s view 0£ Creon's "stupid sel-f con-fidence." 
87 G. M. A. Grube, The Drama 0£ Euripides (London: 
Methuen & c L 
•T o., td., 1961), p. 105. See also Burnett, 
W 
ragedy 0£ Revenge," p. 18, who notes that the Corinthian 
omen "prov t . . . Cf , e o be women £irst and citizens only later." 
he. Ra anana Meridor, "Euripides, Medea 639," CQ 36 (1986; 
reafter Meridor, "Medea 639"), p. 95, and Ohlander, 
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· n the act is how to accomplish it in such a way as 
concern i 
t o threaten her superior stat us. not 
Lines 376-385 show Medea pondering her course 0£ 
action. They end with her choosing one road, the way in 
which she acKnowledges she is "especially smart" {ooqial: 
IJ.GAL<11'a, 385), the use 0£ drugs. What the use 0£ such 
drugs has over other courses 0£ action, Medea notes, is 
that she cannot be detected in the act 0£ using them. 
Detection would lead to her death, which would in turn give 
her enemies a good laugh (381-383), which would cinch her 
inferiority.· That being inferior to her enemies is 
unbearable is obvious from Medea's repetition 0£ this point 
within a £ew lines, the second time bolstered by the need 
to maintain her status as genealogically superior to 
Jason's tribe (404-406). So, instead 0£ choosing a course 
which would involve direct action, Medea chooses one which 
affords her the sa£ety 0£ distance £rom the action. As a 
competitor, she must choose this road.88 All others 
allow proximity of the enemy and room for de£eat, and 
thereby the chance £or her enemies to gloat. Given her 
aims, the plan is well conceived and highly rational. It 
is, furthermore, liKe the use 0£ drugs themselves, an 
indication 0£ the essence 0£ Medea's sophia. 
§.uspense, p. 59. 
• 
88Easterling, "In£anticide," p. 183, claims that 
is · · in [Medea's] own view 0£ hersel£ her magical sKill 
Part of her heroic arete." 
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.A.fter all, using drugs to poison requires certain 
P
ersonal skills." For one cannot merely mix up 
•1nter 
. and be done with it; drugs work. only in proximity p0t1ons 
to the intended victim: they must either be swallowed or 
touch the skin. The skill 0£ concoction is, then, only the 
beginning; the success£ul poisoner is one who can render 
the victim heedless 0£ the drug's presence, and can somehow 
so lull the victim's fear and distract him from his natural 
wariness of o£ferings from the poisoner that he willingly 
and thoughtlessly administers the deadly dose to himsel£ . 
.A.nd while Medea's plan in general indicates her abilities 
at rational calculation, her sk.ill'ful execution 0£ the use 
of poison--where she boasts of being especially sophe--
shows what is meant in this play by "smart": Medea's real 
•smartness" will be her ability to lie to her intended 
Yictims and wheedle out of them what she needs to destroy 
them, and her willingness to use innocent agents--her own 
children!--to gain the necessary proximity. 
Medea's •smartness• as a poisoner, then, is in the 
power of her words. She cannot be successful without the 
persuasion she wields over others. In short, Medea's 
sophia in regard to poisons is her sophia as a chary player 
o'f the zero-sum game, translated to a specialized use. We 
have already seen the sophe Medea use these skills--of 
appearing friendly, trying to maximize her profit, lying 
through her teeth, and playing her cards close to her vest 
347 
Creon especially, but to a certain extent even with 
--•ith 
From each she gets what she wants: one day tile chorus. 
and silence. we will later see her using many 0£ these 
sJtillS •i th Aegeus 
friendly) to get a 
(with whom, however, she seems genuinely 
place 0£ re£uge; even later she will use 
these skills with Jason, when in her second interview with 
hilD she is more interested in manipulation than, as in her 
first interview with him, con£rontation. It will be in 
this second interview that Medea•s sophia as poisoner is 
put to the test and shown exceptional, £or she easily 
arranges to gain the proximity needed £or the poison to 
•ork. 
Medea•s sophia has, then, been on display all along. 
It is only in the scene with Creon where its de£inition is 
discussed and made explicit. Whether as poisoner or 
wielder 0£ words, Medea is shown to be the "smartest" 
person in this play because 0£ her skill at conceiving and 
bringing into e££ect whatever plans advance her own 
interests.89 She is precisely the "smart" woman Creon 
89Ann Margaret Abbott, The av.fie OO!OS in 
Buripides (diss. Bryn Mawr, 1971), is an exhaustive study 
of the £ull range 0£ meaning 0£ words with the stem soph-
in the Euripidean corpus. Abbott acknowledges that concern 
:or one's own interests is one 0£ the meanings 0£ sophos in 
1edea (pp. 102-104; 141), but does not discuss sel£-Hnterest in the competitive arena, and there£ore classi£ies 
A:~ea ·~ knowledge 0£ drugs only as a sinister skill. 
w ott s study, passim, traces the evolution 0£ soph- stem 
fords, and argues that their connotations, once both 
b~v:ra~le_ and un£avorable, become predominantly un£avorable 
2-hil uri.pides• time. The exceptions to this are sophia and 
- OSOPhia. 
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d for she is interested in harming those who have feare ' 
d her and she is most capable at this because her 
J18r1De ' 
• is wheedling from others what she needs to 
•saaartness 
accoJDPliSh her goals. 
Medea's sophia, in short, 'finds its de£inition in the 
coaapeti ti ve arena as a force of destruction. It is a 
sKill--whether in using words or administering potions--
wherein one finds the way to self-advancement.90 And 
in this particular competitive arena, that advancement 
comes chiefly through the destruction 0£ one's enemies. As 
the episode comes to a close, Medea contemplates what is to 
come, and in her contemplation shows the competitive domain 
within which her sophia operates, and its consequently 
destructive bent. Medea's current situation is described 
by her in purely competitive terms: "Creep forward to the 
clever/awful thing," she prompts hersel£, "How is the 
contest of courage > es 
. 
TO 6et. vov• V\JV 
403). Medea concludes with 
another appeal to the solidarity of women, this time as the 
•smartest craftsmen of all harms• (KaKwv 6E . 11'aVTWV 
. 
aocpwTaTat., 409). This last may appear 
• Abbott's approach to this evolution is moralistic. 
onetheless, her list 0£ characteristics 0£ •the bad 'wise 
•
•an•• (pp. 125-126), is an illuminating list of zero-sum 
ame strategies. 
90Th· 
sophia t is may be why Pucci, Violence, p. 94, finds 
com . ~ be "an improbable heroic virtue." Zero-sum 
Petition, not heroism, is the issue in this play. 
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· to the casual observer; it is in :fact the 
•isogynistic 
acknowledgement o:f the destructiveness o:f sophia 
firSt open 
· the zero-sum game o:f this play. One may expect defined in 
the women o:f the Chorus will balk at being so tlJ,at 
described. But these women are not predictable to 
sensibilities outside the zero-sum game, :for they not only 
do not protest, rather they crow their approval and 
a•reement. 
These women are, as they say, no ladies.91 The 
first half' o:f their :first stasimon (410-445) is a song o:f 
celebration o:f the zero-sum game in which they, at long 
last, are on top.92 The image o:f the streams o:f sacred 
rivers £lowing backward is not just an expression o:f 
violent reversal; it is as well an expression of the zero-
sum game. There is only one river; either it :flows in your 
91pace Arrowsmith, "Ideas,• p. 48, who tends to 
take at their word the Corinthian women 0£ the Chorus, 
•with their Greek praise o:f sophrosune and their :fear o:f 
ezcess .... • The women's control o:f their passions is, 
nonetheless, i:f better than that o:f the barbarian Medea, 
•still inadequate and precarious.• 
92conacher, Euripidean Drama, p. 191, terms this 
•tasimon "almost 'a song :for 'feminists.'" Hills, 
ll1thopoeia, p. 99, sees in the meter 0£ the :first £our 
choral songs an extension o:f an athletic theme: "The :first 
'four stasima are all built on dactylic cla usulae, a meter 
Which Euripides was employing in this period generally :for 
:n epic or heroic e:f:fect. The Hedeia is unusual in that 
t;ur stasima are in this meter, occurring specifically in 
Ode -form 0£ the dactylo-epitrite, the meter o-f epinikian Yi::· Indeed, the :first stasimon does constitute a 
orr-ode :for women as represented by Hedeia.• 
this Boedeke~, "Medea,• p. 102, argues that the Chorus in 
1a con°td_e begin their critic ism 0£ received opinion, which 
inued throughout the play. 
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r in theirs. Women can now be superior only 
41rection o 
])eCaus e men have shown themselves in£erior, at least in the 
realm of trust. There is no question 0£ men and women both 
baV'inS good repute; change in the order 0£ things will 
t a change in the stories about woman's reputation ef f eC 
(o'tP£fe"t'aL 411 and 418). Since 
•en are now designated deceit£ul, women will no longer be 
90 impugned. 
The tone 0£ the stasimon•s 'first half is sel£-
con£ident and brazen. The Chorus are confident in their 
report that the 'future holds changes in their favor (411, 
418, 420, 421), and attribute their troubles in the past to 
their impotence at manipulating song. Phoebus had given 
song to men, it seems; the women boldly submit that 
otherwise they would have sung a song in their own de£ense 
> I 
av"t'ax'r)a> "' av CJ UIJ.VOV > I apae:vwv 
. yevv{I, 426-429). But they are now the singers, and 
they intend to sing a new song. They are up, men are down. 
A long-standing wrong has been righted. 
The antagonism the Chorus espouse in the 'first part 0£ 
their song has taken its toll in the li£e 0£ Medea. In the 
second strophe they relive her fa te£ul departure 'from her 
PClterna1 home, her taking up residence in a foreign land, 
her husband's betraying their marriage, her current status 
as 'fugitive. In this concentrated recapitulation of the 
Pivotal events of Medea's li£e, the Chorus concentrate on 
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,,
5 
alienation: she has le-ft home, lives among 
•edea 
gers has lost her husband, and is now an exile. 
•tran • 
The 
ce now £or the second time in the play, has been 
audien • 
t 4 to a cause and e££ect view 0£ Medea"s past and trea e 
t For although the Chorus either pass over or are presen · 
unaware o£ the circumstances in which Medea le£t her 
paternal home, the audience cannot help but be aware 0£ 
And while the Chorus cannot discern a turning 0£ the them. 
tide as they recount Medea"s swi£t descent 'from active 
antagonist to passive victim 
,, (£11').£uoas 
, . 
clauv'!I. 431-438). Euripides, by making them in seven 
lines give her whole history, compels his audience to 
consider that this woman"s will'ful choice to leave home and 
abandon philoi £or strangers is a choice 0£ 
alienation;93 it is only logical that she now £ind 
hersel£ abandoned and driven out. In addition, the 
unspoken subtext 0£ the strophe, that Medea betrayed and is 
now hersel£ betrayed, is at least suggested by the Chorus" 
tale 0£ Hedea"s trans-formation -from the master 0£ her £ate 
to its victim. 
The Chorus, however, speak none 0£ this; instead, they 
93v fin . isser. •ffedea.• pp. 150-155. delineates the 
f e ~i.ne that women must walk between natal and conjugal 
n!~ili.es. _upon marriage. women give up the security 0£ the 
fa ~l £ami.ly only to become "-foreigners• in the conjugal 
la::ly. Medea di£fers from the ideal wife in that she 
l"el 8 the reluctance to leave the natal family, a 
lin:c~ance that signals a wife will prove to be a strong 
et ween males of two lines. 
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nize with Medea's fate because she is on their side, 
5y111pat 
current alienation is one with which t.hey, as 
and ner 
t itors are doubtlessly familiar. The zero-sum game, co111Pe • 
all sets one at odds with all defined as contenders for rec • 
P rize.94 The Chorus unwittingly describe the the same 
O f this game in which they so willingly compete: etb.iCS 
trust is not fixed 
> I 
(OUK£Tl 
I 
ll'lO" TlS 
>I 
apape, 415)--
it is as fluid as the streams that flow backward; the grace 
of oaths is gone, and aidos does not remain--it has flown 
away. 95 
This is the creed of competition. Trust and oaths and 
regard for the sensibilities of others are only applicable 
in a consciously cooperative society, one in which common 
security and stability are the goals.96 In the field 
o-f autonomous competitors, such values are only weights 
around the neck. In such an arena, where what is on the 
94Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 106, indicates that 
contentiousness increases individuality, along with which 
comes a feeling of separateness and isolation. 
95The allusions to Hesiod's Works and Days 190-201 
are discussed by Richard Garner, From Homer to Tragedy: 
The Art of Allusion in Greek Poetry (London and Bew York: 
Routledge, 1990), pp. 95-96. See also Burnett, •Tragedy 0£ 
Revenge,• p. 20. 
96g 
20 ee Burnett, "Tragedy of Revenge," pp. 13 and 
• for the importance of oaths to society and their 
:_nction by the gods. GailAnn Rickert, "Akrasia and 
.A:ipi~e:' Medea,• HSCP 91 (1987; herea£ter Rickert, 
Punr:asi.a ), pp. 107-113, makes the point that Jason's 
Of /shment~ childlessness, reflects one part of the penalty 
or orsweari.ng designated from Homer onward: "destruction 
one~ermanent obscurity of one's house or the destruction of 
s Children." (p. UO). 
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strives only to be on the top, security and 
:t>OttOID 
..... 1itY are a part 0£ the rhetoric 0£ power and control, stawl. 
t 
of cooperation. Instability becomes desirable when one 
no 
h bottom; change, £luidity, and £light are then 1• on t e 
t toward what is better. Stability is only to be •oveJDen s 
•aintained when one is in control. Otherwise, it is 
stifling and intolerable. 
The Chorus, however, ignorant as yet 0£ the 
consequences of the de£inition of excellence they support 
and espouse, ironically despair over the disappearance 0£ 
the very values their chosen code 0£ conduct destroys. In 
their ignorance, they can luxuriate in the pity they feel 
for Hedea 1 s loss 0£ her father 1 s home (441), and encourage 
her to fluidity in what is an unacceptable status quo: 
another queen is set up in her house in control 0£ her bed 
(Twv ,.£ "EK ,.pwv , KP£LOCJCa>V 
6011.0LOLV 
> , £11'£0,.a, 443-445). This particular 
stability--that 0£ another "set up" in one 1 s £ormer place--
ia of course intolerable to a competitor. And although 
Hedea 1 s troubles began when she chose to set sail from her 
>I (£11'"£uoas, 431), the Chorus now despair 
that this anchorage is . lost to her (ooL cJ> >I OU,.£ 
cSoa,LoL, c5uoTave;, llOX9pwv 
Ta pa, 441-444). 
The Chorus thus seem peculiarly short-sighted. It is 
hard to imagine that they could indulge in such 
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contradictory thinking, but it is precisely their sel£-
contradiction which effects the refutation of all they 
:t>elieV'e. It would be possible at this point in the play to 
de£end the Chorus as simply ignorant of Medea 1 s past 
criIDes,97 for they have gotten no explicit information 
thus far from anyone on stage, and th,ere is no reason for 
us to imagine that they of necessity know the nature of her 
services to Jason. During the next episode, however, they 
near enough details of Medea 1 s treachery against her father 
and Pelias (see 483-487) that, if they were inclined to 
censure her, they would surely have grounds for it. But 
they do not. It is here, then, that one can see in 
operation the dangers inherent in even the seemingly 
innocuous part of the "help friends, harm enemies" code: 
in their support of Medea and hatred of Jason, the Chorus 
will find themselves paradoxically condoning violence they 
will come to abhor. 
Ronetheless, the Chorus• support of Medea over Jason 
is not hard to understand. For it is in the thoroughly 
self-serving opportunism of Jason, who is currently, but 
only briefly, on top, that Euripides shows to his audience, 
and even to his Chorus, the underside of competitive 
97They are not, however, ignorant of what Medea 
has just said, and, as Williamson, "Woman1 s Place," p. 28, 
Points out, "the ode is in fact in a deeply paradoxical 
relationship with what went before it." The Chorus have, 
that is, just seen Medea display the deceitfulness they 
attribute to men. 
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autonomY· 
individual, 
It is hard to imagine a more sel£-centered 
except when one recalls that Medea, £or all 0£ 
services in behal£ 0£ Jason was, in doing service to 
11er 
t which was everything to her (228), actually serving tba 
Own interests. It is Jason•s job to illustrate how 11er 
despicable is sel£-service and how thoroughly revolting is 
tbe individual who con-fuses his own interests with the good 
of others.9
8 
Jason is, in short, a contender like Medea and the 
Cborus, but he has, unlike Medea, the victor•s easy 
ienerosity and nonchalance.99 With his entrance at 
une 446, he begins by trying to convince Medea that she 
sbould not have squirmed so at having been displaced; she 
should have been content to be one down. His arguments 
recall those very things about the stat us of women that 
1alvanized the Chorus into taking Medea•s side. Jason 
first counsels that Medea could have stayed if only she had 
consented to being inferior, i.e., would have "born lightly 
the decisions 0£ those in control" (Kou•ws 
lPelooovwv pouAeuJJ,aTa, 449). In sum, she should 
Yiolate the creed of the competitor: she should let others 
rule and forget about being in control. These words are, 
98According to Easterling, •In£anticide,• p. 183, !!1{he character of Jason ". . . we are allowed to see the extent of the provocation [Medea] has been suffering." 
Jaso ~9Bo:r1gie, "Heroic Elements," pp. 42-43, sees in 
ah ~ s disregard 0£ Medea•s threats his contemptuousness; 
e is not considered a worthy opponent. 
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se cheap when one is on top, as Jason is. He seems 
of cour ' 
that suggesting that Medea accept in:feriority would 
11118,,are 
d hiS competitive wi:fe, and yet, maddeningly, he does of fen 
oot stop at that. 
Jason continues by supporting the play's de:fini tion o:f 
rtness• as a :force used in competition to throw o:f:f the •sma 
my and thereby gain the edge. Medea, he notes, ene 
displayed her intellectual in:feriority by re:fusing to be 
duplicitous. He is con:fident in terming Medea a :fool :for 
speaking her mind: "You will be driven out o:f the land 
because o:f :foolish words" (Aoywv ' µ.aTalWV 
0 ;sveda1, 450), he scolds; and again: •But you will 
not let go o:f your :folly (µ.wpias.), :forever bad-
aouthing the rulers• (457-458). According to Jason, then, 
lleclea has made some ill-considered moves in this game, and 
•hould consider hersel:f lucky to be getting o:f:f with exile 
c•av Kepoos. c 'l'IYO'U C'lllJ.lO'UIJ.EV'll cpuy-o, 454). 
Perhaps it is only because Jason is now on top that he 
can be magnanimous. His condescension, however, can be 
read in the :fact that it means nothing to him that Medea 
(Underdog :fool that she is) calls him kakistos (452). And 
~et. he still cleaves to the competitor's code o:f helping 
'friends. He there:fore will not desert Medea and the 
Children, Who are still, by his lights, philoi to him (459, 
465). He has, as :far as he is concerned anyway, done 
llOth· ing to harm her; everything she su:f:fers is her own 
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I
t (450, 453, 457-458). 
faU 
In these care£ul de£enses, one 
discern his competitor1 s attention to reciprocity. 
can 
Medea does not mince words with him,100 and later 
"
ill have to repair some 0£ the damage her honesty here 
s11e 
ct.oes. 
Jason is pankakistos, a coward, and her enemy (465-
46'1). What he is doing to those he considers £riends is 
shamelessness pure and simple (469-471). She £urther 
reckons that--locked as they are in a zero-sum con test--her 
> , . , 
d.eli1ht will be his pain (£yw 1'£ yap Aet;aoa 
, . . . , 
1ov•La8'flCJOIJ.a L •UX'l'IV KQKWS 0'£ KQL O'U AU11''110''tl 
• 473-474) . She recalls in detail the services 11vwv, 
she per£ormed £or him and intimates that he has £allen 
short 0£ the expected reciprocity (476-487); instead he has 
betrayed her £or no reason (488-490). Competitor that she 
is, Kedea would have understood being treated as an 
interchangeable part had she not given Jason the expected 
children, but such was not the case in their £ruit£ul 
aarriage (490-491). She, like the Chorus, ironically 
bemoans the fluidity 0£ attachment typical 0£ the zero-sum 
tame; like them, Medea the loser now despairs at the loss 
Of cooperative virtues like aidos (472) and oath-keeping 
(492-495). 
The irony 0£ Medea 1 s lament is driven home as she 
l'"ecaus how Jason used to supplicate her--£alsely, she now 
lOOGredl lled ey, "Place and Time," p. 31, shows that 
ea likewise controls the theatrical space in this 
•Piaode. 
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reauzes: "Ah! 
This right hand. which you so many times 
toolt hold o£. and these knees. How £alsely were we touched 
. harming man; how far off target has landed the br thJ.S 
0£ our hopes." (496-498). These lines, of course, arrow 
recall the scene just witnessed, where Medea so skill-fully 
did unto Creon as she now reveals had been done by Jason 
unto her.101 Her regret of false suppliancy is not one 
1 J.·t is one of expediency. of princip e. Suffering such an 
act is regrettable £or the competitor, but doing it to 
others brings success, and therefore no regret. 
Medea concludes her speech with a review 0£ what 
Gouldner re£ers to as the low object attachment, sense of 
isolation, and distrust of others common to the zero-sum 
competitor. Fluidity of association, an indication of low 
object attachment, can be witnessed in the present acts of 
Jason as well as the past acts of Medea. Jason, once a 
friend, can now only hypothetically be considered one--and 
this consideration Medea, now his enemy, undertakes only to 
•how up his baseness (499-501). Medea openly admits that 
•he herself, in the service of her sole concern, Jason, 
has--like Jason without due cause--become hateful to her 
J 101Boedeker, "Medea," pp. 95-100, shows how first 
ason, and then Medea violate trust by misusing oaths, 
•up 1 . • h P ication, and persuasion. Such are the potential 
f:~rors of ::eciprocity. Boedeker argues that Medea uses 
th:e supplJ.cation with Creon, Aegeus, and, indirectly 
Pri ough the children, the princess. In all three cases her 
hermary goal is not the falsely proffered salvation £or 
Self or the children, but successful retaliation. 
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(TOLS . OlK09EV . friends at home J.1.EV cplAOlS 
/ 
• > a • > > 
. K09EO"T'l')X , O\JS oe µ. > O\JK EXP'l')V 
l1'9P<l 
,.. 506-507). The isolation 0£ the ,.. opav. 1t<11tCIJ5 
Petitor is next recounted: Medea is exiled, desolate, co ID 
,, . 
alone EP'l')J.l.OS J.1.0V'I'), 512-
513). Finally, her prayer to Zeus at 516-519 is £or some 
way to see through the deceptiveness which, as has been 
argued, is a large part 0£ the sophia 0£ zero-sum 
co1Dpeti tors. 
we soon see, though, that Medea has misrepresented 
Jason in this generalization, £or Jason is anything but 
deceptive. He lacks intelligence and tact; he can be 
nothing but blunt. By constructing Jason's character in 
this way, Euripides does more than 'further alienate Medea 
and the Chorus against this man; in this characterization 
Buripides highlights the brutality 0£ the zero-sum game's 
precepts. 
For example, Jason's most in£uriatingly crude 
argument--when he admits to using his erotic appeal to 
purchase Medea's aid--is an incredibly unsel£conscious 
acceptance 0£ manipulation 0£ desire in the zero-sum game. 
Jason can, by this £rank admission, cancel the debt 0£ 
reciprocity Medea claims he owes her; he's beholden only to 
APhrod.i te and Eros: 
As £or me--since in £act you overstress your 'favors to 
me--1 consider Cypris, alone 0£ gods and men, to be 
the savior 0£ my naval enterprise. As £or you, you do 
have an ingenious mind, but it would be begrudging to 
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ribe ho'fl Eros compelled you with his unavoidable 
desc -s to save my lif'e. (526-531). 
arro .. 
. merely making explicit the standard opera ting 
Jason is 
procedure f'or 
eYerything at 
the protagonists in this play: using 
one's disposal, including one's erotic 
1 to accomplish one's goal of' self'-advancement. He appea, 
indulges in a bit of' archaic anthropomorphism, but his 
tactic with Medea dif'f'ers not at all f'rom his tactic with 
Creon's daughter, and only but a little, as will be seen, 
from Medea's tactic with Aegeus. Medea in Jason's 
description is depicted as the constrained and theref'ore 
the loser; she was compelled by Eros, whose arrows were 
unavoidable P'Epws 
> I 
'l')VayKaOE 
I 
"tO~OlS 
He will soon go so £ar as to 
4e£end reusing this old tactic as "smart" (548). Jason is 
one who knows how to use eros to his advantage; he is not, 
however, one who will be himself' stricken by desire 
556). Medea, who according 
to Jason believes this to be true of' him, he will call 
•1staken. 
But even more generally, Jason in his reply identif'ies 
himsel-f as a competi tor.102 He readily admits that 
'fame, the competitor's highest prize, is more important to 
him than anything: •As f'ar as I'm concerned, rather than 
102· 
to Wh Cf'. Walsh, "Public and Private," pp. 295-296, 
41 om Jason is a man who attends only to the public mension of' lif'e. 
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·n tbe nouse or a song more beautiful to sing than 
'old .1 
U s• I'd have the fate that made me famous." (542-orpbe • 
544). Jason can imagine that the score is settled between 
lf and Medea, since he has brought her to a land where bimse 
Can enjoy the fruits of her fame (doi;av €oxes, sbe 
540).103 Jason in addition sees things broadly in 
terms o£ contest. His argument with Medea is a •contest• 
of words; he refers to producing many children as a 
•contest• in which he takes no part 
u (a1.u>.>.av, 546 and 
55'1). 
Furthermore, from the rest of what Jason says, he is 
clearly a ware of the realities of the zero-sum game. He 
accepts that relationships are fleeting: he takes it for 
1ranted that friends flee the impoverished man (560-561). 
Indeed, he defines a friend as one who can advance social 
status; he is able therefore to defend himself as a •great 
friend" to Medea and the children because he has arranged 
for their prosperity and social standing (548-560). 
But perhaps the most telling indication that Jason 
fits the definition of the zero-sum competitor is what is 
to Medea most infuriating about him: that he defends 
himself as •smart• as a competitor would: 
As for your reproaching me for my royal marriage, I 
103Bo . 
ack ngie, "Heroic Elem en ts,• pp. 43-44, 
no nowledges Jason's appeal to "heroic" values, and further ac:~s his sly omission, i.e., "that he has by his recent 
appions brought [Medea] ill-fame since he has made her 
ear weak and vulnerable, and hence open to ridicule.• 
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snall £i~st show ,that I w~s smart. in doing. this 
, -rctt6E c§eu~w 11'pw-ra µ.ev oocpos 
(EV.~.~) then that I was prudent. and finally that y£Y-3 • • • 
1 was a great 'friend (µ.eyas cpl~os) to you and IDY cb.ildren--but do be quiet. (547-550). 
lD snort. Jason can claim •smartness• precisely because he 
bY total-commitment rationality and displays the 
operates 
concomitant low object attachment. In the zero-sum game, 
thiS is •smart.• Consequently, what Jason considers 
•smart• and •prudent• is his ability to have conceived 0£ 
and carried out a plan to win security and social standing 
for b.imsel£ and his children. What luck!, he argues, that 
e xile that he was,104 stumbled upon the chance to he. 
aarry a king's child (551-554). His goal is not to produce 
more children, but to live well and not be in need (557 -
560). He dreams 0£ bringing the children up worthily, 0£ 
creating a clan that thrives and lives the good life (562-
565). Perhaps this dream is, one begins to sense, not all 
that reprehensible. 
But in the wake of this glorious dream of eudaimonia, 
Jason's former wife has been summarily dismissed so that he 
and his children (past and future) and new bride can live 
happily ever after. Wives are, obviously, interchangeable 
Parts, as, Jason makes it clear, are children. Both are 
Objects to be used to one's advantage; Medea, £or example, 
according to Jason, does not need children (565), while it 
104Sha w •Female 
Pliiht Of th~ cityless Intruder,• man. p. 261, describes the 
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lY to his advantage and bene£it to have them (566-
i• ciear 
56'1)· 
But, he at last concludes, wives--especially this 
lY disgruntled one be£ore him--are too messy a thing 
ol>•ious 
a 
•smart" man like himsel£ to have around. Jason, in 
for 
Concluding remarks, is not being so misogynistic as JiiS 
coldlY rational: wives should be avoided because they, 
Ulte Medea, simply cannot accept being treated as 
interchangeable parts, even when it is clearly £or the 
J>etter; why, they cannot even recognize a great plan when 
the:r see one (µ.wv 567). Why 
can they not see this? It is something to do with sex--
"' it is the •bed• that rubs them the wrong way (ou6> av 
. 
av 
>I 
El. 0£ ).exos, 567-568; c£. 
569-570). In £rustra tion, 
Jason argues that the whole matter 0£ beget ting children to 
set onesel£ up socially is bet t.er le£t done without sex 
(5'13-575). Things would run so much more smoothly, he 
imagines, in a sexless world.105 
This last remark. well accords with what £or the 
105Jason•s disdain 0£ women and sex is predictable 
for a zero-sum competitor. His blatant misogyny is as much 
an expression 0£ eagerness £or success in competition as 
•as Creon and Medea •s prior disdain 0£ so£tness. For 
IDiaogyny as the ma1e•s projection 0£ and contempt £or his ;•n sensed weakness as a physical being, see Susan Gri££in, 
cirnography and Silence: Cult ure•s Revenge Against Hat ure p;• York.: Harper and Row, 1981; Colophon Books, 1982), 
aa~e 13-_14. For the sexual act as a threat to sel£-
'lh rtion, see Ernest Beck.er, Denial 0£ Death (Hew York.: 
162~1:,ree Press, 1973; paperback. ed., 1975), pp. 42-45 and 
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·s the one real difference between Jason and Medea 
present 1 
gh even this di££erence will not last. Jason
1 s 
--altbOU 
competitor is his control of his emotions--the 
forte as a 
e •cold £ish" leaps to mind--while Medea, at least for 
p11ras 
P
resent, has abandoned control of hers and instead 
tile 
e)losen to speak openly. This is a tactical mistake, as she 
will soon 
recognize.106 
For the present, however, Medea attacks Jason•s claim 
to being sophos. At £irst it appears that she is over-
turning the play 1 s previously o££ered de£ini tions 0£ 
90phia, because she seems to be denying that one who is 
sophos is duplicitous: 
I admit that I am in many ways di££erent £rom many 
mortals. For as £ar as rm concerned, the one who is 
unjust and "smart• at speaking (ooTlS. ac5u:os. 
b1v ao•os. AEYEl v v£.uu:) should get the 
greatest punishment. Glorying in his power of speech, 
he dresses injustices in finery; he dares to do 
I t. >.,..., >I ~ 
anything (yl.woo't) yap auxwv Tac5LK> Eu 
'D'EPlOT£A£LV. TOAJ.Lp Va voupy£LV• ). But he is 
not really •smart" (eOTl 6> OUK ayav 
ao•os.). This applies to you now: you don 1 t 
• > , impress me as being elegant (£1!0X'l')J.LWV) and 
•clever/ terrible" at speaking (A£YEl v 
6ElVOS.). For one remark will stretch you out 
£lat. 1£ you were not Kakos, you would have persuaded 
me about making this marriage, and not done it in 
secret from your friends (JJ.°'1 al y~ •LAwv). 
(579-587). 
11 
106Foley, 11 Divided Sel£,• p. 64, argues that 
e:ea, i~ her second interview with Jason, mimics Jason's 
:: d ratio~alit! and, in formulating her revenge, employs 
p ainst him his own "bloodless decision making . . . 
rectsely to make Jason feel the emotions he once rejected 
~0• • ·" See also p. 80, where Foley argues that Medea 
111 me~ to despise eros along with •au that is feminine.• 
opps ort, she assimilates Jason's misogyny; once the 
ressed victim, Medea becomes the oppressor (p. 81). 
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e ful reading 0£ this passage, however, proves that j. car 
iS in no way saying that only those who do not hide 11edea 
the truth are sophoi. In the 'first place, Medea does not 
atake the claim to being sophos depend on the use or not-use 
of duplicity, but instead on the propriety of matching 
1>ehavior to type 0£ individual--friend or foe. In fact, in 
her first speech to Jason Medea admitted that she herself 
had likewise abandoned sophia when she betrayed philoi--her 
father and home--and came to lolcus with Jason. She 
describes hersel£ in this action as "more zealous than 
smart" (vpoeu11os 
I 
oo•wTepa, 485). 
In the current episode, then, Medea criticizes Jason•s 
duplici ty--not per se, but for its basis in betrayal: with 
his duplicity Jason conceals that he is "unjust," that is, 
that he is not returning to others what he has received. 
When Medea upbraids Jason for pretending to be "just" when 
he is in fact being "unjust," she picks up on the choral 
interjection that immediately precedes, which likewise is 
concerned with the intersection of what is "just" and the 
comely arrangement of words: 
Jason, you have arranged these words nicely (e~ 
" I > I I 
IJ.£V TOUOcP EKOOIJ."l')OQS l.oyous); 
nevertheless, as far as I am concerned, even if I 
speak. against popular opinion, in betraying your wife, 
you seem to have done things that were not just 
<ou dLKala dpav). (576-578). 
In short, both Medea and the Chorus are put off by 
Jason•s "sophistry" because it has been used in violation 
of the code of reciprocity. He has dressed up betrayal as 
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·n this he is not at -fault. The -fault is that he )l.elp--J:>U t l. 
e this with someone with whom he himsel£ claims to 
bJIS don 
)I.ave a £hilos-relationship. Jason's real transgression is 
of the code 0£ "helping -friends and harming enemies," 
beCause he has used on a -friend the sophia-tactics 
t ending -friendliness, maximizing one's own pro£i t, (pre 
iring, and playing cards close to one's vest) right-fully 
used against a not-£riend. Medea makes this clear in 
unes 586-587: i£ Jason were really a philos, he would not 
11ave sneaked behind her back, but persuaded her 0£ their 
mutual bene£it in this new marriage. He did not: he is 
there-fore mani£estly •unjust• and kakos.107 
There is, however, a second -facet 0£ Medea's criticism 
of Jason's claim to be sophos, obvious even in both the 
Chorus' and Medea's being able to call him on his 
duplicity: he is not credible. As Medea points out, 
Jason's argument is preposterously easy to 
107 Jason is kakos to Medea (586, 618) be ca use he 
has harmed her and is there-fore her enemy. He is not kakos 
because he is unjust. The equation 0£ justice and virtue 
is later than the date 0£ this play; see Adkins, Merit, pp. 
T8-79, £or the equation 0£ arete and justice as a late 
!if~h century or -fourth century B. C. phenomenon. The 
t~ti.ons 0£ th~ autonomous competitor do not concern 
emselves wi.th what we would consider •justice,• which is 
:::. 0~ the "quiet,• i.e., cooperative virtues. In an 
J l.~l.dUal-centered system like the zero-sum contest, any c!:t~ce (as distinct from reciprocity or revenge) which 
ca Sl.ders the interests 0£ others as equal to one's own Ju!:_1.0 t take precedence. For Socrates' wranglings with 
57_6:.ce and personal benefit, see Irwin, Horal Theory, pp. 
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tle 108 She can do it, she claims, with one disman . 
cannot point to such a £limsy construction as 
remark; one 
eYidence o£ one 1 s sophia. 1£ one is going to dupe another, 
econd party should never detect a sneer beneath the the s 
mmodating smile; the intended victim 0£ poison should acco 
,iadlY qua££ the potion. Jason is too transparently sel£-
serving to convince her that he is acting in anyone 1 s 
interest but his own. Medea assumes he is simply 
incompetent at using sophia against an enemy. In reality, 
he is probably just too self-centered to see that this is 
what this circumstance requires, and too slow-witted to 
pull it o£f even if he were able to discern the di££erence 
between his own interest and that of others. 
The rest 0£ the scene deteriorates into verbal 
sniping,109 shorthand redefinitions of the nexus 0£ 
arete, eros, and sophia: 1) eros is merely a means to 
attaining arete. Medea accuses Jason of interest in sex 
and the security of his beloved good reputation (591-592, 
823-624); Jason assures her that sex was not the issue, 
social advancement was, and social security (593-
1080hlander, Suspense, pp. 87-88, agrees. He 
~erms Jason•s first two arguments •ludicrous." C£. 
;Dermott, Incarnation, p. 79, for whom "· . . her 
[ i:dea .. s] outright duplicity seems a part of her strength, 
: ile_ Jason 1 s lesser dishonesty argues an innate weakness 
0 his character.• 
1 
109
see Bongie, 
s careful to dispel 
and H d e ea exchange. 
"Heroic Elements," pp. 44-46, who 
the validity of the charges that Jason 
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59.,,.uo 2> 
sophia means biting one's tongue, setting 
motional reactions, and instead looking to the gain 
aside e 
. able to accrue, especially in terms 0£ 'faring well 
one 1s 
(
598
_602, 614-615, 621-622). Speaking openly only brings 
one down (607). 
In these their last bitter words, both Medea and Jason 
again their adherence--a t least in words--to the code sbOW 
of reciprocity: Medea again tries to shame Jason into 
realizing that he has not given her her due (603-604, 606); 
Jason again denies that he is to blame £or Medea •s plight 
(605, 607). Jason, as magnanimous as he was at the 
1>e1inning 0£ the scene, repeats that he is, as ever, 
willing to help Medea and the children since they are, to 
bim, still philoi (610-613). Medea rejects the help 0£ one 
who harms her (598-599), one who is kakos (616-618). She 
accordingly sends him 0££ with a threat 0£ harm (625-626). 
That the Chorus now in the second stasimon (627 -662) 
sing 'first about eros and aretc, and then philoi, is not 
surprising when one re-fleets upon how charged with such 
discussion was the previous episode. For not only were we 
treated to Jason's memorable disquisition on Cypris and 
Bros as his aides-de-camp in the expedition which won him 
110 St Robert B. Palmer, "An Apology £or Jason: A 
•A Udy 0£ Euripides• Medea,• CJ 53 (1957; herea£ter Palmer, 
Ch~~logy"), pp. 49-55, sees Jason's need £or legitimate 
Pr J. dren as the impetus £or his actions against Medea, and 
SJ':Poses t~at_ the Athenian audience would have 'found Jason 
Pa the tic in this need. 
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. reputation (526-531), we were also made to witness, 
111s 
e broadly, the nexus 0£ eros and arete. Similarly, a ID Or 
IDajor point 0£ contention between Jason and Medea was who 
nad helped or harmed whom, i.e., who was 'friend or enemy, 
and consequently who owed what, help or harm, to whom. The 
stasimon, then, picks up on themes £rom the previous 
episode. It also, however, as will be shown, leads 
thematically into the next episode with Aegeus. 
In the 'first strophe-antistrophe pair, the Chorus turn 
to the use 0£ personi£ied universals to explicate the 
relationship between eros and arete illustrated previously 
only by the particular actions 0£ Jason and Medea. In 
turn, they rein-force the previously intimated competitive 
arena and potential destructiveness 0£ eros: 
Love coming in grave excess grants men neither 
>I c • good repu ta ti on nor excellence (epwTes uvep 
' >I > I > > I > J.1,ev ayav e.>.eovTes ouK eudo1;Lav oud> 
> '\ , > , 
apeTav vapedwKav avdpaoLv•). But i£ 
Cypris comes just su££iciently, no other goddess is so 
• > Cl >I ' > gracious (EL d> a A LS e.>.90L ICU11'PLS, OUK 
>I '\ >I u 
a.>..>.a eeos euxapL5 ouTw5). Hay you never, 
mistress, against me launch £rom golden bow your 
unavoidable arrow, wounding me with desire 
c , , (LJ.1.E:Pct> XPLOaoCaJ). 
Hay prudence (ow•poouva), the gods' most 
beautiful gi£t, 'favor me; may clever/terrible Cypris 
never smite me with disputatious wrath and unceasing 
strife, driving my thumos away to other beds (JJ.'rldE 
ll'oT> aJJ.•LAoyous opyas aKopeoTa Te 
1 
' > 1 Cl >' V~LK'T) 9UJJ.OV EK11'A'T)~ao> ETEPOLS EV!. 
At:K TPOLS ll'poopa.>.oL deL va ICu11'pL5); may she be 
sharp-witted (Ol;U4PPWV) in judging beds 0£ 
w>omen, and honor beds not battle-scarred 
(all'TOAEJ.1.0U5). (627-64-1). 
The Chorus claim that eros, through conferring grace, can 
larner £or one the personal advantage 0£ a good reputation 
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and !Fe~· So much is not new. But their further claim 
e-cessive eros can ruin one is a sentiment not before tnat °" 
d in so many words. The question is, how can excessive 11ear 
eros ruin one 1 s reputation? 
=--
The Chorus1 answer at first seems to be that eros in 
excess leads to marital infidelity. But reading their song 
in only this way is a mistake. Granted, one must allow 
that these women do not wish to be driven to other beds 
(S38), and one must recall that, as Medea has flatly 
stated, women have no respectable way of leaving a marriage 
> (OV 
. 
yap > "' E\JKAEELS. 
> • 
all'aAAayaL 
I 
yuvaL~Lv, 236-
237). Their prayer against excessive eros is, then, partly 
a prayer for marital fidelity. But it is more than 
that.111 
The antistrophe clarifies what the strophe only 
sketches. It continues the women 1 s prayer that they not be 
•wounded" by the "unavoidable" arrow of Cypris. The image 
of love as a wound is so familiar, both from the Greek 
lyric poets and our own derivative depictions of rotund 
cherubs coyly sporting their weaponry, that the menacing 
essence of the image gets lost. If one is wounded, 
1UM .d th eri_ or, "Medea 639," pp. 95-100, argues that 
t e Chorus in line 639 are praying that they not be unable 
-C~ accept _spousal infidelity. Meridor further remarks that 
h )he desire of married women for men other than their 
1 u;ban~s i~ alien to this context." Instead, wifely 
wn ideh.ty is alien, not to this context, but to these 
.:~~n, Who are eager to protect their reputations. The 
Ject of reputation is germane to this ode. 
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r 
one is vulnerable and likely to lose. These 
ll0,..eve • 
·ntbian women, competitors that they are, pray that they 
cor1 
ut at a disadvantage in the competitive arena by 
ne"Ver be P 
tile likes 0£ ~· It is more than anything else this--
tllat is, advantage in competition--that they pray £or, as 
tile antistrophe shows. 
Tbe prayer, which began in the strophe at line 632, is 
ostensibly against ex:cessi ve eros, but it £1 uct ua tes 
c:hiasticallY between positive and negative -formulation. In 
the -first and last lines 0£ the antistrophe, the 
formulation is positive,112 and the results are 
favorable. In the -first lines (635-636), the women pray 
for sophrosuna, prudence, which they imagine as "£a voring" 
them, as "the gods• most beauti£ul gi£t• 0£ which they 
will be the recipients. "Prudent• (sophron), recall, was 
how Jason billed his use 0£ eros to acquire his royal 
aarriage (548). In the last lines (640-641), the women 
pray that "clever/terrible" Cypris be "sharp-witted" in 
Judging and "honoring• the beds 0£ women, beds which are 
•not battle scarred." It is obvious £rom this set 0£ 
lines, at the antistrophe•s beginning and end, that the 
•omen are praying £or the control 0£ eros by the mind; that 
control, they imagine, leads to £avor, gi£ts, and honor, 
the competi tor•s prizes. Prudent women succeed, £or they 
control e_ros to . win. 
112Heridor, "Medea 639,• p. 96. 
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irne central lines 0£ the antistrophe (637-640). 
r 
are negatively £ormulated and show at best a 
b01'eve • 
t o£ undecided outcome. There is no winning--no 
contes 
gi£ts or honor--when eros is out 0£ the mind's favor. • --
control. Instead, one's thumos becomes the object 0£ 
one is •driven out• and •struck. at• by the yiolence; 
•clever/terrible• Cypris, the battle one £inds onesel£ in 
18 wi tnou t positive outcome: wrath is •disputatious/ 
wavering/uncertain," stri£e is "unceasing." There is no 
wa:r to win, £or the two aces in the success£ul competitor's 
bole. ~ and sophia, are not being played to advantage. 
It is as i£, to continue the card-playing metaphor, the ace 
of sophia is never played, while the ace 0£ eros is 
carelessly laid out on the table £or all to see. 
The women abruptly change theme in the second strophe-
antistrophe pair, and end this song as they ended their 
last, with verses on country, home, and city. But whereas 
there (431-445) the Chorus spoke directly to Medea in the 
second person, and turned in the antistrophe at least 
l>rie£1y to discussion 0£ lost civic virtues 0£ oaths and 
aidos, here (643-662) they are more personal. Hot only 
have they changed to the £irst person, they now turn in the 
antistrophe to the value 0£ honoring £riends. As we shall 
see (below, Part Five), it will be this very thing, the 
Proper treatment 0£ philoi, which not only endures the 
def1n·t· l. ions' (i.e., 0£ arete, eros, and sophia) wending 
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y to a logical but emotionally repulsive 
t11eir ..,a 
·on it also, ironically, is the very £uel 0£ the 
conc1usi • 
e•otional repulsion. 
'!'he honor due a 'friend is the subject 0£ Aegeus' 
·ng remarks in the next episode (663-823), and thus his 
opeDl. 
entrance, criticized as unmotivated113 since the time 
of Aristotle (Poetics 1461b.19-21),l14 has obvious 
thematic connection to what precedes it.115 Aegeus 
U3ohlander, Suspense, p. 107, argues that Aegeus' 
•aagic appearance• colors the help he is able to give Medea 
with the sense •that it was meant to be, was ordained by a 
higher will.• 
114'1'. v. Buttrey, •Accident and Design in 
Buripides' Medea,• AJP 79 (1958; herea£ter Buttrey, 
•Accident•), pp. 1-17, answers Aristotle's objection by 
showing that the Aegeus episode is the •pivot on which both 
action and emotion turn• (p. 10). Buttrey dismisses 
earlier attempts to justi£y Aegeus' appearance as 
functional, i.e., as either o££ering Medea an escape (the 
ezod.os proves Medea needs no such help) or as 
unintentionally serving to suggest killing the children 
(this post quod ergo propter quod argument is invalidated 
1>1' analysis 0£ the scene). 
115Easterling, •Infanticide,• p. 184, points out 
that the Aegeus episode is the third 0£ • ... three 
contrasting visits to Medea, 0£ which the third o£fers a 
close parallel to the :first.• Bongie, •Heroic Elements,• 
pp, 40-41, a £ter Hans von Arnim, ed., A usgewahl te 
'frasodien des Euripides, vol. 3, •Medea,• (Berlin: 
Weidmannsche, 1886; herea£ter von Arnim, Medea), p. 19, and 
~ Darnley Kaylor, •The Aegeus Episode, Medea 663-773,• CR 
3 
. (1909), pp. 189-190, sees the Aegeus episode as that 
:hl.ch suggests to Medea killing the children. Bongie 
urther notes (p. 47) that "Euripides uses this scene to 
~ein~o~ce the audience's sense 0£ the strong obligations 
.:~hcit in the relationships 0£ philoi." Dunl<.le, "Aegeus 
th Sode,• pp. 104-107. terms the episode •a microcosm 0£ 
the •hole ~lay,• and argues that Aegeus' childlessness, and 
e operation 0£ chance and sel£-interest in the episode, 
are thematically relevant to the rest 0£ the play. 
Burnett, •Tragedy 0£ Revenge," p. 13, argues that the 
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ff dea witb a salutation be deems most appropriate ,reets e 
J)et•een :friends;116 sbe returns tbe greeting to bim 
unamended (664-665). Tbe two tb us acknowledge tba t tbey 
:f iends and tbe scene will sbow tba t tbey are willing are r , 
to tbe de:finition 0£ :friend by lending belp to to uve up 
each other. This is all, it seems, so mutually congenial: 
lledea o££ers belp to Aegeus in alleviating his sterility 
('16 -718); Aegeus o££ers Medea help with a place 0£ re£uge 
('123-724). 
Both, indeed, show their adherence to the code 0£ 
reciprocity not only in these acts, but throughout the 
•cene. A£ter Medea relates that Jason is kakistos to her, 
having returned harm £or no harm (690, 692), Aegeus is 
clearly appalled, terming Jason"s action 0£ supplanting 
Bedea •most reproach£u1• 
,, 
(alOXlO"l"OV, 695), the 
functions 0£ the Aegeus episode are to show oath-making in 
action (c:f. Boedeker, "Medea," p. 98) and to suggest the 
ensuing rescue theme. Thomas Chase, "On the Introduction 
Of Aegeus in the Medea 0£ Euripides," AJP 5 (1884), p. 87, 
suggests that Euripides introduces Aegeus to emphasize the 
contrast bet ween the blessing 0£ children he is about to 
receive and Jason"s dire future childlessness. Conacher, 
Buripidean Drama, p. 190, points out that Aegeus• patent 
high regard £or Medea as pro£essional wise woman increases 
audience respect £or her. At the same time, the episode is 
a •turning point in Medea"s career 0£ vengeance and in the 
S7mpathy which the Chorus has hitherto a£forded her." 
U6R . Stu . : A. Browne, •Medea-Interpretations,• in ii di.es in Honour 0£ Gilbert Horwood, ed. Mary E. White 
•1:~onto: Univ. 0£ Toronto Press, 1952; herea£ter Browne, see erpretations•), p. 77, proposes that Aegeus• entrance 
conm: ur:imotivated only because the Athenian king, 
anc~ rained by "the polite conventions o£ten observed in 
Yhi:~t conversation," would not blurt out his motive £or 
i.ng Medea upon his entrance. 
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l ti ve degree 0£ the adjective Adkins deems "the most 
• 11per a 
erful word used to denigrate a man•s actions.•117 
pow 
to hersel£ as a "'former 'friend" 0£ Jason•s who 
•eel.ea refers 
YI 
dishonored (696). A£ter hearing the exact nature 0£ 
iS no 
Jason•s erotic desire (see below), Aegeus is quick. to agree 
that Jason is indeed k.ak.os (699). 
Aegeus, however, has no desire to o££end anyone: not 
the gods (719-720, presumably those who protect the 
suppliant),118 nor his 'friend Medea, whom he is 
obligated to help. It is because 0£ his keen desire to 
return like £or like that Aegeus re£ers to his readiness to 
help Medea as evidence that he is "just" (6i.KaL05 1 
724). In addition, Aegeus, eager to use an oath as a 
pretext to Medea•s enemies (743-745), is unwilling to incur 
new enemies even on an old £riend 1 s behal£.ll9 
Aegeus is, in short, a man who seems deserving 0£ the 
Chorus• description 0£ "noble" (yEvva'los, 762). He 
is clearly one to whom reciprocity is 0£ the utmost 
importance, and one who looks out £or himsel£, but not--
unlike Medea--£irst and only. This characteristic is 
signalled, as it was earlier in the case 0£ Creon, by 
117 Adkins, Merit, p. 
118see 
Protection 
Gould, "Hik.eteia," 
0£ suppliants 
30. 
p. 
by 
78, 
Zeus 
£or the 
C I lKEOL05. 
ll9Bo . Ae ngie, "Heroic Elements," p. 48, remarks on 
he l~us• •scrupulousness• as indication 0£ "how very serious 
eems the 'formal relationships 0£ philoi." 
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single-minded concern £or children.120 Aegeus 
•••eus• 
rneyed, not, like Jason on the Argo, seeking his own 
Jl8S jOU 
t but, as he tells Medea upon his entrance, to 
adYancemen • 
r
acle o£ Apollo, "seeking how there may be £or me the 
tile o 
ds of children" (669). ,ee 
'l'be interaction between Medea and Aegeus is strange, 
cllarged with talk. 0£ eros and allusions to sophia. The two 
terms are so inextricably entwined that it is di££icult to 
treat them separately. What should however preliminarily 
:be noted is that both eros and sophia £unction in this 
scene on two levels. The -first level is that 0£ explicit 
definition, the second that 0£ enactment. Previously, we 
baYe been treated only to the enactment 0£ the play•s 
definitions 0£ arete and sophia; now at last we get a truly 
erotic scene. But the scene is erotic in the sense that 
the play has de-fined eroticism, something subtly 
aanipulated by sophia and there-fore di££icult to espy. 
On the level 0£ explicit de-fini tion, this scene 
provides a turning point in the meaning 0£ eros. For while 
we once again are given the by now -familiar de-finition 0£ 
eras put to the service 0£ sel£-advancement (697-700), 
beside this is put another de-finition (714-715) which will 
Ultimately suggest the re-futation 0£ the more -familiar one 
120M . Ae cDermott, Incarnation, pp. 101-104, considers 
Ja:eu.s amia~le and noble-souled, a paragon when compared to 
•er on, and h.k.e Creon in that his virtues put him at the 
cy 0£ Medea. 
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t>eloW, Part Five). (see 
gros and etymologically related words are used more 
==---
in this scene than in any other. The verb erao and 
often 
noun eros are used thrice in £our lines (697-700); tile -
ir de£ini tion is the one 'familiar £rom previous tile 
formulation. The scene is of Aegeus asking Medea about the 
nature o£ her rift with Jason: 
> I 
--Was it that Jason fell in love (epao9EL!i), 
or did he loathe your bed?· --Oh, it was a great love 
(µeyav y> ~pw1'a) [he had], this man not 
faithful to his friends. --Let him go then, if, as 
you say, he is bad. --He loved to get a marriage 
> "" I 
connection with rulers (avdpwv -rupavvwv 
""" > , ,.,. K'f)dO!i "IP0<19'Jl AafJELV). (697-700). 
'!'his catty characterization 0£ the nature 0£ Jason 1 s erotic 
desire is nonetheless one at which Jason would not flinch. 
In his view, one need not squirm against using eros to 
advance one 1 s own suit. 
For Aegeus, however, eros has aims other than social 
advancement. His eros, at least by Medea 1 s description, 
has as its end point the production 0£ children,121 
With no mention 0£ his own gains thereby. Medea pleads 
With him, 
· · · receive me in your land and in your house at the 
hearth (ecpeo1'LOV). In this way with the gods 1 
favor your desire may, be £ru,it£ul 0£ children 
(OUTW!i ~PW!i OOL VPO!i 9EWV TEAEocpopos 
A 121A £ew critics suggest that Euripides intends 
•1e:eus: impotence to be amusing. For example, Arrowsmith, iro~a_s. p. 4~, sees Aegeus as "Euripides1 pathetic and 
de l.~ embodiment 0£ Athens," especially the Athens 
fo~~ribed as visited by Cypris in the choral song that 
ows Aegeus 1 exit. 
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ll'OlOWV), and 
(713-715). 
you yourself may be 
It iS precisely this Aegeus, whose strong desire is -for 
d en 122 whom Medea supplicates, using both the cllil r ' 
. suggestion that she could serve as his bedmate, as 
erotic 
as that she could avail him of her renowned sophia. well 
While it is not certain that Medea •s supplication o:f 
.Aegeus is, like that 0£ Creon, actual instead 0£ 
figura ti ve,123 its erotic element is unmistakeable i:f 
quite subtle. One could argue that Medea here supplicates 
.Aegeus -figuratively by placing herseH--in his mind only 
and in the -future--at his hearth. Recall her plea at 713: 
•Receive me at the hearth" (0€.;at. 
And yet the -figurative placement 0£ 
herself at Aegeus• hearth suggests that Medea could be to 
him more than a mere suppliant. The hearth, while 
certainly a stock site for the suppliant, also has general 
associations with group solidarity and :family stability 
and, more speci:fically, with marriage: "The association 0£ 
122Dunk.le, "Aegeus Episode," pp. 106-107, ties 
Aegeus• childlessness to his sel-f-interest, and suggests 
that "[h]is childlessness seems to in-feet the air 0£ 
Corinth lik.e a pestilence, bringing about the death 0£ 
three children." 
t 123See Gould, "Hik.eteia," p. 85, -for use o:f a past 
hense to indicate an achieved supplication. With Aegeus, 
t:wever, Medea never deviates -from the present tense; on 
sue c~ntr_ary, Medea uses what Gould calls "the language o:f 
th:ih.cation," and there is no indication in this passage 
Point the act is being per-formed in word only, as Gould 
s out must be the case at 321 and 325. 
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and hearth is traditional. "124 
the poet was aware of such an association seems 
'l'bat 
£rom the phrasing he gives to Aegeus' report of the 
obvious 
oracle: "1 am not to loose the projecting £oot 0£ the 
" Aegeus relays. "until I reach my paternal 
•ineskin. 
. 
"' 
, < , 
b.earth" (ll'PlV av 11'a1'pctiav e:o"l'lav 
"olw). (679; 681). Medea's suggestion that Aegeus 
place ~ at his hearth is, to be blunt, one that 
encourages him to imagine himsel£ "loosing the projecting 
foot of the wineskin" in her presence; in short, he is to 
1magine her as sexual partner.125 
124Gould, "Hiketeia," pp. 97-98. Cf. Visser, 
•Medea," p. 150: "A woman's position in the home was 
represented by the stationary and interior hearth." Visser 
does not note Medea's proposition to Aegeus, but does 
remark (p. 151) upon the chilling £act that Euripides has 
lledea kill her brother •at the hearth• (U'apeo"l'lov, 
1334). C£. McDermott, Incarnation, p. 96, who in addition 
notes that the death 0£ the princess and Creon is 
4~scribed as Medea's outrage against Creon's hearth (1130). 
•either 0£ these, 0£ course, bodes well £or Aegeus' 
impending experience with Medea at his hearth. 
How Hestia, the virginal goddess 0£ the stationary 
hearth, came to be associated with wives, who are expected 
lo be neither virginal nor stationary (since they must 
leave their natal hearth to marry). is explained by Jean-
Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought Among the Greeks (London: 
Routledge and K:egan Paul, 1983), pp. 131-142. 
l25Ma . M H . . R . . rianne cDonald, Terms for appiness in 
i!ri.pi.des (Got tigen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1978; 
[:reafter McDonald, Happiness), p. 52, notes that "[s]he 
edea) cans hersel£ his [Aegeus'J e:up'r)µ.a (716), 
:ing t!1e very word Jason did in describing his lucky £ind, 
!l~hPri.n~ess (553)." The same point is made by Mills, 
Who opoei.a, p. 71. C£. Williamson, "Woman's Place,• p. 19, 
•a v ar~ues that Medea o£fers Aegeus and receives from him 
•ar e~si.on of what a woman would give and receive in •afe~i.age," Le .• she would promise fertility and receive 
Y. here "not 0£ an oikos, but that 0£ the Athenian 
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rrnere are. obviously. two objections to this interpre-
1) the hint is too subtle £or Aegeus (or anyone, 
tation: 
that matter) to pick up on; 2) Aegeus in particular 
for 
ld not possibly pick up on the hint, because he does not cou 
ttno• what the oracle's pronouncement means; this is why he 
iS seeking Medea's advice in the £irst place. An answer to 
the -first objection is Winkler•s description 0£ what he 
calls •the normal caution and restraint 0£ Mediterranean 
social intercourse.• and the series of parries and thrusts 
of half-hidden meaning and intention whose use (by Daphnis, 
his parents. and Chloe's £ather in their negotiations 
concerning the potential courtship 0£ Chloe by Daphnis) 
Winkler uses as illustration £rom Longus• Daphnis and 
Chloe.126 A similar scene 0£ discreet understatement 
and subtle manipulation. with the suggestion 0£ sexual 
availability, is the one between Hausicaa and Odysseus in 
Odyssey 6, at least by Dimock's interpretation.127 
With the second objection. that Aegeus does not know 
the oracle's meaning and there-fore cannot be manipulated by 
reference to its sexual connotations. one must agree, and 
l!!Olis.• Williamson likewise points out that Medea later 
claims she is going to "live with• (auvoLK.fiaouaa, 
~385) Aegeus. On this last point. c£. McDermott, 
fcarnation, p. 92, who proposes that Medea's announcement 
hs a sly reference to the variant tradition in which Medea 
as a child, Med us, by Aegeus. 
126Winkler, Constraints. pp. 107-112. 
127 George E Dimock. The Unity of the Odyssey 
(Amherst: Univ.· of Massachusetts Press, 1989), pp. 77-81. 
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instead that Euripides intends not Aegeus, but the 
pasit 
be cognizant 0£ the erotic undertow 0£ this 
audience to 
For it is likewise the audience, but not Aegeus, 
uld be aware that Aegeus will, in fact, become 
WJ:l.0 t(O 
•s spouse/lover and have a child by him, and it is l(edea 
the audience who can be expected to be able to pick up 
tben 
00 
Medea•s manipulation of the erotic in this scene. 
Aegeus• ignorance is, in £act, something upon which 
lledea •smartly" relies in her bid for a place 0£ refuge. 
one of the puzzles of this scene is whether or not Medea 
knows what the oracle means, and, if so, why she does not 
reveal its meaning to Aegeus. Since Medea has been more 
than once termed sophe, and since Aegeus explicitly remarks 
that the oracle pronounced "words wiser than can be 
interpreted by a mere man" av6pa 
ov111Ja >.t:'l v 675), and that he certainly can tell 
them to Medea, since "there is need of a smart mind" 
I (OOf~S 6€lTQl cppevos, 677), Euripides encourages 
the audience to expect that Medea will be able to interpret 
the oracle's advice,128 which is--at least to the 
1280ther versions of Medea's story, if the 
audience can be assumed to know them, also suggest that 
:edea has the ability to interpret the oracle's answer. 
:e Jacob Wolf Petroff, Medea: A Study in the Development j- d a Myth {diss. Columbia Univ., 1966; hereafter Petroff, 
uia e~). p. 64, who cites Pindar Pythian 4-.15 as evidence 
'fut t Medea could interpret omens and prophesy about the 
lled!re,_ and a £ragment from Neophron•s Medea {W34-), where 
•e ~ interprets £or Aegeus the oracle's reply. Whether 
a ~P ~on•s play preceded Euripides• is still debated. For 
eview of the controversy, see Ann Norris Michelini, 
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that would know Aegeus• story as it un£olds in 
audience 
with Aethra--£airly transparent. 
-rroezen 
sut i:f Medea Knows the oracle's meaning. why does she 
r
eveal its meaning to Aegeus? The answer is simple: 
11ot 
d •s •smartness" in this scene is used competitively, 11e ea 
n
ot to give £ree advice to Aegeus. but to serve her i.e., 
interests.129 I:f she "unwisely" here, as 
previously in threatening the royal :family. speaks openly. 
she will lose her chance 0£ gaining the :final thing she 
needs: a place 0£ re£uge. For i£ Medea were to solve the 
riddle :for Aegeus, his insecurity about having children 
would ostensibly be allayed. and he would have no need £or 
her drugs or her. By withholding the answer, Medea ensures 
Aegeus will £eel need 0£ her to cure his sterility. 
In short, it is more by appealing to Aegeus• sel£-
1nterest130 than his pity £or her desolation (712) that 
•Beophron and Euripides• Medea 1056-80," TAPA 139 (1989; 
hereafter Michelini, "Reophron"), pp. 115-116. 
129so. too. according to the tradition. did 
Pittheus. who is termed sophos in this episode {by Medea, 
at 685). serve his own interests in not interpreting the 
oracle for Aegeus, so that his daughter would be 
impregnated. For ancient sources on the proverbial wisdom 
0 £ ~i~theus, see Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 81 n. 15. Did 
Bur1pi.des borrow Pittheus• tactics £or his equally "smart" 
!ied.ea to use against the same man? Tradition dictated 
(Ki~t Medea must. not interpret the oracle £or Aegeus 
his ls, Myt~opoei.a, pp. 82-83); Euripides may be :fitting 
a k Medea into this tradition more than has been previously 
c nowledged. 
e . 
1~0Harmut 
Uri.pi.deischen 
l'ecognizes that 
Erbse. "Ober die Aigeusszene de 
Medea." WS 79 (1966), pp. 127-129, 
Medea uses the promise 0£ £ertility drugs 
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. 5 £rom Aegeus the re£uge she needs. And by 11e4ea wi.n 
to protect Medea, Aegeus shows his sel£-interest, 
a•reeing 
turn blinds him in to unquestioning support 0£ his 
w:tiJ.ch in 
friend. 
In this, he and the Chorus share blame. 
Aegeus, however, is not as competitive as are the 
wolDe n o£ the Chorus. 
He is willing to go only so 'far in 
achieving his goal. Nor does he display the low object 
attachment and total commitment rationality seen in Jason 
and (very shortly) in Medea. Aegeus di££ers -from Jason in 
his ~: Aegeus' desire is £or children (714-715), 
Jason's is £or a marriage to advance his social position 
(TOO). Aegeus, then, is similar to Creon, and not only in 
his solicitous concern £or children. Aegeus is the second 
king Medea manipulates £or her own ends,131 and he 
will very nearly su££er in the -future the £ate that Creon 
as a bargaining chip with Aegeus. Dunk.le, "Aegeus 
Episode,• pp. 98-99, notes that mutual sel£-interest 
operates in Medea's relationships with Aegeus and with 
Jason. 
131Gredley, "Place and Time," p. 32, notes how 
Kedea dominates Aegeus by setting the terms 0£ their 
agreement. Musurillo, "Reconsideration," p. 59, sees 
Aegeus• dif£erence £rom Creon (who has "stupid sel£-
confidence") in Aegeus' ability to "match wits with Medea." 
He gets What he wants, and only gives as much as is 
necessary. Rickert, "Akrasia," p. 109 n. 43 and p. 113, 
n~tes that Aegeus, in swearing his oath, is delicately 
: 10.•ed to a void "actually stating the usual imprecation 
ra.lai.nst one's children .... " Rickert imagines that the 
0 ;re threat 0£ the usual penalty £or perjury (destruction I>!' on~·s Children) would nonetheless discourage Aegeus -from 
eaki.ng his oath. 
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f fers near su 
the end of the play.132 
The audience senses, then, that Aegeus, like Creon, is 
t Up as a mark. Medea, however, does not treat him i>eing se . 
(as she did Creon) because it is not as yet in her like one 
interest to harm Aegeus or his family. For now, his 
friendship is what suits her plans. The safe anchorage he 
has offered will allow what she most desires: to be proven 
•beautifully victorious" over her enemies; to make 
retribution by repaying the harm they have given. Medea 
savors her imagined triumph: 
Oh Zeus, and Vengeance of Zeus and light of Sun, now, 
friends, we will prove ourselves beautifully 
victorious (KaAAlVlKOl) over my enemies, and we 
have set foot on the road. How there is hope that 
these enemies o-f mine will pay the penalty. (764-777). 
Aegeus• kindliness and -friendship have been used by Medea 
no less than were Creon's display 0£ quiet virtues; Medea 
in the case 0£ Aegeus has promised a service (and hinted 
perhaps at something more) in return £or a service 
promised. This is the manifestation o-f her and Aegeus• 
friendship: mutual support in attaining desired ends. 
132Reck£ord, "First Exit," pp. 330-331, discusses 
•hat introduction to Euripides• treatment 0£ Medea the 
audience of 431 would have had, after viewing Euripides• 
Peliades of 455 and his Aegeus, whose production date is 
~kely to. have been bet ween 450 and 430. Kills, 
!!lthopoe1a, p. 83, points out that Euripides combined two 
separate motifs in -formulating the interactions 0£ Aegeus 
~~d Medea: ". . . a magical cure £or sterility and a 
l.sastrous favor promised to a supernatural being in 
~Xchange for help out of a dilemma; this favor ordinarily 
e!Volves the loss of a child." According to Mills (p. 84), 
li-fen as Aegeus secures his fertility, he jeopardizes the 
e of his unborn son. 
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Medea now has the time to complete her revenge and a 
to which she may escape. She therefore may proceed 
place 
.,1tb her plan. This involves, she reveals, using her 
· idren as tools of revenge, to carry deadly gifts to 
cb1 
creon's daughter (780-789). But that is not all: she will 
proceed then to kill her own children, a deed "most unholy" 
and whose contemplation makes her weep (790-796).133 
But Medea the zero-sum competitor is willing to weep, 
and she gives a competitor's array 0£ reasons: 1) it is 
unendurable £or her to be laughed at by her enemies (ou 
' yap y£>.aoaat T>.T)Tov 
> ..... £X9pwv, 797); 2) Jason 
will "bhereby be repaid the harm he has done her (os 
c .... 
"IJ'lV 
' ouv 
, 
TElOEl 802); and 3) she 
is concerned to pursue the code 0£ harming enemies 
(primarily) and helping friends (secondarily), £or it is 
this type o-f conduct which wins the most -fame (807-810). 
All three motives contribute to the type 0£ excellence 
133Medea •s announcement at 790, "Thereupon, 
however, I will change the story," (evTauaa µ.evTot 
Tove§> alfa).).aaow .>.oyov), has generated intriguing 
scholarly debate. Boedeker, "Medea," pp. 106-112, argues 
that Medea becomes the author 0£ a new tale, which negates 
Jason's story 0£ epic grandeur and her own labors in 
regard to her children. The old tale is replaced by a new 
one: a tragedy, for both Jason and Medea. See also Emily 
HcDermot t, "Medea Line 37: A Note,• AJP 108 (1987), pp. 
158-161, who argues that the Nurse's dread at line 37, "I 
fear that she [Medea] will come upon some stange new 
Plan," anticipates Medea's change from the old plot (where 
~e does not kill the children) to a new one (where she 
. oes). McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 17-20, offers this 
~t~r~retation as possible evidence £or the priority 0£ 
H ripides over Neophron in creating this version 0£ the 
edea story. 
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l>Y the zero-sum competitor, but emphasis is on 
,odbt 
. £riends are included almost as an a£terthought. 
eoelDieS, 
~e iast lines cited are especially telling in this regard, 
t bere£ore must be looked at closely: and 
Let no one consider me pal try and weak, nor gentle, 
l>Ut o£ another sort: heavy to my enemies and kindly 
to £riends, £or t~e li£e 0£ su,ch pers~ns is "most 
reno"!ned (J.L"l6£LS. < J.LE , cpauA"l": .Kao9£V'11, 
VOJHt£ TCIJ IJ.'116 ~ '110\J>X a La'!..• a)..)..~ 9a 1'£PO\J 
Tp01t0)!o fl~p£LQV, £X9pOL~ KQL > cptA~>LOLV 
£~J.LEV"l· TCIJV yap TOLO\JTWV £\JKAeeOTQTOS. 
flLOS., 807-810). 
surely it is not -friends by whom one would imagine it a 
danger to be considered paltry, weak, or gentle; only in 
reiard to enemies would such a reputation be imagined 
dangerous. Renown in the zero-sum game is here, as 
Gouldner has described, won primarily by the conduct 0£ one 
toward one's enemies; one must guard at all times against 
l>eing viewed as gentle or weak, £or it is at those moments 
that one is likely to be overtaken by overzealous enemies 
who are ever vigilant £or their best chance at success over 
one. And so Medea, like the typical zero-sum 
competitor,134 must focus much of her attention on her 
enemies, who are the chief obstacles to achieving the goal 
Of .reestablishing her lost predominance over them and all 
Others.135 Her three-fold plan is to keep them £rom 
.... -... 
8 d 
134C£. Bongie, •Heroic Elements," p. 49, on 
e ea•s •heroic outlook• here. 
in 135Easterl1ng, •infanticide,• p. 185, recognizes 
th Hedea~s. arguments • ... all the words that belong to 
e traditional code, in which the laughter 0£ enemies is 
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. g predominance over her (signalled by their being 
_.1ntainin 
to iaugh at her), to harm them, and to establish her 
al>le 
as an ef£ective competitor. 
faDle 
With such a program 0£ action in mind, merely harming 
the princess and Creon, and, for that matter, Jason, is not 
enough. She must kill her own children; it not only makes 
per£ect sense, it is the only way. It is, within the arena 
o£ zero-sum competition, the rationa1136 albeit 
eDlotionally repugnant, necessary conclusion. In her 
recourse to the zero-sum competitor•s total commitment 
rationality, Medea £inally establishes hersel£ as a £ull 
participant in this cutthroat competition 0£ self-
the ultimate disgrace and harming enemies and helping 
friends is the duty 0£ a hero.• Easterling is right to 
continue that • ... Medea•s appropriation 0£ the code 
seems hideously out 0£ place•; this is because her acts 
aeainst husband and children, cited by Easterling, in 
themselves deny her the status 0£ hero. Eilhard 
Schlesinger, •zu Euripides• Hed·ea, • Hermes 94 (1966; 
herea£ter Schlesinger, •zu Medea"), pp. 30-32, opposes the 
favored psychological interpretation 0£ Medea•s monologue 
(i.e., passion vs. maternal 'feeling), and sees the killing 
Of the children predetermined by Medea •s decision to take 
revenge. In the monologue, Medea simply comes to terms 
With this necessity. 
• 
136
see Wol££, "Euripides,• p. 239, £or the 
relentless logic• 0£ killing the children. C£. Foley, 
•Divided Sel£,• p. 65: "This argument has its own 
~:tionality as wen, although some recent critics assume 
the contrary.• Foley, like Wolf£, sees the rationality 0£ 
81 e. argument within •the Greek heroic code.• (p. 66). tr mi.larly, Buxton, Persuasion, p. 157, remarks, "Medea is a 
1m ae.'!dY 0£ . ananke: not a metaphysical 'necessity•, but one 
fi Pll.ca ted in the social circumstances in which Medea 
nds hersel£." 
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137 
ncement. 
ad'Va 
:Medea's total commitment rationality, able as it is to 
assur 
e achieving her goal, is not employed, however, 
St For by viewing self-advancement as With OU t CO • 
r
most and all others--including her beloved children--
a,ppe I 
..,,pendable, Medea ultimately achieves what Gouldner 
as e ... 
yie•s as the inevitable byproduct of zero-sum competition: 
total isolation and alienation. For Medea now suffers the 
alienation of the Chorus, who previously supported her. 
They, in disbelief and horror, will at the end of this 
episode have no recourse but to begin to distance 
themselves from her by imagining an idealized Athens (824-
865; see discussion below, Part Two). 
The Chorus are incredulous, for they had never 
envisioned what it meant to play this game to its logical 
conclusion. They -first direct her away £rom this abnormal 
deed (811-813), and then express their disbelie£ that she 
Will be able to commit a crime which will cause her so much 
anguish (816; 818). Medea's only explanations are that 
they would understand had they su£fered as she has (814-
815), that her goal is to sting her husband as much as 
Possible (817), and that her own wretchedness counts £or 
nothing ,, (lTW, 819)--all spoken like a true 
competitor. 
137 
t See Bongie "Heroic Elements," p. 46, for the ensi ' on between rational and emotional motivations in Jason 
and. Medea. 
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In the last sentiment especially we can detect the 
o£ the zero-sum competitor to set the stakes 
,,1111ngness 
d Ven to destroy that to which one is most 111gh, an e 
nd by which one is there£ore made most attacned--a 
yulnerable--be£ore the enemy can get to it and thereby 
prevail.138 The death 0£ Medea's children will, the 
cnorus predict and she readily admits, render her "most 
wretched" (OU cP 
l'\ 
av ' ' Y£VOlO y> > ' a9AlWIQi'r) 
yvv"1, 818); it is precisely why Medea must kill them. 
Kedea is aware that her enemies would, if they could, take 
.-engeance £or her deeds upon her innocent children (781-
'182);139 she will return later to this consideration 
138Thus Bongie, "Heroic Elements," p. 50 n. 47, on 
Medea's killing the children: "By this particular act she 
not only achieves the most ruinous vengeance conceivable, 
she also strips Jason 0£ any means whereby he can exact 
retribution £rom her, £or in destroying her children she 
has also destroyed her one vulnerable point. It is a 
perfect scheme £or one who has the strength 0£ will to go 
through with it." 
Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 66-70, cites Thucydides 
History 1.143-144 as an example of total-commitment 
rationality. There, Pericles urged the Athenians to 
abandon their lands, and suggested that total commitment to 
Victory would entail laying waste to their own lands 
themselves, so that the Peloponnesians would realize that 
such destruction could not make the Athenians submit. 
139There were several versions of how Medea's 
Children died. A full discussion of the sources can be 
found in P. Roussel, "Medee et la meurtre de ses enfants," 
REA 22 (1920), pp. 158-161. 
C The audience could only have been as surprised as the 
ho:us over Medea's proposal to kill the children i£ ~l'l.Pides• version of Medea predated Neophron•s, which fact 
~s not firmly established, pace E. A. Thompson, "Neophron 
H nd Euripides' Medea," CQ 30 (1944), pp. 10-14, and Page, Ted~, PP. x.xx-x.xxvi. See the discussion of von Fritz, 
Jagodie, pp. 333-336. Michelini, "Heophron," pp. 115-136, 
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(1059-1061). It 0£ course makes no sense to argue that 
fledea Kills her children so that they will be spared the 
outrage her enemies may visit upon them;140 she Kills 
tbelD so that she will be spared the humiliation 0£ total 
The defeat her enemies' outrage 0£ them would cause her. 
focus here, £irst and only, is on Medea and her victory; 
tbe children will be sacri£iced--not without a struggle--to 
attain a victory made all the more glorious by the 
sacrifice it demands. 
we, like the Chorus, £ind it di££icult to envisage 
such total commitment to victory; we would deem such 
behavior--by understatement--excessive. Yet excessiveness 
is the mark 0£ such a system, as Slater has noted;141 
calls £or moder a ti on in the zero-sum game were, according 
to Gouldner, £eeble attempts to control those who, by all 
usual standards and norms, were out 0£ controi.142 
Medea's -final words to the Chorus who, incidentally, cite 
argues £rom Euripides' play f'or Heophron's anteriority; 
McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 9-24, argues the opposite; c-f. 
Ohlander, Suspense, p. 28 n. 9, £or other supporters 0£ 
Euripides' anteriority. Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 79, 
concurs, and (pp. 38-42) reviews fragmentary works on Medea 
Predating 431 B. c £or possible preconceptions 0£ the 
audience. 
140Except, as Easterling, "In-fan ticide,• pp. 186-
187, has argued, to the desperately rationalizing parent. 
141s1a ter 
• 
Glory, p . 40. 
142Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 44. 
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man norms" •JJ,U 
in a feeble at tempt to stop her (812),143 
indicate how, to a person at the extreme, middle ground 
rs immoderate: "All arguments in the middle are 
appea 
' ' < 
excessive" (11'£PlOOOl 11'aVT€S. ouv 
819).144 In short, there is no room £or compromise 
the zero-sum game. Compromise is £or losers like Creon. 
in 
It is at this point, then, that the Chorus, formerly 
50 loyal to Medea and the values she embodied, draw back 
from her in an attempt to reassess that to which they had 
formerly lent their wholehearted support. The next ode 
they sing, the Ode to Athens (824-865), marks the beginning 
of the re£u ta tion 0£ their pro££ered de£ini tion 0£ arete 
and is only understandable in the context 0£ the other two 
terms the play seeks to de-fine, eros and sophia. 
Discussion 0£ this ode, and indeed 0£ much 0£ the rest 0£ 
the play, will be postponed to later sections. For now, we 
143see the comment 0£ Walsh, "Public and Private," 
p. 300: "Medea's heroic bid for public honor isolates her 
completely, £or in abandoning natural feeling she offends 
conventional sensibility." C£. McDermott, Incarnation, p. 
61: ". . . the Chorus passes £rom a gender-oriented 
complicity with Medea to revulsion against her, born 0£ 
common humanity." Their complicity, I have argued, is not 
only gender-based. 
144Buxton, Persuasion, p. 166. Cf. Boedeker, 
~!tedea," p. 107, who translates the line, "all >.oyol 
n the middle are superfluous," but adds (n. 49) that the 
~hrase is indeed ambiguous--perhaps intentially so--and 
t~OUld be interpreted as 'words spoken between now and the 
m~me I kill the children' or 'words 0£ compromise, in the 
3:dd~e between ex,tremes.'" Gredley, "Place and Time," p. 
•o' interprets µ.ea<t> spatially, i.e., as referring to 
in rdts coming--hereafter unheeded by Medea--£rom the Chorus 
he orchestra. 
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lY note that the Medea 0£ the last hal£ 0£ the play 
peed on 
s more and more the zero-sum competitor. }>eCODle 
The first evidence 0£ this is during Medea's second 
V iew with Jason (866-975). where, with the tnter 
Petitor's savvy, she discards her -former honesty with co IP 
In fact, Medea's success£ul manipulation 0£ Jason 
a strong resemblance to her manipulation of the ]>ears 
Chorus in that she again £aces someone who views her as a 
potential contender or enemy (recall that she minced no 
words with Jason in their £irst interview), whose services 
she nonetheless needs, and whose suspicions must there£ore 
be de-fused. With the Chorus Medea combined sel£-abasement 
with an appeal to their status as viable contenders, and 
fueled their support by rousing their prejudice against 
men; with Jason she uses exactly the same tactics. She 
abases hersel£ by owning her stupidity, she appeals to 
Jason's desire to play the role 0£ the magnanimous victor, 
and plays 0££ his sense that he, as a male, is naturally 
superior to her. 
In using on Jason the bait that even Creon would not 
take, Medea reveals her sense 0£ Jason's stupidity. And, in 
fact, in this contest 0£ wits, he is gravely disadvantaged, 
for he mindlessly snaps up Medea's bait: she is not, a£ter 
au, intelligent. In reality, she is stupid. Unlike 
Creon th 
• e witless Jason o££ers. no challenge to Medea's 
verbal Withdrawal of herself as a contender against him; 
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t a word to the contrary he accepts her assessment 
.,1tnou 
lf as impaired by being out of her mind of nerse 
(11C1LVOµ.al, 
(cipouALOV 
873), as imprudent and senseless 
, 
IJ.OT'11V, 882 and 883). Medea 
continues, as he silently agrees: she must have lost her 
) . 
mind {E:YW cP 
,, 
acppwv, 885); as a woman she is, 
after all, no better than a babbling infant couo' 
av"tl1'€LV€lV 
) ' 
a VTL 
, 
V'l11f'LWV 1 891 ); her 
tninking had been -faulty {ic.aic.ws cppOVE:l V TOT[€), 
892-893). 
Medea ends her speech by summoning -forth all o-£ her 
contender's sophia: she lies through her teeth and uses 
the best weapon she has--her children!--to gain at least 
symbolic physical proximity to her enemy Jason. Through 
the agency o-f the children, she is able to touch Jason and 
falsely reassure him with a -forsworn pledge 0£ -forgiveness 
and revived philia:145 
Children, children, come here! Come out of the house! 
Greet your -father; say -farewell to him along with me, 
and, together with your mother, change -from the 
enemies we were to -friends (6ta>..>..ax9'119' a1J,a 
,.... , ,, , # ' 
T:'JS 1f'poo9E:v ex9pas e:s. cpL>..ous. 1.J.'l"ITPOS. 
IJ.ETa); -for we now have made a truce and my anger 
has changed (896-897). 
Although it may seem unlikely that Jason could believe 
this Pack o-f lies, it will do well to remember that this 
man, like the Tutor, is not unsettled by the fluidity of 
:relationships; he has stated outright (560-561) that he 
145Flory, "Right Hand," pp. 71-72.. 
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t others to abandon (or, as here, cleave to) him espec s 
ding to their best interests. His willingness to 
accor 
t Medea's "change of heart," then, is a byproduct of 
acceP 
.... pectations he has accrued as a player in the zero-sum 
the e .... 
BY his lights, she has (at last!) come to her 8a1De· 
senses. She--now that she finally realizes there is no way 
her to succeed against his and Creon's plan--is playing for 
the game smart, by putting her true (and only natural) 
feelings under the control of her rational mind: 
I do praise these things [you say), woman, though I 
can hardly blame those things [you said before]. It 
is only natural that a member of the female race get 
angry at her husband, when he engages in secret 
commerce for marriage with another (yaµ.ous 
1fapeµ.1foAwv1'oS aAAol.ous). But you've changed 
your heart--though it took. you some time!--to the 
better course, now that you've recognized the 
>I ' ' "' prevailing plan (eyvws de T'l1V vucwaav 
fJouA"1v). These are the acts of a prudent woman 
" ,, ,,..., , (yuvaLKOS epya Tau Ta awcppovos). (908-913). 
In concluding this speech, Jason indulges in 
fantasizing about the future of his children, and in the 
process reconfirms himself as a competitor in the game (see 
below, Part Five). He imagines his children at the top of 
the heap in Corinth: "I expect that you with your brothers 
•111 be first (Ta 1fpwTCaJ) of the Corinthian land" 
<916-917)--a position his new social standing will, he 
assures them, buy them. Furthermore, at lines 920-921, he 
hopes that they will serve as his protectors against the 
enem.ies he never questions he, the future aged competitor, 
•111 have: 
"Hay I see you thriving as you come to the end 
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stronger than enemies" > ,.. (€x9pwv 
of your youth, 
my 
, ,.. 
€1.J.WV 
< • 
uv€p1"€pous). 
Medea now asks a clearly receptive Jason that the 
be allowed to stay, feigning that she realizes the cb.ildren 
4ecree of exile is for her own good 
> ' (Kaj..l.Ol 
la1't A~a1"a, 935), and equating her good with that 
of the royal house and Jason: after all, she would just be 
in the way (934-937). She further reminds Jason, who at 
first is incredulous of his success in achieving the 
children's release from exile, that he will easily be able 
to have his way with his new wife, to which he agrees (942-
945). His manipulation of his own erotic appeal will 
again win the day, he is sure, and in his breezy self-
assurance one can perhaps discern the source of his 
prejudice against women. For, unlike the Corinthian women 
of the Chorus, whose prejudice is the competitor's 
prejudice against a long-victorious competitor, Jason's 
disdain for women is the victor's contempt for the 
Yanquished--women to him are interchangeable parts, easily 
manipulated to his advantage. For this reason he feels 
that Medea, in o-ffering the costly gown and diadem to the 
Princess, is disposing of valuable resources £or no good 
reason: he will certainly prevail without these girts; 
Medea, to him, is therefore -foolish (~ . µ.a 1"ata, 
959). 
But Medea, £ar -from being a £001, is showing her 
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's savvy. For if she cannot gain proximity to 
colDPeti tor 
P
rincess through these gifts, Medea will not be able to 
the 
pa1son her. Medea therefore at this crucial juncture once 
again plays the supplicant, imaging herself as such to 
Jason: she is in a thoroughly vulnerable position before 
this young girl, whose star is rising, on whose side are 
the gods, and in whose young hands is the absolute power to 
rule 
, 
(KEl V'r)S 
c 
0 oaLJJ.WV, KElVQ V\JV 
,, 
aut;e:l 
, 
8E05, 
, 
ve:a 1upa VVEl, 966-967). She notionally lays 
her life on the line in approaching the princess ("I would 
exchange £or my children •s exile not only gold, but my 
life," 966-967). Medea culminates her imaged supplication 
of the princess by bidding the children to "beseech your 
father's young wife, my mistress" (11'a1pos 
, 
ve:av 
yvvau:a, OEO"ll'Oll v 
> , 
€1.J.'l')V, 
c , 
lKEIEUEl[O], 970-
971).146 The woman sounds so pathetic, so helpless, 
and seems, by sending her innocent young children into the 
den of her enemy, to be putting so much on the line. That 
would be true 0£ anyone but a zero-sum competitor. 
For Medea the competitor this is another master 
stroke. Who could guess that so pathetically tendered an 
146K · 11 
• l. s, Kythopoeia, pp. 120-121, argues that 
[t]he entire episode comprising the death of Glauke is 
full of ambiguities which give it the aspect 0£ a perverted 
:~crifi_cial ritual." Point by point, Kills illustrates how 
Of e chi.~d~e_n can be viewed as o££erants -following the steps 
th sacrifi.ci.al procedure, which culminate in the holocaust 
th at consumes the princess. The children later, of course, 
emsetves become the sacri£icial victims 0£ Medea's kni£e. 
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f such obviously costly gifts in the hands of two 
offer o 
nts given ostensibly to attain something only for 
1nnoce ' 
nothing for their mother--could be hiding treachery tbeDl--
and death? Medea shows to the knowing a sleight of hand 
S he is ever so careful to instruct the little boys--w11en 
• i.· 5 important!, she tells them--to put the gifts in the tbl.S 
1iands of the princess (972-973). In the zero-sum game, 
proxiDlitY spells danger, touch kills, as these boys will 
tbeDlselves soon discover. 
To such a state Gouldner indicated zero-sum 
coDlpeti tion ultimately comes: it brings in its wake a 
crisis of intimacy that results from manipulating desire to 
the dictates of the game. At lines 974-975, Medea signals 
her now full involvement in this crisis by the instructions 
she gives her children: "Go, quick as you can; do well, 
and bring for your mother the good news of the things she 
desires to obtain" (~v 1"UXE:lV). With this 
statement Medea has come full circle: she is no longer a 
woman stricken with desire for any man (8), but one who, 
like the husband who taught her, knows how to control and 
channel her desire to the achievement of her own success 
over her enemies. This has now become the sole object of 
her desire. Medea has become Jason: no longer does she 
•Pend her desire on living beings, she saves it en ti rely 
for h er own success. 
The fourth stasimon (976-1001), which follows, is 
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entirely with the Chorus' expression 0£ 
ta1ten up 
sness, and, as such, belongs properly in discussion 
110pe1es 
next section, as does much of what £ollows. The 
of tbe 
Chorus, and indeed even Medea, from this point £orward show 
e
ffects of the reversal in which they are involved. 
tbe 
n ow, we must ignore these fluctuations, and instead var 
concentrate on what is left of adherence to the defini-
uons. 
For this reason, discussion of the remaining 
eboral songs will be postponed to the next section. 
nespi te the reverberations from the impending horrid 
deed of killing the children, Medea nonetheless argues 
successfully for cleaving to the definitions which have 
:been established thus far in the play. A£ter the Tutor 
announces that the children have successfully delivered the 
fateful gifts, Medea, al though she wavers, remembers what a 
competitor can ill afford to forget, that her enemies await 
her failure so that they can laugh. At 1049-1051 she 
steels herself against so£tness, and determines to act: 
•Do I want my enemies to get off scot-free and to be a 
laughing-stock.? 
Tac§[E]) 
I must do these things." (ToAµ.'f}TEOV 
Medea, who mani£ests the de£initions tested in this 
!!enchos, with this verbal adjective begins to show the 
inescapable 
, unendurable logic of the game into which these 
d.ef1n1 lions fit. As happens in elenchos to interlocutors, 
this . 
1.s the point past which one cannot answer anything 
399 
For i£ one is to support the de£ini tions, the 
logl.. cally £ollow This is why we see Medea 
Sequences . con 
expression to her sense 0£ the "necessity" 0£ the 
11•ing 
he is about to commit, although, obviously, there are 
4eed s 
alternatives to killing the children, alternatives 
other 
t his intelligent woman hersel£ has been able to see: whiCh 
she could, a£ter all, take the children with her (104-5-
1046). But this alternative means abandoning the 'full 
punishment 0£ her enemy, Jason. It cannot be chosen 
unless the de£inition 0£ arete Medea represents is itsel£ 
abandoned.147 And that choice, through the horrors 
that 'follow, will not be taken. 
Instead, Medea, upon seeing the Messenger arrive with 
news £rom the royal palace, reverts back into her old, 
competitive sel£. She has been eagerly awaiting his 
arrival (1116-1117), terms the news that Creon and his 
daughter are dead "a most beauti£ul story" (KaHloTov 
· .. µu9ov, 1127), and claims that the Messenger can 
147Easterling, "In £an ticide," p. 188, po in ts to 
Kedea•s "obsessive need to triumph over her enemies• and 
her "heroic sel£-image" as pieces in the inescapable logic :f killing the children. Similarly, £or Schlesinger, "Zu 
_edea,• p. 32, killing the children "aus Rache und ... 
aus Rotwendigkeit" cannot be separated. C£. Walsh, "Public 
and p · bef ri.vate," pp. 298-299, who sees Medea, like Jason 
e ore her, now opera ting in the public sphere at the 
Xpense of the private. 
as Husurillo, "Reconsideration,• p. 65, by contrast, 
Kc~erts that "[t)here is no logic in the deed . . . ." 
kill~r-m.ot t, Inc~rna tion, p. 92, sees the logic 0£ Medea •s 
as l.~g her children in that it is the climax 0£ her career 
viola tor of the parent-child bond. 
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forevermore be counted among those who work to her 
110.., and 
and therefore one Of her friends cE:v o> ad~antage, 
. . > 
elJ£pyf:'f<ll5 1"0 ~olltov KQl €J..LOl5 
" 1127-1128). 
ea!lt 
What we are about to hear is ghastly; 
uedea consummate competitor that she remains, shame-
and ri • 
ly gloats over the prospect of savoring grisly 1ess 
details: "How don't hurry through it, friend, but do tell. 
So• did they die? You will give me twice as much pleasure 
if they died really horribly." 
This statement, and the Messenger's description that 
follows, will be considered in the last section of this 
chapter (Part Five, below); here we need only acknowledge 
that, typical as this gloating is of the zero-sum competi-
tor,148 the suggested eroticization of death that her 
anticipation of "pleasure" implies, gives pause to all but 
the fully committed competitor, Medea. The disgusting and 
pathetic details of the deaths do nothing to her resolve 
but stiffen it: 
Friends, the matter is resolved (oE:ooK l"al) that 
I must kill my children as quickly as possible and set 
out from this land, and not by dallying give oppor-
tunity for another, ill-disposed hand to kill the 
ch~ldren. It is in every way necessary that they die 
(1l'avTw5 ocp> avayK"l KQT9aV€lV). And since 
it is necessary (E:1t€L of: xp.f}), we our-
selves shall kill them, we who bore them. So come 
on, now, heart, arm yourself (oll'~ttou). Why 
148 llo Ohlander Suspense, p. 167, compares Medea to a tn:1i~ric hero, wh~ likewise "relishes the pain he has 
cour~cted oz:i his foes." An exception to this is, of 
he he, Achilles, who does anything but gloat over the pain 
as brought Priam (Iliad 24.538-548). 
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r 
'" 
d 'We hesitate to do the terrible/clever and necessary 0 '\ ' , ,.., • 
narDl (Ta dt:lVa KavayKala • • • KaKa)? 
come, poor hand 0£ mine, take the sword, take it, 
creep to the pain£~1 starting-post 0£ li£e, and don"t 
turn weak (Ka1C.L08't)5), don"t remember the 
hildren, how very dear they are, how you bore them. ~ut £or this short day £orget your children, and then 
lament. (1236-1249). 
Three things are 0£ concern here. First, Medea again 
espresses, indeed this time stresses (£our times in eight 
unes: 
1236; > I avayic.'I'), 1240; I xp'I'), 1240; 
clvayKal'a, 1243) the necessity 0£ her deed. And 
necessary it is, unless she is to abandon her pursuit 0£ a 
reputation as one who comes out on top. There are no 
answers but •yes,• £or this logic, terrible though it is, 
is cohesively clever (dt:l va, 1243). Second, Medea" s 
decision here is basically to enter once again the £ield 
of competition. Mother that she nonetheless is, she must 
now be soldier who arms hersel£ and takes up the sword 
1242; 1244), athlete 
who sets out £rom the starting-post (PaAPtda, 
1245).149 Gouldner"s description 0£ the competitor 
Who can •never withdraw £rom the contest; he must always 
hurl himsel£ back into the £ray"150 seems especially 
149simon, Tragic Drama, p. 81. Medea here 
•tdentifies with the aggressor,• i.e., becomes like the 
•ale oppressor. Simon, p. 80, sees such identi£ication, 
:nd •separation or segregation of the sexes,• as the only t:: lines 0£ resolution: "What makes the play a tragedy is 
U t none 0£ the solutions really allows men and women to 
Chvie together in harmony and to beget and cherish 
ldren.• 
150 Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 54. 
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to these lines. Here is Medea, arming herself £or 
apropos 
combat, prodding hersel£ to begin yet another 
another 
race. 
Third, in urging herself to forget the children and 
connection to them, that they are "very dear," that she )ler 
t he one who bore them (1246-1248), Medea is merely was 
urging herself to take on the competitor's mandatory 
practice 0£ fluidity in relationships. Individuals, no 
matter how dear, cannot stand in the way 0£ one's success. 
And it is indeed this cold-blooded competitor that the 
children £ace, as Medea 0££ stage traps and stabs them to 
death (1271-1281). The de£initions have been brought to 
their logical conclusion, and here it is: dead children at 
the hands 0£ their own mother. 
The tragic magnitude 0£ a mother's killing her chil-
dren should be enough to destroy the system 0£ de£ini tions 
that made such an act necessary. But this does not happen. 
For as Jason enters, blustering and threatening, we are 
liven to know that the competitive ethos which has wreaked 
all this savagery thrives. Jason is sure that the royal 
household will soon be looking £or vengeance, and will 
extract it from Medea, who he is sure "will pay the 
Penalty (dWOE:l dlK'flV, 1298) and will not escape 
•without penalty" > ,.. (a9ct1os., 1300), £or they will 
treat her harmfully 
,, (E:pfi,OUOlV IC.OKWS, 1302). But 
that is not all. His concern is not her, but his chil-
dren, Whose lives he expects are also threatened by 
403 
relatives 0£ the princess (1303-1305).151 
wnen he hears that Medea has beaten them to the task., 
n 's £irst JaSO 
1£ 1't:LOWIJ.al 
declaration is 
1316). 
that he will get even (T.fiv 
But he really cannot, 
b e is impotently unable to touch her: "You will not for 
touch me with your hand (XElPl 
> 
O\J 
•o1'£). Helios, £a ther 0£ our £a ther, gave this chariot 
hostile hand" 
,, 
to us, a defense against (epuµa 
I I (1320-1322). All Jason do is 
•oAEIJ.LaS xepo5). can 
(oAolCol, 1329; ,, 1346) and 111-wish her eppCel, 
call her names,152 yet he acknowledges that with these 
he cannot "sting" her: "But I would not be able to sting 
rou with a thousand reproaches." (1344-1345). Furthermore, 
he will not be allowed to bury his own children (1377-1378; 
cf. 1412), only his new wi£e (1394). In £act, he cannot 
even touch the children, though he longs to do so, begs 
Bed.ea to let him, and calls the gods to witness that he 
cannot (1399-1400; 1402-1403; 1410-1412). His vanquishment 
151Easterling, "In £an ticide," p. 189; cf. 
Oblander, Suspense, p. 180. Oblander, passim, argues that 
the .audience throughout anticipates and fears that the 
Corinthians will kill the children, as they in £act did in 
earlier versions. 
152g· Of ~mon, Tragic Drama, p. 93, notes how the £orm 
Un the dialogue £rom 1393-1398, with its intertwined hal£-
wr:s• shows Jason and Medea "entwined in some murderous 
Stling match, not entwined as husband and wi£e in 
Procreative sex or in complementary efforts on behalf of 
Children." 
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1 
153 
coIDPlete. 
J.• 
Medea could not be happier £or it. She is -fully in 
as victor, hersel£ and the bodies 0£ her children 
control 
reach.154 As victor, she does the touching and 
out of 
stinging, but is not hersel£ touched and stung. Medea 
in her ability to have touched his heart c-r:fls 
Kap<Stas 1360); she can 
•sung• !!!!!!--by -flaunting his children as dead: "They no 
longer exist; and that will sting you" (oe <S.fie;e-ral, 
1310). She lets him (and us) know that this is merely the 
payback for what was done to her: Jason did not practice 
reciprocity with her, but instead dishonored her (1353-
1354); Creon provided her husband with a ready-to-hand 
marriage and tossed Medea hersel£ out 0£ his land (1356-
135'1). Both needed to be punished; she could not be the 
object of la ugh ter £or her enemies (1355; 1362). 
Furthermore, Medea leaves Jason and us with a pathetic 
picture of his -future: he will die in disgrace, struck. by 
a timber -from the rotting Argo (1386-1389), a£ter having 
153Flory, "Right Hand," p. 73. Furthermore, 
Burnett, •Tragedy 0£ Revenge," p. 22, suggests that in 
lledea•s not allowing Jason to touch the children she is 
•treating them as if they were consecrated objects that 
::u~d be soiled by Jason's touch . . . ." Furthermore, by frll~ng the children Medea has "robbed [Jason] 0£ the last 
n ~J.t of that £lawed quest £or the -fleece. He will have 
e 0 so much as a pair 0£ corpses to show £or that entire 
11:::df-tion." See also Simon, Tragic Drama, p. 92, £or illllll as revenge as robbing Jason 0£ the chance £or 
ortau ty through children. 
154- . Schlesinger, "Zu Medea," pp. 34 and 36. 
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nis old age in lamentation more bitter even than he 
•pent 
feels now 
(1396). 
A.S the Chorus so long ago predicted, the tables have 
turned. The rivers £low back.wards. Jason, once so 
t l.. n his rising star, is now su££ering utter confiden 
defeat. And Medea, what 0£ Medea? \tli th her display 0£ 
seemingly total potency and control, she has all the 
trappings o-f the victor. She touches and stings but cannot 
J>e touched or stung. From her invulnerable position on 
high and with her departure announced and imminent (1384-
t385), she and the definitions she manifests are 
maintained even to the end. 
But have the definitions withstood the elenchos? Or 
have they, like Medea, merely escaped further scrutiny? As 
she £lies 0££ in Helios• chariot, the sun's new course 
signals cataclysmic upheaval (see below, Part Five). 
Despite triumph and Medea's claims to the contrary, all is 
not well. A reversal 0£ the -first order has taken place. 
Ro wonder the Chorus 0£ Corinthian women. and we. are 
dismayed and con£used.155 
155 
att . Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge." p. 10, would 
kU~lbute the audience's confusion to the £act that, in the 
of ing of the children. they have witnessed •an inversion 
an expected tragic pattern." 
406 
T1'0: tart 
The Socratic Character 0£ Elenchos in Medea: 
Re£u ta tion, Recognition, .Aporia, and Escape 
In statements made by Medea•s Chorus o-f Corinthian 
one can see the same progression toward and through 
troJDen. 
· n witnessed in interlocutors 0£ the early Platonic 
refutatio 
41a1ogues: the Chorus go -from boast-ful con-f idence in the 
proposed de£inition to uncertainty and doubt. Although 
tber:e is some evidence that these women experience 
recognition and begin to grope -for a new truth, they end in 
aporia. The women o-f the Chorus are, a£ter all, the 
-
primary interlocutors in this would-be dialogue. They 
are, however, not the only ones in whom the progression 
through re-futation can be traced: Euripides shows traces 
of elenctic progression also in Medea, and, to a lesser 
extent, in Jason and Creon.156 
Medea, in short, serves a double role. In her -first 
role, she, along with the other main characters, mani-fests 
the proposed de-fini tions o-f arete, sophia, and eros. In 
her second role, however, Medea mani-fests some o-f the same 
aspects 0£ re-futation evident in the Chorus: uncertainty 
and doubt, and evidence 0£ some recognition. Medea, 
there-fore, by being both the de-finition and its 
refutation, illustrates the de-finition•s internal £allacy. 
156 . 
r The messenger who witnesses the deaths in the 
d~Yal house is likewise stricken to aporia; see the 
scussion below, this section. 
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can be said 0£ Jason and Creon, in whose £ates 
tfbe sa111e 
re•ersal 
es:J1il>i ted 
is evident. In Medea alone, however, is 
the one hallmark 0£ early Platonic interlocutors 
in Medea's primary interlocutors, the Chorus: the 
oot seen 
.iapdash solution 0£ escape. 
The Chorus, not being a££orded escape, exceed Medea as 
j,Dterlocutors because they must stay and labor toward 
truth, the terminus 0£ elenchos never witnessed in Plato's 
earlY dialogues. And al though Medea does not transcend the 
early dialogues• terminus in gaining the truth, the Chorus• 
willingness to grope £or it marks them as budding 
philosophers. They at one point realize, like Socrates, 
that they know only one thing: that they know nothing. 
Tb1S is quite a distance -from where they started. 
They started in general agreement with Medea. This 
auch was apparent -from their entrance at line 131, where 
their concern and sympathy are mani£est, and where they 
define themselves as -friends 0£ the house (137; c£. 178-
179, applied more speci£ically to Medea). Although they 
cannot at this point (152-154) understand or approve 0£ 
Kedea•s ~ (£or death), and consider her -foolish 
(tiaTala, 152) £or entertaining it, this is be ca use 
they have not yet been encouraged to acknowledge their own 
outrage at their endemic helplessness as women in the £ace 
o'f spousal in-fidelity and abandonment. For now they see 
•uch treatment as not remarkable (155-158). The Chorus are 
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more concerned to commiserate with Medea's woes 
at first 
support her in action (173-182): they do not even 
tJ:&aD to 
-· 
to consider taking action profitable or availing; to 
tile ir 
invariable victims• minds the best course is to trust 
gods (157-158). j.D the 
sut a£ter hearing Hedea•s assessment of her own and 
other women's position, the Chorus• general agreement 
J)ecomes £ull-fledged support of Medea, and they become 
bC)ast£ullY confident of their position as allies of Medea 
10 her intended action. They without hesitation agree to 
lteeP silent, and approve of Hedea•s plan to harm her enemy 
Jason (267-268). 
The £irst stasimon (410-445), recall, showed them 
upousing broadly but unmistakably the zero-sum ideology, 
the •us vs. them• division of the world into winners and 
losers. The tone of the stasimon is evident from the first 
strophe: the women intersperse strongly declarative 
present tense verbs (410-411; 419) with bold, predictive 
futures (418; 420). They obviously feel they know not only 
•hat is, but what will be. In the £irst antistrophe (421-
430) they confidently explain their previous status as the 
•ron11y oppressed: they hadn't the control of song 
afforded men. 
The second strophe (431-438) finds them briefly 
reviewing Medea•s history. The use of -ra.>.alva at 437 
(C'f. duoTav£ at 442) marks their sympathy with 
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•s degeneration 'from active determiner 0£ her £ate to 
11edea 
P
assive and helplessly dishonored; their transition in 
tile 
438 £rom previously active verbs to a passive one une 
signals their perception that Medea is 0£ course not 
responsible £or the status quo they subsequently describe 
iD the second antistrophe (439-445): oaths are gone, and 
so is aidos. Poor Medea is not to blame; how can she be? 
Sile is without home (441), has no place 0£ anchorage in a 
sea of woes (442-443), and is under the control 0£ another 
woman whose position is 'fixed as ruler of a bed once hers 
(•and another queen is set up in control 0£ the bed in your 
,.. . 
11ouse," TWV T£ >.eicTpwv KP£LOOWV 
60JJ.OLOLV 
, . 
£1f£OTa, 443-445). Jason, the oath breaker 
and shameless betrayer of his wife, and the unnamed 
princess whose exercise of control takes the manifestation 
of possessing the bed once belonging to Medea, are 
responsible. Medea is the victim with whom these women can 
identify, for before the vicarious moral victory afforded 
them by Medea's helplessness in the £ace 0£ obvious male 
treachery, they once were--but, thank god! no longer are--
one down. 
But later, after the women have witnessed the verbal 
contest between Jason and Medea, they admit for the £irst 
time a certain distaste £or one predictable aspect of the 
zero-sum game: strife arising between friends. "Terrible 
1a the anger and one hard to cure when friends engage in 
410 
,trife 
1u0La 1'05 
with 
lpLVt 520-521). 
friends." 
Cl 
OTQV 
(6El v.fi 
They, unlike Medea 
, . . 
OPY"I KQl 
(and strangely 
a utious Hurse, who hesitates openly to curse her the c 
like 
master and therefore philos, Jason, even though she foraier 
adDli ts be bas wronged his friends), seem unable to forget 
tnat in the relentless pursuit £or one•s own advancement 
friends are often discarded or betrayed and therefore 
))eCODle enemies. They take seriously the part of the creed 
that dictates that one help 'friends; this will soon 
contribute to the demise of the zero-sum definitions of 
arete, sophia, and eros they propound and defend. 
-
The beginnings of this demise can be -found in the 
second stasimon (627-662), though not until the end of the 
first strophe. Here the high con£idence of the first 
atasimon is continued as the women assert that eros can, in 
fact, as has been illustrated by Jason, bestow eudoxia and 
~. and that, as Medea's plight has shown, it is a 
dangerously unpredictable ally in this acquisition. Again 
the tone is, at least initially, one 0£ great sel£-
confidence and fully supportive 0£ the propounded 
definition, and yet, there is, by the first antistropbe, a 
note of uncertainty. 
The women•s uncertainty is marked first by a change 
fl'olll the indicative to the wist£ul optative. A£ter their 
b1-ash gnomic aorist 0£ the first lines (1fape6wKa v, 
411 
indicative mood appears again only in the last 
ez9), the 
which sports the boldly declarative 
antistrophe, 
of une 652., and the definitive future tense J601J.£V 
indicative in its final 
vurthermore, the ~.>..9oL of 
word >I (£0Tal, 662.). 
line 630, part 0£ a 
condition, is the only optative not expressing a wish. It 
1S clear that the Chorus accept certain things (like the 
usefulness yet danger of eros in the zero-sum game) as 
status quo, and yet, despite their acceptance, nonetheless 
wiSh for certain things to be otherwise. 
For example, beyond the Chorus• general mood 0£ 
uncertainty, they again give at least lip service against 
the strife endemic to the zero-sum game. In the -first 
antistrophe, they want nothing to do with the "disputatious 
wrath and unceasing strife" > I (aµ.•L.>..oyous > • opyas 
2 I I 
a1topeaTa T£ 
I V£lK'f), 637-638), with which they 
suspect Cypris of being able to beset one 1 s thumos. They 
further wish that she may with keen discrimination honor 
"beds not battle-scarred" > I (a 'll'To.>..£µ.ous 
) I 
euvas. 639). Furthermore, their desire for the favor 
Of moderation (aTepyoL I µ.£ aw•poauva, 635) in 
the first line 0£ the antistrophe, marks them as chary 0£ 
the excessiveness characteristic 0£ -fully committed 
competi tors.157 In £act, all of the above appear to 
157 Gouldner Enter Plato, 
filor-z, p. 4o. • 
p. 59, and Slater, 
412. 
d r cut their commitment to competition, and the second un e 
Phe/antistrophe pair adds more evidence £or the Chorus' stro 
ing doubts about the dictates 0£ the zero-sum game. grow 
The theme 0£ the last hal£ 0£ this ode, like the last 
Of the £irst ode, is the value 0£ connection to balf 
otbers, this time applied more personally to the Chorus 
themselves. As they sing the praises 0£ country and 
friends, the women take another notional step away £rom the 
complex de£inition of arete within the con£ines 0£ the 
zero-sum game. For al though competitors in the game claim 
to value helping £riends as much as harming enemies, as 
indeed does Medea later in the play (807-810), the game 
ttse1£, as Gouldner has argued, puts emphasis primarily on 
harming enemies, £rom whom victory in competition must be 
wrested. The Chorus here, in their song 0£ longing £or 
fatherland, home, and city, and their musings on the 
meaning 0£ having £riends, stress instead the worth 0£ 
connection, that £luid commodity in the zero-sum game. Can 
we then continue to posit the Chorus' initial avowal and 
defence 0£ the zero-sum competitor's de£ini tion 0£ arete, 
•hen they have so quickly begun to repudiate necessary 
aspects 0£ the game? 
We, in £act, can, £or in addition to the argument 
above (Part One), that the Chorus here £ight £or their only 
access to social respectability, the status as wi£e, they 
continue to cast their descriptions, both 0£ their imagined 
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e encounters with Cypris and their wistful musings on 
futur 
ily home, and friends, in competitive terms. fa JD • 
. allY they still are concerned to remain in control, 
sas1c ' 
are willing at least to ill-wish their enemies. and 
The first indication of their persistently adversarial 
standpoint is the terms by which they describe their 
iJDagined future encounters with Cypris.158 Hot only is 
she uncharacteristically described as sporting bow and 
arrow,159 but, as argued above (Part One), the 
encounter shows the Chorus imagining themselves in a 
position of helplessness, and this is a position no 
contender can abide. Cypris here is in control: with her 
weaponry she is envisioned as "having stricken the thumos• 
of her victim, and, by means of the disputatious wraths 
and insatiate strifes, •striking out against• her 
(8uµov > • t:Kll'l'fl~aoCaJ, 639; 11poopa.>.ot., 640). In 
addition, Cypris is depicted in the zero-sum contender's 
Y1ctorious role of having rational control over this 
emotional landscape: she is "clever /terrible" 
(deLva, 640), and the women describe her as 
Potentially "sharp-witted• 641) in her 
discernment. This first antistrophe, in short, is not for 
the women of the Chorus merely a wish to avoid stri£e; it 
158 
the . Oblander, Suspense, 
intended referent in the Y1ct· l.miza tion of lovers. 
p. 99, presumes Medea is 
Chorus" remarks about Cypris• 
159Page, Medea, p. 118, at lines 633-634. 
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t a d a wish to avoid strife with which they visualize J$ illS e 
lves helplessly assailed, at the hands of a superi-
tJ:LelDse 
armed, highly rational contestant. 
orlY 
ThiS interpretation is but tressed by the terminology 
of helplessness which invades the second strophe. As they 
i•agine themselves in Hedea•s current state of disconnec-
tion. the Corinthian women -foresee not only a pain£ul 
> , 
situation (axt:wv, 647), but one in which they are 
severely disadvantaged: the disconnected life is one 
without resources and is hard to get through (Tov 
dUO''lfEpa Tov >"" QLCaJV(aJ, 645-646)i 
death is now preferable to them, too, rather than such a 
state of helplessness (648-649)i loss of one•s fatherland 
is described as the worst hardship, and as that most 
helpless of states, bereavement (µ.ox9wv > OUK 
'II 
a Hos Cl U1f£p9t:V yas OTEp£o9aL, 650-
651). The women clearly despair of attaining for 
themselves the zero-sum contender•s isolation, but they 
despair of its practical disadvantages as much as its 
emotional deprivations. 
Furthermore, the Chorus are not yet willing to allow 
that they are at a loss, but instead insist on their 
enduring knowledge. They begin the second antistrophe back 
in the indicative, with 
knowledge, •we have 
a declaration of first-hand 
seen• 
>I (£Ldoµ.£V 1 653). They 
rem · . 
ain soll.dly on Hedea•s side, Medea, whom they describe 
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Suffering 
•• 
and unpi tied by city or £riend (655-656). 
!'bef ill-wish those who do not honor £riends, and end the 
ode bf proclaiming. with a strongly predictive £uture. that 
h a person will never be a £riend 0£ mine• (661-662). ••UC 
'!'he ill-wishing marks their enduring status as competitors 
iD two ways. First. ill-wishing a non-£riend is 
tantamount to the hope £or harm to be£all an enemy, which 
puts them squarely back into the £ray 0£ dealing out harm, 
at least notionally. So much £or their wish to avoid 
conflict. Finally. this particular ill-wish, •may he die 
without charm• 
> , (a xapla-ros 
which (balanced as it is by 
>I 
o>.ol9CEJ. 659) is 
the earlier >I t:uxapl5 
one 
0£ 
line 631 of the £irst strophe), wishes upon the non-£riend 
the worst 0£ all £ates £or a contender: to die without the 
l!"&Ce which can lead to good repute and arete. For the 
competitor, recall, does not prevail only by his strong 
ri1ht arm. Grace and good looks can bring victory.160 
The women end. then. wishing upon enemies what they 
themselves despair at su££ering, inability to attain one•s 
own advancement. 
It cannot be denied, however, that these same women 
have begun to display reservations about the competitive 
160se w· 
di e inkler. Constraints. pp. 77-79. and the scus . doe sion above, Part One. Keridor, •Medea 639." p. 97. 
and.s not sense the connection bet ween grace and reputation. 
1011 there£ore argues that line 631 "does not £ollow quite 
•tatcally upon the £irst part 0£ the bipartite introductory 
ement.• 
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The neat is rising, and they begin to move away 
its source. frOlll 
Like interlocutors made to sense £or the 
time the logical repercussions 0£ their belie£s, 
11rst 
•omen show discom£ort at one 0£ the prices paid by 
t11ese 
tile zero-sum competitor: the total alienation that is one 
of the game's most devastating and inevitable by-products. 
It is £or this reason .that the Chorus are able to take 
Solace in the ensuing interaction between Aegeus and Medea. 
J)espi te its undertow 0£ erotic manipulation (see above, 
Part one), the current 0£ the interaction between the two 
friends is one 0£ cooperation and help, not divisiveness 
and harm. The Chorus can thereby well-wish Aegeus along on 
bis journey (759-763), and they, like us, can experience 
aomentary re£uge £rom the competitive £ray. This is, 
however, merely the calm be£ore the storm, the moment in 
elenchos when the interlocutor, still clinging to his 
initial de£initions, has been lulled into believing that 
the analogies with which he has expressed agreement have no 
real bearing on the maintenance 0£ his thesis. Elucidating 
the analogies must wait £or the £inal sections 0£ this 
chapter. How, however, we must look to the Chorus' 
reaction as Medea, a£ter Aegeus exits (764-823), brings the 
definition 0£ arete supported by them to its emotionally 
repugnant yet inescapably logical conclusion: that she 
•ust k"l 1. l her own children--there is no other way (see 
above, Part One). 
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The Chorus• first reaction (811-813) is horror. They 
n
o waY of foreseeing the inevitability of this 
iia4 
solutiOD· Claiming a desire to help Medea, they try to 
cliSsuade her from this act, so far from human norms as it 
Their second reaction (816) is incredulity: "But will 
18· 
dare to Kill your own o:f:fspring, woman?" Their f OU 
reactions allow them a certain distance :from her; it is 
from this perspective that they again, in the third 
stasimon, define arete, eros, and sophia. And al though, as 
we shall see, ~ and sophia are once again subordinate to 
arete, the Chorus in their descriptions of the 
-----
interconnection among these three terms show a subtle 
shift in their thinKing. It will do well for us to recall 
that their third ode is sung in the spirit 0£ trying to 
help Medea. 
That ode, the Ode to Athens (824-865), is pivotal in 
the development 0£ the moti£s and images which serve as the 
play•s elenctic analogies, and there:fore discussion 0£ its 
full impact must be postponed :for the last two sections of 
this chapter. At this point, however, we may note that the 
Chorus• musings on the play•s three crucial terms puts them 
into a new and decidedly different context.161 
161This may explain why the ode is sometimes 
con · 
B Sl.dered a sort of escape for the Chorus. See, e.g., oneie "H · th • eroi.c Elements," p. 50. Ruth Padel, "'Imagery of 
e IUsewhere•· Two Choral Odes 0£ Euripides,• CQ n.s. 24 (19'14) • (Bi • Pp. 227-241, :finds in two other •escape odes• 
iii. :PP01Ytus 732-775 and Helen 1451-1511) "a reassertion 0£ 
e themes and problems 0£ the play in a di££erent and 
418 
wnereas before arete, eros, and sophia were always 
d in the arena of conflict, here they are 4ef ine 
. ipants in a cooperative milieu. Sophia makes its partlC 
ranee first as that by which the prehistoric Athenians 
appea 
were nourished K~£LVOTaTav 
826_8 29). This description, which renders sophia as 
sustenance for a whole society of undifferentiated humans, 
iS a far cry from its previous depiction--as a commodity to 
J>e 1Danipulated for individual advancement. Eros is also 
transformed and with even more subtlety. It 'first appears 
as the sensuously depicted Cypris, who busies herself not 
with advancing the position 0£ one individual over another, 
:but with drawing water and being pelted with flowers (835-
843). Then eros is the personified Erotes, who are 
likewise not involved in competition, but who do the 
flower-pelting and are described as •the assistants 
to Sophia, helpers toward all sorts 0£ arete• (Tp 
distant context• (p. 227). Furthermore, "This type 0£ ode 
· · · creates mythological and pictorial associations that 
lead to a lyric vision of the appropriate action, and 
reassembles motifs 0£ the play in a new mode, as a dream 
regroups the thoughts and events of the waking day.• (p. 
241). These comments have obvious relevance for the first 
strophe-antistrophe pair of the ode under discussion here. 
~f. the similar analysis of another Euripidean ode by 
,;orge B. Walsh, "The First Stasimon 0£ Euripides• 
28 lectra•,• YCS 25 (1977), pp. 277-289, especially pp. 281-
st 2 ~nd 288-289, where Walsh stresses the importance of the 
asimon•s world as a contrast to that 0£ the play. 
di . By contrast, Husurillo, "Reconsideration,• p. 60, 
_ smi.sses the significance 0£ this stasimon by remarking, QiUri ·d Ch Pl. es had long since abandoned the tautly relevant 
ora1 ode save for special · occasions.• 
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I > 11'av-ro\a5 ape-ras 
• 844-845). At £irst the nexus 0£ arete, 
,,,vf;pyous, 
~· 
and sophia seems to remain the same here: arete is 
t he ultimate goal, while eros and sophia are the still 
aides-de-camp. 
There is, however, a di££erence. That eros would be 
an assistant is not surprising, £or we 
:tiave heard Jason describe Cypris, i£ not with this word, in 
broadly the same terms (526-528). Furthermore, as Winkler 
:tias noted in his study 0£ magical papyri, the word 
is used to describe the all-purpose 
serviceableness 0£ eros throughout the competitive 
structure.162 Here, though, eros is imagined as the 
assistant to sophia, not to the person seeking an 
edge.163 Elsewhere in the play we have seen eros set 
off against sophia, as i£ eros were something which had to 
be kept in control, and the controller were sophia. 
It is di££erent here. First, the description is 
overwhelmingly sensual. The Chorus engage our sense 0£ 
•iCht with •most brilliant air• (829-830) and •golden 
Harmony• (834), 0£ touch with •moderate breezes• (839-840), 
of smell with •sweet-breathing breezes" (840) and the 
162Winkl er, Constrain ts, p. 79. 
ac 
163Foley, •Divided Sel£,• p. 83. Foley, however, 
de c~ra_tely cautions against taking this idealistic 
ab:iction too optimistically: "· . . yet Athens itsel£ is 
Ut to be visited by Medea .... • 
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e t-smelling" •stte 
rosebud wreath (843). Such sensual 
r 1. ption will 4esc 
only occur one other time in the play: 
d a caresses her children £or the last time. trben Ke e 
There is, in addition, an the overriding spirit 0£ aid 
and cooperation that pervades the ode, and casts arete, 
· •s and sophia in a totally di££erent light.164 And 
~· 
although the Chorus are unable to bring new definitions to 
es:plici t -formulation, the sense one gets 'from their use 0£ 
tbe three terms suggests the beginning 0£ a complete 
realignment, away 'from autonomy and competition, and toward 
connection and cooperation. Later analysis (below, Parts 
Four and Five) will bolster what here is presented as a 
mere suggestion 0£ this realignment. 
The second strophe/antistrophe pair continues the 
suggestion 0£ realignment 0£ values in two ways: 'first, 
the Chorus betray a new uncertainty; second, their 
alienation -from Medea is unmistakable. Their uncertainty 
is obvious -from the series 0£ questions they ask (846-850; 
856-862); again, this is a -far cry 'from the sel£-con£ident 
brashness 0£ the first ode: How then will this city 0£ 
holy rivers receive Medea? How will the land, safe escort 
of friends, contain her, the child-murderer? How will she 
let the boldness 0£ mind either £or hand or heart to 
el 164So Wol££, "Euripides," p. 241: "All the 
h enaents that in the play produce destructive conflicts are 
~r: integrated and beneficent: wisdom, 'fame, traditional 
e ry, passion, heroic achievement, and excellence." 
421 
clever /terrible daring for the child-
How will she be able to look at her 
d en and tearlessly proceed with their murder? cbil r 
what, in fact, all their questions amount to, is: How 
can thiS be true? The Chorus' uncertainty and incredulity 
a regular feature of the interlocutor's reactions in are 
!!enc hos. The women's only recourse is to predict, 
)lopefully, that Medea will not be able to go through with 
tile murder when the time actually comes (862-865). It is 
tlleir only way of salvaging de£initions which are sel£-
destructing before their very eyes. 
Clearly, if Medea can kill her own children, the 
Cllorus' definition of arete, and along with it the 
definition of its helpmates, eros and sophia, must undergo 
severe revision, simply because these women can no longer 
approve 0£ Medea's actions. And that they can no longer 
approve is evident from their imprecations that she 
consider what she is about to do, and their figurative 
supplication 0£ her not to proceed as planned (851-855). 
It is the 'first time they have disagreed with Medea's 
actions, and thereby with the definitions those actions 
represent.166 It is ironic that they, who have so 
1651 adopt Page 1 s solution 
this line; see Page, Medea, pp. 
for the difficulties 
135-136 at lines 856 f£. 
166 Cb. Buttrey, "Accident,• p. 9, argues that the 
f orus' attitude a£ter this point is reversed to sympathy 
or Jason. 
in 
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tlY insisted upon standing by £riends, must now 
_.,eadfas 
stand against her, but they supplicate her with 
talte a 
even as they imagine in the last antistrophe the 
•ords, 
cnildren's (vain, although the Chorus are unaware 0£ this) 
l actual supplication 0£ their mother (863). For the fiDa 
cnildren will con£ront, despite the Chorus' prediction 
otiierwise, a mother who remains true to the de£ini tion 0£ 
rete her actions represent, whose thumos is un£altering !---
(&65), even when murdering her own o££spring. 
The Chorus come to this realiza tion--tha t the 
4e£inition 0£ arete they have openly approved does, in 
fact, include emotionally repugnant corollaries--during the 
ensuing episode between Jason and Medea. Their only 
interjection (906-907) shows the beginning 0£ this 
realization, £or they admit that they, too, are beginning 
to weep and express the--what must appear even to them--
Tain wish that things may not get worse than they now are. 
But as the episode draws to a close and Medea has 
succeeded (though with great di££iculty; see lines 899-
905), as the zero-sum competitor must, in keeping her 
emotions in line with the accomplishment 0£ her goal, and 
has sent the children out with the poisoned garments, the 
Chorus sing the £ourth and last regular167 stasimon 
l67E11 · Po. iott, Medea, p. 92 at lines 976 ££. The fi~nt may be important when we consider that the Chorus' 
in t 1 observations are £rom the perspective 0£ the reversed 
er1ocutor. 
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Ol) remarkably different (9'16-10 • 
•P1r1ts 
evident in the :first. 
in tone :from the high 
The double anaphora in this :fourth stasimon"s :first 
uoes. 
longer no longer" 
> I ( o u u: ·n 
olJ1t£'1'L, 976-977), and "She will receive she 
receive" 978-979), 
1>etrays the numbness the Chorus :feel as they own the 
consequences o:f the definitions they have espoused. Such 
numbness is common to interlocutors at the moment o:f 
reversal. But it is primarily in the Chorus" resignation 
and their despair that one can detect the dawning o:f their 
reversal. 
They now admit that the hope they had--that Medea 
would not be able to go :forward with her plan--is gone. By 
sending the children o:f:f with the gifts, Medea has set o:f:f 
a chain o:f reactions that will lead to the children "s 
death, one way or the other. For either the Corinthians 
•ill kill them in revenge (so much even Jason expects; see 
lines 1301-1305), or Medea herself will--this much is 
certain, given the rules o:f the game the principals in this 
Play are so proficient at playing.168 The Corinthian 
168Kichelini, "Reophron," pp. 121-124, discusses 
the ef'fect on Euripides" play 0£ an earlier mythical 
~radition, in which the Corinthians kill Medea"s children 
1~ revenge_ :for the royal murders. Michelini sees lines 58-1063--in which Medea :first decides to take the C~ldren to Athens with her, then reverses her decision and ~:ims that since in any case the children must die, she 
a 0 bore them will kill them--as concluding in an illogical 
nd Perverse cooperation o:f Medea"s conflicting personae: 
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begin their song with the simple and pathetic 
•0111en 
nouncement: "How there are no longer any hopes le£t me 
pro 
children to live, no longer; £or they proceed for the 
d to the slaughter.• This is a statement 0£ a1rea Y 
r sal 0£ acknowledging the inevitability 0£ something reve • 
-omen £ind intolerable. As they sing, it is obvious the ... 
that the success Medea will gain is a bitter one, not the 
long anticipated moment 0£ glory the women initially sang 
of in the £irst ode. The mood, somber and regret£ul 
throughout, is the exact opposite 0£ that -first ode, with 
its crowing sel£-assurance and high hopes £or the -future. 
As the reversal 0£ de-finitions begins to take shape, 
the old hard and -fast lines between 'friend and enemy, the 
•us vs. them• ethic that drives the whole contest system, 
break down. Suddenly these women empathize with everyone 
involved: the princess (whom they twice describe as 
6uaTavos., 979 and 988), Jason (Ta>.av, 991; 
6uaTavt:, 995), and Medea (Ta>.alva, 996). Ho 
one here is named; instead, all three (£our, including the 
Children, who are unnamed here as throughout the play) are 
described tellingly by their marital and familial 
connections to each other. The princess is "bride" (she, 
:other and hero. This is a compelling insight, but I 
llan4not agree with Michelini
1s interpretation (p. 122) that 
e ea1s l - , 
ch. c aim that "in any case (1tavTw5)• the 
O-f l~dren _must die •strongly suggests ... that the death 
Will he Children is determined by £actors other than the 
Of Kedeia.• 
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children, is admittedly otherwise also unnamed; 
11J<.e tbe 
,rul'•a' 
avvt:uvetJ, 
•busband" 
978; 
1001); 
,001); Medea, 
c:f. 
Jason is the 
pathetically, 
>.exE:wv, 999, and 
"unhappy groom• and 
, 
991, and VOOLS, 
is •mother• 998). 
BY expressing only the relatedness o:f the princess, 
Jason, and Medea to each other, and by joining them each, 
stropbe by antistrophe, in the same web o:f horror the 
Chorus themselves are vicariously experiencing, the 
Corinthian women not only signal the beginning 0£ the 
reversal o:f the old creed separating :friends and enemies, 
they signal the beginning 0£ a new kind 0£ knowledge: that 
the apparent rugged autonomy 0£ the zero-sum competitor is 
counter-factual. Here, in this ode, as in real life, all 
humans are bound by their misery and mortality. There is 
no •us• and "them" o:f the :first ode. 
By having the women express their sympathy :for the 
princess and Jason as well as :for Medea, Euripides sets a 
tone which continues into the next episode. The horror at 
•hat is inevitably resulting :from the established 
definitions, and the regret that it must be so, extend the 
reversal beyond this ode and these women to the next 
episode, where it reaches its culmination in Medea 1 s 
struggle to bring her plan to :fruition. 
In this episode, Medea takes up the tone 0£ horror and 
re1ret as she reacts to the news the Messenger :first 
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that the gi£ts have been delivered and the 
. en reprieved £rom exile. This should, like 
cJJ.1ldr 
letion of earlier steps toward the success of her plan, colDP 
l>t! a time of boastful exultation. We have seen her react 
a
fter her success with Creon (366-385) and Aegeus (764-
so 
'189)· we shall see this Medea again shortly, as she gloats 
over the deaths 0£ the princess and Creon (1127-1128; 
u34_U35). But here, as Medea £alters when she 
contemplates her permanent severance from the children, 
suripides shows us the emotional unacceptability of the 
logical consequences of the definition of arete Medea~s 
actions represent. For instead 0£ gloating, Medea now 
twice groans her despair: 
> ..... QlQl. > ..... QlQl 
(1008 and 1009). 
The Messenger, who is confused at her reaction, asks 
what is the matter, only to hear in her repetitive "You 
have reported what you have reported" of> 
,, 
'IYYEL>.as, 1011), her numbness at the news. Recall that 
the Chorus betrayed a similar numbness in their repetitions 
at 976-977 and 978-979. Euripides has, in fact, fashioned 
an entwined reversal and recognition of the Chorus and 
Medea: the Chorus lead in certain reactions, Medea in 
others. 
Medea shows the same despair and resignation as the 
Chorus. Again, these are not the reactions of one 
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a long-awaited goal. She pities hersel£169 
t
be Chorus pitied her and the princess and Jason: 
as 
refers to hersel£ as duo-ra~aL va (102.8), 
(1032.), and Ta~av (1057). She 
despairs, as did the Chorus, 0£ her own lost hopes: she 
will never see ber children grow up or have them tend to 
)1er in ber old age (1032.-1037). And yet, as were the 
corintbian women, Medea is resigned that this must be 
50:170 tbeY will, indeed, die (1038-1039); the 
princess has already dressed in the poisoned gi£ts and set 
off tbe chain 0£ reactions that will lead to the children 1 s 
deaths (1064-1066). 
Medea likewise shows a recognition 0£ the value 0£ 
connection as did the Chorus, but hers is a much more 
physical and much more personal recognition than their 
notional and more philosophical one. Medea, experiencing 
the physical proximity 0£ the children, twice exults in the 
Joys of connection to them. At 1040-1048, she nearly 
169nunkle, "Aegeus Episode,• p. 102., argues for 
Medea's sel£-pity as evidence 0£ her "sel£-obsession• and 
considers her to be lacking in love £or her children. One 
can protest, however, that sel£-pity is a regular -feature 
Of loss. 
t 170Reck£ord, "First Exit," pp. 355-356, argues 
t:at H_edea's resignation to the inevitability 0£ killing 
~ Ch1ldren is a result 0£ her entrapment in su££ering, 
Which is a result 0£ her extraordinary alienation £rom her 
c~njuga1 -family. Hotional alienation is inherent in the 
s a~us 0£ wi£e as •stranger" (9upa'los.). It is this 
n~tiona1 alienation that -forces Medea literally "outside" 
: k2l4; her extraordinary alienation in turn -forces her to 
a e revenge as the only •way out." 
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s her plans when they look. into her eyes and laugh 
renounce 
in childish joy. She momentarily chooses connection over 
competitive autonomy and even plans to take the children 
Y with her so as to preserve her connection to awa 
thelD,171 acknowledging the pain it would cost her to 
iose them. Again, at 1069-1075, she calls them back. to 
ner, takes their hands and kisses them, speaks of their 
liPS and again of their eyes, experiences their sweet 
embrace, soft skin, and their childish--sweetest of all!--
1>reath. 
These two moments between Medea and her children, 
laden as they are with experience of the physical, are 
sensuously if not erotically cast. Medea's reactions to 
171The illogic of Medea's not taking the children 
to Athens, and her implication that not killing them means 
leaving them for her enemies to kill (1060-1061), have 
encouraged scholars to argue for excising some or all of 
lines 1056-1080. J. Diggle, Euripidis Fabulae, Vol. 1 
{Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984; reprint ed. with 
corrections, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 138-139, 
encloses all the lines in square brackets. A recent review 
of the history of the debate on these troubled lines, and a 
persuasive argument for retaining them, may be found in 
Seidensticker, "Medea 1056-80," pp. 89-96. Cf. also Gustav 
A. Seeck., "Euripides Medea 1059-68: A Problem of 
Interpretation,• GRBS 9 (1968), pp. 291-307, who proposes 
excising 1060-1063 ~solve the problem of the illogical 
Progression of Medea's decision; David Kovacs, •on Medea's 
Great Monologue (E. Med. 1021-80)," CQ 36 (1986; hereafter 
l:ovacs, "Great Monologue"), pp. 343-352, argues on 
stylistic grounds for retaining with minor correction all 
but 1056-1064. 
For Medea•s decision as illogical synthesis of her 
~:nflicting personae, see Michelini, "Reophron,11 pp. 122-
4· McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 57-59, argues that Medea 
~lnPloys a self-serving delusion here, because her decision 
~s only valid "in an offbeat sense, given the mythic 
raditions.• 
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nildren engage all 0£ the senses: she hears the sound 
11er c 
h eir laughter, sees the brightness 0£ their eyes, £eels of t 
i ups embrace, and so£t skin, and smells the sweet the r • 
t o£ their breath. We linger with her in these taS e 
17 2 
180 1Dents. 
But, in the end, the sensuous joys 0£ physicality--
iaughter, bright eyes, sweet breath, and so£t skin--must 
not win out. Sweet thoughts are dead (1036), words must 
not be so£t (1052); the joys 0£ the presence 0£ children 
(1058) lose out to the thumos, that organ which "includes 
all those emotions which have to do with sel£-
esteem."173 In short, the erotic comes under control 
of the mind, ever calculating to assure the predominance 
of the autonomous competitor. Despite her attempts to stop 
her thumos (1056)--the urge to sel£-assertion--Medea 
nonetheless chooses domination over her enemies, which has 
driven her by turns in this scene (see above, Part One), 
and once again puts her deliberation £irmly under the 
control 0£ her thumos. This is not the reign 0£ emotion, 
alas, but "total commitment rationality" writ large.174 
1721 cannot agree with Gellie, "Character,• p. 20, 
Who considers that Medea's momentary rejections 0£ the plan 
to murder her children are • meant only to tease us.• 
173IUliot, Medea, p. 94 at lines 1078-1080. 
H 174Pace Bongie, "Heroic Elements,• p. 52, to whom 
edea•s thumos is her heroic passion that overcomes her 
~:ason. "The heroes 0£ Greek tragedy are not reasonable; 
v· ey are undeniably and magni£icently unreasonable . • 
_lde contra Seidensticker, "Medea 1056-80," pp. 96-97, £or 
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tton would 
•• 0 
•edea abruptly 
have let the children live.175 Instead, 
dismisses them (1053)--no more physical 
·initY for her!--and becomes the epitome of the zero-sum proS1 
antithesis of passion and reason as artificial. 
tile Kedea•s dangerous •passion• has, however, been so 
rstressed in the critical literature that it is 
o•;ftcult not to exaggerate her rationality to make the 
di int. For an antidote to viewing passion as a danger, see 
iabert c. Solomon, The Pa~sions: The Myth and Rature 0£ 
euman Emotions (Garden City, RY: Anc~or Press/Doubleday, 
1976; reprint ed., Rotre Dame, IR: Univ. of Rotre Dame 
press, 1983), p. 120: "Without the guidance of the 
passions, reasoning has neither principles nor power. Cut 
off from our 'sentiments,• we can justify or show that one 
cannot justify anything. Hume made this point powerfully 
but brutally when he insisted that it was not 'irrational 1 
(that is, against the dictates of reason) for him to prefer 
tile slaughter 0£ a hundred thousand Orientals to the 
pricking of his little finger. Reason makes contact with 
human values only through the passions. It is only a 
particular form of reason--objecti ve reasoning--tha t is 
free of personal values and passions." 
One cannot, of course, separate emotion from reason 
es:cept theoretically; a very balanced discussion of the 
folly of doing so can be found in Solomon 1 s introduction, 
pp. 1-25. Solomon•s view of the interrelation of emotions 
and self-identity is thought-provoking: "It is the goal of 
Self-esteem that motivates our actions, our inquiries, and 
--most importantly--our passions. Self-esteem is the 
ultimate goal of every passion .... Our emotions, to put 
the matter bluntly, are nothing other than our attempts to 
establish and defend our self-esteem.• (pp. 96 and 99). 
The success of a zero-sum competi tor 1 s self-promotion, 
however, is largely if not entirely dependent upon the 
opinions of others, upon which Solomon claims •self-esteem• 
is not dependent. (p. 99). The inability of pre-literate 
individuals to formulate self-analysis (see Ong, Orality, r6P· ~4-55, following Luria, Cognitive Development, pp. 144-0) is perhaps at issue here. 
34 .
175Reckford, •First Exit,• pp. 334-335 and 340-
i 3, is excellent on the alienation of emotion and 
nteUect as Kedea 1 s tragedy; he sees Kedea•s "inhuman 
•elf-mastery• as •a kind of suicide.• Oblander, Suspense, 
::· 1_43-1~1, is convincing on the psychological de~~i.nations of the loving mother that underlie the cold 
sions of the competitor. 
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ti tor, willing at any cost to ensure her reputation as 
colDPe 
..,ictorious contender. 
tJle 
For despite Medea•s apparent victory over her enemies, 
a
ssured, there remains her unmistakable recognition of 
no• 
reversal and defeat. This takes place in the much-
discussed lines 1078-1081: 
In fact I understand what sort of harm I intend to do, 
but the urge to self-assertion176 has control over 
my considered deliberation, which urge, is the. cause of 
the greatest harm for mortals (Kal µ.av9avw 
µ£v ofa dpav IJ,EAAW KaKa, 9\JIJ,05. d£ 
KP£taawv -rwv ~µ.wv Pou>..euµ.a -rwv, ga 11'£P 
µ£Yl0"'1'WV aLTlOS. KQKWV ppo-ro'i:"s.). 
Does this translation correctly interpret these lines? 
The controversy over lines 1078-1080 is one that will 
perhaps never be resolved; especially when it is possible 
that ambiguity was Euripides• intent.177 One more 
discussion will not end the controversy; yet judicious 
choices must be made to try to understand these lines. It 
is my belief that the above choices about key words, all of 
them supported by previous scholars, are justified by the 
use of these words elsewhere in the play and by the 
interpretation of the play advanced in this study. 
176see Michelini, "Reophron,11 p. 132, who 
describes the thumos Medea addresses as "the product of an 
a11ressive self-assertion that can lead to much 
Unhappiness." 
177 See Michelini, "Reophron,11 pp. 115-136, 
;specially pp. 128-136; cf. Foley, "Divided Self," p. 72. 
a ee also Ohlander, Suspense, pp. 156-160, for the ambiguity 
t~ a way of maintaining the audience•s hopes (and, given 
Ch 9:1threat of Corinthian vengeance, £ears) on the l. dren•s behalf. 
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' disputed words are euµ.os. KPElOOWV, and 
fJou>-e:tJIJ.Ct -rwv 0£ line 1079, and, to a lesser extent, 
' 
,... 
• o£ line l'aveo vw 1078, and Ka Ka and KOK WV 
l ·nes 1078 and 1080. of 1 Here I intend to consider each 0£ 
e words in turn, to review the most relevant scholar-thes 
shiP on each, to look to their use elsewhere in the play, 
and to reconsider their meaning in light 0£ the rules 0£ 
the zero-sum game and the thesis that an elenchos is in 
process here. 
0£ the £our disputed words, thumos undoubtedly gives 
the most trouble, because 0£ its apparent re£eren t: a 
mental or psychological phenomenon. What exactly the 
thumos is, i.e., what it does and how it was imagined to 
function, is a question which in scholarship is not always 
separate £rom its relevance to the debate over these 
lines.178 Bruno Snell, in 1948, was the £irst to try 
to clari£y the meaning 0£ thumos by contrasting thumos with 
psyche and noos. Snell begins pro£i tably enough by 
claiming that •[t]hymos in Homer is the genera tor 0£ motion 
or agi ta ti on . • He subsequently reduces the 
translation 0£ the term to an •organ o'f (e)motion• and 
178
see e.g., £or a transition between Snell's ~reatment of. Homeric use and later considerations 0£ 
.:ripides• use 0£ the term, William G. Thalmann, 
P eschylus• Physiology 0£ the Emotions,• AJP 107 (1986), p. 494-511. --
433 
i lllS tbiS cl• 
renders the matter "simple enough."179 He 
ot nowever, stop there; the parentheses around the 
does n ' 
all too easy to dispatch, and dispatch them he 
•e• are 
If, as we have suggested, thymos is the mental organ 
1'hicb causes (e)motion, while noos is the recipient of 
illlages, then noos may be said generally to be in 
charge of intellectual matters, and thymos 0£ things 
emotionai. 180 
A].tbough Snell admits some overlap between noos and thumos, 
and acknowledges that "thymos may also serve as the name 0£ 
a function, in which case we render it as 'will' or 
'character• ,• the idea of thumos as emotion stuck 
with him; in a later discussion181 he discards his 
initially cautious translation of thumos as "agitation, 
passion" £or "passion" over against bouleumata, which he 
renders as "reason."182 Snell's understanding of these 
two terms may be fuller than the black-and-white, 
179snell, Discovery, 
publication was titled Die 
same year Snell published 
p. 9. The original 1948 
Entdeckung des Geistes; in the 
his provocative "Zeugnis." 
180snel1, Discovery, p. 12. Cowherd, "Ending,• 
PP. 131-132, seems to follow Snell in seeing th umos as 
emotion, despite her re£inemen t that th umos undergoes 
trans-formations •from love [8] to lamentation (108) to hate 
<310) to murder (865) " 
181 t Snell, Scenes. On p. 50 n. 3, Snell indicates 
hat this discussion supersedes that -found more briefly 
sketched in his 1948 "Zeugnis." 
182
snen, Scenes, pp. 52 and 55. 
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cucnotomous terminology suggests,183 but this dicho-
:nas nonetheless been influential in the critical 
tolllY 
a ture on Medea. For although not all hold that 11ter 
t1edea's con£lict is between •passion• and •reason• per se, 
e lement 0£ the irrational is usually considered to win 5 0111e 
the day in her decision.184 
It was not until 1987 that G. R. Stanton's convincing 
objection was raised against interpreting t.humos as 
•passion,• which wrenched Medea's decision £rom the 
stranglehold irrationality had had on it for so 
iong.185 Stanton looked to the context of the passage 
183e.g., Snell later states (p. 56) that "The 
inner impulse which drives Medea forward is the rebellion 
of the heart against a deep injury which Jason has done 
her. Her passion, which springs from just indignation, is 
element.al in its dimensions . . . .• 
184see, for example, Albin Lesky 1 Greek Tragic 
Poetry, trans. M. Dillon (Hew Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 
1983), p. 2.2.7, •rt is clear that. 8us.ios represents 
irrational emotion, .•; H. Diller, •euµ.os dE 
1tpt:taawv Twv E:µ.wv pou.>.t:uµ.aTwv,• Hermes 94 
(1966; hereafter Diller, •euµ.05,"), p. 2.7 4, who 
translates the line, •[Heine) Leidenscha £t Herr iiber 
[metne] Plane ist.•; Schlesinger, •zu Medea,• p. 2.9: "Das 
wort 9uµ.os hat. hier sicher sch on die Bedeu tung: 
Leidenscha£t, leidenschaft.liches Temperament . . . . •; D. 
J. Conacher, Euripidean Drama, p. 196, is slightly more 
moderate in calling 1079-1080 •a victory . . . of all-
consuming passion for vengeance over her better counsels.• 
Christopher Gill, "Did Chrysippus Understand Medea?" 
Phronesis 2.8 (1983), pp. 136-149, especially 142. ff., is 
convinced that passion and reason operate on both sides 0£ 
Medea's dilemma. Gill's -footnotes, passim, are use£ul in 
identifying positions taken in the passion-reason 
controversy by various scholars. 
185G. R. Stant.on, "The End 0£ Medea's Monologue: 
Euripides, Medea 1078-1080,• RhK 130 (1987; herea£ter 
Stanton, "Medea's Monologue"), pp. 97-106. 
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11 as the validity 0£ other scholars
1 solutions to 
as we 
S lating kreisson and bouleumata, and concluded, tran 
iS not the seat 0£ so£t emotions such as 
IDotberlY love, but the strong £orce in Medea which drives 
ner to assert hersel£."186 In the same year, Gail Ann 
Rickert discussed the tendency to simpli£y thumos and, in 
tbe process, got to the heart 0£ modern misgivings about 
Medea's thumos: 
Since thumos is at the center 0£ the passage under 
discussion, it is important to be aware 0£ the 
tendency to reduce it to less complex concepts, or, 
more precisely, to concepts which in £act are no less 
complex, but with which we are more com£ortable: 
£eelings or emotion. . . . 
The overgeneraliza tion and reduction 0£ th umos to 
•passion" (Leidenscha£t) obscures its complexity, 
especially the principles with which thumos, including 
Medea's thumos, are inextricably bound up, namely, the 
heroic principles 0£ harming enemies, helping £riends, 
not submitting to dishonor, injustice, insults, or the 
mockery 0£ one 1 s enemies. All 0£ these principles 
have been acknowledged to play a central role in 
Medea's action and tragedy. This reductionism, 
combined with a moralizing tendency to see passion as 
evil and in con£1ict with reason, which is good, is at 
the center 0£ many unsatis£actory interpretations 0£ 
this drama.187 
Then in 1989, Helene Foley agreed with Stanton and Rickert: 
... it is better to categorize thumos in the 
monologue not as "irrational passion" or •rage" but as 
a capacity located in Medea that directs her to act, a 
"heart• that can (or at least pretends to itsel£ that 
it can) choose to side either with the arguments 0£ 
the revenger or the arguments 0£ the mother (although 
it is predisposed to the £ormer).188 
186
stanton, "Medea 1 s Monologue," p. 106. 
187Rick.ert, "Ak.rasia,• pp. 99-100. 
188Foley, "Divided Sel£,• p. 71. 
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It seems possible, then, to translate thumos broadly 
•motivator,• which, ironically, comes close to Snell•s 
as 
earlier, more cautious renderings. But is it valid to 
particularize this to •urge to sel£-assertion• suggested 
a1>ove? Yes, i£ we look to the use 0£ thumos in this 
play.189 Besides the line in question, there are eight 
other uses 0£ thumos, and three uses 0£ the verb 
Two 0£ these attribute to thumos Medea•s 
ability to execute the murder: at 865 the Chorus assert 
that Medea will not be able to murder her children •with 
unfaltering thumos•; at 1056 Medea pleads with her thumos 
not to kill the children. Since Medea•s stated purpose, 
both to the Chorus and to hersel£, £or killing the children 
was to put herse1£ above her enemies, it is sa£e to assume 
that self-assertion is operational here. 
Five 0£ the remaining uses re£er to actions 0£ Medea 
other than killing the children: at lines 6 ££. the Hurse 
notes Medea•s being •struck with eros in her thumos• as the 
precursor of her leaving home, persuading Pelias• daughters 
to kill him, and becoming Jason•s wi£e; at 106 f£. the 
Rurse anticipates a "cloud 0£ lamentation• which "will rise 
up anew with a greater thumos• in Medea, which makes the 
Rurse, Who describes Medea as •high-spirited, hard-to-
Check• (IJ.Eya>.oov>.ayxvos duoKaTa'll'auoTos), dread what 
ov ~89Foley, "Divided Sel£,• pp. 
erv1ew of thumos in all Euripidean 
arr· ive at her slightly less speci£ic 
69-70, gives an 
plays and £ragments to 
rendering of the term. 
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t1edea will do; at 271 Creon, upon entering, describes Medea 
S
ullen, with thumos roused against her husband--in this 
as · 
ust be re£erring to the threats he has heard she has 
11e ID 
aaade against Jason; at 879 Medea attributes her previously 
unreasonable, non-cooperative attitude toward Jason and his 
new 1Darriage to her thumos; at 883 Jason praises the newly 
cooperative Medea £or not £oolishly rousing her thumos in 
ya in. In short, in all 0£ these instances, Medea's thumos 
iS the acknowledged origin 0£ action against others taken 
to advance or protect her own interests.190 
The £inal £our uses also show th umos as an organ 0£ 
self-assertion: at 310 Medea attributes Creon's giving his 
daughter to Jason as an act where his thumos led him; at 
455 Jason describes how he tried to arrange £or Medea •s 
staying when Creon's thumos was roused; at 639 the Chorus, 
seemingly in re£erence to Jason•s bed-hopping, prays that 
Cypris will not, through stri£e and wrath, drive their 
l90There are, in addition, rive instances 0£ 
compounds 0£ thumos applied to Medea, none 0£ which 
disprove the proposed de£inition 0£ thumos: at 91 and 691, 
•he i~ described as duo9uµouµE:vti and experiencing 
6uoeuµLas., both the result 0£ Jason•s treatment 0£ 
her~ at 176 the Chorus wish she would give up her 
llapueuµov opyav at Jason's treatment 0£ her; at :l9 and 485, Creon and Medea respectively relate Medea's 
f1"umos to her sophia, which is shown to be, as elsewhere 
n the Play, properly the agent 0£ the thumos in 
competition: Creon asserts that it is easier to guard 
aca · , • p i.nst an o~u9uµos person than a silent, sophos 
Ter;son; Medea laments that she, in 'following Jason, was 
.:0 e~1.1os. µa>..>.ov ~ oo•wTepa, i.e., using her ex~~l.a_ to advance his interests rather than tending 
usi. Vely to her own. 
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05 to other beds; at 1152 Jason urges the princess to ~-
1eased £rom her th umos so that she can consider her 1>e re 
b and's -friends her £riends. Again, the thumos is what ?iUS 
operates to assert one's own interests over against those 
of others; release £rom the thumos' control signals 
cooper a ti on with the interests 0£ others.191 
In line 1078, then, the disputed line, Medea can be 
argued to be acknowledging the control 0£ her thumos, her 
urge to sel£-assertion. For indeed, whether we translate 
Kreisson as •stronger than• or •master 0£, in control 0£1 • 
the meaning 0£ the line is nearly the same. In 1966, Hans 
Diller argued £or the latter two meanings.192 I£ we 
look to the text 0£ Medea, 0£ the seven uses 0£ kreisson 
outside 0£ line 1078, three (123, 290, 301) are best 
translated as the comparative 0£ aga thos, i.e., as 
•better"; two 0£ the remaining £our (315 and 449) can 
easily be argued to mean either "in control 0£• or 
•stronger"; one (965) is awkward i£ translated anything 
other than •stronger•; one (444), as Diller himsel£ 
argued,193 is impossible to translate as anything other 
l9lsee Wol££, "Euripides,• p. 239, £or thumos as 
•self." 
l92Diller, •auµ.05, 11 pp. 267-75. 
Subseqently supported by Stanton, "Medea's Monologue," pp. 
l00-101. C£. Shaw, •Female Intruder,• p. 263; Foley, 
•Divided Sel£,• p. 68 n. 30 and p. 71. 
1 Vide contra M. D. Reeve, •Euripides, Medea 1021-080.• CQ n.s. 22 (1972; herea£ter Reeve, •Medea 1021-
1080•>. P: 59 n. 2, and :Kovacs, "Great Monologue,• p. 351 
n. 12. 
193Diller I "auµ.os.· p. 274. 
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t11an 
control 0£/master o£.•194 Given that 
d is aware enough 0£ this "obscure• meaning 0£ guriPi es 
·sson to use it in this play, there is, as 'far as I can 
~
195 no reason not to translate the kreisson of 1078 
see, 
•in control of/master of.11 In any case, the distinction 
1>etween •stronger than• and 11in control of/master of" for 
tJJ.iS 11ne•s translation is not apparent. 
The controversy over bouleumata is a product of the 
controversy over thumos and kreisson: as go thumos and 
kreisson, so goes bouleumata. For, i£ one is translating 
thumos as •passion• or some equivalent, and kreisson as 
•stronger than,• then bouleuma ta must re£er either to 
passion's perceived opposite, i.e., •reason,• or to Medea•s 
fleeting plans to save the children•s lives. But Albrecht 
Dihle has argued that bouleuma ta here can re£ er to nothing 
other than Medea•s plan to kill the children, since it is 
so used twice previously in the monologue (1044 and 
1048).196 Dihle's interpretation 0£ bouleumata, i£ not 
his understanding of the con£lict Medea undergoes, has 
194symposi um 
am grateful to John 
this passage. 
196d.2 offers a strong parallel. I 
Makowski for calling my attention to 
10 
1951 do not find the argument of Reeve, "Medea 
h
21
-l080,• p. 59 n. 2, convincing, since I cannot imagine 
• at his proposed translation of 444, •another queen SUpe · rior to your bed, 11 could possibly mean. 
5 
196 Albrecht Dihle, "Euripides• 
(Heidelberg, 1977; hereafter Dihle, 
Pp. 27-29. 
Medea,• SHAW 1977, 
11Euripides• Medea•), 
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upport197 and encouraged rethinking gained s 0£ the 
un 
. g 198 . . . 
e
's meanin , since one can in no wise propose a 
Onable argument in £avor 0£ thumos as "passion" or its re as 
equivalent, and kreisson as "stronger than" with Dihle 1 s 
1>ou1euma ta 
-
as "revenge plans" ringing in one's ears.199 
The use 0£ bouleuma ta and related words elsewhere in 
tbe play supports Dihle's interpretation; Foley lists other 
occurrences and notes that " . . . every other use 0£ 
~uleumata and bouleuo in Medea re£ers to a precise plan or 
change 0£ plans.11200 While I agree that bouleumata in 
line 1078 must refer to the plans to kill the children, I 
do not find a problem with leaving the translation of this 
word at "considered delibera tion,11 201 with the 
197see especially Ohlander, Suspense, pp. 156-163. 
198stanton, "Medea 1 s Monologue," pp. 103-106; cf. 
Foley, "Divided Self,• pp. 67-68. Vide contra Kovacs, 
•area t Monologue," p. 351 n. 12. 
199This did not stop Dihle himself from proposing 
that thumos is Medea's maternal instinct, and that line 
1078 is a red herring, in which Medea proclaims her 
decision to spare the children. See Dihle, "Euripides .. 
Medea,• pp. 12-13; c£. his "Euripides• Medea und ihre 
Schwestern im europaischen Drama," A&A 22 (1976; herea£ter 
Dihle, "Medea und ihre Schwestern"), p. 179. 
Cowherd, "Ending,• p. 132, who sees thumos as 
generalized emotion, argues that ta bouleumata must change 
from Plans to kill the children to plans to spare them. 
200see Foley, "Divided Self," p. 67 n. 24, where 
she also lists bibliography £or arguments in support of 
Dihle. 
b . 201see Schlesinger, "Zu Medea," pp. 29-30, whose 
G ri.e£ discussion of th umos in light of bouleuma ta ("die 
v edanken, die Erwagungen, die Planungen, die im Dienst 
erschiedener und sogar gegensa tzlicher Funk ti on en des 
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1'ledgement that, in this context, the word without 
ac1tno 
re£ers to plans to Kill the children. Euripides 
question 
e made Medea speaK quite explicitly here, but could nav 
cJlose not to. 
'l'be translation I propose, then, is supported in all 
Parts in the critical literature. Medea says, "Hy urge 1ts 
to self-assertion has control 0£ my considered 
deliberation," and as she maKes this statement, she chooses 
to relllain the zero-sum competitor she has been in all but a 
few fleeting moments,202 one who will put her success 
in competition above all else, who will jettison her 
emotional attachments so as to e££ect a rationally planned 
course 0£ action aimed at victory over all challengers. 
And yet, ironically, even as Medea announces her 
intent to carry out her plans, the struggle it took £or her 
to arrive at this decision reveals to the Chorus and 
audience that her victory is also a de£eat, that the 
logical consequence 0£ all her preceding actions is 
Seelenlebens stehen") avoids the usual pitfalls. C£. 
Rickert, "Akrasia,• p. 102, who argues that "bouleumata 
represents at most competing claims on Medea.• 
202ohlander, Suspense, p. 116, points out that 
harming children to get at their parents is Hedea"s modus 
Qperandi; she merely returns to her old method, but, this 
time, With di££iculty. See also McDermott, Incarnation, 
Pp. 81-93, who describes Hedea"s "mythic biography" as •a 
relentless campaign to violate the parent-child bond." (p. 
81). 
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eoaotionallY repugnant--even to her.203 Indeed, she 
as much as she delivers these troublesome lines, for 
safS 
. des announcing her decision she likewise acknowledges 
!)eSl 
defeat--her reversal--and an if only momentary )ler 
recognition: 
Oh soft skin and breath--sweetest of all!--of 
children. Go away! Go away! I am no longer able to 
look. at you, but am vanquished by harm (VlKwµ.aL 
KaKOLS)· In fact I understand (µ.aveavw) 
what harm (KaKa) I intend to do, but the urge to 
self-assertion has control over my considered 
deliberation, which urge is the ca use of the greatest 
harm (KaKWV) for mortals. (1075-1081). 
Previously, Medea only feigned being "vanquished" to 
gain an advantage over her enemies; at 315 she reassures 
Creon that she will remain silent, since she has been 
•vanquished by the stronger/those in control" 
(1tp£Laaovwv VlKwµ.evoL); at 912 Jason praises Medea's 
(phony) submission and cooperation, and describes her as 
•recognizing the prevailing plan" >I (eyvws 
.... 
vu:waav pou.>..fiv). Victory r igh tl y belongs 
to Kedea: the Hurse (44-45) expects Medea will prevail 
over her enemies, "Rot easily will anyone joining in 
enmity with her turn out beautifully victorious 
(1ta>.>.l.vLKov)•; Medea herself (764-765) gloats over her 
e][pected victory after talk.in.g with Aegeus, "Oh Zeus, and 
Justice of Zeus, and Ugh t of the sun, now I shall prove 
203Husurillo, "Reconsideration,• pp. 65, seems 
a~noyed at what he considers the needless wavering " 
• en the audience from the beginning is aware of what is to 
take Place.• 
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1>eauti£UllY victorious over my enemies (KaAAL VlKOl 
> ,.. 
eµwv 
> ..... 
ex9pwv)." "Being vanquished" is, 
reserved £or Kedea•s enemies, like the princess, whom tnen, 
the Messenger describes as •vanquished by mis-fortune• 
,.. 
(C1UIJ.•OPP 
I 
VlKWJ.LEV'I'), 1195). 
•Being vanquished" is not, to be sure, what the ever-
vigilant competitor, Medea, has worked to attain for 
nerse1£. Yet, at 1077-1081, she readily admits that she 
nerse1£ is "vanquished by kaka," and that she is about to 
do •kaka," 0£ which kaka her urge to sel'f-assertion is the 
-
cause. Does this mean that Medea is conscious 0£ being 
about to commit morally reprehensible acts? Most decidedly 
not.204 Instead, what these lines mean is that Medea 
has come to recognition of her own reversal: she knows 
that she is in the position she had hoped to visit upon 
others, the position 0£ having outrage committed against 
oneself and being able to do nothing about it, of being 
under the constraint of others instead of being self-ruled 
and ruling others. 
All this can be ascertained 'from the word Medea uses 
to describe what she is about to do: 
, 
KaKa. I have 
Chosen to translate this as "harm," instead of the more 
usual, morally-laden rendering, "evils" or "wrongs." The 
translation was chosen because, more o'ften than not in 
d ~o4~ Conacher, Euripidean Drama, p. 196, who 
escri.bes Medea a'fter her decision as "now totally 
colllllli t ted to evu.• 
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~· 
Kakos in its various mani£estations, but especially 
neuter singular and plural, can be de-fended as being 
111 tne 
used in the morally-neutral sense of "harm• or "hurt.• 
such. usage is at tested elsewhere, from archaic times 
tnrougb. the fi£th century 
notes that in Homeric usage, 
B. c.205 A. W. H. Adkins 
The neuter forms agathon and kakon have no such claim 
[i.e., to be moral terms, as do the masculine and 
feminine forms]: to say of an action 'it is aga thon 
{kakon) to do x• is simply to say that it is 
beneficial {harmful) to do X, without passing any 
moral judgement on the rightness or wrongness of 
x 2 0 6 
Adkins 'further argues that archaic age values persisted 
well into the sixth and fi£th centuries B. C.,207 and 
quotes as one of many examples Simonides• (5 Bergk) use of 
asathos and kakos as de£in1tions 0£ one who •fares well, eu 
prattein• or •fares badly, kakos.• Hore recently, C. w. 
Willick has made a convincing case for reading what are 
I 
s. v. tcatcos, B. 
206Adkins, Her it, p. 31. 
207 A. w. H. Adkins, however, claims in Horal 
Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece -from Homer 
to the End 0£ the Fi£th Century {Rew York: W. W. Horton 
and Co., Inc., 1972; hereafter Adkins, Horal Values), p. 
ll5, that, at least inso£ar as use 0£ terms like kakos 'from 
the negative end 0£ the continuum, a complete change in 
Yalues (i.e., from emphasis on competition to emphasis on 
~ooperation) is evident in Euripides and the later plays of 
B 0P~o~les. I am not convinced, especially in the case of 
~r1.p1.~es, who in Medea at least seems to use terms like 
- kos in their •older• senses to question the validity 0£ 
~ompetitive standards, which still held sway in Athens. 
{;e also E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational 
D ~rkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1971; herea£ter 
0 ds, Greeks and the Irrational), pp. 28-63. 
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regularly interpreted as ethical terms (kalos, kakos, and 
tbe like) in Euripides• Hippolytus as neutral terms 0£ 
success and £ail ure.208 
Kakos in Medea, then, need not connote moral wrong, 
1>ut instead resides on the £ar side 0£ a continuum 0£ 
success and 'failure, bene£it and harm.209 It can be 
argued that this meaning 0£ kakos predominates, and that in 
fact translating kakos (in its various £orms) consistently 
throughout the play as •bad• or •evil• or •wrong• is 
an anachronistic transplantation 0£ value-laden lan-
guage.210 A £ew examples must su££ice, £or I count 56 
uses 0£ the adjective kakos (in its various forms), and 19 
...... 
uses 0£ the ad verb KaKws., and these are only the two 
largest categories of related words. 
Actions taken against Medea, whether by Jason or 
Creon, are termed kakon or kaka, and Jason himself is 
labelled kakos £or his actions: at 48, after describing 
Jason's choice of a new bride, the Hurse remarks that the 
children do not understand the kaka of their mother; at 62 
208c. W. Willink, •some Problems of Text and 
I~terpretation in the Hippolytus,• CQ 18 (1968), pp. 11-43. 
Wi.Uink's views on these terms are upheld by David Claus, 
•Phaedra and the Socratic Paradox,• YCS 22 (1972; hereafter 
Claus, "Phaedra"), pp. 223-238, who opposes psychological 
~nd what he calls •con£essional" readings of Phaedra's 
'famous speech. 
209Foley, •Divided Sel£," p. 70, apparently 
agrees; she translates, without comment, kaka as "things to 
He de a •s harm.• 
210c1aus, "Phaedra," p. 231. 
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exclaims that Medea doesn't know 0£ new kaka to 
tile 'l'11 tor 
impending exile by Creon); at 78 the Hurse 
collle (her 
s that this exile is a new kakon; at 84 she claims 
agree 
n 
has been caught being kakos to his £riends;211 at Jaso 
uo she wonders what Medea will do, stung as she will be by 
ne• ~ka. Later, Jason cautions that exile brings many 
pka (463); Aegeus likewise terms Hedea•s banishment a 
----~Kon (705). 
The things Medea plans £or her enemies are kakon or 
kaka, and those su££ering them are said to £are Katoa>s 
---
or are themselves described with the adjective: Creon 
consistently uses the terms kakon and kaka (283, 285, 317) 
to describe the harm Medea, £or all her skill, is likely to 
do to his daughter and himsel£; at 805 Medea claims the 
I 
princess, KQK'l'}V, must die KQKWS; at 1219 the 
Messenger describes Creon in his death as no longer 
victorious over kakon; at 1306 the Chorus caution Jason, 
who is about to see his children dead, that he does not 
know what sort 0£ kaka he has come to; at 1315 when he 
learns what has happened, Jason himsel£ terms it a kakon. 
Host tellingly, in two lines, kakos is explicitly used 
as Part 0£ the vocabulary 0£ bene'fi t and harm: at 293 
Kedea complains to Creon that her reputation has •hurt• 
»I 
(ePAa•e) her and done her great kaka; at 618 He de a 
e..,· 
211Adkins, Merit, p. 190 n. 6, cites this line as 
l.dence of a •quiet• use 0£ kakos. I disagree. 
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. 111s tb.at tb.e gi£ts 0£ a kakos man like Jason "contain no c1a1 
1>enefit" 
>I (OV'f)<JLV > 0 \J IC >I £X£L), 
Tb.e b.arm done to Medea, a£ter being passed along first 
Otb.er people, ironically becomes harm she does to to 
nerself. Sb.e, who more than once called Jason kakistos 
(229, 488, 690; c£. Jason
1 s remark at 452. and Kedea 1 s use 
of E!lnkakist[e] at 465), is now hersel£ kake: at 1046-
1041. In an attempt to talk herself out 0£ killing the 
cllildren, Medea asks, "Why must I, in ca using pain for 
tlleir £a ther by the kaka against these (children), obtain 
for mysel£ twice as many kaka?"; at 1361 Jason tells 
Medea, "You yoursel£ £eel pain and are a companion 0£ 
[these] kaka. "; at 1363 he bemoans the fact that his 
children met up with a kake mother. 
It is in this spirit, then, that we must understand 
lledea 1 s £inal lines at 1077-1081. Medea is not morally 
awakened to the "wrongness" 0£ her actions and her incon-
tinence in the £ace 0£ what she knows is wrong; these 
lines were not the impetus to Socrates1 dictum that "virtue 
is knowledge,•2.12. nor do they--or £or that matter, 
f 212The views to which I re£er are 0£ course those 
: 1. Sneu, first put £orth in •zeugnis," pp. 12.5-34, and llhtly amended in Scenes, pp. 2.3-69. Snell sees the 
:nologue by Phaedra at Hippolytus 375 f£. as a close 
Chrane1. SnelPs views have been both supported and 
aUenged, and still generate response. 
incl Supporters (some are predecessors) of Snell1 s views 
Cit Ude Decharme, Euripide et 11 esprit, pp. 45-47, who 
Pla~ss· many alleged anti-Socra}iC: sentiments in Euripides 1 
llean. • E. R. Dodds, "The aLdws. of Phaedra and the 
i.ng 0£ the Hippolytus,• CR 39 (192.5), pp. 102.-104 
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•s somewhat similar comments at Hippolytus 373-390--pbaedra 
c11a11enge 
--
its validity. Quite the contrary.213 
ipideS •emphatically denies that enlightenment can make 
csur good"; see also his later "Irrationalist," pp. 97-104, 
•e; hiS slightly more reserved agreement 0£ 1971 in Greeks 
and the Irrational, pp. 186-187); Winnington-Ingram, 
~ippolytus,". i:.· 174 (Snel~'s conclusions ~re "plausible, 
if not certain ); Lesky, History, p. 370; Richmond 
i.attimore, •Phaedra and Hippolytus," Arion 1 (1962), pp. 
U-l2; T. H. Irwin, "Euripides and Socrates," CP 78 (1983), 
P· 183-197, concludes that Euripides describes 
rncontinence and is probably replying to the Socratic 
paradox. C£. McDonald, Happiness, pp. 49-54, who argues 
that Medea £irst takes up Socrates-like positions, and then 
a position that Socrates would certainly have rejected. T. 
B. L. Webster, "Euripides: Traditionalist and Innovator," 
in The Poetic Tradition. Essays on Greek, La tin, and 
SnClish Poetry, ed. Don Cameron Allen and Henry T. Rowell 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 37-38, 
equivocates: Euripides makes his characters use Socratic 
terminology and take a Socratic position, but there is no 
intent by Euripides to debate Socrates. 
Detractors now abound; see especially Barrett, 
Hippolytos, p. 229 (who makes the point, which Snell in 
Scenes, p. 66 n. 26, acknowledges, that a character does 
not speak for the poet); Reeve, "Medea 1021-1080," p. 61 
(Snell "manufactured" out of Medea 1078-1080 a debate 
between Euripides and Socrates); Claus, "Phaedra," pp. 223-
238 (Phaedra's concerns are those of Homeric heroes, and 
have nothing whatsoever to do with Socratic conceptions 0£ 
morality); Moline, "Euripides, Socrates," pp. 45-67; cf. 
his Plato's Theory 0£ Understanding (Madison, WI: Univ. 
of Wisconsin Press, 1981; herea£ter Moline, Plato's 
Theory), pp. 22-27 (Moline argues in both that neither 
Medea nor Phaedra are credible polemicist mouthpieces £or 
the poet, and that the polemicist view -fails to consider 
the overall impression one gets £rom the play); Yank.ow, 
Soc_ratic E1flo1'!it.H), passim (E1flo1'!Jf..L"I as 
defined by Socrates is lacking in the main characters of 
both plays). 
213 I agree (but not only £or the reasons he gives) 
!'ith. J~n Moline's bold statements on these passages in his 
•s Uri.pi.des, Socrates," pp. 49 and 62, respectively: 
r o~rates Pr_-ovided not the antithesis to Medea's words but C: her their explanation."; "Phaedra's case then is less a 
it'!.nter-example to Socrates' view than a con£irmation of 
• ~f. Moline's Plato's Theory, p. 24. 
Rickert, "Ak.rasia," pp. 103-104, argues that Medea is 
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AS Medea states that she knows what she is doing is 
~· 
but that her thumos has control over her considered 
c:teliberation, she sounds remarkably like the interlocutor 
in the early dialogues 0£ Plato. This is the moment 0£ 
reversal and recognition 0£ that reversal, when the 
tnterlocutor cannot help but admit that what he has 
cnampioned is repugnant even to himsel£.214 I am 
reminded 0£ that moment in the Symposium when Alcibiades 
shamefacedly admits that he, again and again, pursues 
policies he has agreed are not in his own best interests: 
I have experienced at the hands 0£ this man alone that 
of which no one would imagine me capable--being shamed 
by anyone; I £eel shame be£ore him alone. For I know 
not akratic because, even though she recognizes that her 
deed is kakon, she nonetheless deems it better than other 
possibilities, and there£ore chooses a kakon that is, by 
her reasoning, the best course 0£ action. As Rickert 
points out, Medea•s thumos has "ties to principles and 
values as well as 'feelings." Within Medea•s system of 
values. I would argue. totally defeating and therefore 
incapacitating the enemy is the best course 0£ action. 
Michelini, "Heophron,11 p. 133 n. 86, claims that Rickert •s 
definition of akrasia is 110£ modern date," but I see no 
proof 0£ this in Michelini •s citation of Rickert •s p. 96 n. 
14. 
214Michelini. "Beophron.• p. 126. describes 
dissonances which have built up by line 1060. and calls 
them the "knot 0£ a problem around which the Euripidean 
Play is built. 11 
Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge." p. 22. sees Medea •s 
struggle as one between her "masculine, honor-oriented sel£ 
and her 'feminine, hearth-oriented self." C£. Foley, 
~Divided Self," pp. 79-85, and Boedeker, "Medea," pp. 99-
00, Who points out that by using against herself •so£t 
Words about her children,• Medea nearly undermines her own 
revenge plot. This is, then, as Burnett acknowledges, a 
~:-•in situ~tion for Medea, who "must be m_ade the au~hor 0£ 
r own misery• (p. 21), and who, by killing her children, 
commits "an act 0£ violence against hersel£" (p. 22). 
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"ell that I am not able to answer his arguments that 
1 •ho whenever I depart am seduced by the esteem 0£ 
t'he masses, must do as he bids. So I skulk. away like 
a runaway slave and £lee him, and then when I see him, 
1 feel shame at the agreements to which we•d come. (§_ymposi um 216a.8-b.6). 
As an interlocutor, Alcibiades is atypical, as has 
a rgued (Chapter One, Part Three), because, by 1>een 
es:pressing his shame, he openly admits his reversal and 
recognition. Medea likewise openly admits her reversal and 
recognition. And since her actions represent the de£ini-
tions in this would-be dialogue, Medea•s admitted reversal 
and recognition allow the Chorus and the audience to 
witness the sel£-contradiction inherent in those de£ini-
tions. Medea, however, is no Alcibiades, £or as a zero-sum 
competitor, she can allow no room £or shame. Shame, 
recall, according to Gouldner, is at variance with the need 
to maintain one•s reputation and exalted sel£-
image.215 
Medea, then, in her open acknowledgement is atypical 
and like Alcibiades. But as she pursues actions that 
mani£est the acknowledged -faulty de£initions 0£ arete, 
m!, and Sophia, She begins to £all into line With typical 
interlocutors. These consistently adopt tactics that allow 
a more comfortable championship 0£ -faulty de£initions, 
namely, projecting blame onto another and -fleeing. Medea 
engages in both, while the Chorus, as we shall see, are 
215Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 94-95. 
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auowed the small com:fort o:f projection. 
onlf 
aecall that interlocutors in early Platonic dialogues 
reaiularlY blame the demise o:f their :faulty de:finitions on 
Or more speci:fically. on some capacity o:f his socrates. • 
for wizardry or magic or ob:fuscation. In this. they 
displaY the all-too-human trait o:f projection. Projection 
181 of course. the bailiwick o:f those interested in image-
aaintenance, and, as such, is a natural :for the zero-sum 
competitor. We should not be surprised, then. to see both 
Jledea and the Chorus engaging in projection, £or, to 
paraphrase Philip Slater, the need to surpass prevents 
rational appraisal 0£ one 1 s own actions.216 
In Medea, there is 0£ course no Socrates allegedly 
wielding supernatural abilities, and so the blame is 
(by Medea, only partially; by the Chorus, to a greater 
extent) projected onto those best 0£ all scapegoats, the 
1ods.217 Medea is the :first to do so: at lines 1013-
Wt' where she explains her sadness and tears to the 
befuddled Messenger, who has just reported what he thought 
was the good news 0£ the children1 s reprieve £rom exile: 
•the gods and I, thinking harm£ully. have contrived these 
things.• (Tau Ta 9£0l > ' ic.ayw 
216slater 
• 
Glory, p . 40. 
Gl 217For the ancient Greek tendency, as Slater, 
n~~· p. 40. puts it, •to attribute behavior they could 
0 
accept to external in£luence (e.g .• divine agency) 
ai-" . .• see Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 103-105; c£. Dodds, 
- eeks and the Irrational, pp. 1-18. 
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With this statement, 
h as already begun the escape which, at the play•s 11edea 
S he makes actual. end. 
Is it any wonder, then, that the Chorus, as they sing 
ill lyric anapaests at 1081-1115, begin to express their 
Oria and to grope tentatively toward a new understanding? !E -
For theY have seen prevail the de£inition 0£ arete they 
openly upheld: they have seen Medea assiduously beat back 
with the necessity 0£ executing a rationally conceived plan 
every bit 0£ eroticism le£t in her; they have, in the end, 
heard her resolve to go 'forth with the logical consequence 
of her rational deliberations. Yet they, the women 0£ the 
Chorus, have also seen 'first hand the emotional unaccepta-
bility of this logical consequence. In short, they have 
witnessed the self-annihilation but nonetheless continued 
advocacy of the definitions 0£ arete, eros, and sophia they 
themselves espoused. 
The Chorus, then, are con-fused, humble, and getting 
the sense that the only thing they can know £or sure, is 
that one can know nothing £or sure. These are the same 
women who, some 500 lines earlier, were crowing, assured 0£ 
their knowledge and de-fending the superiority 0£ women. 
Row they are meek and hesitant about their sex•s claim to 
know: 
I have by now many times gone through rather subtle 
~a J. ters and have come to con£lict greater (lfpos 
C:Zl-LL.>.>.as ~A9ov IJ.Eltous) than the 'female race 
18 required to seek out. For in fact we too have a 
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Use which has intercourse with us £or the sake 0£ JD t ,.. , Cl 
•isdom (VpOO'OIJ.lA£l O'Oq>lQS £V£K£V)--not with 
11 o£ us, to be sure. But among the many you would 
:erhaps £ind a £ew; t!1e rafe ,0£ women is not entirely 
•ithout muse (ouK avoµ.ouoov). (1081-1089). 
Tbe role 0£ the muse, as well as the birthing imagery 
t hiS song, will be discussed below (Part Five); £or now 1n 
tre snould £irst notice the new hesitancy and humility 
evident here: •not with all 0£ us•; •you would perhaps 
find a £ew.• These are not phrases 0£ sel£-con£idence. 
The sophia to which the women say some 0£ their sex can lay 
claim is not the £irst ode 1 s boast£ul revelation 0£ what 
tras and what will be; instead what we £ind is a declarative 
statement that comes down to this: What we know is that 
one simply cannot know a single thing. 
This is the point 0£ their long digression on the 
advantage 0£ not having children. First, we notice again 
the recurrence 0£ many questions (though all but one are 
not, as previously at 846-862, direct questions): is it 
that children are a sweet thing or a trouble £or mortals? 
(1095-1096); how is one to bring them up well? (1101-1102); 
from where is one to obtain an inheritable sustenance £or 
one•s children? (1102); how can one know i£ children will 
turn out bad or good? (1103-1104); how can one suppose that 
it is pro£itable to have children i£ children, by their 
dying, can ca use one the most distressing 0£ all grie£s? 
(1112-1115). The sheer, remarkable abundance 0£ 
interrogative words emphasizes the women's deep 
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Certainty: 1111 
~,,0eev 
u 
Oll'WS 
(1095. 
uo1. uo2. uo3-U04. 1112). To them. there is no way 0£ 
powing the answers; they admit, in the question 0£ 
ther children will turn out bad or good1 "this is •he 
unknowable" 
, . 
t:O'TlV 
,, 
ad"l>.ov, 1104). 
Still. their orientation as zero-sum competitors 
reaaains, because their en tire disquisition on parenting 
coaaes to the conclusion that it is better not to have 
children because it puts one in a position 0£ being one-
down as compared to those who do not have children, and it 
15
1 
quite simply, not pro£itable. At lines 1090-1093 the 
Chorus claim: "And I say that those 0£ mortals who have no 
experience at all and who have not borne children, they 
surpass in good 'fortune (ll'pocpepel v , t:LS 
, , 
euTuxLav) those who have begotten.• Furthermore, 
their conclusion, at 11121 is: how does having children 
profit one? onv >.ut:l). The question is 
rhetorical, £or they have already shown that it does not 
pay. 
But it does cost, as it always costs, the zero-sum 
competitor who must give up connection to others. It costs 
in that one is not allowed to experience the innocent 
Pleasures of such association. The Chorus signal their 
awareness of this loss in twice re£erring to children as 
• sweet•: once, as potentially so, at line 1095 ("the 
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. iess through their inexperience 0£ whether children 
cJllld • 
t or troublesome to mortals 
are swee 
• • ")i again, at 
99 where children are called a "sweet o££shoot" in 11ne 10 ' 
tile house. 
gven as these women seem to waver between acknow-
iedging their sophia and their ignorance, as they teeter 
between coldly deciding that being a parent does not pay 
and yet signalling that the cost 0£ childlessness is 
great, their 'final argument, that even i£ all else goes 
well, the gods can suddenly take one•s children a way 
unexpectedly to death, shows more than anything else their 
position in this elenchos. For, like Medea (1013-1014), 
and like interlocutors who blame Socrates £or the demise 
of their de£ini tions, the Chorus resort in the end to 
scapegoating the gods: 
Even i£ all turns out well, death can nonetheless take 
clean away to Hades the bodies 0£ your children. How 
then does it pay i£, in addition to all those other 
things, the gods can still lay this grie£, most 
distressing on behal£ 0£ children, on mortals? (1109-
1115). 
Critics regularly cite these lines as Euripidean nodding, 
or indulging in escape, because the women 0£ the Chorus 
obviously cannot think that they are singing about Medea 
and her children. A£ter all, no god is going to whisk 
these Young ones 0££; their own mother will be to blame. 
Or, if the women do pro£ess to be topical here, are they 
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t d or pulling a 'fast one on us, or what?218 tbick-lfit e • 
----
218yon Arnim, Medea, p. 23, notes that the Chorus .. 
kS have no particular connection to the circumstances; 
reaaa[he complaint 0£ Bongie, "Heroic Elements," p. 52 n. 
cf· that the Chorus' song "seems rather banal and more than 
50,bit cranky, contributing little to dramatic development 
ab r than the necessary pause be£ore the £inal achievement 0~ eHedea's goals." McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 62-63, 
~i dS the Chorus' remarks "somehow inappropriate, 0££-the-
p::.nt." McDermott continues, "For, instead 0£ dealing 
directlY •ith the problem that £aces them ... , the 
Chorus rambles 0££ into a prolonged catalogue 0£ the 
yartous worries inflicted by children on their all-
concerned parents." The women 0£ the Chorus, though, are 
dealing directly with the problem that £aces them: the 
destruction 0£ de£initions they hold dear. McDermott 
aaisses the point 0£ the Chorus' "tax[ing] their brains" 
bere because she consigns them to a passive role (p. 60 n. 
38), and does not recognize them as quasi-interlocutors in 
an elenchos, whose work is precisely to tax their brains. 
Dunkle, "Aegeus Episode," p. 103 n. 6, terms this ode 
•ironical," given that "[i]n this play parents are a plague 
to their children.• C'f. Michelini, "Reophron,• p. 131, 
according to whom the Chorus employ the trope 0£ parental 
suffering "in a naive and there-fore disturbing way." 
llusurillo, "Reconsideration,• p. 62, 'finds this song 
irrelevant, and sees Euripides as "gloss[ing] over• the 
fact that "here it is no chance death that carries 0£ the 
:babies to Hades, but the uncontrolled -fury 0£ their 
mother.• 
Dihle, "Medea und ihre Sch western,• p. 181, argues 
that the Chorus' song is unintelligible unless they think 
lledea has renounced her plan to kill the children. The 
opposite is asserted by Stanton, "Medea's Monologue," p. 
103 n. 15, 'following O. Zwierlein, "Die Tragik in den 
Kedea-Dramen,• Literaturwissenscha£tliches Jahrbuch 19 
(1978), pp. 35-37. 
Wol££, "Euripides," p. 240, is one 0£ the -few critics 
to appreciate the women•s stance in this song: "Here, 
rationality is put in the service 0£ a purely private goal 
of emotional sel£-su££iciency that simply ignores the 
community's need to reproduce itsel£, a need apparently 
:upported by the nonrational 'forces that move human beings 
0 Produce and 'foster their children.• Wol££ 'further notes ~PP. 240-241), brilliantly, that this ode "oddly resembles 
,,~:on•s -fantasy wish that men might produce children 
aei!out ~o~en (574-575), making the male world essentially 
co sufficient.• C£. McDermott, Incarnation, p. 69, who 
thmpares the ode to Jason's wish that he 1 d never begotten 
e Children (1413-1414). 
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The women, quite simply, are seeking an escape that 
a uow them to persist in holding the de:fini tion o:f 
,,111 
te to which they are attached, :for otherwise, they will 
!!£-
e to re-formulate their lives top to bottom. They use nav 
their sense o:f their own ignorance--newly acquired in the 
~enchos--to justi:fy the detachment :from children which 
will soon be required o:f them (and o:f Medea) as they stand 
l>Y (as every good Chorus must) and allow the action o:f the 
plaY to proceed without inter:ference. They distance 
themselves and Medea :from the act o:f child-murder about to 
take place by claiming that the gods can--and do--
regularly visit parents with such a tragedy, whisk. their 
children o:f£ to un£oreseen death. 
To these women, though, these deaths, this mother 
willing to kill her children, were in :fact un£oreseen, :for 
they, like the typical interlocutor in elenchos, had never 
sufficiently examined the consequences o:f the de£initions 
informing the actions 0£ their daily lives. To the Chorus, 
the horrible logic o:f the zero-sum game remained hidden. 
Reck.£ord, •First Exit,• pp. 345-346, recognizes the 
women•s argument as a "tightly constructed but despairing 
· · · demonstration [which] could have come from Antiphon 
· · · ·" The argument "dramatizes ... the divorce 
between reason and feeling• and shows that "[r]ational 
argument points to incalculable disaster." 
t Sim~n, Tragic Drama, pp. 75 and 89, sees this song as T~e culmination 0£ an assault on the epic-heroic worldview. 
• e declaration that it is better not to have children 
th · · is both an abdication 0£ a major source o:f power in 
c e struggle between men and women and at the same time a 
rrYstaUiza tion 0£ another possibility in the struggle--to 
efuse children." 
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k guripides, in 'fashioning his Medea, to 'force this 
:it too 
·nto the open air 0£ its emotional unacceptability. 
logic J. 
tne end 0£ the play, a£ter the 0££ stage demonstration 
Sf 
of thiS horri£ying logic, the Chorus will be in £ull-blown 
!2°r~. acknowledging their disorientation and ignorance as 
bashedly as Keno (Keno 79e.7-80b.4). una 
The Messenger who enters as the Chorus 'finish singing, 
and who reports to Medea the death 0£ the princess and 
ereon, serves primarily in the maiuetic part 0£ the 
elenchos, and his speech will there£ore be covered at 
length below in Part Five. For now, we need only consider 
two things: his description 0£ Creon•s £ate and his own 
concluding remarks. 
In the description 0£ Creon•s £ate we are treated to a 
grisly representation 0£ the reversal 0£ Creon•s bid as an 
autonomous competitor. Creon•s one apparently e££ective 
act as zero-sum competitor was, as Medea put it, to give 
away his daughter to whomever his th umos led him 
I 
KOpT)V u OT«tJ auµ.os ~YEV, 309-310). 
Recall that we argued that Creon was not really £it or 
eager £or competition, at least competition against the 
likes 0£ Medea. 
The last becomes apparent in the horrible death Medea 
arranges £or him. But in his demise we can see more than 
his mere unsuitability as contender against Medea. In it 
is also the reversal 0£ Creon 1 s one act as autonomous 
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ti tor, and the suggestion that competition, in 
colllPe 
..,er form it takes, is the deadly game it in fact is. 
•11ate 
of these things are conveyed in the gruesome struggle 
sotn 
ere on nas with the corpse of his daughter: 
aer poor father, ignorant of what had happened, came 
unawares into the house and fell upon the corpse; he 
groaned straightaway, and, folding her in his arms, 
Kissed her and addressed her as follows, •Ky poor 
cbild, which of daimones wrongfully killed you thus? 
wno made me an aged tomb bereft of you? Oh, let me 
die with you, child." And when he stopped his 
lamentation and groaning, and wanted to lift his aged 
flesh, he stuck to the fine gown, like ivy to the 
stems of a laurel, and there was a terrible/clever 
wrestling (6£l Va cS> ~V 'lfa).alOtJ.aTa); he went 
to raise himself on his knee, she grabbed onto him. 
> ' ' , If he took to force (£l 6£ 'lfpos thav 
ayol), she tore the aged flesh from his bones. 
After a time the poor wretch extinguished his spirit 
and died; for he was no longer on top of harm 
(KQKOU yap OUKeT> ~v uvepT£po5). 
(1204-1219). 
Creon, whose self-assertion had dictated that he 
should give away his daughter to a married man, now cannot 
1et rid of her! He is engaged in a contest, here a 
horrifying wrestling match with a corpse,219 and the 
contest is, crudely speaking, to get rid of his daughter. 
But he cannot!220 Creon, who was •one up• at the 
219see Husurillo, "Reconsideration,• p. 70, who 
also notes the athletic metaphor in lines 1181-1182. Cf. 
Kew ton, •Passionate Poison,• p. 18. See also Kc Dermott, 
~ncarnation, pp. 86-87. Ky discussion owes much to 
cDermott•s superb analysis of this scene, with Creon cast 
as the suddenly insincere elegiac lover caught in a 
wrestling match with his daughter's reanimated corpse. 
d 220Dunkle, • Aegeus Episode," 
leath-scene as evidence of Creon's ca· · d" iming that Creon "chooses to die 
isregards his struggle against the 
pp. 103-104, sees the 
selflessness, and, in 
with [his daughter]," 
corpse. 
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•s beginning, is no longer "on top"; kakon has 
pla1 
r ,..helmed o"le 
him (1219). He dies in a contest he thought he 
11ad already won, letting go 0£ his daughter. Their 
some tussle graphically illustrates that, when one grue 
plaYS the zero-sum game, proximity spells danger. Touch 
l(illS, even between £or mer intima tes.221 
Ro wonder that the Messenger, as he departs, makes an 
obviously aporectic statement: 
This is not the £irst time that I have c:onsidered 
mortal a££airs to be a shadow, nor would I hesitate to 
declare that those mortals who think they are wise and 
are concerned with explanations (Tous ao•ous 
ppoTwv doKouvTas ecvaL Kai µ.epql.V'flTas 
Aoywv) deserve the greatest rebuke. For no one 0£ 
> , 
mortals is £ort una te (eudaql.wv); when 
prosperity £lows in one man•s direction, he is more 
success£ul than another, but, £ortunate?--no. (1224-
1230). 
Such a sentiment is not so much anti-intellectual as it is 
pessimistic; it betrays a deep insecurity about the ability 
to maintain the status quo on even the most mundane level. 
Gouldner is convinced that such pessimism and insecurity 
are by-products 0£ the zero-sum game, where envy brings 
success into association with peril and doom, which then 
generates pessimism; pessimism in its turn breeds 
insecurity.222 But such pessimism and insecurity 
become operative only when the unexpected in £act arises; 
this is precisely the situation Euripides has constructed 
221Flory, "Right Hand,• pp. 70 and 73. 
222Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 58, 69-70. 
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..... e end 0£ his play. The perils 0£ the competitor are 
at tu. 
d iscernible except in reversal 0£ -fortune, and reversal 11ot 
been arranged by the playwright not only £or the once rias 
rialf-}l.eartedly competitive Creon and his daughter--not only 
for tnese and, through them, Jason--but also for Medea, 
t he Chorus will soon witness effecting with her own 
•bom 
}l.and the harm that she, as competitor, should visit upon 
}l.er enemies, not, as she does, upon her "-friends" and 
}l.erself. 
The Chorus, upon hearing the Messenger 1 s report, 
express again their willingness to assign responsibility 
for this horror elsewhere than upon Medea, who represents 
all that they still uphold: "It seems," they remark, "that 
on this day a daimon has rightly > , (EVchKWS) brought 
up from below much harm (KaKa) upon Jason" (1231-
1232). This remark is testimony to their continuing 
support of zero-sum procedure. At the same time, however, 
they betray their growing discom£ort as, £or the second 
time, they express sympathy £or the £ate 0£ the princess: 
•Poor thing (Q T>.'JJ.Lov), how we pity your mis£or-
tune, daughter 0£ Creon, you who go to Hades 1 house 
because of the marriage of Jason" (1233-1235; cf. 978-990). 
They are not, of course, the only ones discomfited. 
Med.ea now once again displays her pain at what she £eels 
She must do. As has been argued (above, Part One), she is 
l"k 1 
e the hapless interlocutor near the end of elenchos, who 
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s tba t sbe cannot a void the logical consequences 0£ 
41scern 
d finitions she has espoused and lived. And yet, these tb.e e 
eonsequences, terrible/clever and necessary as they are, 
onetbeless kaka (1243): 
are n 
harm, which she there-fore, 
understandably, hesitates to do (µEU.oµEv, 1242). 
b as to such an extent lost her taste £or competition s11.e 
th.at she must command hersel£ to go back into the £ray with 
brusque imperatives: 
c , 
come on, now, heart, arm yoursel£ (01r>..ttou). 
. Come, wretched (Ta>.atva) hand 0£ mine, 
take tbe sword, take it!, creep to the pain£ul 
starting post 0£ your li£e (>.apf: >.ap>, 
~pll'E vpos pa>.p'loa >.uv,,pav PLou), and do 
not turn weak, do not remember (µ.Ji KaKtae!ls µ,,o> 
> "' avaµv,,a9!JS) your children, how very dear they 
were (ws •l>-TaCTaJ), how you bore them; but 
-forget (>.aeou) your children £or this brie£ day, 
and then lament (9pitv€t); £or even i£ you will 
kill them, they nonetheless were dear (•L>.ot)--1 
am an un£ortunate (dua-ruxits> woman! (1242, 1244-
1250). 
That Medea sees this as a competitive arena is clear 
from her use 0£ •arm yoursel£" and her 
description 0£ the act as the pain£ul •starting post• 
(fla>.p'loa) 0£ her li£e (see above, Part One). That 
she is reluctant is obvious -from the abundance 0£ 
imperatives. That she knows this is harm£ul to hersel£, 
her use 0£ 
, 
KOKO and illustrate. 
But this act is not merely competitive, taken on 
reluctantly, in the knowledge that it is sel£-harming. It 
also consists 0£ doubly sel£-negating premises. This is 
unmistakable when one considers Medea's description 0£ the 
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as and For not only 
Medea, in order to harm her enemies, harm hersel:f; she 
.. ust 
•ust once again turn harm upon those dear to her. She has 
thiS be:fore, o:f course, in the case o:f her :father and done 
the di:f:ference this time seems to be that these J>rother; 
c:tiildren are the only ones with whom Medea has allowed 
:tierself to :feel real and enduring attachment. They are the 
onlY things she terms "dearest,• philtata, and she uses 
t:tiis designation o:f them not only here, but £our other 
umes: at 795, when she -first reveals that she will murder 
:tier children, they are philtata; twice, at 1071, their 
bands and mouths are so described; :finally, at 1397 she 
snatches away Jason•s description 0£ the children as 
philtata with the response: "To their mother, yes, but not 
to you• (see -further discussion below, Part Five). 
It would certainly be much more com:forting to propose 
that Medea does not--cannot--truly love her children, that 
so much is obvious :from her ability to :kill them. Such a 
theory, however, de:fies what Medea hersel£ says, and robs 
the play•s elenchos 0£ its pro-found reversal. We must, 
•1th Medea, contemplate the excruciating paradox that her 
killing them does not negate their dearness to her. Her 
reversal is unmitigated: she experiences :first-hand the 
emotional unacceptability o:f the zero-sum game•s logical 
consequences. Otherwise, when Medea escapes, she escapes 
•ith the de:finitions she represents unchallenged, that is, 
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scapes unscathed. That she does not, she hersel£ will 
sne e 
d ilY admit in the exodos, as she does here, talking to rea 
nersel£: "For even i£ you kill them, they nevertheless 
dear--! am an un'fortunate woman!" (1249-1251). 
were 
The Chorus, a£ter hearing Medea pronounce the agoniz-
tne paradox in which she is embroiled, now sing their 'final 
song (1251-1292). It is interrupted by the cries 0£ the 
c:tiildren, being killed by Medea within, and by the Chorus 1 
own impotent interjections (1271-1281). 
They begin with a prayer to the Earth and light 0£ the 
sun, begging them to look down dn and stop Medea,223 
whom they describe as "destroyed" 
> , (oAoµ.Evav, 1253). 
They see her crime as the work 0£ an Erinys (1260), and 
appeal to Medea hersel£ to consider that she is rendering 
her birth pains, as well as her trip through the Symple-
gades, in vain (1261-1264). They 'finally try to convince 
her, as zero-sum competitor who care-fully weighs advantage 
and disadvantage, that she will pay a heavy price (1267-
1270). They know no other appeals, £or they did not 
foresee the logical consequence 0£ the competition they 
themselves were so keen on; they there-fore can only ask, in 
confusion, "Why has this heavy bitterness 0£ mind and harm-
d.ealing slaughter 'fallen upon you?" They clearly see Medea 
1 . 
223H. E. Collinge, •Medea ex Machina,• CP 57 ~::2, hereafter Collinge, "Ex Machina"), p. 172, argues 
1 
t, by providing Medea transport, the Sun ironically 
Kt-ants one part 0£ the Chorus
1 request: that he drive 
ed.ea out. 
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v-ictim of a perverse circumstance; their use of the 
•• tne 
-.rpoa1fL 'T'VEl (1266) suggests that the impetus for 
fer:t> · 
_.edea is about to commit has been visited upon her 
.nat p 
tb.e outside. frOID 
It is partly £or this reason, their inability even now 
nderstand the reasons behind the reversal their to u 
definitions, manifested in Medea, have undergone, that 
tnese women, after hearing within the cries 0£ the children 
)>einS slaughtered, compare Medea--insensibly, it seems, at 
first glance--to Ino (1281).224 For certainly, had 
they thought but a £ew minutes longer, some critics 
intimate, they could have come up with a much better 
parallel: Agave or Althaea, :for example. Or better yet, 
Procne.225 Al thaea and Procne, at least, killed their 
children knowingly; Procne, most like Medea, did so to 
punish her husband. 
Why then do the women 0£ Corin th insist that they have 
224 Joseph Fon tenrose, "The Sorrows of Ino and of 
Procne,• TAPA 79 (1948; hereafter Fontenrose, "Sorrows"), 
p. 165, notes that both Ino and Medea are involved in the 
Argonaut expedition; Collinge, •Ex Machina,• p. 172 n. 10, 
adds that Ino is related by marriage to Jason. Fontenrose 
also sees a similarity between Ino and Medea {with Theseus) 
as Wicked stepmothers. See also Wolf-Hartmut Friedrich, 
•Hedeas Rache," in Euripides, ed. Ernst-Richard Schwinge 
~armstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgessellschaft, 1968; 
ereafter Friedrich, "Medeas Rache"), pp. 185-186, for 
enumeration of the child-murders that occur in Attic drama. 
A 225see Rick M. Newton, "Ino in Euripides 1 Medea,• ~ 106 (1985), pp. 496-502, who suggests that close 
::raUels are suppressed intentionally by Euripides so that 
c ~ non-parallel of Ino may make the point that Hedea•s 
rune is unparalleled in its unmitigated heinousness. 
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neard o£ the acts of one other. woman, Ino, to whom 
01111 
an compare Medea's? Instead 0£ looking to the 
t11e1 c 
ns of the myth that one may allege the audience could 
patter 
"nown but which are nonetheless not expressed by pve ~ , 
gurtpides,226 let us instead look to what the Chorus do 
••1 of Ino: 1) she laid her hands on her children (1283); 
2) slle was driven mad by the gods (1284);227 3) she was 
c1rtven out of her home and put to wandering by Zeus• wife 
(l284-1285); 4) she threw herself off a cliff into the sea, 
poor thing (1286-1288); 5) the leap followed hard on the 
irreverent slaughter of her children (1286-1287); 6) she 
died along with her children (1289).228 The Chorus 
conclude Ino•s story by lamenting how much harm the "much-
226For this approach, see Fontenrose, •sorrows,• 
pp. 125-167. S. P. Hills, "The Sorrows of Medea,• CP 75 
(1980), pp. 289-96 {hereafter Hills, "Sorrows•) makes 
excellent use of Fontenrose•s evidence, by identifying 
elements of the Ino/Procne myth that appear in Euripides• 
atory of Medea. 
227Robert Eisner, "Euripides• Use of Myth," 
Arethusa 12 (1979), pp. 158-159, proposes that "[t)he focus 
Of the comparison is Hera's crime in driving Ino crazy 
• · · as opposed to Medea's crime in motivating her own 
crime. Later we hear Medea will bring the children to 
Rera•s temple (1379). Euripides has chosen the Ino 
P&radigm because Hera enters into Medea's crime. Medea 
acts like a goddess, with the gods' tacit approval, Upe . 
ch. Cl.~lly the approval of the goddess of marriage and 
hl.ldbi.rth, who herself once made a mother kill her c ildren." 
228Th . IOdd ere is no mention that Ino later ,be~ame a 
P.'lx e~s. Maurice P. Cunningham, "Medea all'o 
pP. ~v"ls,• CP 49 (1954; hereafter Cunningham, "Medea"), 
Par- ~8-159, argues that this unmentioned fact is the bee: el Euripides draws between Ino and Medea, who herself 
Illes a faux-goddess by acting as deus ex machina. 
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bed o-f women• has already done to mortals (1290-
troubled 
t,293)· 
In Ino•s case as described here, this lament must 
to Hera's action against Ino hersel£, not to any 
refer 
n 
o£ Ino against her husband's paramours or other 
actiO 
229 
.1-veS· 
A £ew parallels immediately suggest themselves: both 
a nd Medea are made exiles; both were driven out (Ino JDO 
actually, Medea e££ecti vely) by another woman; both Ino and 
Medea killed their own children; both have the Chorus• 
sympathy. Why? Because both their crimes are, to the 
Chorus, equally inexplicable. Ino was driven mad by the 
ps, that they know, and such a suggestion is merely an 
expression 0£ the inexplicable. Medea's action is 
similarly incomprehensible to them. They even go so £ar as 
to suggest, in an interpretation which brings them 
dangerously close to agreeing with Jason (569-573; c£. 
1338), that sexual jealousy was the cause 0£ all 
this.230 They cannot see, despite its having been 
made more than su££iciently clear, that the ideas they 
229see Fontenrose, "Sorrows," pp. 127-129, £or 
other variants. One 0£ these, that involving the 
maidservant Antiphera (or Halos), shows more obvious 
similarities to the Jason and Medea story than the one 
Ii ven in the text 0£ Medea. 
23
°Foley, "Divided Self,• p. 77, notes that Creon 
and Jason, as well as the Chorus, misinterpret Medea's 
mot· · t l.Vati.on as jealousy. Foley sees Medea not as "the 
o~~gedy o-f jealousy we expect" but "a tragedy 0£ gender.• 
in ander, Suspense, p. 93, argues that the gods Medea 
mo~~kes suggest lost honor, not sexual jealousy, as her 
l.Ve. 
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hold about competitive excellence have given 
t11e111se1ves 
this repugnant act. Therefore, they are at a loss. 
rtse to 
act, like Ino's, 11edea's 
they propose, had external 
231 In this they 
t•Petus. 
once again join the ranks of 
locutors who look outside their systems of beliefs for 
tnter 
of these beliefs' reversal in elenchos.232 tbe cause 
There is, however, one further, though less apparent, 
parallel between the stories of Medea and Ino. The Chorus, 
bf comparing Medea to a woman who killed herself upon 
killing her children, suggest again what they have already 
binted at with their recent description of Medea as 
•destroyed" 
> , 
(o~oµ.Evav, 1252):233 namely, that 
lledea, like Ino, self-destructs after killing those most 
clear to her. This interpretation has been suggested 
:before, in many different guises, but most of them psycho-
101ically based.234 What I wish to propose here (see 
also below, Part Five) is not that the Chorus foresee for 
lledea a psychological self-destruction, but instead, dimly 
231cf. Oblander, Suspense, p. 179, who claims the 
Chorus use Ino as a parallel because she, like Medea, was 
insane. 
232Perhaps this is what Bongie, "Heroic Elements," 
p. 53, means by her claim that, in proposing Ino as 
llYthological antecedent, the women "rationalize" their 
experience. 
l>l ,233~ Cunningham, "Medea," p. 156, who considers 
OJlEvav to have opt a ti ve force. 
234see 
• 'l' • 
ragedy of 
e.g., Hills, 
Revenge," p. 
Mythopoeia, 
22. 
p . 123; Burnett, 
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tatively perhaps, they sense the destruction of all 
aod ten 
she has manifested £or them: the competitive ideal 0£ 
uiat 
~· Indeed, that this is so is supported by their (as 
a
s :Medea's) reactions in the exodos and by their final 
,,ell 
When Jason enters at line 1293 to announce the swift-
coming royal vengeance and to try to protect his children 
from it, he has only the Chorus, who aided Medea in her 
yeneeance against him, to face. But they, unlike Medea, do 
not revel in his misery. Instead, they address him, their 
old vicarious enemy, as TATi1.1.ov ("wretched," 1306), 
and acknowledge the harm he has come upon. They have, 
Yicariously through Medea, won; they have also, under-
standably, lost their taste for victory. 
Ironically, even as the victorious Medea by contrast 
tloats and exults, she too acknowledges de£eat.235 
This victory has brought its harm upon her, too. Jason 
says as much to her, and she agrees: --"You yourself 
suffer and you are a companion 0£ the harm." > , (KaUT'll 
. 
KQl KQKWV 
. 
ICOlVWVO~ ec) • --"You are 
ri1ht." (1361-1362).236 And again, at 1397, Medea 
235See Michelini, "Heophron," p. 134: "The 'final 
:cene expresses th[e] union 0£ irreconcilables in drama tic 
ex-~s: it is a triumph that is also a kind 0£ 
ann1hua tion." 
236 fut ~hlander, Suspense, p. 172, sees in Medea's 
f Ure misery a basis for the audience's abiding sympathy 
a:"l' her. Mills, "Sorrows," pp. 295-296, detects in Medea 
ever-sorrowing mother a pattern from the Ino/Procne 
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that the children were philtata to their mother, 
.. serts 
to Jason. 
11ot 
Jason, however, has obviously lost too. We have 
d already the Chorus 1 description of what he is 
•enuone 
t to see as k.ak.a (1306); to this may be added his own a:bOU 
concessions of the harm done to him: At 1310 he exclaims, 
•110• you have destroyed 
> , (a vw>.£aa s.) me, woman!"; at 
1315, •open the doors, so that I may see the double harm 
(itaicov)•; at 1348-1350 he uses again the language 
of benefit and harm, "I will get no benefit from 
(lw.ftaoµ.m) my newlywed bed, nor the children I begot 
and reared will I be able to speak. to alive, but I am 
destroyed 
> , (a vw>.£aa )"; at 1395-1403 Jason is pa the-
tic in his grief, "I go, with no share of two children 
Oh. dearest children (Q , TEICVQ 
Alas, I, wretch that I am (Talas.), want to 
kiss the dear (•l>.Lou) mou tbs of my children. 
· . . Let me--by the gods!--touch the soft skin of my 
children.•237 
Pathetic as this scene is, neither Medea nor Jason 
accepts that their actions are culpable or suspect. Both, 
there£ore, are like interlocutors who maintain their views 
by Projecting the blame £or their definitions 1 failures 
stories. 
237 
out McDermott, Incarnation, p. 70, 
that al though Jason is now pitiful, 
•hr·f . 1. t of his mediocrity. 
correctly points 
he is still not 
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external object. 
onto some 
Medea, recall, previously laid 
Part 0£ the blame £or her actions on the gods at ieast a 
") once again she mitigates her reversal even as (lOl3-t01-r ; 
iS acknowledging it. 
111e 
For Medea £lees (1384-1385) like 
interlocutors, and, like those who £lee, she must, at 
•anY 
ieast publicly, persist in disowning the blame. For it is 
onlY thus that £aulty de£initions can remain operational. 
aecall seeskin's description 0£ the interlocutors who, 
despite their stint at elenchos, depart £rom Socrates, 
suspect de£ini tions still in heart and there£ore to hand, 
only to dishonor themselves with (at least by the standards 
of de£ini tions withstanding elenchos) ill-conceived and 
shame£ul actions.238 Such a £uture 0£ the continued 
employment 0£ £aulty de£initions is suggested likewise in 
the case 0£ Medea, as a £ew critics have pointed out, £or, 
according to one version, Medea•s £uture tenure in Athens 
includes an attempt on the li£e 0£ Theseus, Aegeus• 
son.239 Her repeating a crime like the one she has 
Just committed reveals, as did interlocutors" aborted 
reformations, the £ailure not so much 0£ elenchos as a 
failure of nerve and endurance in its reversed parti-
cipants. Scapegoating, there against Socrates, here 
238seeskin, Dialogue, pp. 127-130. See the 
quotation in the discussion above, Chapter One, Part Four. 
239 R See McDermott, lncarna tion, pp. 91-93; c£. 
p~~i~n, •Passionate Poison,• p. 2.0; Foley, •Divided Sel£,• 
472. 
. t anY convenient other. is a £ace-saving measure to 
aia1ns 
these failures. 
41sotrn 
And so in the exodos, Medea chooses Jason as 
scapegoat. and he, similarly untrans£ormable, chooses her. 
first to her accusations, then to his: •1 would i.uten 
long reply to you if father Zeus did not know what !Pke a 
fOU experienced from me and what sorts of things you did in 
return (1351-1353) . • . . O children, you perished from 
rour father's disease (1364) .... [It was not my right 
)land,] but it was your insolence. and your newly mastered 
aarriage [that killed them) (1366). • . . The gods Know 
who began this torment (1372) ..•• You. pernicious 
one (KaKos>. as is right, will die in harm 
(11taKw5) 0 struck on your head by a chunk 0£ the Argo, 
and will see a bitter end 0£ my marriage to you (1386-
1388). • • • What god or daimon listens to you, £orswearer 
and deceiver 0£ outsiders? (1391-1392).• 
How Jason: •You despicable thing, you most ha te£ul 
thing to the gods and to me and to the whole race of men, 
rou who dared to lay sword upon your children, whom you 
bore. and you destroyed me, leaving me childless (1323-
1326). you great harm (KaKoV ' µ.eya, 1331) 
· · · for the sake of pleasure and the bed you killed them 
(1338). • 
.. I married you, a ha te£ul, destructive 
connection £or me, you lioness. no woman, who have the 
savage nature 0£ the Tuscan Scylla (1341-1343). . .. Such 
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is natural to you. Go to destruction, you who do 
audacitY 
s)laJDeful things, you who are £oul with the murder 0£ your 
cJlildren (1345-1346) .... Oh children, you met with a 
)larJDfUl (KaKTJS) mother (1363). It was not my 
right )land that killed them (1365) .... You thought it 
111eritorious to kill them £or the sake 0£ the bed (1367). 
All things are harms (KaKa) t.o you (1369). 
. . [The children] are, alas, curses against. t.he 
pollution upon your head (1371). . . . [The gods] do, in 
fact, know--they know your despicable mind (1373). 
y 0 u revolting child-murderer (1393).• In £act., the bulk 0£ 
Jason's last speech (i.e., 1405-1412) is an accusation 
against Medea. In it he calls Zeus and t.he other gods 
to witness what he has su££ered at the hands 0£ •this 
repulsive and child-murdering lioness• (1406-1407) who has 
killed his children (1411). 
Jason ends his speech in helplessness and despair, 
wishing that he had not. ever begotten the children to see 
them killed by Medea (1413-1414). In this pronouncement, 
he betrays a concession to the inevitability 0£ what has 
happened (i.e., once begot. t.en, the children were on their 
way to being murdered by Medea). His solution is one born 
Of a sensed impotence in t.he £ace 0£ t.his horri£ying 
inevitability: t.he children should never have been born. 
He echoes the Chorus• earlier sentiment (1094-1115: one 
should not have children because one cannot predict or 
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1 lf'n.at n.appens to them), and Medea's slightly contro 
t rendering of this, a lament on the vanity of her 
clifferen 
the children (1029-1031). 
Tlle n.opelessness and impotence of the major parties to 
e lenchos are a consequence 0£ their adherence at all t:tliS 
ts to definitions proven faulty. Medea and Jason cos 
•anifest those definitions and persist in their 
application, even through the horrors that result from 
t:tiem. Similarly, the Chorus, despite their sense of 
repulsion at the act Medea commits, never wholeheartedly 
abandon their support of her. Ho one therefore has the 
sense that such crimes are preventable in the future. And 
indeed, given the across the board reluctance to abandon 
faulty definitions, they are not. 
The Chorus' departing tag echoes the despair of change 
and acceptance, albeit reluctant, of the status quo they 
and the principals feel. It is at one and the same time a 
prayer to Zeus and an acknowledgement of the women's 
impotence in the face of their ignorance. It is, more than 
anything, full-blown aporia: 
Zeus on Olympus, controller (Taµ.ias) of many 
things, the gods bring to pass many things beyond 
an ticipa ti on (aEAll'Tws). In fact, the expected 
(Ta 60K'f)9EvTCaJ) was not accomplished, and god 
found a way (ll'opov) for the unexpected (Twv 
, , 
aooic'f)Tea>v). So it went. (1415-1419). 
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entiment, despite being formulaic,240 is an 
't'JliS S 
r
opriate description of Medea 1 s Chorus1 experi-
aPP 
241 They had not expected what was logically 
ence. 
iJlevitable from priorities of the zero-sum game whose 
player. Medea, 
't'lleY therefore, 
they cheered on from the sidelines.242 
upon witnessing in ffedea 1 s escape the 
salvation of their faulty definitions from submission to 
another round of elenchos, again ascribe the outcome to 
soaie other entity, like interlocutors who blame Socrates 
for dispatching their surety. In five lines, they credit 
zeus with control, the gods for accomplishing, and god 
with finding a way. They themselves have lost the way 
240The lines appear at the end of four other 
Buripidean plays: Alcestis, Andromache, Helen, and 
Bacchae. In all of these, however, the first line instead 
reads: 'lfoU.aL µopcpaL -rwv _ 6m.µov~wv, "ffany are 
the shapes of the miraculous." 
241pace Musurillo, "Reconsideration," p. 66 1 who 
terms this tag "a trite, all but meaningless re£rain." C£. 
Barrett, Hippolytos, pp. 417 -418 at lines 1462-1466, who 
deems the lines a "platitude" inappropriate to all but 
Alcestis 0£ the plays to which it is attached. It is 
•crossly out o-f place" in Medea. 
242
so But trey, "Accident," p. 16: " 
•arning we have gone completely o-f-f the track, the 
without 
play 
Charges of£ in a direction which we did not expect 
•hich we cannot approve. Like the chorus, we find 
0~selves struggling to be -freed of that to which we have :e~ea~y given our allegiance. Seduced into approving 
ob ea s revenge, we cannot approve it at all. . . . And we ~t. But neither chorus nor audience has now any 
OWnU~ds -for objecting. Euripides has trapped us in our 
actio labby reasoning, in the morality that justi-fies any 
atup·~· be only the aggravation great enough. Our 
and o-f 
l. i.ty has led logically to this conclusion . . . ." 
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1418), they experience aporia.2.43 
McDermott sees the relevance 0£ this tag not only to 
d a 1fhiCh she in the subtitle 0£ her book calls •The ~· 
arnation 0£ Disorder,• but sees in it an expression 0£ 1nc 
trbat Whitman alleges is Euripides 1 penchant £or the 
unforeseen: 
guripides 1 purpose£ul achievement 0£ the unexpected is 
not simply a dramatic trick, a device to create 
suspense and keep the audience "on the hook..• It is, 
rather, one 0£ the primary tools by which the poet 
effects the play 1 s £inal chaos. To the audience that 
comes to him asking, ... z:" or • y", 11 he 
responds, "Hot •z:. 1 Hor •y. 111 He suggests no 
•z." Worse than that, whether on the large scale 
or the small, he repeatedly establishes (or seems to) 
an either-or structure within the play, to all 
appearances working with "z:"s" and 11 y"s 11 
easily recognizable by his audience. He th us seems to 
be saying 114 Z:" or •y 1 ? I will tell you 
which." When he goes on to show that neither 
alternative is viable or true, or when the •answer" 
provided by the play 1 s events is so ambiguous that the 
audience must conclude that the posed alternatives 
were simplistic or meaningless, this outcome is doubly 
destructive 0£ the audience 1 s sense 0£ classi£ication 
243Aristotle is right, then, that Hedea 1 s escape 
in the chariot of the sun is..!. as a sort 0£ deus ex machina, 
an inadaqua te >.uols. Tou µueou (Poetics 1454a.36-
b.2). Hone 0£ the di£ficulties has been solved; Hedea 1 s 
•escape• does not cancel the aporia, but instead, as in the 
case 0£ Plato 1 s interlocutors, is its acknowledgement. See 
R. B. Appleton, •The Deus ex Hachina in Euripides,• CR 34 
(l920), pp. 10-14, £or the argument that Euripides at times 
uses the deus ex ma china to complicate plots or "to remind 
us that the problems 0£ li£e are not so easily solved as we 
had been led to suspect . . . . 11 Euripides1 Medea, 
according to Appleton, "is allowed to point [her wrongs] 
~ut for hersel£, with all the sanction and -finality that 
elongs to the J.L'f'IXav.fi.• 
e Even Plato indicates that the tragedian uses the deus ~machina a\ tim~s 0£ aporia: •tragedians, when they are 
er a lo~s (avopwolv) in any way, have recourse to 
anes with gods raised on high" (Cratylus 42.5d.5-6). 
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and order.244 
While I would postpone judgment on whether Euripides 
"
ould add, "like Socrates") purposefully effects the (l 
unexpected to reveal to his audience their ignorance, the 
siJDilari ties bet ween the method used by Pla to 1 s early 
socrates and the method used by Euripides in this, and 
perhaps other, plays, suggest that McDermott is wrong to 
claim that Euripides "suggests no z," or that the 
provided answer 1 s ambiguity points back. only to the 
simplicity and meaninglessness of the audience 1 s 
notionally supported alternatives.245 For, as in 
244McDermot t, Incarnation, p. 112, where she also 
quotes Whitman, Full Circle, p. v. 
245ohlander, Suspense, 187-188, who imagines that 
the original audience -felt "purpose-fully misled• by 
Euripides, nonetheless describes the sel-f-searching Medea 
encourages: "We are le-ft with sel-f-doubt, le-ft to question 
the validity o-f both Jason1 s and Medea 1 s world, both the 
cavalier sophistry that can defend any decision and the 
passionate demands of piqued honor that justifies the 
brutalization of feelings and extremely venge-ful actions. 
· · . If we are at all to be made more conscious from our 
experience of the drama, we must question our own 
motivations for action, examine our feelings and challenge 
the authenticity 0£ our thinking.• See also Wol££, 
•Euripides," p. 241, for the "uneasy, unresolved 
Juxtaposition• at the end of the Ode to Athens and at the 
end of the play, and the ambivalence Medea arouses in the 
audience; cf. Walsh, "Public and Private," p. 300: "The 
Play does not, however, simply reflect what one might 
:xpec~ to be the conventional judgment of its audience, nor 
d~es it ~ffer its own single point o-f view. Its 
T i.scover1es are paradoxical and inconclusive." Simon, 
_!'agic Drama, p. 97, says that "this is a play that makes 
:s Writhe, twitch, and feel uncomfortable." Of the quasi-
fus ex machina, Simon remarks that it "does not clean the 
c:ritants out of our system." Goldhill, Reading, p. 114, 
A mpares the end of Medea with those 0£ Bacchae and 
._!U.igone, •where dissolution, aggression, and 
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s so in this play: once we begin to assault the ~· 
· s o£ the work, be it dialogue or play, we confront J>Oundarie 
reader-auditors or an audience 0£ theater-goers, who are 
l timate consumers and targets 0£ the philosopher's and tbe u 
playwright's purpose in conducting elenchos, and in whom 
success of that purpose is at least possible. For as in 
etenchos, the view £rom the outside provides to Euripides• 
-
audience, as it did to Pla to•s reader-auditors, a more 
objective perspective from which to view the unfolding 
!!enchos. It is at this audience, then, as at Plato's 
reader-auditors, that we can perhaps suspect maieusis to be 
aimed, and in them we can theorize upon its operation and 
consider its varying success at attaining elenchos• 
ultimate goal: the birth of truth. 
To such theorizing and consider a ti on we now turn, 
keeping in mind that, if there is truth born of elenchos, 
it is neonatal, and that no one should expect full 
development from an infant. 
disappointment seem to stress the shattering tragic 
0 PPosi tions .. 
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part Three: Personal and Impersonal Aspects of 
~tenchos in Medea: Pre-requisites £or Maieusis 
ductorY Remarks intro 
Jn Chapter One, it was argued that interlocutors in 
S are led to philosophy and truth only when they are ~
engaged personally in the discussion. At the same time, 
theY must be allowed distance for objectivity. Socrates 
provides both. He insists, on the one hand, that inter-
iocutors say only what they believe; on the other hand, he 
maintains that the reversal of definition is nonetheless 
impersonally effected. The result is engagement and 
estrangement, attraction and repulsion.246 In this 
balancing act are dangers and potential gains. For if 
repulsion takes hold, the interlocutor £lees, denying the 
reversal--truth is never born. But if Socrates provides 
the right distance from which the interlocutor can 
simultaneously feel the pull of recognition and yet 
maintain the comfort of objectivity, the interlocutor may 
choose to stay through the painful process of birthing 
246It was argued in this study's original Chapter 
Two, now set aside, that, in Aristotle's de£inition of 
tragedy, pity operates comparably to the personal aspect 
Of elenchos, £ear comparably to the impersonal aspect. For 
: discussion of pity as an engaging mechanism and fear as a 
•ist~n~ing mechanism in Medea, see Pietro Pucci, 
(l9ur~pi.des: The Monument and the Sacri£ice," Arethusa 10 v· 77• hereafter Pucci, "Monument"), pp. 174-175; cf. his 
-!!>lence, pp. 169-174. 
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, 
2'17 More o-ften than not, though, pain repels the 
trutll· 
j.11ter1ocutor, and the truth, conceived but unborn, makes 
n irritating fOr a 
presence in his memory 0£ the elenchos. 
·th more distance than the shame-ridden SOIDeone Wl. 
interlocutor 
cua1ogues o-f 
is needed £or truth to be born; in the 
Plato, this is the reader-auditor. But even 
uie reader-auditor must sense proximity and yet be k.ept at 
a distance. 
In short, elenchos demands a balancing act, and 
suripides in Medea per-forms one. He provides his audience 
with definitions, manifested primarily in Medea and Jason, 
which are like those upon which they base their own 
l>ehavior. At the same time, Medea and Jason (and, to a 
lesser extent, Creon) are depicted in such a way that the 
audience cannot help but feel alienated from them, and 
therefore from the definitions they manifest. 
The Personal Aspect 
At Poetics 1460b.33-34, Aristotle reports Sophocles• 
claim to have depicted men as they should be, while 
Buripides depicted them as they were (:Eo•oK>.TJs. 
, 
GUTos ' µ. E: v u Ol OUS. 
..... 
11'0lE:lV, 
, , 
EUpl'll'lO'l'IV 
, , 
El<Jl V). At Frogs 959-960, Aristophanes• 
Yi 247Pucci, "Monument," p. 170, stresses the t~lence and pain of Euripides" remedial song; I disagree 
•m t the audience is brought into such engagement that they 
de Ust Undergo the most distressing experience, a 
se t-angement of the mind struck. by the brutality and 
nseiessness of suffering." 
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d S in describing his poetry, agrees with this suriPi e • 
assess111en t o-f his art: 
1 enacted -familiar things, things we use, things we 
live with, things on which I could be put to elenchos; 
for the audience knew about these things and could 
> ,.. I 
submit my cra£t to elenchos. (OLKE:La vpayµ.aT> 
daaywv, ofs xpwµ.elt, o'fs ~uveaµ.ev, e~ 
'lf\ > , , ' @v y> av £~,,AE:yXOIJ.,,V• ~\JV£lc50T£S yap 
otiToL ~Aeyxov ll v µ.ou T°'1v Tex v,,v). 
t hese assessments accurate, at least in the case 0£ A.re 
guripides' Medea? Kore speci-fically: were the rules 0£ 
the zero-sum game by which Medea and Jason comported 
the111selves -familiar to the largely male Athenian audience 
of 431 B. C.? Did they recognize behind the outrageous 
acts of Medea and Jason the beliefs that in£ormed their own 
less drastic actions? While it can never with absolute 
certainty be asserted that they did, there is evidence that 
the zero-sum game depicted in Medea was a commonplace in 
fifth century B. C. Athens. 
Sentiments expressed by characters in Euripides• plays 
correspond to sentiments expressed during events described 
by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian Wars. 
John H. Finley, Jr. maintains that these correspondences 
argue £or a realism in both Euripides and Thucydides rather 
than a borrowing by historian -from dramatist: 
As contrasted with Herodotus, Thucydides devotes his 
whole work to analyzing the actual, and there£ore 
o£ten the material, aspects 0£ the war, and Sophocles• 
remark about Euripides could as well have been made by 
the older about the younger historian, •1 make men as 
they should be, he makes them as they are.• Kore 
speci£ically, the £irst debate in the History, that 
between the Corcyreans and the Corinthians, turns on 
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tne same con£lict between expedience and justice that 
nas been noted in the Medea. . . . The close parallel 
resented by the debate in the Medea o££ers striking 
p roo£ that these were the methods 0£ argument in use ~t the time in Athens, and, though that £act might be 
taken to prove merely that Thucydides was in£luenced 
as a writer by the tragedians, surely it proves more 
tnan that. For the whole development 0£ Attic tragedy 
was towards a greater naturalism, and Euripides in 431 
would hardly have made his characters speak in this 
waY unless the sophistic arguments were generally 
known and practised.248 
Finley is 0£ course not alone in noticing that 
suripidean characters speak sophistically; indeed, they 
speak so persuasively in this manner that as late as 1971, 
when the third edition 0£ his Geschichte der Griechischen 
Literatur was published, Lesky was still cautioning that 
Buripides should be considered • ... weder ein£ach Schuler 
der Sophisten noch Propagandist ihrer Ideen . . . .•249 
'fhe theory that sophists were the mentors 0£ Euripides is 
no longer promoted, even though it is acknowledged that 
Buripidean characters express views identi£ied with the 
sophists.250 But did such views £ind popular reception 
248Finley, Thucydides, p. 53. General discussion 
Of resemblances between sentiments expressed by characters 
in the History and Medea may be £ound on pp. 46-57; c£. 
also Finley•s earlier •Euripides and Thucydides," HSCP 49 
(1938; herea£ter Finley, "Euripides"), pp. 23-68 passim. 
1 
249Lesky, Geschichte, p. 409. For Euripides• 
: ays as critiques 0£ Sophistic rhetoric, see Robert 
s:a1her, Mortal Vision: The Wisdom 0£ Euripides (Hew York: 
· Martins Press, 1989), p. 23 
Ja 250see, e.g., Reck.£ord, "First Exi t, 11 p. 341, £or 
fi::n:s sophistic arguments in Medea as a reflection 0£ 
in.fl h century Athenian intellectualism. An analysis 0£ the 
lut"~e~ce 0£ sophistic argumentation and relativism in 
Pl.des• Electra may be 'found in Fass, Tragedy, pp. 45-
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Athenian citizens? G. B. Ker£erd has recently argued 
aoaong 
t tb.eY did, pointing out that the sophistic movement ttia 
ld not have flourished without the encouragement ,,ou 
sophists received -from regular employment by £i£th century 
s. c. Athenians. Social and politic al conditions created a 
popular need £or sophistic teachings, and Pericles was in 
tbe forefront of those who provided patronage £or 
individual sophists.251 
It is arguable, then, that views o£ten expressed by 
BUripidean characters, views Known to have been advanced by 
sophists, were not just -familiar to, but used by the 
Athenians in Euripides• audience. Moreover, these so-
called sophistic views are a part 0£ zero-sum ethics. 
Kote, for example, the correspondence between elements 0£ 
the zero-sum game and what Finley cites as elements common 
to Thucydides and Medea: 1) wide-spread rationalism; 2) 
arguments advanced and action taken on the basis 0£ 
personal advantage/bene£it/pro£it/interest; 3) material 
ends pursued at the expense 0£ natural ties; 4) sel£-
interest as destructive 0£ £ellow-£eeling, which is 
considered harm£ul to its possessor.252 Finley 
suggests au 0£ the above (which are elements 0£ the zero-
49. 
251Ker£erd, Sophistic Hovemen t, pp. 15-23. 
252Finl 
'l'h ey, ~.p. 
•Euripides," 
51. 
pp. 31-33, 47, and 65; 
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JDe as described by Gouldner) ,uJll ga 
fiftJ:J. 
century B. C. Athenians. 
were commonplace to 
zero-sum ethics are not, however, fully delineated by 
recourse to views of the sophists. There remains at the 
care of the zero-sum game an agonistic bent, whereby 
eolllPetition and self-advancement are more highly valued 
tnan cooperation and preservation of community. A high 
yalue on competition is found in societies where warriors" 
acnieveJDents on the battlefield mean the difference between 
life and death, security and peril. This hierarchy 0£ 
yalues was posited as characteristic of heroes of the 
Homeric poems by (among others) A. W. H. Adkins and K. I. 
Finley.253 Adkins argued £or at least a partial 
survival of this hierarchy into the classical age and saw a 
tension between the older, competitive virtues and what he 
terms the •quiet,• cooperative virtues as the latter, in 
the interest of civic cohesiveness and stability, began to 
be given at least lip service in the last half of the fifth 
century B. c.254 Finley, though not concerned in The 
World of Odysseus with the survival of competitive values 
into the fifth. century, nonetheless viewed competition as 
an enduring characteristic of the ancient Greeks: "Nothing 
defines the quality of Greek culture more neatly than the 
10 
253 Adkins, Keri t, pp. 1-60; 
-21; Finley, World 0£ Odysseus, 
c£. Koral Values, 
pp. 108-141. 
254Adk- K 58 ins, eri t, pp. 
-147. 
153-194; Koral Values, 
pp. 
pp. 
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. 0 'Which the idea 0£ competition was extended "from tr8f J. 
P ro•ess to the realm 0£ the intellect. to the pllfsical 
feats of poetry and dramatic composi tion.•25
5 
Of late. scholars outside the "field 0£ classics or 
trorI<ing beyond its boundaries agree. and posit that the so-
caUed Homeric conventions 0£ behavior survived into. and 
perhaps beyond. the "firth century B. C. Sociologist Alvin 
aouldner's description 0£ the zero-sum game used in this 
chapter is one example 0£ such work.. Gouldner acknowledges 
that there was a tension that developed between the •quiet• 
yirtues and the older competitive creed. but sees the 
survival 0£ the older behavioral conventions as a result 0£ 
Greece's continuing need £or a warrior class: 
The •quiet• virtues. as Adkins terms them. stressing 
cooperativeness or making cooperation £easible--such 
as temperance. ci vie service. justice. and wisdom--in 
time become more salient. The polis needed peace and 
stability within. i£ £or no other reason than to 
pursue its perennial wars abroad. Yet the newer 
virtues never entirely displaced the older 
implications 0£ agathos and arete that. as 
generalized terms 0£ commendation. were encysted with 
the older military traits. These traits formed a 
concrete paradigm of propriety underlying the more 
abstract usage. and they exerted silent inducements to 
charge military or competitive achievement with a 
special emotive "force. 
The viability of the older military virtues in 
the late classical period were not, however, an 
anachronism; they must not be regarded as a vestigial 
"survival" which continues simply through inertia. 
The military paradigm of virtue persists because it is 
actively reinforced by the continuing military 
character and ongoing warlike activities 0£ the city-
states. There was. it seems. a fatal contra-
diction--one among all too many--in the situation. 1£ 
255Finley 1 World 0£ Odysseus, p. 120. 
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constant warfare among the city-states required them 
to emphasize their internal stability and i£ this, in 
turn, contributed to the growing importance of the 
quiet, cooperative values, nonetheless the very 
continuance of the wars themselves, indeed their 
lengthening duration and growing ferocity, also called 
for fighting men and the old military virtues. Since 
the citizenry were both the major fighting 'force and, 
particularly during the periods of democracy, the 
ultimate decision-makers of the state, they were 
situationally constrained to maintain both sets of 
values and could thus never give full rein to either. 
It would have been fatal to the state, as then 
constituted in war-ridden Greece, had the citizenry 
lost all zest for the military virtues.256 
Ve need only recall that Medea, produced in 431 B. C., £ell 
at the beginning of A thens' longest and most devastating 
military engagement, to see the special applicability 0£ 
Gouldner's argument to this play. 
To Gouldner's arguments may be added the theories of 
Philip Slater and the work 0£ John J. Winkler. Slater 
begins his book with Thucydides' Corinthian ambassador's 
assessment of the Athenians (History 1.70) and elaborates 
upon it. After terming the Athenians first "difficult" and 
then perhaps even "impossible,• Slater, using zero-sum 
terminology, provides a sti£f antidote to the quite 
contrary, idealizing depiction of the Athenians until so 
recently accepted without question: 
T 25~Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 15-16. Cf. 
R horst~in Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An 
ii;~omic Study 0£ Institutions (London: Macmillan Co., 
ed 9• repr. ed., Hew York: Hew American Library, Mentor 
P ·• 1953), p. 153: "The temperament induced by the 
s:edatory habit of life makes for the survival and 
ccess of the group i£ the group's life as a collectivity 18 
also predominantly a li-fe 0£ hostile competition with 
Other groups." 
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rrneY were quarrelsome as friends, treacherous as 
eighbors, brutal as masters, faithless as servants, 
n nanow as lovers--all of which was in part redeemed ~y their intelligence and creativity. But the core of 
:t>oth what is most admirable and what is most 
"impossible" about them is a kind of grandiosi ty--an 
ability not merely to conceive, but also to 
entertain, in every sense of that term, an outrageous 
idea, an outlandish scheme.257 
s1ater's description can almost qualify as a thumb-nail 
sketcb of the zero-sum competitor. Winkler goes so far as 
to posit a Mediterranean •type• that survives even today, 
and senses in modern as well as ancient Greeks what he 
terms •a kind of controlled aggression•258 that, in 
yery few words, cuts to the core of zero-sum ethics. 
While it must be admitted that these reassessments of 
the ancient Greeks can--given our strictly literary 
evidence--no more be proven than the earlier idealizing 
portrait, further persuasive evidence comes, oddly enough, 
from early and middle Platonic dialogues. In these, 
characters (Polus and Callicles of Gorgias immediately leap 
to mind) parade out--in their commitment to self-
advancement at the expense of others--values described by 
257s1ater, Glory, pp. 3-4. 
258Winkler, Constraints, p. 3. Even if Winkler's 
assessment of a peculiarly Greek aggressiveness is 
unfounded, the act of taking vengeance, at least according 
to Burnett, "Tragedy of Revenge,• p. 1, has universal human 
;PPeal.. Cf. Ohlander, Suspense, p. 168, who cites 
H hu_cydi.des_' description of Athenian punishment of the 
ell.ans (Hi.story 5.84 ff.) in arguing that the Greeks, and 
:~~ecially the Athenians, would have identified strongly 
J l. h the avenging Medea. Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 68, sees 
(:~on in Thucydides' description of change and upheaval 
-!storz 3.82 ff.). 
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as basic to zero-sum assumptions. It is hard to 
aouldner 
. ve that Plato would pit his fifth century B. C. J>eue 
a tes against vestiges of a bygone era; it is much more socr 
u1telY that he set his mentor against men who, as they 
tnemselves claimed, held beliefs common to men of their 
tillles. 
To return to the Euripidean corpus in general, one 
other bit of evidence indicates that sentiments expressed 
in Euripides' plays were familiar to his audience. It is a 
frequent charge against Euripides that he portrays charac-
ters in an anachronistic way, that is, that Euripides 
draws characters from the mythic past who nonetheless 
express sentiments of the present. A. E. Haigh, for 
example, terms Euripides "most modern in tone and 
sentiment.11 259 D. W. Lucas agrees, and criticizes 
Euripides for his piecemeal application 0£ modernity: 
Euripides o£ten sets his plays in the Greece 0£ his 
own day; we can put our finger on many passages with a 
contemporary application and characters who were 
suggested by types to be met in fifth century Athens. 
But at times Euripides is all bits and pieces, because 
he has broken away from a tradition and can no longer 
use its language consistently. The characters of 
Sophocles bring before us the ideals of a society 
within the Athenian commonwealth, those of Euripides 
2 59 A. E. Haigh, The Tragic Drama of the Greeks 
(Ox£ord: Clarendon, 1925). p. 217. Cf. Arrowsmith, 
•rdeas," pp. 37 and 51, who gives several examples of 
Euripides' penchant £or translating "heroic• character into 
•realistic £i£th century terms," and who argues that 
Euripides •preferred to base his theater upon what he 
actually saw as the prime reality of his time .... " 
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restore to us scraps 0£ the reality .2.60 
\lib.at we are de-fending in this study is something 
d Lucas• sense 0£ Euripides• contemporaneity . 
.,e1on 
ugb. one can certainly mine Euripides• plays £or •bits 
•ttb.0 
and pieces• 0£ contemporary in£luence,2.61 we are 
pasi ting that, in depicting the main characters 0£ Medea, 
suripides was representing in particular and dynamic 'form 
J>ebaviors and the belie£s that in£ormed these characters, 
and tb.at their behaviors and belie£s were considered valid 
!>Y many i£ not all 0£ the Athenians in the audience.262. 
Finally, it may be argued that one choice made by 
Buripides in composing Medea testi£ies to the poet's intent 
to suggest the particular appeal 0£ the highly competitive 
and autonomous Medea to his Athenian audience. I re£er, 0£ 
course, to Euripides• decision--cri ticized since the time 
of Aristotle (Poetics 1461b.19-2.1)--to include in his text 
260Lucas, Tragic Poets, p. 172.. There is clearly 
unstated criticism in Lucas• contrast 0£ Sophocles and 
Kuripides. In this, he is 'following a long critical 
tradition. Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 9, traces the 
history 0£ critics deprecating Euripides• use 0£ •-familiar 
things,• which was sometimes attributed to the poet's 
psychological instability (Sophocles, by contrast, had no 
such problem); see Michelini's nn. 30 and 31 £or 
bibliography and amusing quotes. 
261This practice is now out 0£ 'favor in the 
~:itical literature. An annotated and categorized collec-
, ion of such minings may be 'found in Yankow, Socratic 
!..!flOT!JJ.L'!), pp. 18-38. 
262see Easterling, •1n£anticide,• p. 180: •1£ :~<lea is to be seen as a distinctively oriental type . 
G Y does Euripides make her talk like a Greek, argue like a 
r-eek, and to all appearances £eel like a Greek'?• 
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otherwise unmotivated appearance 0£ Aegeus. By showing 
tne 
•s -friendship with the legendary Athenian king, and 
11edea 
s' promise to accept her a£ter she leaves Corinth, 
•egeu 
·ptdes provides his Chorus with an opportunity to 
sur1 
r
ibe an idealized A thens in their third stasimon (824-4esc 
865). This is not merely any idealized A thens, but, as 
critics have noticed,263 it is the Athens described a 
few 1110nths a£ter the production 0£ Medea by Thucydides• 
Pericles in his £uneral oration. The Chorus are incredu-
lous that such an Athens would accept the likes 0£ the 
child-killer, Medea. But they are wrong, as Euripides is 
careful to point out. For as Medea makes her escape, she 
informs Jason, •1 mysel£ am going to the land 0£ 
Brechtheus, to live with Aegeus the son 0£ Pandion• (1384-
1385). "The land 0£ Erechtheus• recalls the •Erechtheidae• 
of the third stasimon and the ideal A thens they inhabit, 
and, as myth melds with contemporary history, Athenians in 
the audience are le£t to ponder their own notional 
acceptance 0£ Medea and the possible consequences 0£ such 
acceptance, given the consequences £or Aegeus known £rom 
myth.264 
As Medea announces her itinerary at the play•s end, 
Euripides brings Medea and the de£initions represented by 
263e.g., Elliott, 
Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ 
Medea, p. 
Revenge,• p. 
89 at 
23. 
827-30, 
264HcDermot t, Incarnation, pp. 105-106. 
and 
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actions quite literally home to his a udience.265 
11er 
s to suggest that, -for all their idealism,266 
se seelll 
like Jason and Aegeus, would be willing to bring 
tJ1ef, 
first to Greece and then to A thens Medea and what she 
265ffewton, •Passionate Poison,• p. 20; McDermott, 
1 carnation, p. 116. McDermott (p. 117) is excellent in 
..!!-r analysis o-f the e££ect o-f Medea's journey to A thens: 
~st his audience sit back. and presume that such things 
1181 happen only onstage, or only in the mythic past, or 
nlf when wrought by a barbarian witch, the allusive 
:nsertion o-f Athens into the play intimates that the 
confusion Medea embodies lives on to the present day and 
touches them even on their sacred citadel, -for it is part 
of the human condition.• 
This last remark. recalls Seesk.in's description 0£ the 
reader-auditors' sense o-f their own incompetencies as 
comparable to those o-f interlocutors in elenchos (Seesk.in, 
Dialogue, p. 15). It is di-f-ficult, upon re-flection, to 
feel smug about the Athenians' shamed recognition o-f their 
complicity in basic human realities. The urge to sel-f-
assertion is, a-fter all, one that has allure -for all 
humans. 
2661 disagree with the critical opinion that holds 
out hope for the idealized Athens o-f the third stasimon. 
Burnett, •Tragedy o-f Revenge,• p. 23, -for example, compares 
lleclea to the Furies at the end o-f the Eumenides and 
nggests that •Medea might undergo a trans-formation and 
Join the company of benevolent forces, since her promise to 
Aeceus, like theirs at the end o-f the Eumenides, is one o-f 
fruitfulness (714-15).• Burnett blames Jason more than 
Bedea for the pollution in the play, and likens Medea to 
9emesis who may take re-fuge •at Athens, a city that is 
healthy and virtuous still." (p. 24). 
McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 105-106, by contrast, does 
not forget that Aegeus• child will be attacked by Medea, 
:d instead calls attention to the implication in the 
Be oral song that Medea's presence will pollute Athens. id:r~ott ~xtends this threat o-f pollution to the Athens 
lllfb. h.zed in the minds o-f the the 431 B. c. theater-goers: 
•ee e .clarity of the easy patriotism which the poet 
eyomi.n~ly seeks to arouse with_ the Chorus's glittering 
hauc~t.ion 0£ Athens's pristine beauty is tainted by these 
lb.e ~ ing c:iuestions. One more revered truth is assailed as 
Per-v u:i .. enians are reluctantly drawn to see a chink. in their 
asive assumption o-f virtue.• 
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£or, provided she :further their interests. By 
stands 
. ng Medea literally home to his audience, Euripides, 
1>ring1 
Socrates in elenchos, drew .. the Athenians, as £inal 
like 
tnterlocutors, into highly personal involvement with the 
definitions presented (and ultimately re£uted) on stage. 
But Euripides, like Socrates, did not only demand 0£ 
biS audience personal involvement. He likewise a££orded 
them a distance £rom which they, emotionally disengaged, 
could see their own behaviors and belie£s in a new light. 
The Impersonal Aspect 
In an attempt to explain the £actors that contribute 
to the extreme discom£ort one is likely to £eel as Medea 
draws to a close, Bennett Simon remarks, "The portrayal 0£ 
character . leaves us with no one to admire, no one 
with whom we can make a com£ortable and sustained 
identification, let alone a heroic identification."267 
Although Simon addresses his remark to a modern audience, 
critics have long sensed that the Athenian audience of 431 
B. C. would have found Medea, Jason, and, to a lesser 
extent, Creon, less than pa la table. In short, Medea is a 
267g· I imon, Tragic Drama, p. 98. Cf. McDermott, 
tf!arnation, p. 70: "The audience's sympathies can attach 
Ja em.selves wholly to neither party [i.e., neither Medea nor 
di:on]; li_ke the shades 0£ unburied souls, they must hover 
llcDem.bodied, vainly seeking a £inal resting place." 
l'ep e~m.ott•s -final judgment is that "[b]oth characters 
e • and so both sexes are indicted." (p. 114). 
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and a woman,268 Jason less than £ully heroic, 1>ar1>arian 
a Corinthian. By assigning zero-sum characteristics 
creon 
likes 0£ these, Euripides gives his audience, in 
to tne 
SilDon's words, •no one with whom [they] can make a 
coJDfortable and sustained identi£ication." That is 
precisely the poet's aim.269 
Medea's 'foreign background is something Euripides 
geeps in his audience's mind. Indeed, the 'first lines 0£ 
the play (6-12) describe Medea coming to Greece £rom 
anotner land. Medea hersel£, twice in her 'first speech to 
the Chorus, calls to mind her 'foreignness: she is, she 
reminds the women, a special case because 0£ her status as 
stranger and because 0£ having come £rom a barbarian land 
(~£vov, 222; , EiC Y"1S. f3apf3apou, 255). The Chorus 
268Hedea •s "otherness• is discussed by Goldhill, 
Reading, pp. 116-117. For Medea as a composite 'figure, 
some of whose elements are meant to discourage emotional 
involvement 0£ the audience, see Gellie, "Character," pp. 
18-22. See also Friedrich, •ffedeas Rache,• p. 236, £or 
Euripides• artistry in bringing Medea into this world 
Without ever taking her out 0£ the world 0£ myth. Hills, 
Kythopoeia, passim, argues the thesis (p. 8) that "[Medea] 
is both male and 'female, good and evil, Hellene (i.e. 
Corinthinan) and barbarian (i.e. X:olchian); a Heliad 
d.~scendant 0£ the Sun-god who is at the same time linked 
•1th ch thonic powers." 
K ~69Foley, "Divided Sel£," p. 81, recognizes both 
edea s barbarism and her £eminini ty as distancing 
•echanisms exploited by Euripides to demonstrate "the 
~ntradictions inherent in this heroic ethic and behavior." 
e;rows~ith, "Ideas," p. 49, sees in Medea's barbarism the 
Of Pression 0£ naked, uncivilized physis; "· .. a symbol 
ha ~he. ter~ible closeness 0£ all human nature to ~h~i~m; in her inadequate sophrosune and her imper£ect 
10 . ia is represented the norm 0£ Hellenic, and most human, Cl.ety.• 
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:t1edea's alien status, though, as cause for sympathy, 
1ee 
contempt > ' ( € lfl 
, 
VQl€lS. X80VL, 
The same cannot be said of Jason's attitude. He 
it up in Medea•s £ace that by marrying him she has tb.rows 
d the great advantage of living in "Greece instead of ,a1ne 
a barbarian land" 
> ' 
aV1"l pappapou xaovos. 
yol'ov, 536-537). Later in the play he bemoans the fact 
tb,at he was the one to have brought her •from a barbarian 
iand to a Greek. home" (pappapou &vO xeovOs. 
uBU"IV' €s. oCKov, 1330-1331), be ca use no "Greek. 
woman" ever would have dared kill her own children (1339-
1340).271 In Jason•s words one can detect the 
prejudice against foreigners and xenophobia familiar from 
other ancient Greek. texts; Medea thus understandably 
suspects Jason abandoned her because of such prejudice, 
i.e., that he realized his "barbarian marriage" would not 
serve his reputation well in his old age (591). 
27
°For the Burse"s role in increasing audience 
sympathy for Medea, see Pucci, Violence, pp. 32-58, and 
Ohlander, Suspense, pp. 37-40. 
271Moline, Plato's Theory, p. 24, sees Medea"s ~ck of the typical Greek. woman's sophrosune as one in a 
ong list of factors which would alienate her from 
•:dience sympathy. I would argue that Medea lacks this 
:C, rt.ue because Euripides has depicted her as a zero-sum 
Shmpetitor, which depiction would win her some sympathy. 
a aw, "Female Intruder," pp. 258-259, however, sees Medea 
•=·~ typically Greek. woman in her moral values and her 
dells, the latter of which differ from the average only in Bree. 
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'l'b.e £oreignness 0£ Medea, then, creates a distance 
b.er and the audience, who, i£ they were typical J)et1feen 
were prejudiced against non-Greeks (especially 
sree1<.s. 
gasterners) and xenophobic.272 For although they, like 
Cb.orus, would probably recognize in Medea •s isolation ttie 
Competitor's £amiliar plight, the males 0£ the audience ttie 
aonetb.eless would £eel more a££inity £or Jason than 
lledea.273 For they, no less than Medea and the Chorus 
(or anY 0£ us, £or that matter), could £ind in sex 
difference an easy peg upon which to hang the ca use £or 
all tb.e dissonance they sense in their own operational 
J)elie£s.274 Recall that the Chorus were eager and 
ready to blame men £or the oath-breaking and disregard £or 
~ that are regular 'features 0£ the zero-sum competition 
in which they nonetheless engage (414-415, 439-441). 
Should we be surprised, then, i£ Jason is sexist in 
272page, Medea, pp. xv111-xix, describes the 
nrious facets 0£ this prejudice and phobia. For 
Euripides• amelioration 0£ Medea's barbarian status, see 
llills, Kythopoeia, pp. 94-97. 
273Hurray, Euripides, pp. 
that •the plain man thought that 
be thrashed, not listened to." 
53-54, claims 0£ Medea 
such women should simply 
(197 
274See Karylin B. Arthur, "Classics," Signs 2 
Gr S), p. 390: "The extreme sexual dimorphism 0£ ancient 
-~eek society was both its most rigid rule and its most 
~•orb· 1rr . ing Problem. Inner and outer space, rational and 
bea:.tiona1 forces, religion and politics, chaos and order, 
•er lal and human, human and divine, death and li£e--all 
bet: capable, in the imaginative li£e 0£ the Greeks, 0£ 
llale g subsumed under and expressed by the relation bet ween 
and 'female." 
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tl.. 0 g to women negative aspects o:f zero-sum compe-attril>U 
With Jason as their model, the audience is 
f r ded the com£ort 0£ distance :from the more ne£arious af o 
facets 0£ competi tion.275 Jason is smug in citing 
, sex as the cause £or the heavy o££ence she takes at 11edea s 
being worsted (568-573). When he proposes disposing 0£ the 
female sex al together (573-575),276 Jason (and, 
'f'icariously, the male audience) projects onto the opposite 
275Hills, Hythopoeia, p. 65, sees in Jason's 
misogyny that 0£ the Athenians. 
Medea is not, however, entirely :female; she usurps a 
male role in her aggressiveness and strength. This, 
nonetheless, could still serve as a distancing mechanism in 
a revenge play. See Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge," pp. 3-
9, who notes that al though :feminizing avengers tends to 
make them appear weak.er, and their revenge there£ore 
ethically more pa la table, Euripides eschews this mitigation 
which would give his play "moral delicacy." Instead, in 
Medea, Euripides "embrac[es) the rudeness 0£ a simple 
archaic revenge." 
Even though Medea does become in some sense masculine, 
she remains, nonetheless, :female, and this af£ords the male 
audience objectivity. Zeitlin, "Playing the Other," p. 67, 
makes an important point on gender 0£ characters in the 
ancient Greek. theater: "Even when :female characters 
struggle with the conflicts generated by the 
particularities 0£ their subordinate social position, their 
demands £or identity and sel£-esteem are nevertheless 
designed primarily £or exploring the male project 0£ 
selfhood in the larger world as these impinge upon men's 
claims to knowledge, power, :freedom and sel£-su££iciency--
not for some greater entitlement or privilege, as some have 
thought, that the :female might gain £or hersel£, not even 
for revising notions 0£ what £eminini ty might be or mean." 
276Hippolytus begins his famous diatribe against 
•omen (Hippolytus 616-668) with a similar suggestion. How 
much audience sympathy he retains by the end of the 
Presentation 0£ his belabored, excessive position is 
questionable. Theseus, at least (967-970), is not 
~ontvinced by Hippolytus• projection 0£ sexual misconduct 
n o women. 
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the cutthroat retaliation inevitable for losers in 
5es 
m competition. In so doing, the audience is allowed sero-su 
l.·ew such behavior as being every bit as despicable to~ 
is.2.77 it as 
The audience, then, doubly identifies with Jason 
against Medea, because he is Greek. and male. They are 
allowed by this identification an objective, and probably 
277Moline, "Euripides, Socrates," p. 53, 
emphasizes the maniacal aspects of Medea 1 s cutthroat 
competitiveness, and concludes that audience identification 
with her was thereby precluded: "Medea was of course worse 
than queer. She was a crazed, would-be child-murderess and 
regicide who had already killed her own brother, as we are 
reminded at 167, and had been responsible for Pelias 1 dying 
a horrible death at the hands of his daughters, as she 
admits at 483-487. She regards herself as having betrayed 
her own father and his house, an estimate certain to be 
shared by a conventional Greek. audience. One would not 
have to be a wor(l]dly rhetorician to recognize that 
ordinary Athenians in the audience would not be at all 
likely to identify with her." 
Moline is of course correct; cf. Richmond Lattimore, 
The Poetry of Greek. Tragedy (Baltimore and Oxford: Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1958), p. 108 n. 7, for Medea as •pre-
eminent cutter-up and boiler-woman." Moline's observation, 
however, aims to disprove the view that Medea can be 
considered a mouthpiece for Euripides 1 polemic against 
Socrates. But rather than merely making Medea discredit-
able as a mouthpiece, through Medea 1 s "crazed" actions 
Euripides illustrates the emotionally repugnant, yet 
nonetheless logical consequence of zero-sum objectives. 
If, in fact, the object is self-advancement, and if it is 
deemed acceptable to use other people as means to that end, 
Medea should be considered a consummate player. Crazed she 
is,. to be sure, but crazed also is zero-sum competition, 
•hi.ch is Euripides 1 point, as Moline would doubtlessly 
aer-ee. 
1 For Euripides
1 care in dignifying Medea early in the 
: ay, see Easterling, "Infanticide," p. 179. Cf. also 
(l~~nar-d Knox, "Euripides the Psychologist," Omnibus 8 
p . 4-), p. 26, who notes that this •exotic" Colchian 
n t-i.ncess and "awesome priestess, prophet and magician" is 
onetheless presented in a "painfully realistic" context. 
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·te critical, perspective on Medea and the definitions 
qu1 
mani£ests. In short, the audience mirrors the Chorus 1 
511e 
perspective: while the Chorus are sympathetic with Medea 
and prejudiced against Jason, the audience is sympathetic 
tritll Jason and prejudiced against Medea. Yet Medea and 
Jason manifest--at least by the play 1 s end--the same 
definitions. 
The audience must surely have some sense of this, 
especially because Jason, as hero, can hardly fit the bill. 
It has been a critical norm that Jason leaves something to 
1>e desired.278 Some critics, in fact, find his 
behavior despicable. Most of these comments, however, as 
Robert Palmer has argued, betray modern sensibilities 
anachronistically assumed to apply to the Athenian males 
sitting in the audience.279 It is true enough that 
Jason is opportunistic and callous in his treatment of 
Bedea and the children, but, after all, so much would be 
ezpected of him as a zero-sum competi tor.280 If he is 
278Arrowsmi th, "Ideas," p. 37, describes 
Ku.ripides1 Jason as •a vulgar adventurer" and terms his 
characterization by Euripides a "deflation of traditional 
heroism." Mills, Mythopoeia, pp. 60-72, sketches Jason 1 s 
decline from "true consort of Medea" to "loser." 
279Palmer, "Apology," pp. 50-55. See p. 49 for an 
amusing overview (with references) of critics and their 
ridicule of Jason. 
280 
co t Burnett, "Tragedy of Revenge," p. 15, expresses Ofntemp~ for Jason 1 s behavior; many of her criticisms are 
acti.cs common to zero-sum competitors. 
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certain 0£ the •quiet• virtues must be shunted 
tO 1fint 
In regard to his desire £or sel£-advancement, then, 
. unlikely that many 0£ the audience would be sorely j.t lS 
t bY Jason's behavior.281 It is his tenuous hold put OU 
t he status 0£ hero, or even 0£ mere winner, however, on 
tbat would win £or Jason an objective distance 'from 
suripides' audience. 
Jason's de£iciencies as a hero in Euripides' Medea 
bJlVe not gone unremarked in the critical literature. For 
while Knox, Bongie, and others have compared Medea to Ajax 
or Achilles, no one compares Jason £a vorably to other Greek 
heroes. This is no mere misapplication 0£ modern sensi-
bilities, £or there is evidence that, at least by the time 
of Medea,282 Jason's stature as hero was open to 
attack. The reasons £or this are £airly obvious; the main 
one is broadcast by Medea as soon as Jason gives her a 
chance to speak. A£ter welcoming him with the label 
and accusing him 0£ > • avavdpla (465-
466), Medea spells out what she claims every Greek on the 
Argo knew, that she saved Jason and hersel£ per-formed all 
281Palmer, •Apology," passim, argues that Jason's 
treatment 0£ Medea would be considered reasonable by the ::le audience, who, given the Periclean citizenship law 0£ 
1 1/450, would sympathize with Jason's desire £or nel~timate male heirs. Conacher, Euripidean Drama, p. 190 
• O, counters that, had Euripides intended us to 
:7•Pathize with Jason, he would not have •1et him cut such 
sorry £igure in comparison with Medea in this scene." 
•tz 282For bibliography on an earlier, healer and 
ard Jason, see Hills, Hythopoeia, p. 60 nn. 4-6. 
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itS necessary for securing the fleece and trying to 
esp lo 
· s father's throne (476-487).283 And although 
1a1n hl. 
n denigrates Medea's role in JaSO 
qualJDS aboU t crediting Aphrodite 
enterprise (527-528). 
his success, he feels no 
as the "savior" of his 
These two claims together spell out the primary 
obstacle to Jason's heroism. He was, it seems, incapable 
of great deeds without the help of others, most notably 
dd 284 women and go esses. Had Euripides wanted to 
suppress what was, even in his day, Jason's questionable 
hold on heroic status, he would have omitted Medea's 
belittling recollection of Jason's past impotence. But 
i.DStead, Euripides begins and ends his play with reminders 
of the Argona u tic ex:pedi tion,285 and makes use of what 
Roses Hadas has called, in his article by that name, "The 
Tradition of a Feeble Jason," to increase distance between 
283Mills, Mythopoeia, pp. 64-65, sees in the 
nautical imagery the suggestion that Medea is a new 
Ar1onaut, whose successes underscore Jason•s 'failures; 
Jason, not even capable of navigating successfully through 
the storm of his wi£e's verbiage (525), is henpecked. 
284Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 60, 'further remarks that, 
:~ the voyage to Colchis, other Argonauts outshone Jason by 
•heir exploits. Cf. Burnett, •Tragedy 0£ Revenge,• p. 16, 
th 0 notes that "Jason had never been a hero according to 
co e rute, for he had not set off alone (or with a single 
IDPanion) but rather in a vast company " 
285 
tha Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge," p. 16, remarks 
i-a· t "[t]he myth 0£ the Argonauts hangs like a great 
lnted scene behind this play .... " 
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Jason and 
the audience.286 
au t besides being -feeble in past exploits, Jason has, 
t ne p1ay's present and -future time, another strike j.11 
against him. He is once again no hero, no victor; even 
..,orse, he is -finally a total loser. It is obvious to all 
J>Ut Jason himsel-f that he is worsted by Medea in their 
e9/erY encounter. His attempts at sophistic argumentation 
are callow and pathetic. His every a vowed aim is over-
turned by the end: he has no security, no position, no 
children past and no hope o-f them in the -future.287 
He is the very picture o-f impotence as he rages at the 
suspended, out o-f reach Medea. Medea's prediction o-f his 
ignoble death--beaned on the head by a rotting hunk o-f the 
Argo--is the death knell not just -for Jason, but -for his 
heroic stat us as well (1386-1388).288 The audience, 
286Koses Hadas, "The Tradition o-f a Feeble Jason," 
CP 31 (1936), pp. 166-168. Hadas argues -from the evidence 
of an early -firth century B. C. crater, which shows Jason 
puny and outclassed by the dragon, Athena, and another 
Argonaut, and -from the limited evidence on the Haupactia 
that Apollonius Rhodius' aµ..ftxavos Jason is not the 
first helpless Jason, but instead a tradition (perhaps 
comic) -from the -firth century. For Jason's extensive 
reliance on Medea, see von Fritz, Tragodie, p. 332. 
287Burnett, "Tragedy o-f Revenge," p. 16, sees the 
destruction o-f Jason's line, a detail o-f his story common 
to au variations, as proo-f o-f his -failure to prove his 
PUrity and thereby his right to rule. For such destruction 
~s the right-ful punishment o-f perjurers, see Rickert, 
Akrasia," pp. 106-113. 
v· 288Paul Diel, Symbolism in Greek Mythology, trans. 
,:ncent Stuart, Micheline Stuart, and Rebecca Folkman 
OUlder and London: Shambala Publications, Inc., 1980), 
P. 155, interprets Jason's ignoble death as punishment -for 
502 
sympathy £or Jason undoubtedly increases as their 
•Jlose 
to identi£y with Medea decreases, is le£t with the 
al>ilitY 
o£ an aging never-was hero, as decrepit as his picture 
•oldering ship. 1£, in £act, the Athenians 0£ Euripides' 
tillle were as entrenched in zero-sum realities as we have 
suggested, they would have had little sympathy £or such a 
thoroughgoing loser. Plans and intentions do not count 
811100g the competitive, a£ter all; only results are used to 
•easure the man.289 And by this measure, Jason comes 
up short. 
so, too, does Creon, who espouses competitive virtues, 
but lacks the detachment to remain aloof £rom the plight 0£ 
his competitor, Medea. Creon there£ore also loses in his 
contest, and dies in the offing. But Creon has an even 
stronger mark against him, at least in the eyes 0£ the 
Athenian audience 0£ 431 B. C. For Creon is a Corinthian, 
and the Athenians had in the preceding year engaged in 
his Spiritual paucity, his £ailure in the struggle against 
banalization. Similarly, Blaiklock, "Nautical Imagery," 
pp, 233-234, sees "decadence,.. as one 0£ Medea 1 s themes, and 
:oaunents that "[t]he £alling beam which did [Jason) to 
c e:th but translated into physical tragedy the spiritual 
a a astrophe 0£ a lost soul." C£. p. 236, where the Argo, 
Peccording to Blaiklock, "suggests the ship 0£ [Jason's] rson." 
code 
Ollly 
289Adk· . 
. ins, Merit, p. 35, speaking 0£ the warrior 
in the Homeric world: "Success is so imperative that 
results have any value: intentions are unimportant." 
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nostili ties with Corinth.290 It is therefore 
l tnat Euripides would have had to work. hard to avoid u.ite Y 
U
sing bis audience's contempt for any Corinthian char-
aro 
acter. 
Tbe poet expends no such effort on Creon.291 
silence he leaves his audience to their prejudice Bf biS 
and res en tmen t. 
Simon, then, is right: Euripides indeed leaves us, 
and bis original audience even more so, "· .. with no one 
to admire, no one with whom we can make a comfortable and 
sustained identification, let alone a heroic identifi-
cation." Like Socrates who claims the logos does the 
refuting and thereby allows an objective distance from 
which to consider the disputed definitions, Euripides, too, 
prevents his audience from totally identifying with the 
definitions manifested on stage by his characters. For 
290ohlander, Suspense, p. 64. See Page, Medea, 
p. xxv, for strained relations between Athens and Corinth 
as evidenced by the rumor reported by Parmenisk.os that the 
Corinthians had bribed Euripides to shift the murder of the 
Children from their ancestors to Medea. McDermott, 
Incarnation, pp. 98-99, adds that Creon •s more tyrannical 
•ode upon his entrance would have contributed to his being 
stereotyped as an unsympathetic Corinthian. 
291r do not, however, agree with Burnett, "Tragedy 
~ Revenge," pp. 15 n. 27, 18 n. 40, and 19, who finds 
hi eon culpable and therefore somehow deserving of his 
J deous fate. Burnett involves the Corinthian king in 
c::on·~ cri_me of not respecting oaths and incriminates . 
Wit on in his daughter's greed and vanity. Creon cannot win 
•h h Bur~et t; she criticizes first his exiling Medea before 
Re~l co_mmi ts any crime because it "viola te[s] ordinary 
and enic ~ractice• (p. 15 n. 27), and then his being •weak. 
be• (a traitor to his own definition of what a ruler should 
p, 18 n. 40) when he grants Medea a reprieve. 
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. reason he has drawn Medea, Jason, and Creon so that no 
tlJ.lS 
etitive Athenian could consistently empathize with any 
eolDP 
In this, he leaves space in which he can practice 
of them. 
. maieu tic art, in which he, lik.e Socrates, can subtly 
IJ.lS 
suggest the truth through analogy. 
505 
Part Four: The Art o:f Midwi:fery: 
Euripides• Maieu tic Analogies 
ductorY Remarks 
111tro 
In chapter One it was acknowledged that Socrates, as 
"d i.·fe more o£ten than not is unable to bring the truth 
•J. ,, ' 
to birth 'from his interlocutors, who :flee to avoid another 
round o£ elenchos. The reason interlocutors want to avoid 
it was argued, stems :from Socrates• habitual use ~nchos, 
of analogies to technai. These analogies subtly impose 
upon the proposed de:finitions a consistency and logic 
whereby the end, an acknowledged benefit, in-forms the 
aeans, and not vice versa. The subtle imposition is made 
overt when Socrates, near the end o:f elenchos, 
1yllogistically applies de:fini tions conceded within 
analogies to the particular actions put :forth as 
definitions by interlocutors. Interlocutors :flee, then, 
when they realize that analogies to cra:fts render the 
particular actions proposed inde£ensible as de:fini tions 
because those actions do not result in bene:fit. Truth is 
not born because interlocutors are too emotionally invested 
• 
in their belie:fs to allow them to be reformulated by 
analogies to cra:fts. Such re:formulation would render their 
beliefs no longer recognizable as their own, and, as i:f 
that were not enough, interlocutors would then be le:ft with 
lhe messy job of adjusting all actions informed by those 
beliefs. 
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'l'lle elenchos is not, then, brought in early dialogues 
1
·ts true termini, the birth 0£ truth and the moral 
to 
ilDProvement concomitant with that birth. Instead, 
logies are le-ft, suspended alongside the £ail ure to ana 
acnieve de£inition, to work. suggestion on the ultimate 
interlocutor, Plato 1 s reader-auditor. These analogies 
encourage the reader-auditor to "fiddle with the premises" 
in an attempt to arrive at de£initions that will withstand 
!tl_enchos, i.e., that will not collapse under analogies to 
crafts. In the end, the truth is only a £a int suggestion, 
an unsolved riddle with intriguing clues. 
Euripides, in constructing his elenchos in Medea, 
similarly draws analogies to crafts, which suggest to his 
interlocutors in the play (the Chorus) and to the ultimate 
interlocutors in the audience the truth that remains unborn 
at the end of the play.292 By applying the analogy 0£ 
the craft of music to the definition 0£ arete, Euripides 
suggests that the arete of the zero-sum competitor does not 
292w. G. Arnott, "Red Herrings and Other Baits: A 
Study in Euripidean Techniques," MPL 3 (1978), pp. 14-16, 
lives examples (but not from Medea) 0£ Euripides 1 technique 
of Using "linked images . . . to deepen our understanding 
of complex situations by making us see the implications 0£ 
startling relationships and unexpected patterns 0£ events." 
:;nott th~n. (pp. 16 ff.) goes on to illustrate what he 
rms Eur1p1des 1 use 0£ •symbolic analogy,• whereby the 
P~et presents " .... at a relatively early stage of a 
p ay, wen before the details of the climax can be 
:~~dieted, a mythical parallel to one 0£ the events that 
1 l belong to that climax." 
h Both techniques are related to the one argued for 
b ere: use of analogies to cra£t to suggest a solution 
eyond the effected reversal. 
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... ieV'e its proper end, but instead produces music's 
aC,µ 
t itnesis, an 
dissonance and disharmony.2.93 Then, by 
applying the analogy 0£ the era £t 0£ medicine both to the 
f . ni tion 0£ arete and to sophia, Euripides suggests that de J. 
"'J.. a informed by competitive arete, does not achieve 
~· 
111edicine's proper end, health. Such a sophia is in £act 
destructive, whereas its potential is curative. 
Euripides' elenchos, like that 0£ Socrates, is not 
content to stop at suggestion that comes £rom subtle 
tmposi tion 0£ the analogies. Instead, as will be argued 
below (Part Five), Euripides drives home the logic 0£ the 
benefit 0£ health derived £rom the analogy to medicine by 
syllogistically bringing it to bear in the realm 0£ the 
definition 0£ competitive eros. Here, the stark contrast 
between life-bestowing benefits that are readily identified 
with eros, procreation and flourishing, and the produce 0£ 
eros in zero-sum competition, destruction and death, jolts 
the audience out 0£ complacent acceptance 0£ zero-sum 
definitions. It leaves them with a windegg, impels them 
toward the hard work 0£ rede£inition, and, ultimately, 
toward bringing truth to birth. 
!!'ete and Music: The Virtue 0£ Harmony 
Music in Medea is -first heard, and only later de-fined 
293Pace Kusurillo, "Reconsideration," p. 73, who 
~~~Siders Euripides' treatment 0£ music a "minor moti£"; a 
•R isc~urse on the origins 0£ music" is something -from which 
Uri.pides cannot -forbear." 
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era-ft with analogous bearing on arete. Be-fore Medea 
as a 
e..,er 
she "sings" (µ.e~ vel, 150) offstage, as 
Chorus remark shortly after their entrance. And indeed 
tne 
is "singing," for the Chorus• use of this verb is no 
sne 
294 IDere metaphor. Medea--and the Hurse who sings 
responsively to her--uses lyric anapests (96-130, 139-147), 
a digni£ied meter appropriate to the lamentation she 
describes herself as singing 
, "" (odupµ.wv, 112).295 
But hers is a disconcerting song, and not because of the 
cries of 
, , 
lW and , "" alal. These regularly 
punctuate tragic lament and would not sound as unnatural to 
the Greeks as they do to us.296 Medea •s song is 
disconcerting because it careens from mournful lament to 
explosions of violence. As such, it is the antithesis 0£ 
one of music's -fundamentals, the melding 0£ two or more 
elements in to harmonious union. 
Medea's song is disturbing to both the Hurse and the 
Chorus. It is too violent and estranging to quali£y as the 
lament suggested by the anapestic meter. That Medea twice 
expresses suicidal desires (96-97, 144-147) is not 
294Pace Page, Medea, p. 81 at line 150, who 
ack -T nowledges that "such a use 0£ the verb is very rare in 
ragedy." 
295Simon Tragic Drama, p. 7 4, sees Medea •s 
•moa ' -
ns, curses, and shrieks" as evidence 0£ the Nurse's 
allegation (190-200) that traditional song is not able to 
cure Pain. 
296Elliott 
• Medea, p . 75 at line 96. 
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C
essarilY strange in a lament, but that she hates her 
11e 
cnildren, curses them along with their -father, and wishes 
destruction upon the whole house (111-114) is. The Nurse 
iS t:nerefore understandably concerned £or the children's 
safetY (89-94, 98-105), £or Medea's lament reveals more 
tnan sorrow: it reveals deep alienation. Medea •s song 
signals dissolution 0£ all social ties, or so the Nurse 
cautions the solicitous Chorus: there is no home (140) £or 
them to be -friends to, and besides, Medea will not respond 
to comforting words 0£ -friends (143-144). The Nurse 
attributes Medea's alienation to "the moods 0£ tyrants" 
(119-130), whose propensity £or excelling as opposed to 
living "on equal terms" is the hallmark 0£ the play•s most 
highly approved individual--the zero-sum competitor (see 
above, Part One). 
Given the disturbing content 0£ Medea's song, it is no 
wonder that the Nurse takes time to ponder the use to which 
song should be put: 
So111e 
You would not err calling men of times ago bumbling 
and not smart in any way, those men who devised songs 
Cuµ.vous)--the delight£ul (Tep11'vas) sounds 
of li£e--£or use at £easts and banquets and at 
dinners; but no one -found a way, with music and with 
~tr~ins 0£ many strings (µ.ouo!I Kat 11'0>..uxopooLs 
ltldaLs), to stop hate£ul pains (oTuylous 
· · . >..uvas), £rom which death and terrible/clever 
chance trip up (ocpaU.ouol) houses. And yet it 
would be gain £or mortals to cure these things with 
song (µ.o>..val'oL); but where there are luxurious 
feasts, why strain the voice in vain? For the ready-
to-hand £ul£illment 0£ the £east in itsel£ holds 
delight (TEP1'l v) £or mortals. (190-203). 
of the Nurse's remarks must await comment; here we 
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the preponderance of musical terms, signalling the 
11ote 
duction of the musical analogy in full force. The 
111tro 
suggests that song be used to stop hateful 
•urse 
YLotJS) pains that lead to the overthrow of (a1'V 
She describes such an "overthrow" in competitive 
terins: houses are "tripped up" as are wrestlers by a 
throw. 
Indeed, in the house of Medea antagonism reigns over 
cooperation. Medea, according to the Hurse, "hates" her 
children (cr1"uyel' 1l'aLda5, 36). Medea's very 
nature is "hateful" (crTuyepav ' cpU<HV, 103); 
the Hurse has, in addition, heard Medea call herself 
•nateful" (crTuyepas. ' µaTpos., 113) and her life 
•nateful" (fll01"clV I o1"uyepav, 147). All this hate 
results from Medea's strife with Jason and the assault on 
her status as successful competitor. 
The Hurse proposes that song could, given the chance, 
cure such hatred, strife, and antagonism,297 all of 
297Easterling, "Infanticide,• p. 191, notes that 
•[o]ne of the play's recurrent themes is that of song and 
the Muses . . . • and lists the Nurse's speech, along with 
the first stasimon and the Ode to Athens, as expressions of 
this theme. Easterling offers that these passages "draw 
attention to the ambivalence of human intelligence and 
creativity, which is potentially a so,urce of beauty and 
harmony, but liable, too, to break out in destructive 
Violence under the influence of passion.• To Easterling, 
Medea's heroic seli:-image is used by Euripides to increase 
the sense oi: tragedy, and is not itseli:, as I propose, the 
Ultimate source of the violence. 
Cunningham, "Medea," pp. 153-154, argues that the 
Hurse's speech is meant by Euripides to suggest •a mode oi: 
analysis• of the play; Medea's perpetuation of the strife 
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. h are absent :from the situations in which the Hurse 
1'hlC 
ng unnecessary, "at :feasts and banquets and at finds so 
dinners. 11 This is because the sharing o:f elaborate 
asts as Finley explains, itself promotes solidarity: reP • 
Through the sharing o:f :food--in substantial 
quantities, it should be noted, not just symbolically 
--a bond was instituted, or renewed, in ceremonial 
fashion, tying men and gods, the living and the dead, 
into an ordered universe o:f existence. It was as i£ 
the constant repetition o:f the :feast were somehow 
necessary :for the preservation o:f the group, whether 
on the oikos level or on the larger scale o:f the 
class, and also :for the establishment o:f peaceful 
relations across lines, with strangers and guest-
£ r i ends. 298 
But Medea, :far :from sharing :food with others, is alone and 
•ues without eating" (24). Her dissonantly violent lament 
is the antithesis o:f the Nurse's definition o:f song, the 
•delightful" (Tepvvas., 194) sounds o:f li:fe. Song's 
delightfulness explains, according to the Hurse, why it is 
extraneous at the :feast, :for the :feast in itself holds 
•delight" 
Song as sung in Medea, the alienating song o:f the 
zero-sum competitor, will be shown to contain its own 
twisted "delight." At 1135, Medea informs the Messenger 
that if he reports that Creon and his daughter died 
horribly, "you will delight me twice as much" 
Tooov 
"' av 
c .... 
-riµ.a s.). Medea likewise 
llUsic should end marks her as excessive and therefore 
unsympathetic. 
298Finley, World o:f Odysseus, pp. 125-126. 
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. es that she has, by killing her children, th warted j.lllag1n 
Jason •s chance "to live a delight£ul li£e, laughing at me" 
' c5LCsl;€LV (fe;p1fVOV f)LOTOV 
> ,... 
eyyeAwv 
> , 
€JJ.OL, 
!355). These are the perverse delights £rom the song 0£ 
strife: joy taken at the su££ering 0£ others, especially 
n that su££ering has put the other into the one-down ,,ne 
positiOD one sought to escape. 
It is no coincidence, then, that, just as Medea "sang" 
at the play's beginning her song 0£ pain, so, near the 
play's end, another voice li£ts a similar song. The death 
scene 0£ Creon's daughter is heralded by a servant who 
•sang responsively a great wail 0£ grie£" > , (a VTLJJ.OA ll'OV 
> ,... 
oAoAUY'l'JS. 
, 
KWKUTOV, 1176-1177). 
This horri£ying scene is the second chorus 0£ competition's 
discordant song, the answering round to Medea's opening 
lament. 
The Chorus, however, even a£ter hearing Medea's 
disturbing lament and the Nurse's opinion that song be used 
to cure, themselves choose to sing the stri-fe-ridden song 
of the zero-sum competitor and express their initial 
impression 0£ song's £unction: it is to be used to attain 
superiority.299 The Corinthian women's enthusiasm £or 
299 im Whether the songs upon which the women hope to 
ar-Prove are epic songs, as Boedeker, "Medea," p. 108 n. 53, 
Ar-~~~s, or lyric, speci£ically the misogynistic iambs 0£ 
(foll l.l~chus, Hipponax, and Semonides, as argues Page 
ilap owi.ng Verrall), Medea, p. 104 at line 423, is less 
Of ~r~ant than that the women do not question the validity 
si.ng song to bene£it the individual, i.e., to get and 
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colDPetition and their "us vs. them" posture in the first 
:ne-antistrophe pair 0£ the £irst stasimon (410-430) 
stroP 
already been discussed. Since these women are the 118.,e 
's primary singers, the beginning 0£ their £irst formal 
plaf 
· important in setting song's definition. What they 
song is 
suggest is contrary to the Nurse's opinion: song's proper 
subject-matter is competition; furthermore, since control 
of song is the mark 0£ superiors, they, now that they have 
the opportunity, are determined to use song to their 
advantage: 
honor will come to the £emale race; no longer 
will an ill-sounding (duaKe>.aoos) reputation 
hold us. 
The muses {µ.ouoaL) of ancient singers 
> ,... c ,... (aoLdwv) will cease to hymn (uµ.vEuoaL) 
my £ai thlessness. For Phoebus, lord 0£ songs 
(µE>.ewv), did not bestow on our mind inspired 
lyre-song (>.upas aoLdav); otherwise I 
> , 
would have sung in response a song {av-rax'f'lo> 
J\ Cl 
av uµ.vov) to the race 0£ men. The long stretch 
of time has much to say about our part and the part 0£ 
men. ( 421-430). 
Again, the preponderance 0£ musical terms is remark-
able. The Chorus• complaint is that they, as women, had in 
the past no access to song, and, therefore, men were able 
Wl.th impunity to destroy their reputation. The tables 
have turned: women now are the singers and intend to 
return tit £or tat to men. The "ill-sounding" reputation 
that once applied to women will now sound discordant in 
songs about men. They do not £or a moment entertain using 
keep 
su Power, rather than using it, as the Hurse has 
ggested, to bond opposing £actions. 
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to remedy the woes 0£ competition, as the Hurse has so 
5ong 
UY suggested. The women's use 0£ song will continue 
recen 
competition and stri£e. 
tbe 
The play's next mention 0£ song £inds it again in the 
Peti ti ve arena. This time it is Jason who, in describ-colll 
illg to Medea his competitor's pre£erence £or reputation 
above all else, unwittingly recalls the song analogy and, 
111 tbe process, like the Chorus, rejects the Nurse's notion 
ttiat song be harmonizing: 
. . . besides, all the Greeks perceive you as smart 
and you have a reputation {do~av); but i£ you 
lived on the outermost boundaries 0£ the earth, there 
would be no word {.>.oyos) 0£ you. As £ar as I'm 
concerned, I'd rather have no gold in my house or no 
song to sing £iner than Orpheus (>op.E:ws Ka.>..>.LOv 
C ..... I 
uµ.V'l"IO"al µ.e:.>.os) than have no remark.able success 
) I C I {E11'lO"'l')IJ.OS 'I') "t'UX'I')). (539-544). 
Jason clearly vies £or advancing his reputation £or success 
above all else, and, in this, de-fines his priori ties as 
competitive rather than cooperative. Particularly telling 
in this regard is Jason's rejection 0£ Orpheus' song, £or 
by this rejection he chooses stri£e over concord:300 
The cosmogonies sung by Orpheus, by rehearsing the 
origin 0£ the universe, promote order. When Orpheus 
sails with Jason and the Argonauts, £or example, the 
very 'first song he sings £or the heroes, to calm the 
stri£e arisen among them, is a cosmogony. This song 
has a cosmic signi£icance £or the cosmic journey 0£ 
the Argonauts. In addition, it demonstrates one 0£ 
the commonest -features 0£ cosmogonies: they are 
intimately related to the restoration 0£ order in 
300g· 
111 imon, Tragic Drama, p. 73 n. 8, sees Orpheus 
J ere1y as singer and, as such, the instrument 0£ £ame a son ' in t so desires. He notes that Jason disparages this 
s rument, but o££ers no explanation. 
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situations 0£ st.ri£e.301 
. g that Jason chooses an anti-Orphic st.ri£e does not 
sa11n 
that he chooses chaos and anarchy, but instead st.ri£e 
oaean 
tnat fuels competition. Orpheus, according to Freiert, 
·ects "logos 'speech, argument., reason,' the discursive 
reJ -
system of the polis"--the very logos t.ha t. Jason cit.es as an 
advantage Medea has gained £rom her tenure in Greece (541, 
quoted above). In short, 
Orpheus st.ands £or the removal 0£ argument. and st.ri£e 
in the secular sphere . . . . [He] appears as 
nonheroic, alien to the warrior-hunt.er et.hie, and 
alien to the poetry 0£ praise (k.leos) and blame t.ha t. 
legitimizes heroic behavior in the archaic Greek. 
societ.y.302 
'l'he Orphic song that. Jason rejects, then, is the sort 0£ 
tune that would appeal to the non-competitive Hurse, who 
praises living "on equal terms" with others, and wants to 
•grow old in not.-grea t.ness" (122-123). This sort 0£ song, 
however, has little appeal to anyone else in the play, 
certainly not to Medea, the Chorus, or Jason. 
It does, however, make its appearance in the third 
stasimon, the Ode to At.hens (824-865). Here, a£t.er having 
heard Medea and Aegeus £ollow up his "overture" 0£ wishing 
his friend well--"Medea, may you be well! For no one knows 
a finer overture than this £or addressing 'friends" 
P 
301William K. Freiert., "Orpheus: A Fugue on the 
Olis" · II. .' in Myth and the Polis, ed. Dora C. Pozzi and John 
199 ~lckersham (Ithaca and London: Cornell Univ. Press, l, herea£ter Freiert, "Fugue"), p. 33. 
302Freiert., "Fugue," pp. 3'7-39. 
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,11.fi6£l<l 
0 iJ6eis 
TOU~E 
" ll'poocpWVEl v 
. yap ' ll'pOOlj..LlOV KaH.lOV 
663-664)--W i th 
ession a£ter expression 0£ solicitous concern £or each 
es: Pr 
r 
the women 0£ the Chorus can now sing imaginatively 
otne , 
of narmony. 
As they begin to sing, they describe Athens as the 
place where "the nine holy Pierian Muses produced golden 
aarmonY" 
c • (ayvas. > ' EVVEQ Mouoas. 
i;avaav cApµoviav cpUTEUOal 830-
834).303 The connection between the Muses and Harmonia 
15 not traditiona1304 and thus must be read as 
metaphorical. This concocted connection £its in well with 
the spirit 0£ the £irst hal£ 0£ the ode, where nearly 
everyone is connected, either genealogically or through 
shared action, with everyone else. The cooperative milieu 
has been noted above (Part Two). Here we can add that the 
303The line could, 0£ course, be translated, 
•golden Harmony produced the nine holy Pierian Muses," 
pace Page, Medea, pp. 132-133 at line 831, who terms 
this •a meaningless and absurd idea• but explains that 
•cA ' P~OVLa here denotes the Union 0£ the nine Muses: 
Where these are together, they create a tenth essence, the 
Child 0£ none alone but 0£ all together." As metaphor or 
a~legory, however, I £ind it impossible to explain the 
difference between the two translations. Though I lean 
toward Page•s pre£erence, two considerations call it into 
question: 1) the verb, cpuTeuw, is used elsewhere in ~he Play to mean "beget, give birth to• (878, 1078). It 
~s h.ard, at least £or me, to imagine nine Muses laboring 
Ho give birth to one Harmony. 2) Euripides mentions 
s:r~onia's "true• mother, Aphrodite, two lines later in the 
btsunon, which would seem an awkward intrusion upon the 
rthing Muses. 
304see Page, Medea, p. 133 at line 831. 
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P
era tion seems natural, given the implied and expressed 
eoo 
ealogical connections between participants:305 in 
gen 
lines 824-825, inhabitants 0£ Athens are "the descendants 
arechtheus" and "children 0£ the blessed gods," i.e., 
of .,. 
duallY descended, as Elliott explains, £rom Erectheus and 
the river god Cephisus, Erectheus• relative, who is 
aten tioned in line 835.306 In lines 830-833, the Hus es 
are said, contrary to received tradition, to have been the 
parents of Harmonia, whose traditional mother, Aphrodite, 
iS mentioned in line 836. Finally, the Erotes 0£ line 844 
recall Eros, who is Aphrodite's traditional cohort, or who 
is sometimes even considered her son. 
In short, this song depicts "harmony" in the non-
technical sense 0£ the word. According to Giovanni 
Comotti, harmonia's original meanings are "· 'joint, 
connection, adaptation• (c£. Hom. Od. 5.248), and therefore 
'pact, convention,•• out 0£ which its musical senses 
trew.307 What the Chorus present in the first strophe-
305simon, Tragic Drama, pp. 84 and 100, following 
Pucci, Violence, pp. 122-123, senses a paucity 0£ men and 
stress on chastity and parthogenesis in the ode. Simon 
suggests that this song encodes a wish by the Corinthian 
•omen £or separation £rom men. 
306Elliott, Medea, p. 89 at lines 825-856. 
C 307 Giovanni Comot ti, Music in Greek. and Roman 
~· trans. Rosaria V. Hunson (Baltimore and London: 
If. 0 ns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1989), p. 24. By contrast, 
s~s~riUo,. "Reconsideration,• p. 60, sees harmony in this 
reasi.mon in terms 0£ domination and control: " ... it 
th.Presents the enlightened and sophisticated discipline 0£ 
e Passions, the avoidance 0£ extremes, and the elevation 
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t
istrophe pair as they describe the cooperation and 
an 
~nection between the mythological inhabitants and 
cov 
dsitants 0£ Athens, is a song 0£ harmony,308 the 
antithesis to the songs 0£ stri£e sung by Medea o££stage, 
tnet11se1ves in the £irst stasimon, and pre£erred by Jason in 
r eJ·ection 0£ Orpheus. biS 
When, then, in the second strophe-antistrophe pair, 
tbeY imagine Medea the child-killer, the mani£estation 0£ 
the song 0£ competitive stri£e, rejected £rom this 
nar111onious environment at Athens, they are, as inter-
iocutors in elenchos, £or the £irst time sensing how the 
music-analogy imposes its logic upon the particular 
definition 0£ arete they have supported, Medea 1 s ethic 0£ 
competition. The two modes 0£ song do not £it; there can 
be no joint, no connection, no harmony born £rom the second 
of these musics; the only hope is that Medea 1 s song 0£ 
strife will change its tune. The Chorus propose that Medea 
Will be unable to engage in the violent slaughter 0£ her 
of What is best in man to the highest degree 0£ 
excellence." It is obvious that, to Musurillo, the Erotes 
here are not equal partners, but untrustworthy elements 
that must be brought under control. 
0 . 
308see Synnj!Sve des Bouvrie, Women in Greek. Tragedy ~ slo. Norwegian Univ. Press, 1990; herea£ter des Bouvrie, 
~), p. 232, who suggests that the Harmonia 0£ this ode 
Bevokes the Harmonia 0£ well-ordered society." C£. Wendell 
(Serry, "The Specialization 0£ Poetry," in Standing By Words 
an Francisco: Horth Point Press, 1983). p. 17: "Song i.a' · is a_ £orce opposed to specialty and to isolation. It 
•o ~ testimony 0£ the singer 1 s inescapable relation to the 
rd, to the human community, and also to tradition." 
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(S61) that her strife-ridden song forewarned. 
sons 
'#hen, however, the Chorus are forced to realize that 
for a change in Medea's "song" is gone, they begin to 
nope 
nge their own tune in response to a growing sense of cna 
l.·r own ignorance. Instead of singing brashly of putting the 
40,..0 their competitors, as they did in the first stasimon, 
the Chorus• song is now one of humility and acknowledged 
perplexity. And this is the first and only time they lay 
claim, haltingly, to having a muse: 
r have many times by now gone through rather subtle 
C I 
matters and I have come to conflict (aµ.LH.as) 
greater than the female race is required to seek. out. 
>I ..... For in fact we too have a muse (EOTlV µ.ouoa 
' c ..... Kal 'fllllV), which has intercourse with us for 
n ..... I 
the sake 0£ wisdom ("I vpoooµL.>.El oocplas 
eV€K€V)--not with all of us, to be sure. But 
among the many you would perhaps find a few; the race 
of women is not entirely without muse (ouK 
) I 
all'oµouoov). 
And I say that those of mortals who have no 
experience at all in and have not born children, they 
I , 
surpass in good fortune (11'pocpep£l v ELS 
) I 
euTuxLav) those who have begot ten. (1081-1093). 
The Chorus• new humility, uncertainty, and perplexity as 
indicative of aporia has been discussed above (Part Two); 
the concern here is with the role of song in contest. 
Oddly enough, just as the women of the Chorus acknowledge 
their aporia, they redefine both con£lict and song. These 
are to be put to the service of philosophic musings which 
lead to sophia. The conflict they describe is an internal 
one, not a conflict designed to put them on top of the heap 
of other contenders; the muse they claim is one who, like 
SOJJle lover, leads them after intercourse through labor to 
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. a (see below, Part Five). Suddenly, the analogy to ~ 
d nas work.ed its suggestion, and a reorientation 0£ 
5orh. 
f lict and sophia has tak.en place. Ho longer is sophia con 
tbe means to success in con£lict; success in con£lict is 
defined as arriving at the bene£icial terminus: sophia. 
In this sense the women can rightly claim to being 
•Jllused." The competitive stri£e 0£ the old de£inition 0£ 
arete has momentarily been laid aside. In their new£ound 
=--
nesitation and uncertainty the women sing a uniquely non-
competitive song. Their song, lik.e the song 0£ Medea at 
the play•s beginning, is again in anapests; but this song, 
instead 0£ veering wildly between lament and threats 0£ 
yiolence, instead 0£ signalling dissolution o:f all social 
ties, recognizes that the pain brought on onesel£ by loss 
of those connections is inescapable. 
The women o:f the Chorus, instead 0£ proposing as had 
Medea in her opening song, a wish £or the destruction 0£ 
one's own children, outline in detail the pain that comes 
•hen one must endure such a loss. Theirs is a proper 
lament, one that in its subject matter de-flates the will£ul 
Violence in Medea's stri:fe-ridden lament. For what the 
•omen in their :final lines (1097-1115) describe as the 
resu1 t of their "musings"--their awareness o:f the 
•olici tous concern £or those one loves the most, and the 
Pain of loss that comes :from death 0£ those loved ones--is 
•hat unites all mortals and there-fore de-fies the 
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colllPeti ti ve creed: true lament springing from loss. 
ironically, unites even Jason and Medea at the µ111en t. 
91ar's 
end.309 
'l'hiS song, then, counteracts the pseudo-lament o:f 
t1edea's song of stri:fe at the play•s beginning. By singing 
the Chorus betray their dawning recognition that grie:f it. 
and mortality connect all humans, encourage cooperation and 
the •quiet" virtues, and discourage competition and sel:f-
advancement at the expense o:f others. The Chorus, like the 
audience, have come under the spell o:f the :first o:f 
Buripides• analogies. The analogy to song has in:formed 
arete; virtue lies in harmony, cooperation. But that is 
-
not all: this virtue o:f harmony is also, as the Nurse more 
than once suggests, curative. 
Arete and Medicine: The Virtue o:f Harmony as Remedy 
Euripides wastes no time establishing in Medea an 
ana~gy between the craft o:f medicine and the de:finition o:f 
commendable behavior. He again :first uses the Nurse to 
establish the analogy verbally, while Medea is again the 
one •ho gives the analogy its physical mani:festation. In 
this analogy, however, the Nurse leads the way and Medea 
309so B alth oedeker, "Medea," pp. 108-109, who, 
J ough she can hear the Chorus• la men ts at 976-1001, and 
t ason•s lament at the play's close, does not, however, seem 
t 
0 
hear Medea's as the play begins. Boedeker argues that hese ct . fx-om . osing 0P'11VOl signal the change 0£ story. 
epic to tragic, ef:fected by Medea hersel:f. 
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oaanifests the analogy shortly after the Hurse has 
established it. 
In lines 11-16 of her prologue, the Hurse contrasts 
time be-fore stri£e erupted between Jason and Medea with tne 
tbe present. She describes two types 0£ Medea's behavior, 
cooperative and conflictive, and classifies the first of 
tnese as healthy, the second as diseased. Her long 
negative wish against the chain of events leading to the 
present ends as follows: 
. nor would she [i.e., Medea] be living in this 
Corinthian land with her husband and children, 
c , 
gratifying (avoavouoa) the citizens to whose 
land she came in exile, and herself agreeing with/in 
harmony with (i;uµ.cpepouo£a1) Jason in all things; 
which very thing is the greatest preservation 
(oWT'l1Pta), when a wife does not stand apart 
from/disagree with (6Lxo0Ta1~) her husband. But 
now all things are enmity. and the dearest things are 
,... > "' I "' diseased (vuv cP ex9pa iravTa, ic.aL vooe:L 
Ta cpt.>.Ta1a). 
The contrast, between a gratifying, agreeable/harmonious 
Medea, who does not create stasis, and one who does, in 
whose world enmity presides, is for the Hurse analogous to 
the contrast between health and disease.310 The 
former, the cooperative state, is "the greatest 
Preservation, "311 while the latter, the conflictive 
state, results in "disease" of the dearest things. As we 
P . 3101 do not agree with Newton, "Passionate 
Olson," p. 13, who diagnoses the disease as Medea's 
~erverted love, and thus, the poison as that which 
ecrea tes this "diseased love" in her victims. 
, 311By the 
co111.es to mean 
second century 
"bodily heal th"; see 
A. D., O"WT'r)pLa 
LSJ9. 
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will see, the Rurse 1 s description of this disease of "the 
dearest things• will later be picked up and made 
horrifyingly 1i teral by Medea. 
It is no wonder, then, that this Hurse opines that 
song should be used to •cure• > ...... (aKEla0al) those 
things which •trip up houses• like thrown wrestlers (197-
199). For the Hurse, health results from the virtue 0£ 
harmony, not in competition and strife. Ro "cure• is 
needed at elaborate repasts, where the bonds between £ellow 
humans are symbolically renewed. Row, however, in the 
play 1 s present, where "the dearest things are diseased• and 
the unity 0£ the oikos has dissolved (140), a cure, a new 
song, is needed.312 For not only does Medea "sing• a 
lament discordant because 0£ its outbursts 0£ hatred 
against the closest ties of £amily, she also, as described 
by the Hurse, lies ill abed.313 
The motif of the description and appearance of an 
"ill• protagonist is not peculiar to Medea. Hippolytus and 
Orestes open similarly; according to F. D. Harvey, the 
motif may have been so familiarly Euripidean as to have 
occasioned Aristophanic parodies of it in Wasps, Peace, and 
Birds. In Medea, Harvey notes, "Euripides does not use the 
312pucci, Violence, pp. 45-58, detects Euripides 1 
voice behind the Burse~. talking about the potential 
curative powers of his own song. Cf. Wolff, "Euripides," 
p. 240. 
313For Medea in the prologue described as a 
sacrificial victim, see Oblander, Suspense, p. 40. 
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I I 
ol>"ious 
words VOCJOS. or µavLa or the cognate 
l>
s bU t there is no need for him to do so; they would 
.,er • 
d t "314- E · · d d h . th redun an . uripi es oes, owever, give e 
11e 
•urse a 
strictly medical term315 to describe Medea's 
· n as she speculates on her mistress• future 
condit10 
actions: "What ever will she do, high-spirited 
[JLt:YCl AoCJ11' >.a yx vos., as a medical term, "with enlarged 
abdomen/viscera"], impetuous in spirit, stung by harm as 
she's been?" (108-110). 
Beyond her momentary recourse to care£ul diagnosis, 
though, the Hurse goes on to describe Medea more generally 
as a sick. woman: " ... she keeps to her bed, she re-fuses 
food, her gaze is perpetually downcast, she weeps and 
rages, she may do something desperate."316 But not 
every sick. woman "rages" and "may do something desperate," 
like harming her own children. Such symptoms are peculiar 
to the disease described by the Hurse in line 16: the 
epidemic 0£ enmity which has infected even "the dearest 
things.• 
The spread 0£ enmity is a £act 0£ zero-sum competition 
314-F. 
Parody o£ 
hereafter 
D. Harvey, "Sick. Humour: Aristophanic 
a Euripidean Moti£?," Mnemosyne 24- (1971; 
Harvey, "Sick. Humour"), p. 363. 
T 315Harold w. Killer, "Medical Terminology in 
ragedy," TAPA 75 (194-4-; herea£ter Miller, "Medical ;~rminology") p. 161. C£. Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 106 n. 30, 
0 follows Page, Medea, p. 76 at line 109. 
316 Harvey, "Sick. Humour," p. 363. 
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described by Gouldner, and the ill effects on intimacy 
as 
C
oropetition's prime directive of self-advancement have 
of 
dY been described. Here, by drawing a medical 
a1rea 
1 gy Euripides skillfully and economically shows how ana o ' 
deadlY this game 0£ cutthroat competition really is. Medea 
iS patently sick.. And with her glowering and threats, she 
puts the healthy continuance of her children in jeopardy. 
The Nurse, and doubtlessly at this point the audience, 
cannot understand how the children have become implicated 
in what their father has done: "Why do your children share 
in the offense of their father?," the Hurse asks; "Why do 
you hate (ex9ets.) them?" (116-117). The question is 
a logical one, but the answer's logic is beyond the k.en of 
buman understanding. Disease spreads without regard for 
the connections between people; it spreads, in fact, most 
rapidly among those who are "close." In this way, the 
enmity that is epidemic in zero-sum competition is like a 
disease: it too respects no ties, not even those of 
family. 
But Medea is not the only one infected with this 
disease, for she is not the only zero-sum contender in the 
Play. Jason, too, is sick., al though Euripides does not 
have him manifest his disease as a physical disability. 
Instead, Euripides uses Medea to diagnose Jason's illness: 
This is not courage or boldness, to look. friends in 
~he £ace when you're doing them harm, but instead it 
i.s the greatest of all diseases among men, shame-
lessness. (a>.~.> ~ µeyto-r.., -rwv ev 
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&vapw1tolS 
(469-472.). 
, 
voowv " 11aowv, 
) , 
aval<St:llal). 
s:naroelessness is the stock-in-trade 0£ the zero-sum 
coropeti tor, £or, as Gouldner argues, shame becomes an 
tneffecti ve tool 0£ social control when the need £or high 
self-esteem outs trips all other opinion. 317 
s:naroelessness allows one to do to another whatever one 
pleases in order to advance one 1 s own ca use; it allows 
ruthless engagement in zero-sum competition. It is 0£ 
shamelessness that Achilles accuses Agamemnon in Iliad 
U49 after hearing Agamemnon threaten that he will take 
away some other man 1 s prize to replace the one he for£eits. 
This well-known incident -from the beginning 0£ the Iliad in 
fact succinctly illustrates the zero-sum reality 0£ someone 
winning only at the expense 0£ another 1 s loss (£or, as 
Achilles himsel£ notes, there is no stock.pile 0£ prizes 
awaiting distribution), zero-sum mentality and ethics (on 
the part 0£ Agamemnon), and the human costs 0£ zero-sum 
competition. Here, too, perhaps only coincidentally, 
disease spreads, -first literally as a plague sent by 
Apollo, then metaphorically, as Greeks continue to die 
317Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 94-97; c£. Adkins, 
~rit, pp. 43-46, who argues that aidos spans both 
competitive and cooperative excellences, but that aidos 
felt at de-feat would be stronger than the aidos which could 
restrain competitiveness. Adkins tellingly remarks that it 
~onetheless must have been aidos that held Homeric society 
~gether, "· .. £or a society of agathoi with no quiet 
~lrtues at au would simply destroy itself." (p. 46). This 
18 What happens in Medea. 
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use the strife between Agamemnon and Achilles causes 1>eca 
tatter to remove himself -from the -fighting, leaving the 
tne 
K more vulnerable to death on the battle-field. Gree s 
A comparison between Iliad 1 and Medea is instructive, 
J.·n both cases innocent bystanders die as a result of for 
ruthlessly shameless self-advancement. Just as innocent 
GreeKs died there, so in Medea innocents die from the 
•disease" of competitiveness. In Medea, the innocents are 
cb.ildren, both the children 0£ Jason and Medea as well as 
tne child 0£ Creon. 318 
If even children must die -from the disease 0£ 
competitive disharmony, it must be considered rampant. 
Euripides does, however, give one glimpse 0£ health, and 
strengthens his analogy bet ween competitive arete and 
disease by showing a healthy climate as one 0£ cooperation, 
where harmony is in £act born (834). I refer, of course, 
to the A thens 0£ the -first half 0£ the third stasimon (824-
845). 
Wilhelm Nestle argues that in these lines Euripides 
portrays, with nearly clinical precision, Athens as an 
ideally heal thy climate. Nestle in fact cites these lines 
from Medea, together with a few Euripidean -fragments, as 
evidence that Euripides was not only acquainted with the 
medical literature of his time, but that he may even have 
had it in front of him as he composed. In lines 824 £f. of 
3l8see further discussion below, Part Five. 
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d a Kestle points to Euripides• depiction 0£ the "most ~· 
t>rilliant air," the abundance 0£ water, and "mild, so-ft 
e zes" as poetic paraphrases of the descriptions of ?>re 
nealth-bringing climates in the Hippocratic treatise, "On 
J.irS, Waters, and Places.
11 319 It is no coincidence 
that this healthy Athens is a place where Harmony is born 
(B34), where cooperation is the modus operandi (see 
especially ll'apedpous and 
, 
.;uvepyous Of 844-845), 
and arete of every sort the final outcome (845). 
This, however, is a utopia. The real world, the 
strife-ridden, competition-crazed world of Jason and Medea, 
is by. contrast heavily diseased.320 Even the Chorus 
seem to realize this as they comment after hearing Medea 
and Jason's first words to each other, "Terrible/clever is 
319Wilhelm Kestle, "Hippocra tica," Hermes 73 
(1938), pp. 24-25. 
3201 would argue that Burnett, "Tragedy of 
Revenge," pp. 23-24, is perhaps more optimistic than 
Euripides in seeing in the Athens 0£ the central ode a 
chance for Medea's regeneration and transformation into a 
benevolent -force. The hope for such is there, I would 
maintain, but in the Chorus or the audience, not in Medea 
herself, who at the end 0£ the play has, as every Athenian 
would know, unfinished future business in Athens. 
Boedeker, "Medea," pp. 110-112, suggests instead that 
Euripides has created in Medea a cautionary tale £or 
~the:riians. The idealistic Athens 0£ the central ode puts 
n high relie£ the strife enacted on stage between Jason 
:~d Medea, whose domestic dispute hints at the political 
111isaster awaiting Athens, should she, like Jason and Medea, 
111 is_use language, especially the language of trust which 
ai.n ta ins bonds bet ween lf'l>.ol. 
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..,rath and tne 
friends engage 
hard to 
in stri£e 
"' EPl V) 
cure {ch.J<Jla T05), 321 
with £riends" Cl (oTav 
(520-521). 
~ and Medicine: Knowledge as Cure 
when 
aard to cure the disease indeed proves to be, £or 
although Medea seeks a "cure," the disease continues to 
spread, bringing pain and death. Euripides, by describing 
Medea's attempts to -find a "cure• in the language 0£ 
medicine, applies the medical analogy which has served to 
redefine arete, in rede£ining sophia as well. Sophia, 
recall, is Medea's primary means to achieve victory over 
her competitors. The sophe Medea is the "smart• 
contender, the one whose "total commitment rationality" 
gains her success. This sophia, then, in terms 0£ the 
medical analogy, is the skill and knowledge necessary £or 
diagnosis 0£ disease and prescription £or a cure. 
As we have seen, both the Hurse (108-UO) and Medea 
(471-472) have displayed diagnostic abilities. Similarly, 
both set prescriptions £or cure: the Hurse prescribes an 
unheeded cure 0£ song (199-200), while her mistress' 
Prescriptions £or cure are -filled and administered without 
delay by Medea hersel£. Medea's prescriptions, however, 
are not meant to cure the disease 0£ competitive stri£e. 
Instead 
• Medea, who hersel-f is clearly ill and yet 
321The word is cited among "semi-technical medical 
terms• by Miller, •Medical Terminology,• p. 165. 
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adox:icallY the diagnosing physician, prescribes cures 
par 
t will only alleviate, and then only -for hersel-£, the tl:J.3 
se's symptom: the pain o-f being the loser in disea 
colDPeti tion. 
Medea's -first choice is to try to -feel better by 
seeing her enemy, Jason, in pain. She accomplishes this by 
11urling at him what she imagines will be stinging words: 
•You have done well in coming; I will be alleviated 
, )32.2. (itO\JflO' 9'f)O oµ al in my spirit by speaking 
ill of you, and you by listening will £eel pain 
(~u11'"1o~)." (472.-474). Medea then proceeds to use her 
co111peti tor's sophia to win a verbal competition. So much 
is clear :from her remarks at 579-585, where she criticizes 
the speaker (she is o-£ course insinuating Jason} who is 
Cl >I 
"' •smart" at speaking yet "unjust" (00Tl5 a6lK05 WV 
, 
aocpos AEY€l v 11'€cp\JK€, 580-581), assures Jason such a 
speaker "is not so smart" >I (€0Tl 
' 
> OUK >I ayav 
aocpo5, 583), and then promises to "lay" Jason "£lat" 
With only "one word" ' yap > €K T€V€l >I €11'05, 
585). The implication is that she, Medea, is the truly 
•smart" one, and that with this sophia 0£ hers she will 
deliver to her opponent the knockout punch. 
322Hiller "Medical Terminology," p. 161, cites ~ 43 and Philoctetes 735 as the only other uses 0£ 
Koucpltw with "medical :force" in tragedy· according to K·1 ' h ~ ler the verb is, however, •very common in the case 
lstories of Epidemics 1 and 3; also Aph. 2.27." Vide 
~ Page, Medea, p. 106 at line 473, who is not 
onvinced the verb is a medical term. 
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'l'bUS, Medea hopes during this verbal interaction to 
•alleiria te" her pain by recourse to competitive sophia. 
gedea acK.nowledges the pain caused by the disease 0£ 
Petitive strife when she tells Jason that she will have colll 
nothing of the brand of happiness he has hoisted off on to 
ner, and which she describes as a "painful happy life" 
' (Atrirpos 
> , 
eudaq.1.wv 598). Creon had 
earlier remarked to Medea on this pain: "you feel pain 
(AU11'~) at having been deprived of your husband's bed" 
(286); Aegeus later sympathizes that it is understandable 
for Medea "to feel pain" (>.u11'e'lo0al, 703) at her 
situation. 
Medea, however, does not stop at using her competitive 
sophia to choose stinging words and thus administer pain to 
her enemy. This is probably because Medea's words have no 
visible effect on the callous Jason. She resorts then to 
feeling more pain herself so that she can cause pain for 
Jason,32.3 thus effecting a "cure" £or her pain at being 
one down.324 Jason's statement and Medea's acknowl-
edgement at 1361-1362. give telling evidence of the nature 
Cf, 
323see Medea's 
the Chorus on 
use 0£ >.ull'ouoav at 
Medea's a>.yo5 at 997. 
1046-1047; 
324see Oblander, Suspense, p. 115, on Medea's 
•willingness to suffer and harm herself . " Hore to 
the Point, Pucci, "Monument," p. 189, remarks, "In 
sacr·f· l icing her sons, Medea destroys the otherness, as it 
~ere, of her suffering by actively inflicting suffering on 
P
e:self. She should gain control over the otherness 0£ her 
a1n." 
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"cure": --"You yoursel£ in £act £eel pain 
of tnis 
,,.!;) and are my companion in harm [su££ered] (A\J • 
. 
KOL VWVOS EC)." --"You are right. But the 
pain pays (AUEL 
>I 
a>.yos) i£ you cannot laugh [at 
,. Medea has prescribed the zero-sum competi tor 1 s 111eJ. 
colllmon "cure": winning. Medea, like every other 
coJDpetitor, has only two ways to e££ect this "cure," and 
since she can not raise hersel£, she must lower Jason. The 
cuJDulative e££ect, however, is the unchecked progress 0£ 
the disease, marked by an increase in total pain. 
That this is no cure at all, Euripides 1 use 0£ the 
analogy makes obvious. First, the cure is "sick." because 
it is an already ill Medea who takes the role 0£ at tending 
physician. Second, the cure is one that assumes the 
disease 0£ competitive stri£e is established and unassail-
able, and the best one can do is su££er its pain£ul 
symptoms less than or--in a worst case scenario--along with 
one1 s £ellow contenders. And while Medea 1 s prescription 0£ 
a Pain£ul remedy is not unknown among medical practi-
tioners (c£. the £amiliar and dreaded "this will only hurt 
a lit tie bit"), increasing pain is not, as it is here, 
Prescription1 s aim. Physicians use pain£ul procedures and 
Potentially harm£ul medications to lessen pain and curtail 
or cure disease. The potential £or cure is the assumed 
roai, and remains. Such is the case in true medical 
Practice 
I but not in the context 0£ zero-sum competition, 
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the goal is disabling one's opponents by whatever 
.nere 
necessary, even if these be pain and death. 111eans 
The analogy to medicine, then, suggests an al terna ti ve 
to the predictably destructive outcome of zero-sum 
coinpeti tion. The al terna ti ve is nowhere more strongly 
suggested than in Medea's choice to use pharmaka as her 
111eans to achieving victory. She makes this choice because 
the use of pharmaka is the means at which she is 
•especially sophe" 
, 
ll'EcpUKaµEv ' oocpaL µa.hoTa, 
> ' QUTOUS 
c ,.. 
EAELV, 384-385). Medea 1 s 
competitive sophia marks her as "smart," or, in Gouldner's 
terms, as one who practices "total commitment rationality" 
to gain one's ends. 
By establishing an analogy between Medea's competitive 
sophia and the use of pharmaka, then, Euripides suggests 
that competitive sophia is a poison used to spread 
destruction from the disease of disharmony.325 And, 
indeed, it is the sop he Medea who so arouses the Chorus' 
ire at their status as losers that they agree to remain 
silent. It is the sophe Medea who persuades the suspicious 
Creon to give her the one day she needs. It is the sophe 
325Pace Newton, "Passionate Poison," p. 14, to 
Whom Medea's love is the disease and the poison. Newton 
notices that Medea "smears" poison on the gifts, just as 
?YPris "smears" arrows with longing (789, 634); the diadem 
~~ gold,_ as are Cypris' shafts (786, 633). I would argue 
at ~ is, indeed, diseased, as is sophia in zero-sum 
~~mpetition. These, however, are symptomatic of a larger 
s lsease: discord and disharmony, which distort eros and 
~-
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d a -who manipulates her £riend Aegeus• desire. It is the J(e e 
ne Medea who hoists her gullible husband with his own 
~ 
petard and wins his agreement to let their children deliver 
tn.e poisoned £aux-conciliatory gi£ts. 
poison, as was argued above (Part One), cannot be 
administered openly, but requires proximity. This Medea 
gains through verbal manipulation, the mani£esta tion 0£ her 
claim to be called sophe.326 Spreading pharmaka on the 
bait 0£ lovely gi£ts is merely the culmination 0£ Medea's 
art as poisoner. Through her poisonous sophia, she is able 
to Kill Creon's daughter and, perhaps not merely coinci-
dentally, Creon himsel-f.327 And, by then killing her 
own children, she is able £inally to destroy their -father. 
She wins the palm 0£ sophe in zero-sum competition: she 
has e££ectively destroyed or brought to her level 0£ pain 
every other contender on the £ield. She has "won." She 
has poisoned and killed. 
But pharmaka does not mean merely "poisons." It can 
326on the association 0£ knowledge with drugs, see 
Petroff, Medea, p. 72: "The person who uses drugs and 
herbs is di££erent. He or she is someone special--a witch 
or a doctor. The something special which characterizes 
this type 0£ person is knowledge--speci£ically knowledge 0£ 
drugs." 
t ~27 At 788-789 Medea speaks 0£ all dying who touch 
he gi.rl; perhaps she anticipates the scene which in £act 
~~curs. Further support £or this interpretation comes -from 
C e fact that Medea never renounces her intention to kill 
P reon, and yet proposes no way 0£ accomplishing his death. 
C etroff, Medea, p. 108 n. 69, cites another version (0£ 
p~~0Phylus; schol. in Eur. Med. 264) 0£ Creon's death by 
ison at Medea's hands. 
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"drugs" that cure. Similarly, sophe, and the abstract 
111ean 
related to it, sophia, are, like pharmaka, ambigu-
p.oun 
328 sophia can be the "smartness" 0£ the zero-0us. -
Player, or it can be something else, the "wisdom" that 5UID 
U nwitnessed in this play.329 By using the analogy iS 
of tbe craft 0£ medicine to in£orm the de£ini tion of 
~· Euripides suggests redefinition 0£ sophia only 
binted at in this play. Sophia can be like a curative 
drug; it can mean "wisdom," it can be the means to 
obtaining the health that is the virtue of harmony. 
Twice in Medea it is hinted that sophia can be a drug 
of cure instead 0£ a lethal poison. In the Ode to A thens 
(824-865), the abstract noun sophia is used twice, first at 
line 828, and again at line 842. In the 'first instance, 
sophia is described as the 'food 0£ the prehistorical 
Athenians; they are "nourished by most renowned sophia" 
(tEPfJoµ.evol K>.ElVOTaTav aocptav). Attending to 
proper nourishment was one 0£ the mainstays 0£ ancient 
medicine; in £act, the verb cpeppw chosen here by 
Buripides occurs twice in the Hippocratic corpus, although 
1t is a verb of otherwise in-frequent occurrence.330 
• 
328See Buxton, Persuasion, p. 165, for Medea's 
.magical-erotic sophia as "ambivalent." Cf. Pucci, 
Honument," p. 193 n. 13. 
329si · 1 f ... · mi arly, Medea's potential as "a formidable 
.. 1end" . 
•fo is, in this play, less obvious than her stat us as 
rmidable enemy"; see Ohlander, Suspense, pp. 20-22. 
330g 
ee 
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·ttedly, in the Ode to Athens sophia is not used as a 
,\dJlll 
drug per se. But whether as a source of nourishment, as it 
iS described at line 828, or as a semi-anthropomorphized 
attendant upon the Erotes who assist sophia in bringing on 
all sorts of arete, sophia in the Ode to A thens is 
undoubtedly an important element in a health-promoting 
environment. As an ingestant or as an assistant in a 
bealthY locale, sophia's use in this ode suggests, if only 
faintly, its function as a curative "drug." 
The second hint that sophia can be a drug of cure 
comes just before the occurrences of sophia in the Ode to 
Athens discussed above. In this instance the analogy drawn 
between sophia and pharmaka is again subtle, but perhaps a 
bit more direct. I refer to the Aegeus episode (663-823), 
where the king of A thens explains that he has sought from 
the oracle o-f Apollo advice about how he may produce 
children (669). The advice, however, has come in the 
form of a pronouncement, in "words more clever 
(oo,wTepCaJ) than a man can interpret" (675). Aegeus 
therefore welcomes Medea's hearing the pronouncement, -for 
interpreting it requires a "clever /smart (aocp:fls> 
mind" (677). But Medea does not offer Aegeus her sophia 
in the form he has requested. She may well be able to 
interpret the oracle, but withholds interpretation and 
instead holds forth the promise that Aegeus will have 
access to that at which she has said (384-385) she is 
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oiost ~ph~: administration 0£ pharmaka. Medea assures 
•I will stop your being childless, I will make J.egeus, 
t.he offspring 0£ children; I know 0£ such drugs you sow 
(fapi.J.aKa)." (717-718). 
In all other instances, pharmaka in Medea are clearly 
oieant as a means to destruction, and must therefore be 
translated as "poisons." 
1 t d as "drugs.• trans a e 
Only here can pharmaka be 
What Medea promises is the creation 
of life. And al though the audience would know that one 
version 0£ the myth had Medea 1 s pharmaka not only not 
responsible £or the Aegeus 1 renewed potency, but nearly the 
cause of his only son 1 s death, Euripides nonetheless 
reminds his audience 0£ the potential curative powers 0£ 
Medea's pharmaka and, by analogy, 0£ her sophia.331 
I say •reminds" instead 0£ "suggests,• £or the 
ambiguity 0£ Medea 1 s pharmaka and sophia is a part o:f the 
mythological tradition. In £act, early tradition may have 
depicted Medea 1 s skills as largely life-promoting or 
preserving,332 al though Euripides' predominantly 
331Mills, Mythopoeia, pp. 15-18 and 20-21, shows 
how Medea's ambivalent sophia is similar to that of her 
relative, Circe. 
332This is a part 0£ the Petro££'s thesis in his ~d~, passim. Petro££ is convincing on this point, less 
~o When he argues that Medea was originally a goddess. O:f 
~!erest to the Aegeus episode are Petro££'s parallels 
De ween Medea on the one hand and Artemis, Aphrodite, 
In in;ter,_ Athena, and Hera on the other hand (pp. 137-149). 
Of J rawing this parallel, Petro££ interprets the exploits 
as ason to win the :fleece as evidence :for Medea's status 
a goddess 0£ £ertili ty (pp. 146-147). Such a goddess 
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a
ti ve cast gives little indication of this tradition. 
pd 
anY case, the audience doubtlessly would have been aware 
lP 
a
t least some of the stories about Medea •s res tor a ti ve 
of 
d curative powers: how she proved her powers of an 
rejuvenation on Aeson (Jason's father). the nurses of 
Dionysus and their husbands, and Jason himself; how, though 
she failed to do so, her intent was to immortalize her 
children; how she salved wounds the Argonauts suffered and 
cured Heracles of madness.333 
But besides Medea herself having a reputation for 
restorative and curative powers, the names "Medea" and 
•Jason," as well as Jason's early history, may be evidence 
the couple's historical association with healing. "Medea" 
is etymologically related to µ..ftooµ.aL ("to take 
counsel, plan, intend"), which suggests Medea's status as 
could 0£ course insure the future potency 0£ the desperate 
Aegeus. 
333Ancient sources for these and other incidents 
in the life 0£ Medea may be found conveniently summarized 
and chronologically arranged in Petro££, Medea, pp. 4-41. 
The sources cited by Petro££ are as follows: Nostoi £r. 6 
~inkel = Hypoth. ad Eur. Med. (Aeson); Aesch. £r. 50 
auck2 = £r. 426 Mette = Hypoth. ad Eur. Med. (nurses 
~f Dionysus and their husbands); Simon. £r. 548 Page = 
YPoth. ad Eur. Med. (Jason); Eum. £r. 2 Kinkel ~~araphra~ed by Paus. 2.3.10) and schol. in Pind. 01. 
(A·7 'lg (children immortal); Diod. Sic. 4.48 and 4.55 
p rgonauts• wounds, Heracles• madness). All sources 
8~edate Euripides• version with the exception 0£ Diodorus 
ulcuius, whom Petro££ argues (pp. 157-159) may himself have 
sed sources predating Euripides. 
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professional "wise woman"-334 • the name "Jason" 
eiaowv. "healer"). and his early association with 
cbeiron. at least since the time Of Pindar's Fourth 
~· suggest curative powers.335 
But in Jason's case, and for the most part in Medea's, 
guripides chooses to ignore this tradition of healing 
potency. Instead, he emphasizes the destructive powers of 
thiS deadly pair. Medea may have the skill, the sophia, 
and the formulae to effect cure, but instead, herself ill, 
she spreads cure's antithesis, destruction, by the use of 
her wits and her pharmaka. Similarly, Jason, who may have 
been reared a healer, is too busy infecting those around 
him ever to consider that a cure is needed. Perhaps Medea 
was right to describe him as "not so smart" > (O\JK 
,, , 
ayav oocpos, 583). He has not the diagnostic let 
alone curative powers of Medea, misguided as these may be. 
Jason instead believes that everything is fine the way it 
334Bibliography on this point may be found in 
Petroff, Medea, p. 118 n. 2.1 (pp. 2.19-2.2.0), and in Erich 
Segal, Pindar's Mythmaking: The Fourth Pythian Ode 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986; hereafter 
Segal, Pindar's Mythmaking), p. 19 n. 11. Petro££, pp. 
118, 118 n. 19, and 127, adds the supportive evidence that 
Medea's mother's name is Iduia (Hesiod, Theogony 959-960) 
or Eiduia (Apollonius Rhodius 3.2.43), both of which mean 
•the knowing one." 
335see Segal, Pindar's Mythmaking, p. 19 and 19 n. 
11 for bibliography. Petro££, Medea, p. 134 n. ,82, cites 
~~hol. in Ap. Rhod. 1.554: >Iaowv 11'apa 1·rw 
laolV. Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 60, on Jason 1 s name as 
meaning "healer," remarks, "[o]nce upon a time, Jason in 
lllYth must have been the true consort of Medeia." 
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"Surely 
iS· 
pe~ou>.euµ. at 
I have not 
KOKWS, 567), 
planned injuriously?" (µ.wv 
he inanely asks Medea. 
Medea, though, is able to e-f-fect a cure, but it is the 
cure of a zero-sum competitor: winning. This she gains by 
using her wits, her competitor's sophia, whether this takes 
the form of dishing out verbal abuse, or using pharmaka, or 
being willing to increase her own pain so as to bring her 
enemy down to her level. She wins, but so does the 
disease, which if before was rampant, is now a plague. 
What is needed, but never found in this play, is 
suggested by Euripides' use of the medical analogy. True 
sophia would entail finding a cure for the disease, not 
just its unpleasant symptoms. This, however. would require 
the pursuit o-f cooperation and harmony instead o-f competi-
tion, i.e., the complete overhaul o-f belie-fs and values 
manifested in the play, and a painful reformulation of 
actions along those lines. The true cure is therefore 
never pursued. Instead, the "cure" to which Medea resorts 
is bringing death--no cure, but an end suitable when, as 
here, disease runs unchecked. 
541 
Part Five: The Tragedy 0£ the Wind-egg: 
The Perversion 0£ Eros and Stillbirth 0£ Truth 
It is not surprising, there-fore, that truth is not 
}>orn in Medea, £or nothing is born in this dark play. In 
fact, quite the opposite: instead 0£ birth and growth, 
tnere are destruction and death. The young, especially, 
are targets. What Euripides gives his audience is pre-
dictable in a world where eros is put to the service 0£ 
vanquishing enemies. The generative :force doubles back on 
itsel£, and, instead o:f taking the older generation be-fore 
the younger, takes the younger -first; it even attacks hope 
for the unborn. What is depicted, in short, is war brought 
into the domestic sphere. 
This depiction, then, is the culmination 0£ Euripides' 
art 0£ midwi£ery. He delivers his elenchos to its syllo-
gistic conclusion by bringing the analogy to medicine to 
bear upon competitive eros, thereby showing this eros :for 
what it is: the antithesis 0£ nature's eros, a :force 0£ 
death instead 0£ a -force 0£ li:fe. Euripides shows how 
competitive eros, desire manipulated to serve winning, a 
desire Primarily to vanquish enemies, reverses nature's 
order. 
By his -final application 0£ the analogy to medicine, 
Euripides -forces recognition 0£ the truth that competitive 
~. and ultimately the competitive sophia which at tends 
it and the competitive arete that de-fines them both, o££end 
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tne most basic human sensibilities about the continuation 
of nuuian li£e through mating and child-rearing.336 By 
51110gistically applying to the arena 0£ competitive eros 
an etb.ic 0£ bene£i t, derived £rom the analogy to medicine, 
guripides £orces the stark. realization that instead 0£ 
benefit (li£e), competition breeds harm: death and 
destruction. 3 37 
For, as Euripides shows his audience, competition 
perverts eros. In Medea, as in the lives 0£ Euripides• 
audience members, procreation is the bond 0£ marriage, and 
yet, ironically in the competitive world 0£ Medea, marriage 
is synonymous with mourning. This is because birth takes a 
336Arrowsmith, "Ideas,• p. 48, likewise assigns 
pedagogic intent to Euripides• contrast between 
destructiveness and creativity in the play: •Jason's 
calculating, practical sophia is, lacking eros, sel£ish and 
destructive; Medea •s consuming eros and psychological 
sophia . . . are, without compassion, maimed and 
destructive. They are both destroyers--destroyers 0£ 
themselves, 0£ others, 0£ sophia and the polis--and it is 
this destructiveness which above all else Euripides wants 
his audience to observe: the spirit 0£ brutal sel£-
interest and passionate revenge which threatens both lire 
and culture, and which is purposely set in sharp contrast 
to life-enhancing Athens where the arts -flourish, eros 
~ollaborates with sophia, and creative physis is gentled by 
Just nomoi. Behind Jason and Medea we are clearly meant to 
see that spreading spirit 0£ expedience and revenge which, 
unchecked by culture or religion, finally brought about the 
Peloponnesian War and its attendant atrocities." 
337Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge," hersel£ uses 
medical terminology in describing the ills that erupt at Co · 
ri.nth (see, e.g., p. 19, where Burnett describes Jason 
~nd the Corinthian palace as "a malady that has spread" and 
.~1°t been quarantined"), but attributes the cause for those l. s to Jason and the Corinthians. She seems nearly to 
e:onerate Medea as the avenging erinys, the natural result 
0 Jason's violation 0£ oaths (p. 13). 
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'!'he first of the symbols of promise is the marriage 
> I Euripides uses three words for "bed": EUV'l'l, 
J.f~ "tpOV, and .>..E:xos. Al together, "bed" occurs 
tnirty-£our times in 1419 lines. These words serve a 
double duty, for while on the one hand they can merely be 
taKen as a concrete symbol £or "marriage," on the other 
nand, the word "bed" summons up a vision o:f sexual 
intercourse. The audience is thereby encouraged to think 
of marriage as a bond :formed primarily :for procreation, a 
notion not alien to :firth-century B. C. Athenians.338 
Indeed, Medea and Jason appear to have considered pro-
creation marriage's purpose, :for Medea claims she could 
nave accepted Jason's abandoning her i:f their union had 
been childless (489-491), and Jason, despite his protests 
to the contrary (557-558), when he thinks 0£ his new 
marriage, imagines the new children that will be born of it 
(563-564; 596-597; 917). 
Alongside this impression o:f marriage as a potential 
for new li:fe, Euripides places another image o:f marriage, 
as a death-knell. This he does by using ic:floos 
and the related words K'l16Eµ.wv, i<:.fioEuµ.a, and 
, , 
338see, e.g., Xenophon, Oeconomicus 7 .18-19: E:110l I >I I C I 
, Yap To L, E cp '11 cp av a L, Ka l o L 0 E o L ,, 
Yu!al, ooi<:ou<n ..roAu oLeai<:eµ.µ.E:vws µ.aALaTa To 
te:';'Yos TOUTO OUVTE0ElKEVQl, 0 i<:aAELIQl e:r}.>..u 
K Q l >I Cl Cl > I ~ > 
> appEV 01fWS Oil wcpEAlt.J.WIQTOV 1.1 - aUl<tJ, e: l (' ' t I ' ' ,_ 
> :i ,.,,v KOlVWVlQV. 1rpWTOV µEv yap TOU t.J.'11 
E:K).l11'ELV ~i;,wv yev'l"I 1ouTo 10 ~Euyo5 
'1E:T> ciA>..Ti>..wv 'T€KV01f0t0UlJ.€VOV 
.... 
KEliQl 
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ic"1<5euw to signi£y "marriage" and the like. Euripides 
tnerebY suggests that the perversion 0£ eros in zero-sum 
coJD.peti ti on is a perversion 0£ the £irst magnitude: the 
life-force becomes a dea th-£orce. 
J(edos and related words are ambiguous; their 
associations suggest both marriages and £unerals,339 
gaining connection and losing it £orever.340 The words 
occur eight times in the play, and only in one case (the 
first instance, at line 76, where the Tutor is speaking) 
can use be argued to be strictly unambiguous. In their 
second and third occurrences, however, the ambiguity 0£ 
these words is purpose£ully exploited. At 366-367 Medea 
boasts: "There are con tests ahead £or those newly wed and 
no small toils £or the bridal/£uneral party" (TOLOl 
339yet ano,ther word suggesting both marriages and 
death is µ.aic:apLos, "blessed." See Hills, Hythopoeia, 
p. 144. C£. McDonald, Happiness, p. 47, who elaborates 
that µ.aKapLOS is used "as an epithet £or a bride or 
as an epithet £or a person who is dead." McDonald further 
notes that the adjective in Medea is applied only to Medea 
(509, where Medea sarcastically imagines hersel£ "blessed" 
by her marriage to Jason) and to the princess (957, by 
Medea, as she is instructing the children to take the 
fatal gi£ts to the princess); Euripides in other plays 
exploits the word's ambiguity to suggest that a person will 
be dead by the end 0£ the play. 
340The ambiguity 0£ these words has been noted, 
but not £itted into the pattern 0£ related moti£s I am 
:r~posing. See Collinge, "Ex Hachina," p. 172 n. 6; c£. 
K lhot, Medea, p. 90 at lines 884-888, and Kills, 
~thopoeia, p. 144. Newton, "Passionate Poison," p. 14, ~oes ~ug~est that the ambiguity is carried over into the 
( escription 0£ the death 0£ the princess, whose wedding 
fPel"'versely consummated with her £a ther) becomes her unel"'al. 
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icfl~e.UaaaL v). Again, at 399-400, Medea •s threats 
t>ring out the ambiguity 0£ kedos: "I will make the 
inarriage painful £or them and mournful, painful the 
inarriage/mourning (K:r}oos.) and my exile 'from the 
1and." 
While Medea •s next use 0£ one 0£ the words seems 
innocent enough--at 700 she explains to Aegeus that Jason's 
desire is £or a "marriage connection" (K:r]oos.) with 
royalty--the meaning 0£ the word is colored by the previous 
exploitation 0£ its ambiguity. In the next two uses 
at 885 £ollowed quickly by at 
888), the 'first, apparently innocent, use at 885 is under-
mined by a sinister and undeniable ambiguity at 888. 
Medea is talking to Jason, and it becomes obvious that the 
only reason she does not openly exploit the words' ambi-
guity is that she does not wish Jason to sense that her 
repentance and mildness are a sham. The ambiguity is 
nonetheless there: 
So now I praise you. To me you seem prudent in having 
taken on this marriage (K~oos.), and I was 
st up id, I, who should have shared in these plans, 
should have taken part in the wedding, and stood 
beside the bed (lfapt:o-ravaL ).ex£l) and been 
delighted to tend to/bury (K'r)oE:uoav) your bride. 
(884-888). 
Medea has previously, i£ as here only notionally, been at 
the side 0£ Jason's new marriage bed. At lines 379-380, 
Medea brie£ly entertained the thought 0£ sneaking with her 
dagger in to the house "where the bed is made" cYv• 
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>.exos).341 To have her now imagine 
n.erself standing beside this same bed, taking delight in 
•tending to" the bride, brings with it a chilling picture: 
tbe blood 0£ murder drenching the marriage bed, where, i£ 
tbere is to be blood, it should be the result 0£ an 
entirely different act. The picture, which juxtaposes 
procreation and killing by making them eerie bedmates, 
speaks volumes about the reversals of nature that occur in 
zero-sum competition. 
The Chorus seem to get this message, for they are the 
next to use one 0£ the words 0£ this group. As they sing 
their £ourth stasimon, they address Jason with these words: 
And you, poor wretch, harm-ridden groom 
(KaKovuµ.cpt:), connected by marriage with/attender 
of the dead of (K'l'lot:µwv) kings, you do not know 
that for your children you bring destruction to their 
>I ...... life (oAt:9pov fJLOT?) and hateful death to your 
wife. (991-994). 
The juxtaposition here of life and death, hope and despair, 
is excruciating. This marriage is marriage's true 
antithesis: instead of bringing to life new children, it 
destroys that hope for the future and then doubles back, 
bringing death to children already alive. 
~Jason, in despair at finally coming to know the 
destruction, if not its source, is the last to use one of 
the words £rom this group. He blames Medea alone, and 
341At 40-41 the Hurse speaks the same lines, ~hich both Page and Diggle consider to have been 
interpolated from 379-380. 
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terms his marrying her a •connection by marriage/mourning 
nateful and destructive to me" 
, ' 
exBpov 
0Af:9pLOV 
T, > I Eµ OL, 134-1). 
Jason, however, is not the one £or whom this l<.edos has 
been literally destructive. By laying destruction on the 
bed of marriage, Euripides portends the trans£orma tion 0£ 
children, the customary result 0£ procreation, into 
corpses, destruction 1 s ultimate issue. Euripides sees to 
it that children are a 'focus throughout the play.34-2 
Children are, i£ not literally, at least imaginatively on 
stage in every episode, and they are the subject 0£ £our 0£ 
the Chorus• songs. These symbols 0£ new lire, lil<.e the 
marriage bed as a symbol 0£ procreation, are used by 
Euripides in another shocl<.ing counterpoint. Children, 
life's very beginning, brought repeatedly be£ ore his 
audience 1 s mind 1 s eye, become corpses, li£e1 s end. 
Words £or "children" appear more than twice as many 
" times as words £or the marriage bed. The word ll'OLS 
alone occurs in seventy-one lines, 
, 
TEKVOV in 
eleven.3 4-3 The majority 0£ these re£erences are to the 
Children 0£ Medea and Jason. There are, in addition, seven 
342The centrality 0£ the theme 0£ children has 
been o£ten noticed, but little examined. See, e.g. 
:ch~esinger, "Zu Medea," pp. 4-8-4-9. C£. Conacher, 
._E.r1pidean Drama, p. 192. 
b 343A summary 0£ the context 0£ the occurrences may 
(1~ found in Leon Golden, "Children in the Medea," CB 48 
71), PP. U-12. C£. des Bouvrie, Women, p. 224-n. 2. 
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.cerences to other, prospective children (0£ Jason and the 
re;i. 
princess, 597, 805; of Aegeus, 669, 674, 715, 717, 721); 
miscellaneous references (to children 0£ various 
ten 
otners, three referring to adults quasi-patronymically, 
487, 665, 684, 825, 1289); five to children in general 
(295, 574, 1092, 1096, 1114); and nine references to 
Jason's new bride as a child (19, 283, 329, 344, 554, 783, 
1207, 1210 1220). 34 4 
By these constant references to children, Euripides 
Keeps children in his a udience•s minds. And while ideas 
about children and child-rearing have certainly changed 
since fifth-century B. C. Athens, and differences between 
modern and ancient notions may be difficult to discover, it 
is clear that the play depicts the death 0£ children as 
traumatic. This can be argued from the reactions 1) of 
Medea herself at the prospect of killing her children (791-
796; 1056-1058; 1069-1077); 2) of Creon at the sight of his 
child dying (1204-1210); 3) of the Chorus at Medea•s 
raising her hand against her children (846--865; 976-977), 
at the imagined reaction 0£ Jason and Medea to this act 
(990-1001; 1306-1307), and at the thought of losing a child 
in any way (1090-1115); and 4) 0£ Jason at the news and 
sight of his children dead (1310; 1315; 1361; 1377; 1397; 
344McDermott, Incarnation, p. 85 n. 5, notes the 
namelessness of the princess, and suggests that it may be 
~SCI"ibed to Euripides' " . . . effort to emphasize her role 
in a significant parent-child relationship." 
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1399-1400; 1402-1403; 1405-1414). It is hard to imagine 
tnat Euripides would have presented adults so consistently 
traumatized by child-death and expected them to be sym-
patnetic to an audience indi££erent to such loss. And 
indeed, Hark. Golden has argued that the ancient Athenians, 
despite high child mortality rates and the possible 
exposure 0£ unwanted in'fants, were hardly indi££erent to 
tb.e loss 0£ children.3 45 Furthermore, it seems sa'fe to 
assert that children represented, among other things, to 
the ancient Athenians what they represent now: new li'fe. 
It is £or this reason that Euripides• turning children to 
corpses e££ects a power'ful reversai.346 For i£ 
children cannot thrive, but instead must die horribly, the 
world must be disease-ridden. 
The world 0£ Medea is, in £act, disease-ridden in all 
of its parts--wi th one notable exception: the idealized 
Athens 0£ the third stasimon (824-865). This is a healthy 
345see Hark. Golden, Children and Childhood in 
Classical Athens (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopk.ins 
Univ. Press, 1990; herea'fter H. Golden, Children), p. 89, 
•. · · the weight 0£ the evidence seems overwhelmingly to 
favor the proposition that the Athenians loved their 
Children and grieved £or them deeply when they died." 
Evidence 'follows, on pp. 89-99. McDermott, Incarnation, p. 
27
• cites Hesiod's Work.s and Days 185-188 £or the 
assumption that trophe will be given by parents to children 
:nd sho~ld there'fore be returned. McDermott argues that 
the ancient Greek.s attributed parental philia particularly 
0 females, and that Euripides especially shock.s his 
audience by showing a mother who k.ills her children. 
0 
346Nussbaum, Fragility, pp. 397-399, is excellent c:. the e££ect created by Euripides• use 0£ an already dead 
lld, Polydorus, in the prologue 0£ Hecuba. 
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. ..,e and, as such, one in which children are born, 
ell ... • 
nurtured, and thrive. As was noted above (Part Four), the 
first strophe-antistrophe pair contributes largely to this 
picture. The £irst strophe begins by twice designating 
tn.e Athenians "children,•347 £irst by a patronymic 
and then by terming them "children 0£ the blessed gods" 
aewv 
I µaKapwv, 824-
825). These "children" are •nourished" (cpeppoµevol, 
826) bY wisdom. The strophe ends with the Muses giving 
birth to (cpu-reuaal) Harmony, whose more usually 
designated mother, Aphrodite, is mentioned in the succeed-
ing antistrophe. 
The contrast between these lines and the rest 0£ the 
play is stark.. Children do not thrive here; instead, they 
are born only to become corpses be£ore they can grow up. 
This turning 0£ chi.ldren into corpses is the £inal 
extension 0£ the medical analogy, and Euripides' most 
power£ul weapon in reversing his audience's complacent 
acceptance 0£ de£ini tions encouraged by zero-sum competi-
lion. What the poet gradually reveals is that the Nurse's 
remark. at line 16, "the dearest things are diseased" 
' Ta was unwittingly prophetic 
Within the analogy. Ta philtata, "the dearest things," to 
347 Pr . Ohlander, Suspense, p. 124, notes the 
edominance 0£ words £or children in the stasimon. 
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in Medea, are her children:348 -five times 
text she re-fers to them as such, at 795 ("-fleeing ifl tne 
tnurder 0£ my dearest children"); twice at 1071 (where tne 
O f the children's hands and then his mouth is termed one 
•dearest"); at 1247 (both children are "dearest"); and 
finallY at 1397, where, upon hearing Jason call the 
ctiildren "dearest" 
, 
TEKVa cpt.>.-ra-ra), Medea 
counters, "To their mother, but not to you." 
can we be surprised, then, that the children, these 
•dearest things," died "o-f their -father's disease," 
, , 
(11'a1"p<t>{l voa<t>, 1364 ), as Medea claims at the play' s 
end 7349 There is, in this unhealthy climate 0£ 
competitiveness, no place £or children to thrive; at best, 
they must grow up quickly so that they can enter the 
competition in which their parents can no longer take 
part. Jason proudly describes this scenario to his 
children as he contemplates their 'future: 
3481 there-fore disagree with the meaning 0£ line 
16 proposed by Hew ton, "Passionate Poison," p. 13, who 
translates -ra .pt.>.1a1a as "what was the greatest 
love," Which he equates loosely With eros. This 
translation is then used in his interpretation 0£ the rest 
Of the play. 
349That Medea's re-ference to her killing the 
Children as a "sacri£ice" (1054) may not be a "mere 
metaphor" has been considered by Walter Burkert, "Greek 
Tragedy and Sacri£icial Ritual," GRBS 7 (1966), p. 118. 
Although Burkert earlier (p. 112) claims that 
•[e]xtraordinary situations 0£ emergency, £amine, disease 
may again and again lead to human sacri£ice," he does not 
consider that the impetus £or Medea's "sacri£ice" may be 
the disease, i£ only metaphorical, rampant in the play. 
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For I imagine that you will yet be -first (Ta 
11pw-rla1) o-f the Corinthian land with your 
brothers. You just grow up; the rest your -father and 
lfhatever gods are -favorable will accomplish. May I 
see you thriving, coming to the £ul£illment 0£ your 
youth, victorious over my enemies (ex9pwv -rwv 
eµwv uvep-repous>. (916-921).350 
1111agining that his children will be absorbed in his 
coJDpetitive struggle the moment they come to maturity, 
Jason has £ailed to imagine a worse, but, given the 
coJDpeti ti ve milieu, -fully possible case: that they will 
sooner be taken down by that struggle, that he will not 
ever see them £ull grown, but only as child corpses. 
Jason is not, 0£ course, alone in serving his 
children's lives up to competitive stri£e. In this he is 
anticipated by Medea, who does not wait £or the -future to 
throw her unwitting children into the £ray. We should be 
astonished at such activity in most mothers, but certainly 
not in a mother who pre£ers thrice over the -front line 0£ 
battle to giving birth (250-251). Such a mother takes 
battle very seriously; so seriously, in £act, that 
children are used as pawns351 to clear the -field 0£ 
350Jason•s words 0£ course recall Hector's to 
Astyanax at Iliad 6.476-481. There is a di££erence, 
however: Hector imagines his child in a purely ci vie 
context, returning £rom war a£ter killing an enemy not 
~P~ci£ied as Hector's personal enemy (EK vo>.eµou 
QlOVTQ • • • K1"€lVQS 6°'1lOV av6pa, 6.480-481). 
For a good discussion o-f this passage as indicative o-f the 
~ormative ancient Greek parents• expectation that a child 
is not only theirs but "a child 0£ the state," £or whose 
:otential loss they must prepare themselves, see Rick M. 
3~~ton, "Oedipus• Wi-fe and Mother," CJ 87 (1991), pp. 36-
351
see Boedeker, "Medea," p. 99. 
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For difficulties standing in the way o:f ultimate victory. 
!(edea, in addition to using her pharmal<.a 0£ sophia, her 
cornpeti ti ve savvy, uses the appeal o:f children to manipu-
iate Creon into giving her the time (340-347) and Aegeus 
into providing her a place o:f re£uge (714-722). Finally, 
sne uses a pretense o:f concern :for her children's wel:fare 
to require mal<.ing an appeal to the royal -family on their 
bellal-f (939-940), and the persons o:f her children as 
bearers o:f :falsely conciliatory gi:fts (956-958), thereby 
making them accessories to murder.352 
we shudder to consider parents so hard, but these are 
competitors :first, parents second.353 As competitors, 
they must be hard; Winl<.ler quotes Xenophon's Memorabilila 
3.7.1 as a sort o:f thumb-nail sl<.etch o:f competitive disdain 
of so:ftness: 
--"Tell me, Charmides, i:f a man is capable o:f winning 
a crown at contests and thus being honored in his own 
person and mal<.ing his :fatherland more renowned in 
Greece but does not wish to compete, what l<.ind 0£ 
person do you think. this man would be?" --"Obviously 
a so:ft (malal<.os) and cowardly one."354 
Medea -follows this creed o:f esteeming hardness and dis-
daining so:ftness. She l<.nows that being "hard" wins her 
"F 352Easterling, "Infanticide," p. 187. Shaw, 
emale Intruder," p. 260, sees Medea's poison as symbolic: 
"It represents the ability to create, destroy, or pervert 
the bonds between -father and child." 
. 
353simon, Tragic Drama, p. 92, sees Medea's 
~nstrumental use o:f the children as an extension o:f Jason's 
instrumental attitude toward them (565). 
354Winl<.ler, Constraints, quoted on p. 50. 
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tne 1110st renown (809-810) and rebukes hersel£ £or being 
f t" (1052) except in instances where she uses sham •so 
f tness to manipulate her enemies (291, Creon on Medea's so 
seeIIlingly "so£t" words; 776, Medea's plan to use "soft" 
,,ords to Jason). Even the hal£-heartedly competitive Creon 
realizes that "being soft" leads to regret (316). Is it 
anY wonder, then, that such disdain 0£ softness would 
eradicate children, among whose most prominent 
characteristics to the ancient GreeKs was the very 
softness355 so disdained by competitors? Both Medea 
and Jason remark. on their children's "soft" sKin (1075, 
1403). Such remarKs signal not only the desirability 0£ 
children, but their vulnerability in the contest as well. 
The softness 0£ children seals their death on a field of 
hardened and hard competitors. 
In short, competition is innately deadly to children, 
especially to the children of those who engage in it. The 
death of Creon's daughter illustrates this. She, too, liKe 
Medea's children, had the mis£ortune 0£ being labelled 
"dearest" (if only indirectly; see line 329) by her (albeit 
halfheartedly) competitive parent. Predictably, then, 
Creon's daughter also dies--and she almost literally--of 
the play's disease, in a hideous competition with her 
father, with whom she is described by the Messenger to be 
"wrestling": "There was a terrible/clever wrestling," 
Golden, Children, p. 8. 
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o' 11'a~alaµ.a-ra, 1214).35 6 Poor 
er eon. ever the reluctant competitor, is £inally pinned, 
"anquished. He is, according to the Messenger, no longer 
"Oll top 0£" 
c , (u11'ep-repo5, 1219) harm. 
The princess• death scene abounds in grisly details 
that are not merely gratuitous; they serve a serious 
t . 357 func ion. The scene is doubly meant to shock. and 
iDJ.press the audience: £irst, it tak.es a child and turns 
her in to a ghastly corpse;358 second, its culmination 
tinges death with a hint o-f the erotic. In short, 
Euripides gives -first a graphic depiction o-f the horrors o-f 
the conjunction o-f young li-fe and death, and then makes it 
356see McDermott, Incarnation, p. 87, who also 
notes that the men . . . de construction 0£ lines 1215-1216 
"succinctly re£lects the change in this particular parent-
child relationship £rom reciprocity to antagonism." Cf. 
Rewton, "Passionate Poison," p. 18. 
357Browne, "Interpretations," p. 78, suggests that 
Euripides uses "drama tic economy" in keeping Medea silent 
about the e£fects of the magical apparel so as to exploit 
"vivid, articulate horror" in his description here. 
Gellie, "Character," p. 21, suggests that the grisly death 
scene interrupts the audience's emotional involvement with 
Kedea•s "racked motherhood" and cautions them •to stand 
aloof." 
Husurillo, "Reconsideration,• pp. 62-63, by contrast, 
finds the scene's descriptions "nauseating," and comments 
that the "destruction o-f the innocent Glauke seems 
gratuitous and waste£ul: it serves merely to demonstrate 
Kedea•s awe-inspiring power and the -force o-f her 
vengeance." In this, "Euripides reveals himself as a 
master of pure horror" and "betrays his morbid streak." 
358see Buttrey, "Accident," p. 12: "1£ you do not 
~nderstand the meaning of a child's death, an example is 
lmmedia tely at hand: the second part of the episode is the 
messenger's relation 0£ the death of Creusa." 
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doublY repugnant359 by casting this conjunction as 
per-verse procreation. 360 
That Euripides intends the audience to consider 
Creon's daughter a child is not di££icult to de-fend. She 
,... 
iS called ll'OlS because, technically speak.ing, she 
is a child, as was every girl 0£ her era until mar-
riage.361 And although this particular girl can be 
argued to have given up the stat us 0£ child by her recent 
marriage (see especially 1178), her actions nonetheless 
betray her as childish. She may not be described as so£t 
in sK.in as are the children 0£ Jason and Medea, but she has 
the other so£tness typical 0£ children: she is so-ft 0£ 
character. Variable as the weather, she is, malleable, and 
greedy, as ancient Greek.s thought children were.362 
Within £our lines (1146-1149) she goes -from eagerness to 
disgust, -from an intent gaze to eyes covered by her hands 
and head turned away. 
Perhaps the princess is momentarily the adult in the 
359Pace Ohlander, Suspense, p. 167, who argues 
that Euripides guards against Medea's losing the audience's 
sympathy by k.eeping the princess 0££ stage. 
36 0see Newton, "Passionate Poison," pp. 16-19, on 
Whose superb analysis 0£ the erotic elements 0£ this scene 
my discussion depends. I depart, however, -from Newton on 
several points, which mak.es our assessments 0£ what is 
communicated by this scene radically di££erent. 
361M. Golden, Children, 
187 £or ancient sources. C£. 
lOq. n. 7. 
p. 15; see his 
Dunk.le, "Aegeus 
Golden, Children, pp. 8-9. 
n. 81 on p. 
Episode," p. 
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presence 0£ her new husband; Burnett's description 0£ her 
as "touched by lust (1146)" and "haughty and filled with 
10athing £or Medea's sons" is not without merit.363 
aer actions can be understood as those 0£ any adult but 
young bride confronted with evidence 0£ her husband's 
forrner sexual attachments. The princess' presumably adult 
disdain £or the children and sti££ resistance to her 
husband's appeal to be reasonable immediately melt, 
however, in the £ace 0£ pretty baubles that are dandled in 
front 0£ her.364 Burnett finds in the princess' greed 
evidence 0£ Corinthian sensuality, 0£ moral weakness and 
culpability.365 It takes a determinedly stern 
attitude, though, to require adult sensibilities and a 
corresponding accountability from the likes 0£ this girl, 
whose lust quickly subsides (did she £eel lust, or merely 
act it out?), who can barely wait £or her husband's and his 
children's departure before she dons the dress and tiara 
363Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge," p. 18. 
364Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 85, sees in Medea's gifts 
to the princess the -folktale motif 0£ •a jealous -fairy or 
nymph [who] uses the gift 0£ a magical belt in an attempt 
to destroy her rival." Furthermore, Medea, by dressing up 
the princess in her [Medea's] clothes and then destroying 
her, creates a double 0£ herself and destroys her mortal 
aspect. (pp. 121-122). 
365Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge," pp. 18-19. C-f. ~hlander, Suspense, p. 167, who acknowledges that 
1~Uripides presents the new bride in a scarcely winning tlght" _but adds: "There can be no denying, however, that 
he Princess dies horribly and could hardly have sinned 
enough in her short life to merit such punishment." 
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{U56-1158), playing a little girl's dress-up game as she 
priIDPS in :front o:f the mirror and prances about the room, 
too 0 ver joyed at the :fall o:f the gown (1161-1166) to recall 
tnat she has abandoned her adult disdain. In :front o-f our 
eyes, Euripides has begun to turn the newly adult bride 
))aCK into the little girl she so recently has been. 
Euripides completes this trans:forma tion :from young 
adult to child even as he is turning the princess into a 
corpse. First, her childish glee is momentarily inter-
rupted by a chilling :foreshadowing: she smiles at her 
reflection,366 which Euripides describes as the 
•lifeless image o:f her body" (a-.vuxov > ' €lKW 
owµ.aT05, 1162). The moment is ghoulish and disturbing, 
coming as it does in the midst o:f her dress-up game. Then 
the princess is beset by what at :first seems to be some 
kind 0£ £it: she pales, £alls into a chair,367 'foams 
at the mouth as her eyes roll bacK, and 'finally bursts into 
flames (1167-1189). Her childish prancing gives way to 
headlong flight (1164, 1190); the tiara once set on so 
care-fully arranged tresses now cannot be hurled :from the 
36 6Hewton, "Passionate Poison," p. 16, sees this 
act, as well as the princess• extreme joy and repeated 
looking at her outstretched cal£ (1165) as autoerotic (see 
his n. 12). Similarly, Hewton argues that the dainty step 
Of the princess echoes the "tender-£ooted Eros" described 
~y Agathon in Plato's Symposium 195d-e; the "li:feless 
image" recalls a symptom o:f eros in Archilochus 104W. 
367The princess• change of sK.in color and 
trembling limbs remind Hew ton, "Passionate Poison,• p. 16, 
of symptoms of love described by Sappho 31LP. 
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:nair o£ a £rantically shaken head (1160-1161, 1191-1192). 
gelpless to save hersel£, the girl £alls into a heap. But 
finallY, and all the while increasing the horror almost 
:beyond our endurance, Euripides turns the princess once and 
for all time back into a child. He does this by bringing 
ber £ather upon the scene. 
A parent, as Euripides is care-ful to have his 
111essenger note, is probably the only one who can identi£y 
tbe young girl: she was " except to a parent, very 
bard to recognize at sight" (v)..fiv T<t> ' T€KOVTl 
, ,.. 
l0€l v, 1196). Euripides thus puts 
us behind her £ather's eyes,368 and it is with these 
eyes that we see the de£ormities the princess has su££ered 
(1197-1202). Her eyes have shi£ted -from their normal 
position. Her whole £ace has lost its £ine con£ormation. 
Blood mixed with £ire drips -from the top 0£ her head. The 
poison still gnaws away -from inside her; her -flesh oozes 
off her bones like sap 0££ a pine tree. A child becomes a 
macabre, revoltingly dis-figured corpse (veicpou, 
1203). 
We are no more -finished beholding her with a parent's 
eyes, than in comes her £a ther (ll'aT.fip, 1204), who 
falls upon the corpse 1205), twice calling it 
36 8Euripides has, in £act, immediately be-fore the 
messenger's speech prepared the audience to view as parents 
by having the Chorus sing about the travails 0£ those who 
rear children (1190-1115). 
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•cnild" ( '5' 0 
..... 
11'aL, 1207; 
, 
IEICVOV, 1210). 
l{iS -vrish to die with her, expressed in extreme grie'f, is 
granted a£ter his grie£ has abated (1210-1211), and we 
,,itness rather and child in a grisly struggle. Time seems 
to stand still as she appears to come alive only to Kill 
:tiiID.369 And, in the end, it does stand still as we 
regard a bizarre and un£orgettable tableau: "They lie, the 
corpses, both child and old rather, close together, longed 
for--in tears--the disaster." (IC El Vial . VEKPOL 
,.. 
1fQLS IE 
. 
IC al 
, 
YEPWV veAas, 11'09El v.fi 
I 
c§aKpUOLOl 
I 
ouµ.cpopa, 1220-1221). 
The description or the child and parent lying together 
dead is not, however, merely pathetic. It is erotically 
suggestive. The physical closeness or the child and £a ther 
is stressed in the Greek. text by veAas, which is the 
third element in an alliterative chain: 
VaT.fip 11'09EL v.fi, i.e., " child 
father, close together, longed 'for " The chain or 
words is itsel'f somewhat suggestive, but becomes even more 
so by the emphatic placement or "close together" at the 
line's beginning, and hard upon the word £or "longed 'for" 
369 McDermott, Incarnation, p. 87, argues 
convincingly that Euripides, by using the £eminine pronoun 
·~he" <11. 1216) to describe the corpse's struggle 
~lth Creon, seems to revivi'fy the daughter only to cause 
e:r- father's death. 
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"£Ull 0£ longing").370 
surely one can consider neither the striking 
alli tera ti ve chain nor the doubly strategic placement 0£ 
11'£>.as accidental, especially when one re£lects upon 
tnis line's status as climax 0£ a scene in which other 
erotic elements abound. These have been duly noted by Rick. 
ff. Newton in his article, "Medea's Passionate Poison." 
Although I disagree with Newton's £inal assessment 0£ the 
meaning conveyed here, he is correct in arguing £or this 
scene's eroticism. Newton cites an impressive list 0£ loci 
classici to illustrate that all 0£ the £ol1owing can be 
interpreted as erotic: the princess• delighted laughter 
(1162), autoerotic sel£-gazing (1162-1165), and change 0£ 
skin color and trembling limbs (1168-1169); Creon's lover-
like desire to merge with his daughter in death (1210), and 
the subsequent melding 0£ his £lesh with that 0£ his 
daughter a£ter their "wrestling match" (1214).371 
370Newton, "Passionate Poison,• p. 19, notes the 
emphatic position 0£ the adverb 1l'e>.as at the line's 
beginning, but does not remark. upon its proximity to 
Vo9eLv.fi. This last word is not, 0£ course, i tsel£ 
erotically suggestive. Indeed, as the line progresses into 
tears and disaster (c5atc.puoLol ouµ.cpopa), sexual 
suggestiveness yields to horror. This does not, however, 
Obliterate the line's eroticism, much as one would pre£er 
that it did. 
371Newton, "Passionate Poison,• pp. 14-19. Newton 
:rgues that other details 0£ the scene are likewise erotic; 
he ones I have cited are those which I £ind most 
convincing. Newton gives many citations to ancient texts Wh· lch I will not reproduce here. To the re£erences on 
;restling as love-making, however, I would add one, called 
0 my attention by James G. Keenan: Cassandra •s 
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This last, the "wrestling match," deserves further 
coIDIDent, for it is here that I depart from Newton. As has 
aireadY been noted (above, Part Two), "wrestling" denotes 
coIDPeti tion. It also, as Newton argues, connotes for the 
ancient Greeks love-making, a connotation undoubtedly 
suggested by the close physical proximity the two acts have 
in common. Denotation, however, predominates over con no-
tation in the messenger's description, because the 
norrifying details of this "match" (1212-1217) depict 
death so graphically that the erotic undertone is 
increasingly eclipsed. By the end, when Euripides has his 
messenger reveal corpses of father and daughter lying close 
together, the depiction, despite erotic undertones, ends 
with tears and disaster (daKpUOlOl 
, 
ouµcpopa, 1221). 
To be sure, an incest ual tryst is suggested by this 
•wrestling." In the context of the whole scene, though, 
where a child becomes a corpse that literally wrestles her 
father to a gruesome death 372 while 
• 
he is all the 
While fighting her, the perversity is not only, and not 
Primarily, sexuai.373 
description of Apollo as "wrestler" (11'a>.ato1Tis> with 
her at Agamemnon 1206. 
372simon, Tragic Drama, p. 78, interprets the 
melding of flesh in this scene as one more example of the 
Violence and torture resulting from touch. 
373Pace Newton, "Passionate Poison," p. 18 n. 18 
and p. 19, where he suggests that Creon loved his daughter 
excessively and suffered an ironically fit ting end. 
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rn short, the -father-daughter relationship is more 
grossly distorted by the overt struggle between the corpse 
and her -father than it is by the sexual suggestiveness 0£ 
tne scene.374 There is, indeed, perversion 0£ eros in 
Uiis scene, but the perversion is 0£ eros by competition, 
..,11ich, in its extreme, turns love, even the love 0£ a 
father £or his daughter, into a struggle that ends in 
death. 
Medea's "delight" as she anticipates hearing the 
details 0£ the death-struggle indicate how Euripides 
intended the perversion 0£ eros in this scene to be 
understood: "How did they die? For you will delight 
(1'epvelaS.) us twice as much i£ they died horribly" 
, (1134-1135). The verb -repirw she here uses, and its 
related noun and adjective (-repirvos.) 
are largely concerned with sensual pleasures, whether these 
be -food, drink, song, stories, or, as the observation 0£ 
Kimnermus (5.3) reminds, the delights 0£ Aphrodite.375 
Here, delight is again sensually aroused, not by hearing 
song, nor partaking 0£ rood, nor engaging in sex, but by 
hearing the grotesque details 0£ a £a ther and daughter 
brought together in deaths that parody love-making. This, 
i.e., by hearing the destruction 0£ one's enemies, is what 
374on 
McDermott 
• 
this point, 
Incarnation, 
375L;:;J9, 
Tepirvos.. 
s.v. 
see the excellent 
pp. 86-89. 
, 
-repirw, 
discussion 0£ 
and 
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gi ..,es delight. 
Medea, then, is true source 0£ the perversion. For, 
e..,en though the Messenger tells the tale, it is £rom the 
perspective 0£ the competitive Medea that the 
trans-formation 0£ a child into a corpse has erotic 
undertones, as, in turn, does the trans£orma tion 0£ that 
..,erY corpse into a force of destruction against its own 
father. Even the -father is hideously trans-formed by 
Medea •s eros rendered perverse by competition: Creon 
changes -from one who, lover-like, wants only to die with 
his child (1207-1210) to one who struggles mightily to get 
rid of her.376 
But -from another perspective, that 0£ the Messenger 
who is con-fused at Medea's initial glee (1129-1131), this 
is more horri£ying tragedy than incest ual tryst. So much 
his last descriptive line (1221) and the regret£ul tone 0£ 
his closing remarks (1224-1230) suggest. Competitive eros 
has borne terrible issue: a dead father locked in the 
perversion 0£ a loving embrace with a corpse recognizable 
only to him as his own beloved child. 
There is, as we shall see, a similarly perverse issue 
3 76McDermott, Incarnation, p. 86, suggests that 
Creon's wish " ... is revealed as a standard elegiac 
topic, not literally meant. However, with grim irony, it 
Will be literally granted . . " See also Simon, Tragic 
~. p. 98: "The movements conveyed by the messenger's 
description 0£ Creon trying to save his tormented daughter 
are a hideous combination 0£ excessive closeness and 
excessive separation." 
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:frOIIl the eros 0£ Medea and Jason. As they single-mindedly 
:follow their true desire, to attain competitive arete, 
tneir children, no less than Creon's child, are rendered 
corpses. As we are treated to the vision 0£ Medea, Jason, 
and the child corpses in the 'final scene, we are shown the 
epitome 0£ the perverse issue 0£ competitive eros: young 
death. And as we think. back. to the young death that was 
the princess', two truths begin to dawn: that young death 
is, contrary to what is suggested by a competitive creed 
that rewards high stakes, anything but beauti£ul, and that 
such a death sucks into its vortex 0£ horror the parent 0£ 
the child. 
The idea 0£ the beauty 0£ young death is an epic moti£ 
that expresses all 0£ the idealism 0£ competitive arete. 
In order to attain glory and honor, one must set the stakes 
high, must put one's lire on the line; doing so does not 
insure (except in the case 0£ Achilles) but certainly 
increases the chance that one will die young. Such a death 
is beau ti£ul, it is a k.alos thana tos.377 Euripides 
has, in describing the death 0£ the young princess, 
exploited this moti£ and exposed it to reductive 
absurdity. 
The princess, like the children 0£ Jason and Medea, is 
377Identi:fied by ~0-83. C:f. Michelini, 
he exploitation 0£ the 
Rur-ipides• Hecuba. 
Vernant, "Beautiful Death," pp. 
Tragic Tradition, pp. 169-170, £or 
epic moti£ 0£ the youth£ul death in 
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roung. and therefore by this fact alone a candidate for 
}C.aios thanatos. She, like they, is not, however, a warrior 
::;;----
on the battle:field,378 but a :frivolous young girl. 
furthermore, she is hardly allowed to die with any beauty. 
instead, she is grotesquely deformed by the pharmaKa on the 
gown and tiara, and dies the pa the tic death o:f the dis-
figured corpse. O:f the three types o:f hideous death, o:f 
outrage (aiKia), Vernant has identified as possible :for a 
warrior to su:f:fer--dis:figurement, dismemberment, or 
decomposi tion--379 the princess su:f:fers the :first: 
One Kind o:f cruelty consists in defiling the bloody 
corpse with dust and in tearing his :flesh, so that the 
enemy will lose his individual appearance, his clear 
set o:f :features, his color and glamor; he loses his 
distinct :form along with his human aspect, so that he 
becomes unrecognizable. When Achilles begins to abuse 
HeKtor, he ties the corpse to his chariot to tear off 
its skin, by let ting i t--especially the head and the 
hair--drag on the ground in the dust: "A cloud o:f 
dust rose where HeKtor was dragged, his dark. hair was 
:falling about him, and all that head that once was so 
handsome [paros charien] was tum bled in the dust" (IL 
2.2..401-3). By dirtying and disfiguring the corpse, 
instead o:f purifying and anointing it, aiKia seeks to 
destroy the individuality of a body that was the 
source o:f the charm o:f youth and life. Achilles wants 
HeKtor to be like Sarpedon: "Ho longer could a man, 
even a Knowing one, have made out the godlike 
Sarpedon, since he was piled :from head to ends o:f :feet 
under a mass o:f weapons, the blood and the dust" (Il. 
16.637-40).380 
37 8christopher H. Dawson, "Random Thoughts on 
Occasional Poems," YCS 19 (1966), pp. 51-55, discusses how 
Tyrtaeus (:fr. 7 Diehl, 19-32) stresses that being dead is 
only beautiful i:f a man has died on the :front lines in 
defense o:f his country. 
379vernant, "Beautiful Death," pp. 70-72. 
380vernant, "Beautiful Death," p. 70. 
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we now can better understand the detail Euripides has 
ia"lished on describing the princess• death. The young girl 
suffers nearly every aspect 0£ dis£igurement alluded to 
abo"fe. She is all but unrecognizable (1196), her £eat ures 
and beauty destroyed (1197-1198), her hair is de£iled with 
blood and £ire (1198-1199), her 'flesh is torn 0££, depriv-
ing her 0£ human aspect: she brings to mind a pine tree 
(1200). 
such gross dis£igurement is actualized in epic, but in 
the most signi£icant cases it is countermanded by the gods, 
who protect the hero's glorious status by preserving the 
body from harm.381 Furthermore, parents are rarely 
allowed to view the death 0£ the hero;382 they are 
instead brought in only notionally by the poet, by £lash-
back or £lash-£orward, and then to increase the pathos or 
to begin the mourning that will doubtlessly ensue at such a 
tragic and beauti£ul sel£-sacri£ice.383 But no such 
divine preservation and no such re-fined pathos occur in 
Medea; instead the princess is le£t a hideous mass 0£ 
flesh, ultimately lying next to the equally dis-figured 
corpse 0£ her 'father, who has died with the memory 0£ the 
381vernant, "Bea uti:ful Dea th," p. 7 4. 
3B2charles Segal, The Theme 0£ the Mutilation 0£ 
!.!!_e Corpse in the Iliad (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1971; 
herea£ter Segal, Mutilation), p. 17. 
3 83Jasper Gri££in, Homer on Lire and Death ( O:x: ford: Clarendon Pre s-s-,--1-9_8_0_)_,_p_p-.--1--2-3 ___ 1_2_7 ____ _ 
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grotesque thing his daughter has become. 
If there was, before this scene, any con-fusion 
:relllaining that the code of the zero-sum competitor is a 
~ile perversion of the heroic creed, no such confusion can 
1f'ithstand the view with which the spectator is left at the 
end of this scene. There is here no glory, no honor, there 
iS no beauty, no victory. Furthermore, there is no mention 
of anyone to bury these two; they are abandoned in a parody 
of procreation, an embrace that has brought grotesque 
death. 
With this image in mind38'l we are led into what 
can now only be considered paradox: Medea's decision to 
proceed with killing her own children. The juxtaposition 
of birth and death is nowhere more violent than in Medea's 
formulation of that decision: •we who gave [them] birth 
Will kill [them]" c "' ("l'llJ.ElS "' KTEVOUlJ.EV Cl Olll'Ep 
) I 
e~ecpuaaµ.ev, 1063). The decision to kill the 
children, logical :for the zero-sum competitor, becomes 
repugnant by the juxtapositon of birth and death. Deftly, 
as if through the sleight-of-hand of some shell game, 
Euripides has indeed brought us to paradox, a mother who 
must kill the children she has borne into life. For what 
else is paradox than inexorable, yet emotionally 
38
'1Buttrey, "Accident,• p. 12 n. 11!: 
murder of Creusa is a sort of prologue to the 
Children. She is just as they, without :form, 
Character, without even a name in the play.• 
• the 
death of the 
without 
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unacceptable, logic?385 
The paradox of a mother who kills her young is brought 
discomfortingly into physical manifestation in the final 
encounter between Jason and Medea. Here, in the little 
bodies Medea carries aloft with her in her moment of 
seeming triumph, is the visible evidence of this perversion 
of nature, the withdrawal of life from its soft, sweet-
smelling, fresh, young receptacles. Here, again, and this 
ume not merely described but made visible, are corpses of 
children. And here, with these corpses, is their mother 
385ohlander, Suspense, pp. 14-3-14-5, has a good 
appreciation 0£ the paradoxical nature of Medea •s decision; 
cf. Pucci, "Monument," pp. 186-187, for the paradox 
becoming apparent and projected into the future at the 
play•s close, where Medea announces the ritual to 
commemorate her children, upon which Pucci remarks, "The 
unresolvable tension will continue forever." See Burnett, 
"Tragedy of Revenge," p. 19, for Euripides• use in Medea of 
a "reversal of nature motif" whereby "· .. a mother is to 
bring death instead of life to her children . " Cf. 
Kills, Mythopoeia, p. 107. 
Similarly, Michelini, "Neophron," p. 131, explains, 
"Kedeia's particular dilemma and the solution she chooses 
involve her in interlocking contradictions." Cf. p. 134-, 
where Michelini terms Medea " .... an absurdity, a 
paradox, in which conflicting forces are held forever in 
opposition." I do not, however, agree with Michelini's 
later assertions (p. 133): 1) that the Medea's dilemma 
"resembles the complex picture of moral responsibility that 
we find in Aristotle more than it does a Sophistic or 
Socratic paradox," and 2) that "· .. Medeia, who feels 
mother love most keenly at the moment of her decision to 
murder, recognizes the irrational force guiding her 
rationality." It is her mother love that is "irrational," 
and her decision to murder that is "rational," within the 
dictates of the established definitions. The paradox, by 
stressing the emotional unacceptability of seeing a 
decision to murder one's own children as "rational," forces 
the recognition that it is the definitions, not the logic, 
that is wrong. As in elenchos, one must discard the 
Proposed definitions and begin anew. 
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.... no Killed them. But, as Creon's death has suggested, the 
parent cannot survive the death 0£ the child, £or death 
ina1<.es no such discrimination. Parents, whether willing or 
not, cannot but die when their children die. 
The women 0£ the Chorus have already revealed that to 
parents the loss 0£ a child is the "most distressing grie£" 
(i113); so distressing that not having children maKes one 
:nappier than having them (1090-1093). We can now, a£ter 
:naving witnessed Creon's death with his child and Hedea•s 
killing 0£ her own children, understand 'further why it is 
that the women 0£ the Chorus can think only o-f Ino as a 
parallel to Medea •s situation. Ino, too, died when her 
children died: " and dying with (ouveavouoCa1) 
her two children she was destroyed" (1289). This is not 
a hint that Medea should kill hersel£;386 instead, it 
is a recognition 0£ a £act: whether literally or not, 
parents die when their children die.387 
386Pace Hugh Parry, The Lyric Poems 0£ Greek 
Tragedz (Toronto and Sarasota: Samuel Stevens, 1978), p. 
198. C-f. the suggestion o-f Cunningham, "Medea," pp. 156-
157, that the participle o>.oµ.E:vav at 1253 has 
optative £orce, and that the Chorus• attitude toward Medea 
after the murder is one 0£ revulsion. 
387 So Conacher, Euripidean Drama, p. 197; 
Conacher, however, does not notice the parallel suggested 
by the scene between Creon and his daughter, and thus 
dismisses the Chorus• Ino analogue as an in tima ti on that 
Medea's continuing to live and -flourish annuls. Hills, 
~thopoeia, p. 123, sees Ino•s death as a parallel to 
Medea's in that Medea has to destroy a part o-f hersel£, her 
maternal instinct, in order to Kill the children. C£. 
~haw, "Female Intruder," p. 262, who asserts that earlier, 
in Medea's second scene with Jason, "her [Medea's] 
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Neither Jason nor Medea literally die, but both su-f-fer 
ttie death o-f their glory and honor, their status o-f 
attaining competitive arete. Jason's ignoble death is 
foretold by an exultant Medea (1386-1388); he himsel£ 
acKnowledges that he has been destroyed (1350). Medea, 
111eanwhile, is likewise destroyed along with her children. 
A.s Jason and modern critics are quick. to point out, her 
act has in some sense assaulted her status as human 
being.388 Her victory 0£ not being laughed at pales by 
involuntary outbursts or grie£ reveal that a part 0£ 
hersel-f is su££ering and dying." 
388The mode 0£ Medea •s escape in the sun-chariot 
is regularly cited as evidence or her loss or humanity. 
For Medea's trans-formation into a -faux-goddess, see 
Cunningham, "Medea," pp. 158-160; er. Schlesinger, "Zu 
Medea," p. 51: "Der Mensch Medea is tot; an ihre Stelle is 
die siegreiche Rachegottin getreten." Knox, "Medea," pp. 
303-306, points out Medea's similarities to other 
Euripidean gods -from the machine, but concludes that she is 
meant to represent "· .. something permanent and power£ul 
in the human situation .... "; Cowherd, "Ending," p. 135, 
asserts that this "irresistible power" is thumos, which 
Cowherd interprets as generalized emotion. To Conacher, 
Euripidean Drama, p. 198, Medea has been trans-formed into 
"the folk.-tale fiend of magic powers." Burnett, "Tragedy 
of Revenge," p. 2.2., sees Medea as "slough[ing] o-ff" her 
humanity to become "a truly impersonal alastor." 
Boogie, "Heroic Elements," p. 54-, casts Medea's 
trans£orma tion in a positive light: she has become " 
something more than human, in a sense, puri£ied by the 
cleansing £ire o-f her own passion." Furthermore, she is 
"godUk.e": "The gift or the chariot -from her grand-father 
the Sun symbolizes the recognition, the glory she has won 
in the eyes 0£ the gods." Boogie is forced by her analysis 
of Medea as "heroic" into such ill-considered 
P:ronouncements. Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 93, by contrast, 
sees as evidence o-f Medea's duality the £act that "· 
She, a polluted murderess, is rescued by the Sun-god, the 
very incarnation of purity and light." 
Contra Bongie's optimism, see H. P. Stahl, "On Extra-
d:ramatic Communication in Euripides," YCS 2.5 (1977), p. 
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comparison with the destruction o:f her glory and honor that 
Killing her children has brought upon her; liKe the corpses 
of the princess and Creon, Medea has been dis:figured to the 
point where she is no longer recognizably human. LiKe 
Jason, Medea can no longer be the object o:f approval she 
once was. She is hideously trans:formed, and in the 
description o:f her trans:forma tion, we are allowed to see 
that the human status she has lost is that 0£ the hero. 
We have already witnessed Medea's pro:fessed delight at 
hearing the report o:f the princess' and Creon's deaths, and 
we recall that these deaths entailed grotesque dis:figuring 
of a corpse, and that Medea had been care:ful to arrange 
just such a death (784-788). Medea has thus become that 
which the epic hero--with one notable exception--only 
threatens to become: one who not only Kills his enemy, but 
proceeds to outrage the enemy's corpse. The notable 
exception is, o:f course, Achilles,389 whose vile 
treatment o:f Hector in Iliad 22 is the climax in a rising 
170, who cautions, "We should not minimize the horrors 
Euripides 'finds inherent in human nature by saying that 
Medea here substitutes £or the not human deus ex machina." 
See also Ohlander, Suspense, p. 185, to whom Medea is "a 
wrecKed mortal." 
A very balanced discussion 0£ the many aspects 0£ 
Medea's airborne escape can be 'found in Mills, Mythopoeia, 
Pp. 109-118. 
389one could argue that Odysseus serves as 
another, and, on one point, an even more appropriate 
comparison. Odysseus allowed, even as Medea arranged :for, 
the mutilation 0£ one 0£ his enemies, Melanthius {Odyssey 
22.474-477). 
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crescendo 0£ threats 0£ corpse mutilation390 __ threats 
•hiCh veil an even more hideous threat: raw-ea ting the 
enemy's corpse.391 
The case 0£ Achilles and that 0£ Medea are, then, 
strangely exceptional, and there-fore comparable. Both 
desecrate the corpses 0£ their enemies: Achilles by boring 
a hole in Hector's heels and dragging his body (Iliad 
22.395-404), Medea by arranging the hideous devastation her 
poison's e££ect (1167-1203). Both outrages are witnessed 
bY the enemy's parent(s): Hector's dragging is viewed from 
afar by Hecabe and Priam as well as Andromache (Iliad 
22.405-436, 462-515); Creon's mis-fortune is worse, and yet 
it has only begun, when he stumbles in upon the hideous 
mass that once was his daughter (1204-1210). 
But there the similarities end. Achilles so£tens and 
relents. Al though Hector's corpse has been outraged, the 
outrage is in some sense mitigated by the gods' alleged 
protection 0£ the corpse (23.184-191; 24.18-21), by the 
decreasing detail in descriptions 0£ the mutilation 
(22..395-405; 23.24-26; 24.14-18),392 and by Achilles' 
both seeing to the repair 0£ damage he has done the corpse 
390segal, Mutilation, passim, but especially pp. 
33-47. 
391James M. Red£ield, Nature and Culture in the 
!!iad: The Tragedy 0£ Hector (Chicago and London: Univ. 
of Chicago Press, 1975; Phoenix BooKs, 1978; herea£ter 
Red-field, Nature and Culture), pp. 193-203. 
3 92segal, Mutilation, pp. 42 and 57. 
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and Keeping it out 0£ Priam's sight until it is so repaired 
(24.581-586). 
This last is but one example 0£ Achilles• respect£ul 
treatment 0£ the grieving Priam. When Priam -first enters 
.Achilles• tent, the hero submits to the old man's touch 0£ 
supplication, gently removing Priam's hand only a£ter 
bearing out his appeal £or the return 0£ his son's body 
(24-.475-480; 508-509). Achilles agrees to return the body 
for burial, and himsel£ attends to some 0£ the details 0£ 
tbe return (24.571-591). Furthermore, he promises to 
secure a moratorium to give time £or burial (24.656-670). 
But this is not all the hero Achilles does. He shares with 
Priam both the wisdom he has gained £rom his own grie£ 
(24.523-551, 596-620) and, more importantly, a meal 
(24.601-627).393 This last act mani£ests the communion 
of Achilles and Priam £rom their shared experience 0£ loss. 
It is no wonder that at this juncture the poet describes 
the respect these two ostensible enemies £eel £or one 
another (24.628-632). The violence latent between them 
(24.567-570, 583-586) never detonates; they instead part in 
peace, with Achilles using touch to reassure the old man 
(24.671-672). This is the hero's £inal act in the Iliad; 
When the poet withdraws him -from our vision, he is asleep 
beside Briseis (24.675-676). 
393see above, Part Four, £or the signi£icance 0£ 
feasting. 
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How di££erent are Medea •s 'final acts! As was noted 
above, the princess• corpse was a££Orded no divine pro-
tection, and the outrage visited upon it is described in 
unremittingly brutal detail. Furthermore, the desecration 
of this corpse is never repaired, and, in £act, the 
corpse's parent, instead 0£ being kept at a distance, is 
made the unwilling instrument of the its -further humilia-
tion. 
The princess' death-scene, as has been argued, serves 
as an analogue £or what -follows: the second turning o-f 
·i 
children into corpses, the killing 0£ Medea's own children. 
And in the scene where Medea displays their bodies -from 
afar to their grief-stricken father, her actions again show 
how f'ar -from the heroic Achilles is Medea, the zero-sum 
competitor. There is here no possibility for actual 
supplication: Jason cannot touch Medea (1320). There is 
no return 0£ the bodies to the father, and there will be no 
burial of them at his hands (1377-1378; 1410-1412); he will 
not be allowed even to touch them (1402-1404; 1411-1412). 
Al though Jason and Medea do share grief (1361-1362), and 
one even more common than that of' Priam and Achilles, there 
is no quieting here, no re solution, no parting in peace 
with a reassuring touch. That is because there is no hero 
here, and the transformation 0£ Medea described by Jason 
makes it clear that she, no less than he, has lost any 
association she may have had with the approval given to one 
of heroic stature. 
In short, Jason is unwittingly on-target when he 
describes Medea's transformation into a lioness (1342) who 
K.illS her cubs (1407),394 a wild beast, a monster like 
scylla (1343) who is no less befouled with the blood 0£ 
slaughter (1346) than that monster who ate the raw £lesh 0£ 
men. What all 0£ these descriptions suggest is the 
degenerated hero, which is precisely what the zero-sum 
competitor is. 
The comparison 0£ a warrior to a lion is a £avorite in 
Homeric epic; the struggles between man and lion, and 
between the lion and other beasts serve as comparisons £or 
man's struggling with man in war.395 The lion's 
awesome power as king 0£ beasts makes him the perfect 
comparison £or a warrior engaged in successful battle. 
That is not to say that the lion is regularly depicted as 
having an easy time 0£ it. He is o£ten, i£ set against 
helpless herds or £locks, equally matched by the men and 
dogs who come to de£end the domesticated animals.396 
Comparison with lions, then, is engineered to highlight a 
warrior as perseverant and brave in a contest in which he 
394HcDermot t, Inca rna ti on, p. 67, po in ts out 
Medea's transformation -from lioness protecting her cubs 
(187-188) to child-murdering lioness (1407). C£. Simon, 
!!'agic Drama, p. 89 n. 28. 
395Red£ield, Ha ture and Culture, p. 191. 
396Red:field, Hature and Culture, p. 192. 
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IDaY £all. Lion similes celebrate the strength and bravery 
of the warrior. 
There is another reason why the lion is a £a vored 
comparative to the warrior, and that is because the lion is 
imagined to be driven by blood-lust. As such, this animal, 
often depicted consuming raw -flesh (e.g., Iliad 3.23-25, 
5.782, 7.256, 15.592, 18.582-583; Odyssey 9.292-293), 
serves as the external mani-festation o-f war 1 s latent 
threat: that the heroic warrior may violate those 
boundaries o-f civilization his role -forces him to brush 
against and at the same time protect. For the heroic 
warrior must act lil<.e the predatory lion but never partal<.e 
of the l<.ill. Doing so would trans-form him -from human into 
beast, -from hero into horror. 
The Iliad, as Segal and Red-field have argued, depicts 
a world where just such a trans-formation o-f the hero is 
ever menacing, in the thrill o-f battle that overtal<.es even 
the best, in threats to leave bodies unburied -for carrion, 
in threats o-f corpse mutilation, in actual mutilation, and 
in the threats and suppositions that someone or another 
wants to eat or is capable o-f eating the enemy 1 s 
flesh.397 What Euripides has done in Medea is to show 
Medea as a warrior who has given in to the dark.est 
impulses: she is termed a lioness, but not so as to 
3 9 7 segal, 
2-_ulture, pp. 
Hu tila tion, passim; 
167-169, 189-203. 
Red-field, Nature and 
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bighlight her strength and bravery. She is a warrior, but 
not the hero whose reason £or doing battle is protection 0£ 
tbe vulnerable and the young; Medea is instead a horror who 
Kills her own, who, lion-like, eats raw 'flesh. This is the 
trans-formation Euripides e££ects by having Jason describe 
Medea as he does: as lioness (134-2) who kills her young 
(1'!07), and as one 0£ a nature wilder than Scylla's (134-2). 
As lioness who kills her young, Medea loses every 
positive association the lion simile holds £or the heroic 
warrior. Instead 0£ engaging in battle with equals, she 
attacks those whose weakness in the £ace 0£ her strength 
precludes their sel£-de£ense. She £irst killed a £ri volous 
young girl, and now has killed two other children. Killing 
the de£enseless may be lion-like, but it is not one 0£ the 
positive associations between heroic warriors and lions. 
In Homeric epic, comparisons describing lions who all too 
easily take their prey are, whether to lion or to prey, 
clearly meant as insults or rebukes (Iliad 21.4-81-4-88; 
Odyssey 4-.335-34-0 [= 17 .126-131]). Furthermore, heroic 
warriors are ennobled when compared to lions (and other 
animals) who de£end their own and £eel keen loss when their 
Young become the prey 0£ others (Iliad 17.132-136; 18.318-
322);398 heroic warriors do not, as Medea has, turn on 
398Red£ield, Nature and Culture, pp. 50 and 191. 
See also Emily Vermeule, Aspects 0£ Dea th in Early Greek 
!:£t and Poetry, pp. 87-88, on lions as protectors 0£ the 
Weak, and on Heracles as "the preeminent lion-soldier." 
The contrast between the child-killing 0£ Heracles and that 
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and Kill their own. 
As Scylla, Medea becomes the raw-eating savage beast 
that lion similes suggest the warrior is capable 0£ 
becoming. Scylla 1 s 3 99 brie£ biography in Homeric epic 
is a one-pointed meditation on the horri£ic savagery 
entailed in the raw-eating 0£ human £lesh (Odyssey 12.85-
259, passim). Odysseus calls her eating his men the "most 
pitiable sight" (OLKTlOTOV >I lOOV, Odyssey 
12.258) 0£ all he has seen in his long journeys. Blood-
lust is to be expected £rom both heroic warrior and lion, 
but raw-ea ting £le sh, to be expected in Scylla and 
accceptable in a lion, constitutes £or the heroic warrior a 
boundary-crossing that robs him 0£ his humanity. So much 
is clear £rom Apollo's criticism 0£ Achilles' much lesser 
savagery--dragging Hector's body--at Iliad 24-.39-54-. 
Apollo compares Achilles to a lion that £easts on domestic 
herds: Achilles "Knows savage things" (aypla 
ocoe:v, 24-.ll-1); his mind is not intent on justice 
(24-.ll-O); he has destroyed pity and has no aidos (24-.ll-ll--ll-5). 
In short, Achilles has crossed the line 0£ civilization and 
become the savage beast; justice, pity, and aidos are 
values 0£ civilization that war threatens to destroyll-00 
0£ Medea is another indicator 0£ her anti-heroism. 
399 As even her name suggests, Scylla is part dog 
(Odyssey 22.86). For the dog as the representation 0£ the 
uncivilized in man, see Red£ield, Nature and Culture, pp. 
193-203. 
ll-OOsegal, Ku ti la ti on, p. 58. 
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and that the gods--with the exception of Hera and Poseidon 
(24-.25-30)--are now eager to protect. 401 
such civilized values must be protected by the heroic 
warrior whose actions, ironically, most threaten them. He 
111ust only be comparable to a lion, and not become the lion, 
for lions do what Scylla does--and what humans must never 
do. A final contrast to the lioness and Scylla Medea is 
the lion Odysseus. At Odyssey 22.401-406, Homer gives a 
highly detailed description of Odysseus as Eurykleia found 
him after the slaughter of the suitors: like a lion after 
a kill, he is spattered with blood and Cl gore (aq.1.aTl 
1c.al. ).u9p<t> ire:ira).ay1.1.evov, 22.402) up to his chest and 
his cheeks (22.403-404). But Odysseus, for all the gore of 
his enemies that is spattered upon him, has not become the 
lion. He remains the human: he checks Eurykleia •s 
hooting glorification of slaughter as impious, and reminds 
her that the slain men died because of their mal treatment 
of others (Odyssey 22.407-416). 
Medea, however, can in no way distance herself from 
the horrible comparisons to lioness and Scylla Jason in 
his descriptions of her has made. The bodies of the slain 
over which she stands are her own children, helpless and 
401The poet gives the judgment of Paris as Hera •s 
reason for not stopping Achilles• maltreatment of the 
corpse. A better reason may be her depiction as savagery 
incarnate, as the one with lus·t for raw-eating flesh; see 
Joan O'Brien, "Homer's Savage Hera," CJ 86 (1991; hereafter 
O'Brien, "Savage Hera"), pp. 105-125. -
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innocent victims. She earlier arranged the death 0£ 
another child by hideous mutilation. Jason's descriptions 
are correct: Medea is a lioness who has killed helpless 
innocents and she is capable, like Scylla, 0£ eating raw 
numan £lesh--i£ only metaphorically. For, as zero-sum 
competitor, Medea, like Jason, rejects harmony and 
cooperation £or discord and stri-fe. Metaphorically, then, 
neither partakes 0£ the £east 0£ meat, ritually sacri-ficed 
and roasted; each is, metaphorically, an eater 0£ raw human 
flesh, £or "[t]he lust £or raw-eating or omophagia .. is 
epic's primary image 0£ moral degeneration, just as a meal 
roasted and shared with others is the primary metaphor £or 
the best 0£ human behavior."402 
The zero-sum competitor, one who pursues sel£-
ad vancemen t at the expense 0£ all others, is no heroic 
warrior like Achilles or Odysseus, but that hero 
degenerated, like Agamemnon, who -feeds on his own people 
(Iliad 1.231). The degenerated hero who -feeds, i£ only 
metaphorically, on human -flesh, is an inhuman human and, 
as such, a perversion 0£ nature itsel-f. 
Medea, as she escapes, is just such a perversion. And 
as she -flies 0££, we begin to recognize that even as a god, 
her grand-father Helios, conspires to save her, the very 
402o•Brien, "Savage Hera," p. 106. 
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mode of her salvation signals a profound reversai.403 
yor as the chariot 0£ the sun carries Medea and the child 
corpses that are her trophies from Corinth to the "land o:f 
grectheus" (1384), the city o:f Athens, her very journey 
traces the cataclysmic reversal 0£ nature e££ected by the 
opera ting defini lions o:f zero-sum competitors: the sun 
travels :from west to east, the reverse 0£ its accustomed 
course.404 
That is not all that has been reversed in nature. By 
403ohlander, Suspense, p. 175, suggests that a 
reversal o:f the natural order is anticipated by the Chorus 
at 1251-1260, when they call Earth and Sun to stop Medea. 
For Medea's mode 0£ transport as empowering her position, 
see Arrowsmith, "Ideas," p. 43 (cf. pp. 49-50), who 
discerns in Euripides• use of the sun chariot a "savage 
moral oxymoron"; Medea's escape in it lends her 
"elemental" eros "the power of sacred physis." Hills, 
"Sorrows," pp. 294-296, sees in Medea's airborne escape the 
recurrence of a pattern from the Ino/Procne stories, i.e., 
it is "a kind of avian metamorphosis." 
404see the Chorus of Euripides' Electra (699-750), 
who disbelieve the story that, when Thyestes deceived and 
betrayed his brother Atreus, Zeus turned the course of the 
stars and the sun. Their disbelief is, of course, called 
into question when, after Orestes and Electra have deceived 
and killed their mother, the celestial Dioscuri come down 
from the sky (1233 ff.). 
Collinge, "Ex Hachina," pp. 171-172, however, sees no 
thematic signi£icance to Medea •s journey on the chariot 0£ 
the sun. He accuses Euripides throughout the play of 
hinting that Medea has ready transport from Corinth, and, 
by strategic re:ferences to the Sun, suggests that Medea's 
celestial ancestor will play some role. Euripides thereby 
" ... plays a game with his audience and indulges in an 
intellectual exercise which is detached from the course of 
the tragedy, and on another mental plane from its 
appreciation as tragedy, much as he so readily introduces 
sophistic disquisitions of startling dramatic 
irrelevance." 
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naving bedded down eros, the power to create li£e, with the 
cnoice to kill, Euripides has £orced zero-sum logic to a 
conclusion that strikes the Chorus and his audience as 
preternatura1,405 and there£ore emotionally repugnant 
to an extent that annuls the logical cogency 0£ killing the 
cl'lildren. The image 0£ the cosmos• £orces reversed, 0£ the 
blood 0£ murder on the marriage bed, 0£ the corpses 0£ 
cllildren at the side 0£ their mother who killed them, 
reverses £or all time Euripides• audience's easy accep-
tance 0£ zero-sum ethics. 
In the train 0£ Medea's escape chariot are other 
reversals. Arete has been claimed by a cannibalistic 
monster. So much should be expected, however, in a world 
where song, the celebration 0£ the zero-sum competitor's 
arete, is a twisted and dissonant lament, not the cele-
bration 0£ glory con£erring immortality that is the reward 
of heroic excellence. It is logical in this world, where 
destruction is rampant, where it is the action 0£ choice, 
that children become corpses. For nothing can thrive in 
such a sick reversal 0£ natural order, where sophia is 
defined as having the savvy to catch one's enemies o£f 
guard, and eros, generative desire, is trained to e£fect 
ll05McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 109-111, sees in 
the anti-:familial and anti-civic individualism and sel:f-
interest o:f Medea a comparison with the Cyclops Odysseus 
encounters in Odyssey 9. Medea, however, outdoes the 
Cyclops: she is actively hostile to family and state, 
While he merely exists in a place where such institutions 
are as yet not established. 
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destruction. 
As Medea escapes, drawing along with her these now 
reversed because newly repugnant de£initions, Jason, lik.e 
the Chorus earlier (1090-1115), suggests that it would be 
better £or children--here, Jason speci£ically re£ers to his 
own children--never to be born only to die (1413-1414). 
The way he expresses it, however, -further indicates that 
the de£initions with whtch Medea escapes are not truths, 
but stillbirths 0£ truth, natures ghastly wind-eggs. For 
as Jason tells it, in his world, in the realm 0£ zero-sum 
arete, children are dead even be£ ore they are begot ten to 
die: his children, whom he can neither touch nor bury, 
are, as Jason cries to Medea, "· .. corpses whom I ought 
never to have begotten to have to die at your hands" 
(ve:Kpous, n ous , . e:yw . ipuoas oipe:>.ov 
. 
ttpos oou ip9q.J.EVOUS 
, . 
e:ll'loe:oBal, 1412-
1 4 1 3 ) 4 0 6 
Jason, driven as he is by the perverted eros 0£ the 
zero-sum competitor, is powerless to beget anything but 
child-corpses. Furthermore, since zero-sum arete in-forms 
and de-fines sophia as well as eros, competive sophia 
406aoedek.er, "Medea," p. 104, notes that this 
"impossible wish" 0£ Jason, along with the Nurse's initial 
and equally impossible wish that the Argo had never sailed, 
"frame the action 0£ the play [and] hint that the Medea 
deals somehow with a negation 0£ its own myth." Cr. 
Ohlander, Suspense, p. 189. Simon, Tragic Drama, p. 89, 
suggests that Jason here repeats Medea's :Killing 0£ the 
Children by :Killing them be-fore they are ever conceived. 
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ensures such issue. No wonder the Chorus, only lately 
eager competitors, must, in the £ace 0£ such a stillbirth, 
acKnowledge that the gods have accomplished things beyond 
e~pectation and that gods alone can £ind a way out 0£ this 
~oria (1415-1419). All things, even the very course 0£ 
nature, have £or them been reversed.407 
The Chorus could themselves come up with only one 
solution: never have children (1090-1115). This is, 0£ 
course, Jason's solution--one born 0£ despair when £aced 
with the lioness, the Scylla, Medea. But even as Jason's 
hideous descriptions betray a germ 0£--surely unwitting--
wisdom, so too in the Chorus' dire solution is there some 
small hope that live-birth may still be possible, that 
truth has, i£ not been born, at least taken embryonic £orm. 
The evidence £or this claim is at 1085-1086. There, 
the women 0£ the Chorus tentatively lay claim to sophia, 
and one that is newly generated: by a muse, and through 
"intercourse": "For indeed there is even £or us a muse, 
who holds intercourse [with us] £or the sake 0£ wisdom 
' 
>I 
' 
c yap 
€01"lV µ.ouoa ic. al 'r)µ.lv, 
. 
OO'f'lOS. Cl €V€1C.€V). The word 
11'pocroµ.l~t:l' is its el£ uncommon. Euripides uses it only 
one other time: in fragment 897.3 (lfpoooµ.l~t:l'v 
ofiTos. c 0 oaLµ.wv [i.e. 
407 The deus ex ma china 
meant to suggest a resolution. 
and Euripides' Electra," BICS 
. 
ll'OV1"WV 
Cl 
'r)OlOTOS. 
is not here, as elsewhere, 
See George Gellie, "Tragedy 
28 (1981), p. 8. 
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~cpu 9v'l')TOLS.), where it has obvious sexual conno-
tations. Here also there is a sexual undertone to the 
word, 4 08 al though it is admittedly subtle. By their 
use of this word, the women of the Chorus hint at a 
connection bet ween eros and sophia, a connection suggested 
more openly once before in this play, in the first 
antistrophe (835-845) of the Ode to Athens. There the 
Erotes were assistants to Sophia. Here again, and this 
time even more explicitly, eros is not put at odds with 
sophia, not put, if one knows best, under the vigilant 
control of a rationally deliberated plan. Here, in fact, 
eros is the generative force employed by a muse to produce 
sophia.409 
The Chorus' new sophia, never to have children, is 
surely not the final wisdom, but it is the best they can 
do, burdened as they still are with defective definitions 
they cannot quite bring themselves to discard. But we 
should not expect from them, any more than we should from 
408Evidence for use of the compound 
vpooo1 . Ll>.ew in an explicitly sexual sense is, besides 
the Euripidean fragment mentioned, confined to texts later 
than Medea, according to LSJ9, which cites, in addition 
to a sixth century A. D. papyrus (PMasp.153.6, al.), 
Lucian's Amores 17, and the third century A. D. novelist 
Heliodorus 4.8. Use of the uncompounded 01.u>.E:w in 
a sexual sense is, however, not unknown to the fifth and 
fourth centuries B. c., again according to LSJ9, which 
Cites Xenophon, Anabasis 3.2.25, Memorabilia 2.1.24, etc.; 
and Sophocles Oedipus the King 367 and 1185. 
409The relationship between eros and sophia seems 
to resemble that -found in Plato's Symposium. 
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the interlocutor in Socratic elenchos, truth to be born. 
It is instead someone else•s--Euripides• audience's, 
p1ato•s reader-auditor's, in short, our--job to "£iddle" 
with the premises, even as the Chorus seem to have begun 
to do, to try to bring truth to birth, to arrive at true 
sophia, true eros, and, £inally, true arete. 
And what might those truths be? The clues lie in the 
maieutic analogies Euripides has drawn, and in the essence 
of bene£it upon which those analogies rely. What clues 
have been given? The harmony 0£ song, the healing £rom 
medicine, the li£e-giving power 0£ generative desire. 
Somehow, with these in mind, we must--or so it ever seems! 
--be able to £ind our way out 0£ discord, sick.ness, and 
death. 
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